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ABSTRACT 
Justice in one sense means grant of expeditious and inexpensive 
relief to persons who approach the court with legal problems. Delay in 
providing justice has been interpreted as denial of justice. 
The Constitution of India reflects the quest and aspiration of the 
humankind for justice when its preamble speaks of justice in all its 
forms - social/ economic and political. 
The principle of natural justice is that 'justice should not only be 
done but it should seen to have been done' which means that those 
who receive justice must feel it has been done with them. Delay 
defeats not only equity but justice also and if the delay in relation to 
criminal justice system it defeats justice more pervasively. 
It is not only important that the machinery of justice works 
effectively and efficiently but it should also work timely in the 
sense that the trial should be as speedy as is possible. There is an 
old adage that 'justice delayed is justice denied; which means that 
justice should be dispensed with within a reasonable period of time. 
However, another doctrine associated with the disposal of cases is 
that 'justice hurried is justice buried', meaning thereby that the hasty 
trials entail injustice and consequentiy affect the quality of justice. 
The Supreme Court of India as the guardian of 
fundamental rights of the people, has obligations as well as 
powers of wide amplitude to ensure a speedy trial for the 
accused, and as such while adopting an activist approach in 
Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar. It followed the dynamic 
interpretation placed on Article 21 of the Constitution of India 
in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, it observed: 
There can be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy 
trial we mean reasonably expeditions trial, is an integral and 
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty 
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The entire 
human rights jurisprudence has been the result of a most 
startling and reasonable development of the law follows the 
landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi's case. 
This new jurisprudence, which has been evolved by the 
judiciary, is the result of a case-to-case development. Speedy 
trial is the most important basic human right in the field of 
criminal jurisprudence. The judiciary, through a process of 
creative interpretation, has evolved it. Speedy trial though 
not a specifically enumerated fundamental right in the 
Constitution as in the United States of America (U.S.A.) 
The principle of speedy trial propounded in Maneka Gandhi's 
case, nurtured in Hoskot's case, and came of the age in 
Hussainara's case with a judicial bang. 
Speedy trial is not a new concept, it is quiet old both at 
International and national level. At the international level, the 
traces of speedy trial are found in the modern democratic 
world and more particularly in the developed democracies. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The legislature of India through 
Section 309, 258, 468 and other provisions of the criminal 
procedure Code, 1973 and also the Supreme Court of India by 
way of interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India 
have recognized speedy trial as the essence of criminal justice 
system. 
As far as speedy trial at national level is concerned, we 
get some evidence of speedy trial in Ancient, Medieval and 
Mughal period, which grew gradually and now hold the place 
of fundamental rights. 
Although justice is meant to be "simple, speedy, cheap, 
effective and substantial", yet it remains elusive to Indians, 
and one of the major reasons are delay in the dispensation of 
justice. Many cases in India take up to 10 years for disposal 
and usually take for longer than stipulated 6 month or 2 years 
for trials, resulting in enormous pendency. The pendency of 
criminal cases in lower courts, for instance, as per figure 
available was 2.5 crore in 2008. 
Those who suffered physically, mentally or economically, 
approach the courts, with great hope, for redressal of their 
grievances. They refrain from taking law into their own hands, 
as they believe that one-day or the other they would get justice 
from the courts. Justice delivery system, therefore, is under an 
obligation to deliver prompt and inexpensive justice to its 
consumers, without in any manner compromising on the 
quality of justice or the elements of fairness, equality and 
impartiality. 
It is not only important there should be proper 
machinery of justice but the machinery must be capable of 
providing speedy justice to the needy people. There is an old 
adage that "Justice delayed is justice denied". The adage 
makes ample clear that justice should not only be given but it 
must be given before unreasonable delay is caused and its 
value is lost. 
Therefore, one of the most crucial aspects of the 
dispensation of justice is that of time and quality of justice. 
If a case is not decided within the right time, or if too much 
time is taken in deciding it. Justice cannot be said to have been 
done. In fact the most fundamental thing in speedy trial is that 
a person accused must be able to get results in the court of law 
without unreasonable delay. Prevention of unreasonable delay 
is therefore the pivotal of speedy trial and effective criminal 
justice system. Prolonged litigation causes financial burden 
and mental torture to the litigants besides eroding their faith 
in judiciary. It is important to mention that the causes leading 
to delays, in disposal of cases are not related only to the 
judiciary as is generally believed but they owe their origin 
to, the legislative, the executive, the judiciary, the legal 
profession, the court procedure and the litigants. In the 
present criminal justice system, the poor and indigent persons 
are suffering and being harassed by the police and prison 
authorities whereas the persons who have sufficient 
means and influence make full use of the legal loopholes. 
The judiciary, the legal profession and the Government have to 
share the blame for the unfortunate development in the 
otherwise proved judicial record of the World's largest 
democracy. Delay in the disposal of cases is the greatest 
drawback of the administration of justice in India. 
Statement of the Problem 
Justice that comes too late has no meaning to the person 
it is meant for. During a prolonged and unending trial, the 
priorities of an accused person towards life change along with 
the circumstances. The person can also lose everything on 
account of the pending proceedings. 
Administration of criminal justice is facing serious 
problems now a day. Although, access to justice should 
normally mean taking recourse to an affordable, fair, speedy 
and satisfactory settlement of dispute through a court of law, 
yet the agony associated with it is so unending and prolonged 
that the number of people who resort to litigation is much less, 
than those who prefer to forgo their claim, howsoever genuine 
their claims might be, for the sake of maintaining peace in 
their life. After all, no person would like a major part of his life 
to be consumed in unending litigation. In cases, where the 
accused is the head of a family and is the only bread earner, 
his responsibility is also towards the large family left behind 
him. It is not only the accused but also his other members of 
the family who suffer because of delays in trial. As estimated 
66 percent of all prison inmates are under-trials, but in some 
States the proportion goes up to as high as 80 percent. 
The total prison population as on December 2006 for all 
categories of inmates was 3,73,271 of these 2,43,244 were 
under-trials. An overwhelming 96 percent of these are men. 
Uttar Pradesh reports the highest number of under-trials 
followed by Bihar. The lack of a speedy dispute settlement 
mechanism has a direct impact on the level or lawlessness in 
our society. 
Significance of the Topic of Research 
The significance of criminal justice system in public 
administration is that it has the aim of establishing such 
condition in society in which there is law and order, and there 
is protection to the rights of the individuals. This system gives 
sustenance to Rule of law and the meaning and significance to 
the idea of speedy justice. The administration of justice does 
not deal with the punishment of the guilty alone, almost 
means acquittal of the innocent. Fairness and speed are 
equally important in the administration of justice. Speedy 
justice serves the best interests of the accused, the survivors 
and the society at large. An efficient system acts as a deterrent 
to any potential violator of law. 
However, in our country criminal justice has come in for 
serious criticism. Almost every component of this system is 
finding it difficult to get along. The problem of delay and 
backlog is rather acute in criminal cases, as compared to civil 
cases. The Indian criminal justice process appears to be on the 
verge of collapse due to diverse reasons for delayed 
dispensation of justice. Therefore, speedy trial in criminal 
justice system is an urgent need of the present judicial system 
in order to decide the fate of lakh of litigants. 
Rationale for the Study 
What has influenced the researcher to select this topic is 
the criticism very often heard that the criminal justice system 
of our country has failed in its purpose of dealing with the 
dispensation of speedy justice. 
On the other hand, it was inspiration of my able 
supervisor that I decided to select the topic of my research 
work on such essential an issue that of 'speedy trial in criminal 
justice system'. I also share the idea to carry on my work on 
this topic with my teachers having vast practical experiences 
whereby it had been inferred that there was an urgent need to 
look into the current position of speedy dispensation of 
criminal justice in India and in other countries. 
Hypothesis 
1. Criminal justice system is suffering from several 
pernicious defects such as delayed disposal of cases and 
huge pendency. 
2. Seedy trial is the essence of criminal justice system and 
there can be no doubt the delay in trial by itself 
constitutes denial of justice. 
3. The worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to 
prisoner's vocation and peace resulting from an unduly 
prolonged investigation, inquiry and trial should be 
minimal. 
4. A new jurisprudence is evolving the world over 
particularly with the help of judicial decisions, whereby 
prisoners are treated as human beings and speedy trial as 
their human right. 
5. The state is under a Constitutional mandate to ensure 
speedy trial and whatever is necessary for this purpose 
has to be done by the state. 
6. Most of the provisions of the Procedural Laws are vague 
and highly technical making it difficult to enforce them 
towards the end of speedy justice. 
7. The state cannot avoid its Constitutional obligation to 
provide speedy trial to the accused persons by pleading 
financial and administrative inability. 
8. Effective case management system needs to be put in 
place for growing number of new cases and the courts 
should reach to the people through local venue hearing. 
9. There appears an urgent need to bring punishment for 
absconding witnesses and strict enforcement of deadline 
for duration of trial and length of argument. 
10. Concrete steps to implement the recommendations of 
various committees on reforms in criminal justice system 
needs to be taken, if we are to achieve the precious right 
to speedy trial. 
Aims and Objectives of Research 
This research work has been carried out with the 
following objectives: 
1. To expound the concept of speedy trial in criminal justice 
system and underline the basic feature of the systems 
obtaining in India; 
2. To examine the legal framework of components of 
criminal justice system keeping in view the normative 
and social perspective of the system of criminal justice; 
3. To examine the fundamental principles embodied in the 
Constitution, regarding speedy trial, as fundamental 
right, and institutions involved in the administration of 
criminal justice, namely, the police, the courts, the 
prosecution and the prisons. 
4. To enquire how principles of procedural law are adhered 
to in conducting criminal trial and in managing the 
operational aspects of the system; 
5. To study the legal and Constitutional position of the new 
institutions established by the state to attend as 
alternative dispute resolution in furtherance of speedy 
justice. 
6. To examine the position of various committees. 
Commissions reports and its recommendations on 
speedy trial. 
7. To analyze the safeguard guaranteed to under trial 
prisoners in relation to various phases of the criminal 
process and how the system takes care of the victims and 
8. To point out the error and defects in procedural law 
which hamper the criminal justice system in regard to 
speedy disposal of cases. 
9. To suggest some possible measures to speedy 
dispensation of criminal cases. 
Methodology 
Keeping in view the nature of research problem and the 
hypotheses formulated in this regard, research has been 
carried out on the subject by following the Doctrinal and 
Analytical Methods of Research. 
Scheme of Presentation 
The study has been presented in the following chapters: 
Introduction: Contains the research design. It describes the area of 
research, the reasons for conducting research on the topic, the 
hypothesis formulated for the purpose, the methodology followed 
and the aims and objectives pursued in this regard. 
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Chapter-I - "Speedy Trial - Explained" discusses the conceptual 
basis of speedy trial. After giving a brief overview of speedy trial, 
explains the concept and meaning of speedy trial. And the defects 
and errors in procedural law has also attempted in detail, on the 
other hand the need for simplification of the procedural law to 
attain speedy justice has discussed. 
Chapter-II - "Speedy Trial - Historical Perspective" explains 
historical background of speedy trial. For this purpose chapter llnd 
has been divided into three parts and examine the evolution of the 
concept of speedy trial from ancient Indian criminal justice system 
to Medieval and Mughal period and its position in modern time 
has discussed in a historical manner. Moreover, gives a 
comparative view of ancient, to modern position of administration 
of criminal justice, to examine the position of speedy justice. 
Chapter-Ill - "Speedy Trial in International Perspective" deals 
with international aspect of speedy trial. It first deals with the 
fortification of speedy trial in several International Covenants and 
Conventions. Then examines the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 has exclusively 
outlined. Researcher further deals with international comparisons 
regarding problem of backlog and delay reduction, in dispensation 
of criminal justice in India. 
Chapter- IV - "Speedy Trial: A Constitutional Mandate" deals 
with Constitutional ramification of speedy trial. For this purpose, 
the researcher first examines the Constitutional provisions for 
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speedy trial. Then the emergence of speedy trial, as a Fundamental 
Rights in India, last part of this chapter deals with the articulation 
of right to speedy trial injudicial pronouncement/dynamism. 
Chapter- V - "Speedy Trial in Statutory Provisions" it discuses 
the several statutory provisions, which are designed to speed up 
the trial of criminal cases, in the last part of this chapter, it also 
discusses the utility of free legal aid as a tool to secure speedy trial. 
Chapter VI - "Role of various Agencies in Furtherance of Speedy 
Trial". This chapter examines the role of various agencies. For this 
purpose, it provides an insight into the report of Mallimath 
Committee. Then the role of lawyers, litigants, Lok Adalat and use 
of technology in speedy justice are examined. 
Conclusion and Suggestions contains a summary of the findings 
and offers suggestions as to how an effective system can be 
established to achieve the idea of speedy trial in criminal justice 
system. 
The present study although limited in scope, also endeavours to 
ascertain the material facts that has paralised the criminal justice 
system. For instance, the study reveals that justice today is shut out to 
most in India. Most citizens, especially the disadvantaged sections, have 
limited access to justice, due to unclear laws and high costs that act as 
effective barriers. Unfortunately, those who do venture forth are also, 
often denied of their right to justice. One of the major causes for this is 
known to be 'delays in the dispensation of justice.' 
That "justice delayed is justice denied" as repeatedly held by 
Apex Court, yet 'delays continue in matters before the judiciary 
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resulting in huge arrears/backlogs/pendency' and repeated violation of 
fundamental rights of citizens of India. 
It is, therefore evident that the old adage "justice delayed is justice 
denied" is found present in about all part of our country, causing 
frustration and anxiety not only amongst the under trial prisoners 
but also amongst their family members, neighbours, scholars 
dealing with criminal justice system, jurists, judges and a number 
of other people. The urgent need, therefore, is to find out 
solutions for delays in disposal of cases in general and criminal 
cases in particular. Hence the researcher offers the following 
suggestions. 
1. The first and foremost step is to increase the strength of judges at 
all levels. The present strength is inadequate in the sense that 
there are only 10.5 judges per 10 lack of population which is 
highly dissatisfactory as compared to the strength of judges in 
advanced western countries like United States of America and 
United Kingdom. The present strength of judges should be 
raised to 50 per 10 lack of population at the earliest otherwise the 
huge pendency of cases will go on increasing in future. 
2. The existing infrastructure of the courts in most part of the 
country is grossly dissatisfactory in the height of technological 
advanced atmosphere. It is not only necessary that the posts of 
judges and other court staff are to be created but the old and 
ineffective infrastructure such as court rooms, building, manner 
of keeping court records should all be changed be replaced with 
the modern techniques and latest gadgets. 
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3. There is urgent need to have in place judicial machinery, which is 
easily accessible and dispenses affordable, incorruptible, and 
speedy justice to the people. 
4. There is urgent need to improve the present legal aid support 
system and legal aid lawyers given better and prompt 
remuneration. 
5. It is need of the hour to have our legal procedures simple, 
rational, easily understandable and the amendments of procedure 
have to be made carefully so as to ensure quick justice while 
safeguarding that fair play, equity and good conscience does not 
become a casualty. Speedy but faulty justice is no justice at all. 
6. Steps need to be taken to make use of alternative disputes 
resolution mechanism to decide the cases pending in different 
court involving petty offences. Such minor cases may easily 
resolve through mediation and compromise. 
7. The role of advocates in speedy trial is also very crucial because 
they are equal partners with the judges in the administration of 
justice. Separate steps need delivery system. The Bar should also 
refrain from boycotting the courts and approach concerned 
authority for redressal of their grievances. Members of the Bar 
should avoid unnecessary adjournments. Members of the Bar 
should also stat following strictly the principles of professional 
ethics and abandon their narrow parochial interest. 
8. There must be an effective computer training programme for not 
only the judges of subordinate courts in different parts of the 
country but also for the entire staff of the subordinate courts so as 
to make justice delivery system at the base level speedier and 
timely. 
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9. There is an urgent need on the part of the Union Government and 
as well as state governments to change their mindset and stop 
politicising fundamental issues such as judicial reforms, rather 
the government should take effective steps at all levels that no 
inaction on the part of any government agency becomes an 
obstacles in the speedy dispensation of justice. 
10. There is a need for effective case management system so as to 
control the rising number of new cases for this purpose Fast 
Track Courts should be extended to the level of Magistrates and 
all existing vacancies in courts across the country should be filled 
up on top priority. 
11. Gram Nyayalay system dealing with petty disputes at the village 
level should resolve the cases amicably and such courts should 
not be allowed to reach the complicated legal stages and 
procedural delays are avoided. 
12. The concept of pre-trial meeting to restrict issues and admissible 
evidence should also be taken to meet out the long and 
complicated procedural hurdles of the evidentiary law. 
13. There is an urgent need to create deterrent effect on the witnesses 
who do not turn up in the courts of law for evidence. 
Punishment for absconding witnesses should be imposed and 
there should be strict enforcement deadlines and restrictions on 
the length of arguments so as to ensue speedy trial in criminal 
justice system. 
The criminal justice system machinery must also meet the 
challenge of effectively dealing with the emerging forms of crime and 
behaviour of criminals. On many occasions, delay in the process of trial 
is caused by the accused themselves. 
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The accused know that only delay in trial would help him as the 
memory of witnesses is likely to be blurred by the passage of time. In 
most of cases, the blame for delay in administration of criminal justice 
system is put at the doors of the courts. Courts are over congested with 
petty cases and many legislations are being enacted which result in 
filing of large number of cases before the courts. 
Last but not the lest the need of the hour is to maintain an 
equilibrium between the two most popular doctrines - "justice delayed 
is justice denied" and "Justice hurried is justice buried" dispensation of 
justice should result with best possible speed but the quality of the trials 
and judgements is not compromised and that would be the only way to 
achieve the noble ideas of justice - social, economic and political as 
conferred in the Preamble of our Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The cardinal principle of natural justice is that 'justice should not 
only be done but it should seen to have been done' which means that those 
who receive justice must feel it has been done with them. Delay defeats 
not only equity but justice also and if the delay in relation to criminal 
justice system it defeats justice more pervasively. 
It is not only important that the machinery of justice works 
effectively and efficiently but it should also work timely in the sense that 
the trial should be as speedy as is possible. There is an old adage that 
'justice delayed is justice denied; which means that justice should be 
dispensed with within a reasonable period of time. However, another 
doctrine associated with the disposal of cases is that 'justice hurried is 
justice buried', meaning thereby that the hasty trials entail injustice and 
consequently affect the quality of justice. 
It is therefore, crucial that the dispensation of justice must be not 
only timely but also include quahty. If a case is not decided timely or an 
unreasonable time is exhausted in disposal of a particular cases i.e. nothing 
but a kind of injustice disguised in the form of justice. In fact the most 
fundamental aspect in speedy trial is a person accused of some offence 
must get results in the court of law without any unreasonable delay. 
Prevention of unreasonable delay is, therefore, the pivot on which the 
concept of speedy trial and effective criminal justice system revolves. 
Justice in one sense means grant of expeditious and inexpensive 
relief to person who approached the court with legal problems, if such 
persons do not get justice on time that could be interpreted as injustice or 
denial of justice to them. Prolonged proceedings cause not only financial 
burden but also mental torture to the litigants, consequently eroding their 
faith in the system of administration of justice. Delay in the disposal of the 
cases is the most prominent drawback of the administration of justice in 
India in general and criminal justice system in particular. 
It may not be out of place here to quote Prof. Amaratya Sen^ who 
says that: 
"to secure a social order without a perfect justice system is 
impossibility, what is required is to prevent manifest injustices 
prevalent in our social order. One of the most prominent manifest 
injustices prevalent in the Indian society is delay in dispensation of 
justice which invites speedy trial as the essential aspect of justice 
system in our country in general and in the criminal justice system in 
particular." 
The concept of speedy trail is not new, it is quite an old concept 
existing both at the National and International levels. At the International 
level the genesis of speedy trial is found in the concept of modem 
democratic governments and their Constitutions. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966, European Convention on Human Rights.1950 
and Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of United States mention the 
concept of speedy trial as a part and partial of their system. 
In the National perspective it is found that the Constitution of India 
reflects the quest of Indian people for justice in all spheres of life such as 
social, economic and political. The Preamble to the Constitution of India 
solemnly affirms justice in social economic and political spheres for all and 
especially those who suffered physical, mental or economic disabilities so 
that justice could be done with them. Percolating from this philosophy of 
justice in all forms as mentioned in the Preamble is the obligation that 
justice should not only been promptly delivered but should also be 
inexpensive and bearable, so as to bring fairness, equality and impartiality 
ultimately helping to achieve the noble ideal of egalitarian society. 
There is no doubt that the courts in India are held in high esteem not 
only by developing nation but also by developed nations of the west. 
There is wide spread praise for quality of judgements delivered in India. 
However, the huge pendency of cases in different court of India is a long 
over due problem which has not been removed from the system though a 
lot of steps have been taken in the past to come out of the ugly tentacles of 
delayed justice. 
The concept of speedy trial was not explicitly provided in any 
provision of the Constitution of India which led to delay in incorporating 
this noble concept into the Indian legal system for a long time. There are 
certain provisions in Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which 
mentions some aspects of speedy trial such as sections 309, 258 and 468. 
However, nothing concrete could be done towards ensuring speedy trial in 
latter and sprit until the judgement of Honourable Supreme Court in 
Husainara Khatoon V. Home Secretary State of Bihar^ in which the Supreme 
Court unequivocally established that the speedy trial is a part and partial 
of life and personal liberty as provided under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
The judgement of Supreme Court in Husainara Khatoon's case is the 
greatest tribute to the concept of speedy trial preventing delay and 
disposal of cases and the consequent pains and suffering associated with 
such delay in disposal. After the Husainara Khatoon's case there have 
been a number of few other cases which have given strength to the concept 
of speedy trial in India raising the expectations and faith of the people of 
India in general and of the poor and indigent people in particular. 
This new jurisprudence which has been evolved by the judiciary is 
the result of a case to case development. Speedy trial is the most important 
basic human right in the field of criminal jurisprudence. It has been 
evolved by the judiciary, through a process of creative interpretation. 
2. AIR 1979, SC1369 
Speedy trial though not a specifically enumerated fundamental right 
in the Constitution as in the United States of America (U.S.A.)^ 
The principle of Speedy trial propounded in Maneka Gandhi's case, 
nurtured in Haskot's case,^ and came of the age in Hussainara's case with a 
judicial bang. 
In Hussainara Khatoon CNo. 1) vs. Home Secretary State of Bihar,^ it was 
brought to the notice of the Apex Court that an alarming large number of 
men, women and children were kept in prisons for years awaiting trial in 
courts of law. The offences with which they were charged were trivial and 
if proved would not have warranted punishment for more than a few 
months, perhaps for a year or two. But, they were deprived of their 
freedom for period ranging for three to ten years, without their trial 
having yet commenced. The Apex Court took a serious note of the 
situation and observed that it was a crying shame on the judicial system 
which permitted incarceration of men and women for such long period of 
time without trials. These persons were denied human rights and were 
languishing in jails for years for offences which perhaps they might 
ultimately be found not to have committed. 
The court referred to the Six Amendment to the US Constitution 
1791, which provides "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial". It is thus a constitutionally 
guaranteed right in the United States. Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights provides that "everyone arrested or 
detained shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or a release 
pending trial". Though, the right to speedy trial has not been specifically 
enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution, but the court held 
that "it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as 
3. The Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution guarantees that in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoying the right to a speedy and public trial. 
4. M.H. Haskot vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 1548. 
5. AIR 1979 SC 1360. 
interpreted by the Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India.^ 
The Supreme Court thus observed: 
"No procedure, which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial, can he 
regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21 of 
the Constitution". 
Therefore, the long delay has the effect of defeating justice in quite a 
number of cases. As a result of such delay, the possibility cannot be ruled 
out of loss of important evidence, because of fading of memory or death of 
witnesses. The consequences thus would be that a party with even a 
strong case may lose it, not because of any fault of its own, but because of 
the tardy judicial process, entailing disillusionment to all those who at one 
time, set high hopes in courts. The delay in disposal of cases has affected 
not only the ordinary type of cases but also those which by their very 
nature, call for early relief. Thus, if the problem of delay and huge arrears 
not tackled in time, there is fear that the whole system would get crushed 
under its weight. 
There is a complaint (empirically founded or urifounded, verified or 
unverified) against the Indian legal system that it suffers from crisis. 
The Chief factors of crisis are inherent in that India has no legal system of 
its own. It is the legacy of Common Law - a foreign legal system imported 
into the country.^ It has been clearly observed that modem Indian law is 
"inspite of its foreign roots and origin unmistakably Indian in its outlook 
and operation" .8 Obviously, the justice system suffers from crisis of 
adversarial processes, deterioration in its prestige, maximisation of 
quantity and minimisation of quality, corruption, delay, etc. The menace of 
delay not only discerns justice denied, but is now vision as justice 
circumvented, justice mocked, and the system of justice undermined. 
Delayed justice culminates a sense of injustice, long periods of denial 
6. AIR 1978 SC 597 
7. Seetalvad, M.C. (1965) - "The Role of English Law in India". 
8. Seetalvad, M.C. (1961) - "The Common Law in India", p. 225. 
emanates a sense of injustice long periods of denial emanates uncertainty. 
The problem of delayed dispensation of justice seems to have reached such 
a climax of notoriety that one can hardly escape from its vice. 
The vice of judicial delay has affected the criminal process involve, 
investigation process, court process, adversarial procedure i.e. procedural 
bottlenecks suffering from technicalities; delivery of judgment; and time 
consumed therein. All these processes cause delay, thus making the entire 
process a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. The problem of 
delay has developed into an open hostility in as much as criminal justice 
system has become a focal point of dissatisfaction. 
In order to overcome this sort of dissatisfaction, various reports of 
committees (i.e. Justice Malimath Committee and Law Commission 
Reports) have prescribed various ways to expedite criminal justice system, 
either to minimise or ameliorate the malady of delay. The judicial response 
in this perspective is also vital. However, diagnostic measures to cure this 
ailment have left no remarkable reduction, and the problematic - delay -
disease continues to survive. It may not be wrong to say about the delay: 
what was true then (yesterday) concerning the complaint on delay is true 
now (today) and may/shall be true tomorrow (future) if some adequate or 
sufficient as well as efficient measures are not taken to minimise the delay. 
I. Statement of the Problem 
Generally, man by nature wants to live in peace and harmony, not 
only with fellow human beings and other creatures but also with the 
nature. This inherent human nature gave birth to natural justice and to the 
need for an efficient, equitable and expeditious justice delivery system. 
It is evident from history that a legal system, which has easy access to 
justice can only, ensures security, fraternity, amity, peace and harmony in 
the society. Justice that comes too late has no meaning to the person it is 
meant for. During a prolonged and unending trial, the priorities of an 
accused person towards life change along with the circumstances. 
The person can also loose everything on account of the pending 
proceedings. 
Administration of criminal justice is facing serious problems 
nowadays. Although access to justice should normally mean taking 
recourse to an affordable, fair, speedy and satisfactory. Settlement of 
dispute through a court of law, yet the agony associated with it is so 
unending and prolonged that the number of people who resort to litigation 
is much less, than those who prefer to forgo their claim, howsoever 
genuine their claims might be, for the sake of maintaining peace in their 
life. After all, no person would like a major part of his life to be consumed 
in unending litigation. In cases, where the accused is the head of a family 
and is the only bread earner, his responsibility is also towards the large 
family left behind him. It is not only the accused but also his other 
members of the family who suffer because of delays in trial. 
As far back as in 1978, K.F. Rustamji, Member of the National Police 
Commission, observed that compassionately in his report on under trials 
that prisons are "a system which is slowly grinding thousands of people 
into dust". He found hundreds of under trials to be "dumb, simple 
persons, caught in the web of law, unable to comprehend as to what has 
happened, what the charge against them is, or why they have been sent to 
jail. These are the people without a calendar or a clock, only a date in a 
court diary, extended hearing. There are many charged with ticket less 
travel, possession of weapons, or illicit liquor or some minor infraction of 
the law". He found to his dismay that "several of them have been under 
trials for more than five years". 
Human hope has its limits and waiting endlessly is not possible in 
the current life-style. The consumer of justice wants unpolluted, 
expeditious and fair justice. In absence of it, instead of taking recourse to 
law, he may be tempted to take law in his own hands. This is what the 
judicial system shall have to guard against so that people do not take 
recourse to extra-judicial methods to settle scores and seek redress of their 
grievance. If such tendency develops, it would be a sad day for the 
Constitutional democracy to which we are all wedded. The lack of a 
speedy dispute settlement mechanism has a direct impact on the level or 
lawlessness in our society. 
Tens of thousands of deprived men and women are trapped in jails 
throughout the country, often for many years, without trial or conviction, 
separated from their families, exiled from hope. The predicaments of these 
"under-trials" prisoners, who constitute as many as two-thirds of our 
overcrowded jail populations, have for many decades. Most of these 
unfortunate, incarcerated men and women and sadly children are very 
poor and from socially disadvantaged groups. It is by no means a fact that 
most crimes in our country are committed by very poor people. It is just 
that these dispensable and forgotten people are too powerless to free 
themselves from the vice-like grip of law; they lack the money, education 
and political clout to walk free. They cannot muster resources to afford bail 
and lawyers, and overburdened courts do not find time to try them. 
The recent estimates show that 66 percent of all prison inmates are 
under-trials, but in some states the proportion goes up to as high as 80 
percent. The total prison population as on December 2006 for all categories 
of inmates was 3,73,271 of these 2,43,244 were under-trials. 
An overwhelming 96 percent of these are men. Uttar Pradesh reports the 
highest number of under-trials followed by Bihar.^ As a result of large 
pendencies, it often takes decade before the courts to pass verdicts. 
The major contributor to the pendency of 2.5 crore criminal cases in India 
are the states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Orissa, 
Bihar and Rajasthan, with over 10 lakh cases pending in the trial courts of 
each of these states. 
9. The Hindu, Sunday, June 21, 2009, Magazine, p.3. 
Uttar Pradesh leads with a pendency of 47.8 lakh cases, closely 
followed by Maharashtra with 40.6 lakh cases, Gujarat has 25.8 lakh cases 
pending in criminal courts. The figures for other states with major 
pendency are Bihar- 13.3 lakh, Orissa- 10 lakh, Rajasthan- 10.8 lakh and 
Karnataka- 10.9 lakh. Among the states, Sikkim has the lowest pendency 
with 793 criminal cases awaiting adjudication in trial courts in the year 
2008. 
The situation in India is even worse with the mounting arrears of 
cases but the numbers of courts have remained almost static. This has 
created an ever-increasing backlog of cases at present; it has virtually 
checked the existing courts. Another root cause for delay in dispensation 
of justice in our country is poor judge-population ratio. The ratio of judges 
per million populations in this country is the lowest in the world. 
The population and judges ratio in India is 13.5 judges per 10 lakh people 
as compared to 135 to 150 per 10 lakh people in advanced countries. 
The ratio of judges per million of population is about 58 judges in 
Australia, 75 in Canada, 51 in the U.K. and 107 in the U.S.^ 
There is a network of over 14000 courts all over India and these 
courts are handling about 4 crores of cases. Out of 14 thousand judges, the 
working strength would be about 12,500 judges and nearly 4000 cases are 
being handled by each judge. This is too high as compared to the average 
load per-judge in other countries." Due to this low judge - population 
ratio, the courts are lacking requisite strength of judges to decide the cases. 
The failure of justice system has several disastrous implications in 
society. As Gladstone observed, the proper function of a government is to 
10. Rattan Singh, Dr. "Fast Track Courts in India" (A Movement towards speedy justice). 
Journal of Constitutional and parliamentary studies, July-December 2007, Vol. 41, p. 
295. 
11. Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan (Chief Justice of India), presidential address on 
the occasion of All India Seminar on Judicial Reforms, held on 23 '^' February 2008, 
Souvenir, Vol. 2, p.ll 
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make it easy for the people to do good, and difficult for them to do evil. 
The only sanction to ensure good conduct and to prevent bad behaviour in 
society is swift dispensation of justice. Thus the delayed trial and huge 
pendency of criminal cases in India has exposed the loopholes of the 
criminal justice system. The seriousness of the crime problem is to be 
looked at not only from the activities of the criminals but from the 
mal-functioning of the agencies of criminal administration. The pendency 
of cases in the courts has reached its peak. In short, almost all the units of 
criminal justice system are ailing from some problem or the other. 
A number of commissions, such as the Law Commission of India, 
the Human Rights Commission and National Police Commission are 
offering suggestions as to how best the system can be improved to meet 
the challenges of the time. The Government of India and the State 
Governments have been adopting schemes after schemes to remedy the 
situation. Since the system of criminal justice is a complex one, and the 
reformatory measures call for an overall approach to the problem. 
The Government of India has appointed a review committee called the 
Criminal Justice Review Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice 
V.S. Malimath, former Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court to go into 
the problems of criminal justice so that a thorough change may be effected 
in the substantial law and procedural law, to ensure speedy justice. 
II. Significance of the Topic of Research 
The significance of criminal justice system in public administration 
is that it has the aim of establishing such condition in society in which 
there is law and order, and there is protection to the rights of the 
individuals. The administration of justice does not deal with the 
punishment of the guilty alone, almost means acquittal of the innocent. 
Fairness and speed are equally important in the administration of justice. 
Speedy justice serves the best interests of the accused, the survivors and 
the society at large. An efficient system acts as a deterrent to any potential 
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violator of law. However, in our country criminal justice has come in for 
serious criticism. 
The problem of delay and backlog is rather acute in criminal cases, 
as compared to civil cases. The Indian criminal justice process appears to 
be on the verge of collapse due to diverse reasons for delayed dispensation 
of justice. Therefore, speedy trial in criminal justice system is an urgent 
need of the present judicial system in order to decide the fate of lakh of 
litigants. It will held to enhance the faith of general public in the present 
judicial system. It is important that each and every stage of trial of an 
accused should move at a reasonably fast pace. Speedy trial ensures that a 
society is free of such vices. Speedy trial in criminal justice would also 
help save an accused from psychological stress, such as worries, anxiety, 
disturbances to peace at home, etc. Speedy trial is hence significant as far 
as protecting the interest of an accused person. 
It is, thus in the interest of state that the prosecution is able to prove 
the guilt or innocence of accused at the earliest. Uncalled delay often 
prejudices the prosecution and at times witnesses are not available or 
evidences disappear by lapse of time due to various technical and 
non-technical reasons. Criminal law remains ineffective without quick 
trial and prompt punishment. For a variety of reasons, witnesses tend to 
retract from their statements. Investigating officers and prosecutors lose 
heart. Judges feel helpless, society becomes cynical as either criminal go 
scot-free and innocents continue to be harassed. 
This study is significant because the vices of delayed trial are 
harmful for the development and peace of any civilized society. It is thus 
the obligation of the state or the complainant, as the case may be, to 
proceed with the criminal case with reasonable pace. Speedy trial in 
criminal justice system is thus in public interest. 
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III. Rationale for the Study 
The criminal justice system is one of the distinct parts of the 
administrative system of our country, but like other limits of 
administration this system also has its basis in the Constitution and reflects 
the idea which the people of the country have with regard to their life, 
liberty and property in relation to each other and in relation to state. 
The system of criminal justice is designed in such a way that all 
agencies of state administration have to function in accordance with the 
Constitution and the laws made there under. The individual and 
authorities of the state both have to keep in view the great principles 
enshrined in the Constitution. If any improper method is adopted it would 
not only be violative of the principles of Constitution but would shake up 
the very foundation of the system of justice. 
Speedy justice is sine qua non of criminal justice system, indeed the 
right to speedy trial is an integral and essential constituent of the 
Fundamental Right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India which vends thus: "No person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by 
law". The Constitution therefore, not only mandates a speedy process but 
also recognizes the inherent right of an accused. The need to minimize 
delay and to ensure that trials are conducted efficiently is the need of the 
hour. On the other hand, the situation seems to be getting worse with cases 
mounting in courts. While numerous provisions exists in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 to provide for an early investigation and a 
speedy and fair trial, in reality, due to various factors. Such as 
overcrowded court dockets, absence of prosecution motivation, defence 
tendency to prolong, speedy trial is yet an illusory goal. Due to delay 
crores of Indian citizens who are routinely denied justice, and therefore, 
ineffective dispensation. 
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Various authorities such the Law Commission, Mahmath 
Committee the court lawyers, and eminent judges, etc, over the last 50 odd 
years, identified problems in the judicial system reasons for delay in the 
dispensation of justice and specific measures to overcome delays and 
expedite the disposal of cases. Yet, the effective implementations of many 
such recommendations are still pending. 
The great victims of the present situation are the poor, the voiceless, 
and the minority, who cannot bear the burden of decade long adjudication 
necessary to enforce their rights. They are the ones who are turned 
homeless during tenancy disputes, whose lives and deaths get lost in the 
mire of the criminal justice system, and who are denied the basic rights 
necessary for survival. Delay in trial of cases really has become chronic. 
It is often said that cases are disposed of but justice is not done. Speedy 
trial is in public interest. This study has therefore been planned with the 
caption: "Speedy Trial in criminal justice system: An Appraisal" 
What has influenced the researcher to select this topic is the criticism 
very often heard that the criminal justice system of our country has failed 
in its purpose of dealing with the dispensation of speedy justice. 
On the other hand, it was inspiration of my able supervisor that 
I decided to select the topic of my research work on such essential an issue 
that of speedy trial in criminal justice system. I also share the idea to carry 
on my work on this topic with my teachers having vast practical 
experiences whereby it had been inferred that there was an urgent need to 
look into the current position of speedy dispensation of criminal justice in 
India and in other countries. 
On account of the problems arising in organization and functioning 
of the administrative apparatus and controversies arising in regard to the 
officials managing the criminal justice system, there is justification for a 
through analysis into the organization and functioning of the system. 
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IV Review of Literature 
Criminal justice system being a subject of great importance in the 
academic and the professional field. Certain writers have attempted to 
highlight the concept of speedy trial under criminal justice process. 
The following are a few of the important works, Indian and foreign which 
deals with matters of speedy trial and reforms in criminal justice system. 
The book titled: "Handbook of Human Rights and Criminal Justice 
in India". The system and procedure compiled by Mr. Ravi Nair, 
published under the auspices of the South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation centre (SAHRDC) and (published by Oxford University 
press, 2006) has the object of providing for teaching material as a text for 
students, a guide for journals and even for the lay citizen. Its excellent 
documentation and citation of cases makes it a useful reference for 
lawyers, judges and activists in the field. This book particularly discusses 
criminal procedure and criminal justice in the context of human right. 
Specially this book is useful for discussion of the essentials of a fair trial 
and safeguards against custodial torture. 
The book titled: "Indian Judicial System: Need and Directions of 
Reforms" edited by S.P. Verma, published by Kanishka publishers, New 
Delhi, (2004) deals with particular themes of judicial reforms including 
speedy justice and Indian criminal Justice system, the topic is of great 
contemporary interest and relevance to all academics, policy makers and 
citizens due to its importance in judicial administration at various levels. 
The book titled: "Law of Speedy Trial: Justice Delayed is Justice 
Denied" by Hari Om Maratha, published by Lexis Nexis Butterworths 
Wadhwa, Nagpur (2008). This book contains the gist about the law of 
speedy trial it is a compiled book having relevant topics regarding judicial 
delay in dispensation of justice. This book is relevant not only for legal 
fraternity. Members of Judiciary at all levels, prosecutors, police, but to the 
entire community. 
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The book titled: "Law of Speedy Trial in India" by B.L. Arora, 
published by Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, deals 
extensively with the law of speedy trial in India. It covers every aspect 
started with the evolution of state, basic notion of law, crime and justice 
and covered provisions of criminal procedure code with reference to the 
speedy trial, and case law on speedy trial This book also deals with 
particular themes of criminal justice, such as, the historical and social 
framework in which the crime control agencies have evolved the use of 
certain methods within criminal justice system to guide the decision 
making bodies. 
The book titled: "Judicial Reforms in India: Issues and Aspects", by 
Arnab Kumar Hazra and Bibek Debroy, published by Academic 
Foundation in Association with Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary 
Studies, New Delhi (2007). It covers valuable information on judicial 
reforms by different authors, and deals with particular themes as issues 
and aspects of judicial reforms in India. Does the poverty of law explain 
elusive justice to poor, contemporary views on access to justice in India, 
delay's in the administration of justice and the problem of court congestion 
etc. are relevant topics for the acaderhic as well as professional aspects of 
the system. This book also examines through data's and examines whether 
the system of criminal justice obtaining in India is adequate enough to 
cope with the challenges of the time. In the context of the growing 
complexity of crime and its control in a fast changing society, the author 
examines the question what structural changes are needed in all 
components of the system to bring it in tune with the values of time. 
The book "In Defence of Liberty: The Story of America is Bill of 
Rights" by Russell Freedman, published by A Holiday House Book, 
New York, U.S.A. (2003), deals with some aspect of the Bill of Rights, and 
particularly deals in detain about the Amendments made in American 
Constitution, in which the Sixth and Seventh Amendments deals with the 
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"Right to a Speedy and Fair Trial". This book is written in a very easy 
language and is useful for academic as well as for the law professionals. 
The ten amendments of the American Constitution comprising the Bill of 
Rights, and highlighted that this landmark document as a means to defend 
the liberties of all, across boundaries of race and gender, age and class, 
religion and ethics. And the same focusing on examples of ordinary 
citizens who have had the courage to challenge their government and raise 
their voices at injustice. 
V. Hypothesis 
From an observation of the various facets of criminal justice 
system particularly its recent trends, the hypotheses formulated are that: 
1. Criminal justice system is suffering from several pernicious defects 
such as delayed disposal of cases and huge pendency. 
2. Seedy trial is the essence of criminal justice system and there can be 
no doubt the delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. 
3. The worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to prisoner's vocation 
and peace resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, 
inquiry and trial should be minimal. 
4. A new jurisprudence is evolving the world over particularly with 
the help of judicial decisions, whereby prisoners are treated as 
human beings and speedy trial as their human right. 
5. The state is under a Constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial 
and whatever is necessary for this purpose has to be done by the 
state. 
6. Most of the provisions of the procedural laws are vague and highly 
technical making it difficult to enforce them towards the end of 
speedy justice. 
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7. The state cannot avoid its Constitutional obligation to provide 
speedy trial to the accused persons by pleading financial and 
administrative inability. 
8. Effective case management system needs to be put in place for 
growing number of new cases and the courts should reach to the 
people through local venue hearing. 
9. There appears an urgent need to bring punishment for absconding 
witnesses and strict enforcement of deadline for duration of trial 
and length of argument. 
10. Concrete steps to implement the recommendations of various 
committees on reforms in criminal justice system needs to be taken, 
if we are to achieve the precious right to speedy trial. 
VI Aims and Objectives of Research 
It is obvious that the states has kept the Constitutional obligation by 
devising a procedure which ensures a speedy trial for the accused; the 
superior court also not lagged behind their Constitutional obligation in 
enforcing the right of the accused to speedy trial by issuing the necessary 
directions to the state, but still delay persists. This state of affairs 
necessitated the present work on 'speedy trial in criminal justice system'. 
This research work has been carried out with the following, among 
other, objectives: 
1. To expound the concept of speedy trial in criminal justice system 
and underline the basic feature of the systems obtaining in India; 
2. To examine the legal framework of components of criminal justice 
system keeping in view the normative and social perspective of the 
system of criminal justice; 
3. To examine the fundamental principles embodied in the 
Constitution, regarding speedy trial, as fundamental right, and 
institutions involved in the administration of criminal justice, 
namely, the police, the courts, the prosecution and the prisons. 
4. To enquire how principles of procedural law are adhered to in 
conducting criminal trial and in managing the operational aspects of 
the system; 
5. To study the legal and Constitutional position of the new 
institutions established by the state to attend as alternative dispute 
resolution in furtherance of speedy justice. 
6. To examine the position of various committees, commissions reports 
and its recommendations on speedy trial. 
7. To analyze the safeguard guaranteed to under trial prisoners in 
relation to various phases of the criminal process and how the 
system takes care of the victims, 
8. To point out the error and defects in procedural law which hamper 
the criminal justice system in regard to speedy disposal of cases, and 
9. To suggest some possible measures to speedy dispensation of 
criminal cases. 
VII. Methodology 
This research is a criminological research. Basically, criminological 
research has two aspects - one pertaining to the crime problem and other 
pertaining to the criminal policy. Although research in criminal justice 
varies considerably in scope, style and procedure depending upon the 
theme of research, this particular research is concerned with an evaluation 
of the policies and procedures. It is concerned with major propositions of 
law concerning the operation of the system to attain speedy justice. It is 
concerned with the scope of the fundamental norms of our legal system 
namely, the principles, embodied in the Constitution of our country, which 
are applicable to the institutions of criminal justice and the processes 
pursued by these institutions. 
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Doctrinal and Analytical Methods of Research is followed as the 
researcher is firm in his conviction that an accurate evaluation of the law is 
possible if an analytical approach is adopted to ascertain the distinct 
features of the system and the steps taken by the state for viable 
dispensation of justice. 
In the preparation of this thesis, material has been collected from 
authentic reports found in the Libraries of repute (Maulana Azad Library) 
based in Aligarh Muslim University. Every efforts has been made to 
collect material from appropriate and authoritative sources of information, 
the decisions of the courts and the reports found in law library/seminar of 
the Department/Faculty of Law, AMU, Aligarh, the Library of Indian Law 
Institute, New Delhi. A single source of information in the form of statutes, 
judicial decisions etc. not being sufficient for the researcher, so that the 
necessary data collected from secondary sources like the newspapers and 
periodicals and various reports published in souvenir of All India Seminar 
on Judicial Reforms time to tome. 
Scheme of Presentation 
Based on the theme of research the study has been planned and 
presented in the following chapters: 
Intioduction contains the research design. It describes the area of 
research, the reasons for conducting research on the topic, the hypothesis 
formulated for the purpose, the methodology followed and the aims and 
objectives pursued in this regard. 
Chapter-I "Speedy Trial - Explained" discuss the conceptual basis of 
speedy tiial. After giving a brief overview of speedy tiial, explains the 
meaning and definition of speedy trial, and an assessment of time frame of 
a trial has discussed. It discusses the enforcement mechanism of speedy 
trial and the question whether delayed tiial is always an unfair tiial. 
And the defects and errors in procedural law has also attempted in detail, 
20 
on the other hand the need for simplification of the procedural law to 
attain speedy justice has discussed. 
Chapter-II "Speedy Trial - Historical Perspective" explains historical 
background of speedy trial. For this purpose chapter Ilnd has been divided 
into three parts and examine the evolution of the concept of speedy trial 
from ancient Indian criminal justice system to Medieval and Mughal 
period and its position in modern time has discussed in a historical 
manner. We have given a very short description of the judicial system of 
Ancient Hindus. And some rules of speedy justice in Ancient India and its 
roots in the Ancient literature have also been shortly outlined. 
We have outlined a very short description of the judicial system of 
the pre-Mughal period and Mughal period to elicit the historical position 
of administration of justice. The administration of justice during the reign 
of Akbar and the judicial reforms made by Emperor Aurangzeb has 
exclusively discussed. Thus the brief history of the administration of 
justice in India has been brought up to the period of the East India 
Company and gives a comparative view^ of ancient to modern position of 
administration of criminal justice to examine the position of speedy justice. 
Chapter-Ill "Speedy Trial in International Perspective" deals with 
international perspective of speedy trial. The first part of this chapter deals 
with the fortification of speedy trial in several international covenants and 
conventions. To explore the international perspective of speedy trial the 
researcher examines three jurisdictions i.e. U.S.A., U.K. and Australia. 
While examines the international perspective the Sixth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 has exclusively 
outlined. We further deals with international comparisons regarding 
problem of backlog and delay reduction in dispensation of criminal justice 
in India. 
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Chapter IV "Speedy Trial: A Constitutional Mandate" deals with 
Constitutional ramification of speedy trial. For this purpose, the researcher 
first examines the Constitutional provisions for speedy trial, then the 
emergence of speedy trial as a Fundamental Rights in India. Last part of 
this chapter deals with the articulation of right to speedy trial in judicial 
pronouncement/ dynamism. 
Chapter V "Speedy Trial in Statutory Provisions" deals with the statutory 
provisions for speedy trial. It discuses the several statutory provisions 
which are designed to speed up the trial of criminal cases, in the last part 
of this chapter it also discusses the utility of free legal aid to achieve 
speedy justice. 
Chapter VI "Role of various Agencies in Furtherance of Speedy Trial". 
This chapter examines the role of various agencies which further the 
causes of speedy trial. For this purpose it provides an insight into the 
report of Mallimath Committee. Then the role of lawyers, litigants, 
Lok Adalat and use of technology in speedy justice are examined. 
Conclusion contains a summary of the findings and offers suggestions as to how 
an effective system can be established to achieve the idea of speedy trial in 
criminal justice system. 
CHAPTER-I 
SPEEDY TRIAL- CONCEPT 
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SPEEDY TRIAL-CONCEPT 
I. An Overview 
Quality of justice suffers not only when an innocent person is 
punished or a guilty person is exonerated, but when there is enormous 
delay in deciding the criminal cases.^ As in every democratic civilized 
study, our Criminal Justice System is also expected to provide the 
maximum sense of security to the people at large and thus dealing with 
crimes and criminals effectively, quickly and legally. The entire existence 
of the orderly society depends upon sound and efficient functioning of the 
Criminal Justice System. A prolonged trial causes untold harassment to 
victims, accused, and witnesses. Various strategies and tools have been 
used in various jurisdictions to lessen the burden of trials, and ensure 
speedy disposal of cases.^ 
Speedy justice demands speedy and reasonably expeditious trial of 
a case. Indian Judicial hatchet dug up deep into the philosophy of 
fundamental Rights of our Constitution and read the right to "speedy 
trial" implicit in the broad sweep and contents of Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. This found approval with the Supreme Court in the 
landmark cases of M.H. Hoskot vs. State of Maharashtra^ and Hussainara 
Khatoon vs. State of Bihar,'^ where the Supreme Court observed that, "speedy 
trial, and by speedy trial we mean, reasonably expeditious trial is an 
integral and essential part of fundamental right to life and liberty as 
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution". In other landmark cases of 
A.R.Antulay vs. R.S.Nayak^ and Sheel Barse vs. Union oflndia.^ The Supreme 
1. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs "Report of the Committee on Reforms of 
Criminal Justice System" (Vol. I, March 2000). 
2. Ho'ble Mr. Justice A.K, Sikri Sitting Judge of Delhi High Court. Naya Deep. Vol. VII 
issue 3, July, 2006, p.77. 
3. AIR 1978 SC1548 
4. (1980) 1 s e c 108. 
5. (1992) 1 s e c 225. 
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Court held that, "Right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the 
Constitution and the Consequence of violation of this right would be that 
the prosecution itself liable to be quashed on the ground that it is a breach 
of a fundamental right." Significance of speedy justice is not only 
emphasized in Municipal law but also in International Covenants, namely: 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 recognizes the right of a 
person to be tried without undue delay7 India having ratified the covenant 
has taken upon itself the legal obligation to enforce it. 
Although the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. The U.S. Supreme Court has refused 
to settle any precise time frame for the trial^ likewise, thirty five state 
Constitutions have speedy trial guarantees, but these provisions apply 
when the delay has been extensive. 
The vagueness of the Constitutional standards, to achieve speedy 
dispensation of justice, the legislatures in recent years has shown 
considerable interest in putting some teeth into the guarantee of a speedy 
trial. 
The best known and most comprehensive such effort is the Speedy 
Trial Act of 1974 (Amended in 1979)9. The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 
is an excellent example of effective legislation to expedite criminal trials. 
The right to speedy trial is not expressly enumerated as one of the 
fundamental rights in the Constitution of India unlike the Sixth 
Amendment of the US Constitution, which expressly recognises this right 
in the United States. It inter-alia declares that in all criminal prosecutions 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. This is in 
6. (1986) 1 s e c 654.. 
7. Article 14(3) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
8. Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) in David W. Neubaur, America's Courts and the 
Criminal Justice System, 5th (Ed.) Belmont, California; Wadsworth publishing 
company, 1996, p. 385. 
9. Ibid. 
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addition to the Fifth US Constitutional Amendment, which declares 
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without the 
process of law". This corresponds broadly to Article 21 and also to the 
deleted clause-I of Article 31 of the Indian Constitution. Article 21 declares 
that no person shall be deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance 
with law. It reads as under: 
"No person shall he deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law". 
For the first time, the Supreme Court of India in the case of 
Hussainara Khatoon (1) vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar^'^ declared that the 
right to speedy trial was implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 
21. The right to speedy public trial was a facet of fair and reasonable 
procedure guaranteed by Article 21. It could not be arbitrary, fanciful or 
oppressive. The core of 'speedy trial' was considered as a protection 
against incarceration. 
II. Concept and Meaning of Speedy Trial 
Speedy justice is always been the sine qua non (necessary element) of 
criminal jurisprudence. It is an important safeguard to prevent undue and 
oppressive incarceration. It minimises anxiety and concern accompanying 
the accusation. It also limits the possibility of impairing the ability of an 
accused to defend him self. There also remains a keen societal interest in 
providing speedy justice. The right of speedy justice has been actuated in 
the recent past. The courts also, in series of decisions, have opened new 
vistas of fundamental rights." 
It was the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which 
incorporated into it the concept of speedy trial for the first time. 
This concept travelled from there into the Sixth Amendment to the 
10. AIR, 1979 SC 1360. 
11. Sharma,D.P. 'Speedy Justice and Indian Criminal Justice System' p. 97-98. 
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Constitution of the United States of America to bring it into effect that in 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial. It is worth mentioning in this connection that there is a 
Federal Act of 1974 in the USA, which is called Speedy Trial Act. This Act 
estabHshes a set of time limits for carrying out the major events, e.g., 
information, indictment, arraignment, in prosecution of criminal cases. 
Similar provisions exist in Canadian Laws also. The right to speedy trial is 
also recognised as a common law right, flowing from the Magna Carta.^^ 
This is the view in United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada and 
New Zealand, which is not accepted in Australia. However, this right 
whether under common law or otherwise, does not provide an absolute 
relief to be given under various well-settled guidelines evolved in 
the judicial decisions. Further, under Article 14 of the International 
Convention on Civil and Political rights 1976^ ^^  the right to a speedy trial is 
provided. Similarly, Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution refer to it as a 
basic right.i'^ 
The Sixth Amendment spells out eight specific rights to which persons 
accused of a crime are entitled, among one of them is 'the right to a speedy 
and public trial'. Speedy means that an accused person can't be locked up 
and held in prison for years without a trial. Speedy Trial has been defined 
as it is the right of the defendant to have a prompt trial.^5 
The U.S. Constitution and the Constitutions of almost all American 
states provide that the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy trial^^ ^ ut the 
requirements vary among jurisdictions. Then every defendant is entitled to 
a speedy trial. Therefore, justice means grant of expeditious and 
12. Ibid. 
13. Article 14 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Right. 
14. Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Col. 846 (1957) L.R. 
15. Dictionary of Criminal Justice terms, Gould publications inc. 1990 p. 192, and: Robert D. 
Pursley, Introduction to Criminal Justice, 2"'' (Ed.) New York, Macmillan publishing co. 
inc. 1980, p. 575. 
16. Provisions of the U.S. Constitution Dealing with criminal procedure in David W. 
Neubaver, p. 70. 
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inexpensive relief to the persons who approach the court with legal 
problems. Delay in providing justice has been interpreted as denial of 
justice as prolonged litigation causes financial burden and mental torture 
to the litigants besides eroding their faith in judiciary. Delay in the 
disposal of cases is the greatest drawback of administration of justice in 
India. 
The right to speedy trial is an integral and essential part of the 
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, while delivering its 
Constitutional bench Judgement in the case of Abdul Rahman Antulay vs. 
R.S. Nayak^'^ declared that right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of 
the Constitution of India, and thus, constituted a fundamental right of 
every person accused of a crime. In Hussainara Khatoon (1) vs. Home 
Secretary, State ofBihar^^ the Supreme Court observed. 
"Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving, a person of 
his liberty cannot be reasonable; fair or just unless that procedure 
ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No 
procedure, which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial, can be 
regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. 
There, can therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial 
we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part 
of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21." 
The right of the speedy trial must begin without urmecessary delay 
within the time limits established by law. These time limits can be pushed 
back by valid postponements for a variety of reasons.^^ 
Most American and the federal Governments have enacted statutes 
setting forth the time within which the defendant must be tried following 
the date of his arrest, his first appearance or the filing of charges in court.^o 
17. A.I.R. 1992 Sc 1701. 
18. (1980) 1 s e c 81. 
19. Paul B. Weston and Kenneth M. Wells. The Administration of Justice 3f''(Ed,) Englewood 
Cliffs, New York, Practice Hall Inc, 1997. P.129 
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The Sixth Amendment applies only after a person becomes an 
'accused' that is to say, after he has been formally charged with a crime or 
placed under arrest and detained for the purpose of answering a criminal 
charge. Once arrested, a person is deemed an accused and is entitled to a 
speedy trial even though he is later released.21 
Most speedy trial statues in the U.S. provide method for comparing 
'excludable delay' not included in calculations of elapsed time for speedy 
trial purposes. That the American Speedy Trial Act 18, U.S. CSS 316 (h) (7), 
excludes from the Act operation [a] reasonable period of delay when the 
defendant is joined for trial has not run and no motion for severance has 
been granted. And too, that a defendant's failure to object to continuance 
to his co-defendant may upon the defendant subsequent attempt to 
assert a speedy trial claim, impairs his ability to satisfy the prong of the 
four-pronged test.22 
Examples of 'excludable delay' are periods of times spent on other 
proceeding concerning the defendant as hearing on mental competency 
to stand trial, on other charges or probation parole revocation hearing. 
Other examples are delays due to continuances granted at the request of 
the defendant or because of the absconding of the defendant, and the 
execution of procedures necessary to obtain the presence of a confined 
prisoner.^ "* 
In a number of American Federal Courts compliances have come at 
the price of delaying civil cases, civil trials are temporarily suspended in 
an effort to keep pace with courts criminal case load. Potential difficulties 
also arise because not all cases easily fit into the mandated time frames a 
20. Dictionary of Criminal Justice Terms. Op. cit, p. 192 
21. Carmen. Op.cit., p.71 
22. Barken, us. Wingo. See James Wm. Moove, Moove's Federal Practice. Vol. 8b (rules of 
Criminal Procedure 40-52) 2"'' (Ed.) Mathew Bender, 1995 para. 48-13. 
23. Dictionary of Criminal Justice Terms op.cit, p.192-193. 
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major murder case or a complex drug conspiracy trial takes longer to 
prepare than an ordinary burglary prosecution. 
American state laws generally give wide discretion to judges in 
deciding that the time frames can be waived in the interest of Justice.^^ 
III. Nature of delay and time- frame 
In criminal proceedings, following delays are considered systematic 
delays, which are neither within the control of prosecutor nor accused. 
a) Delay wholly due to congestion of the court calendar, 
non-availability of Judges, or other circumstances beyond the 
control of the prosecutor. 
b) Delay caused by the accused himself not merely by seeking 
adjournments but also by legal devices, which the prosecutor has to 
counter. 
c) Delay caused by orders, whether induced by accused or not, of the 
court, necessitating appeals or revisions or other appropriate actions 
or proceedings. 
d) Delay caused by legitimate actions of the prosecutor e.g. getting a 
key witness who is kept out of the way or otherwise avoids process 
or appearance or tracing a key document or securing evidence from 
abroad.25 
The above delays are not considered delays affecting the right to 
speedy trial. The delays being questioned are the deliberate delays 
resulting in protracting of proceedings either by the prosecutor or by 
accused. The accused may like to delay the proceedings as defence tactics 
and the prosecutor may like to prolong it because it has a case or it wants 
to harass or victimize the accused. 
The violation of the right to a speedy trial is not established by delay 
alone. Rather, the determination of whether a case must be dismissed for 
lack of a speedy trial requires a balancing test, in which the conduct of 
24. Neubaur, Op. at, p. 387. 
25. Bhatia G.P. "Application of Right to speedy Public Trial" Labour and Industrial cases 
2005, Dec. 38 (456), p. 281-2. 
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both the prosecution and the defence are weighed and the following 
factors are considered: 
(a) Length of delay: The length of delay alone does not establish a 
violation of the right to a speedy trial. However, a delay of months in 
a case, which depend upon eyewitness testimony, has been presumed 
to be prejudicial to the accused. 
(b) Reason for delay: A deliberate attempt by the prosecution to delay 
the trial weighs heavily towards a violation of the right to a speedy 
trial. On the other hand, a valid reason such as missing witness 
normally will justify the delay in the absence of prejudice to the 
accused. 
(1) If the delay is attributed to wilful tactics by the accused. 
He will be deemed to waive his right to a speedy trial. 
(2) The mere fact that the accused is serving in Jail sentence in 
another state does not justify a delay of his trial on the pending 
charge. The prosecution must attempt to have the other state 
temporarily give up custody for purposes of trial or the 
pending charge. 
(c) Defendants' assertion or non-assertion of right: An accused 
may at any time waive his right to a speedy trial. But it must be 
shown that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. It cannot be 
implied from his silence. 
(d) Prejudice to Accused: The nature and amount of prejudice 
resulting from the delay must be judged by what the right to speedy 
trial is designed to prevent namely, oppressive incarceration, loss of 
evidence, accuracy of witness testimony, anxiety to the accused and 
the like.26 
Under the American Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
accused must be brought before the magistrate at the stage of initial 
appearance "without unnecessary delay". 
The emphasis on conducting a prompt inquiry arose from the 
U.S. Supreme Court rulings in which the court held under the 
MC Nabb-Mallory and the Upsaw vs. United States decision that an 
unjustified delay is unreasonable and sufficient to presume that all 
statements made by the arrestee between the arrest and the delayed 
26. Carmen Op. at., p. 71. 
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hearing are inadmissible in evidence as the product of an unlawful 
detention^^, 
In 1975 congress passed the Speedy Trial Act,^^ under the 
provisions of this Act, the accused must be processed through the various 
trial stages within certain stipulated times. Failures by the American 
Federal Courts to comply with these times will result in the defendant's 
motion for a dismissal of the charges.^^ 
Although many states have similar provisions that call for an initial 
appearance without unnecessary delay, most states courts (unless they too 
have adopted specific time frames under a "Speedy Trial Act" consider 
delays simply to be a part of the overall judicial process. 
In reality the problems of delay in processing the defendant through 
the initial appearance are usually not that serious, the more serious delays 
usually occur late in bringing the accused up for the actual trial.^o 
IV. Speedy Trial —The Enforcement Mechanism 
If the accused is not brought to trial within the specified period the 
case is dismissed. American jurisdiction differs however, on whether 
dismissal on these grounds constitutes a bar to subsequent prosecution for 
the same offence.^ ^ Ten states provide that the case must be dismissed if 
the time limits are exceeded. This can result in: 
(a) A guilty defendant's going free because of an administrative 
problem. 
(b) It can also allow the prosecutor to procrastinate deliberately because 
there is too little evidence for conviction. 
(c) Blame the judge when the case is dismissed. 
27 MC Nabb N United States (1943), Vol 318, US Supreme Court Reports 332 
Washington, DC, US Govt Printing Office, p 332 and Vol 63, Supreme Court 
Reporter, p 608 Mallory N United States (1957), Vol 354, U S Supreme Court Report p 
499, vol n 
28 Speedy Trial Act, p 2 
29 Speedy Trial Act, p 9 
30 Robert D Pursley, Op at, p 271 
31 Supra Note 25 
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Other states permit dismissal but allow re-prosecution, but it can 
undermine the effectiveness of speedy trial provisions by subjecting 
defendants to a series of re-prosecutions. In theory researchers approach to 
speedy trial laws with considerable scepticism. 
However, the American Federal Speedy Trial Law has proven 
effective. The average criminal case filed in the federal courts in the early 
1970s took seven months to reach a disposition. By the early 1980s, the 
average case was disposed of in less than three months.32 In addition to 
speedy trials reduce and decline recidivism in drunk driving cases in 
New York.33 
As, the Federal Speedy Trial Act, provides for the dismissal of the 
prosecution if the terms of the Act, are violated. There was substantial 
judicial debate in the American courts of appeals over the appropriate 
standard for determining whether such dismissal should be with or 
without prejudice-^-i 
In United States vs. Taylor, the Supreme Courts provided additional 
guidance to lower courts, on this issue, it stated that "Courts are not free 
simply to exercise their equitable power in fashioning an appropriate 
remedy for a violation of the Federal Speedy Trial Act, but in order to 
proceed under the Act, must consider at least the three specified factors in 
determining whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice.'s 
Hoping that the defendant/accused would file motion to compel, which 
would have tolled the running of the time periods under the American 
Federals of Speedy Trial Act. The prosecutor in United States vs. Hastings 
32. Garner, Joel, "Delay Reduction in the Federal Courts Rule 50 (b) and the Federal Speedy 
Trial Act of 1974", Journal of Quantitative Criminology 3(1987); 229-250 cited in 
Neubaurer, Op. cit., p. 389. 
33. "Speedy Trial Reduce Recidivism in Drunk Driving cases in N.Y. Alcoholism and Drug 
Abuse Weekly, Vol. 7 issue 2 (1995). 
34. United States N. Karmen, 827 f. 2d 1147 Cir. (1987); United States V. Caparells, 716 f. 2d 
1201- (d.c.cir. 1983). Cited in Eulis Simen "Criminal Procedure" 50 Louisiana Lan 
review 2(1989): 237 
35 . Eulis Simien. Op.cit, p. 237 
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intentionally failed to comply with a local discovery rule. However, the 
defendant did not file the motion to compel; the trial court considered the 
conduct of the prosecutor, in regards to the discovery rule, and dismissed 
the prosecution, with prejudice. 
Following the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor, the court of 
appeals in Hastings reversed the district's dismissal with prejudice. It 
concluded that since the discovery violation did not have the desired 
effect, it was not casually related to the speedy trial violations and not 
relevant to determining whether the dismissal should be with or without 
prejudice.36 
V. Delayed Trial- The Prejudice Theory 
Speedy trial is always considered a reasonable, fair and just trial but 
a delayed trial may not always be an unfair trial. The Supreme Court in 
State of Maharashtra vs. Champalal Punjaji Shah'^'^ i.e. "...while a speedy trial 
is an implied ingredient of a fair trial, the converse is not necessarily true. 
A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. The delay may be 
occasioned by the tactics or conduct of the accused itself. The delay may 
have caused no prejudices whatsoever to the accused. The question 
whether a conviction should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the accused is 
found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and it would 
be said that the accused had thus been denied of an adequate opportunity 
to defend himself, the conviction would certainly have to go. But if nothing 
is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the court to raise a 
presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be 
no justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed trial 
only". 
36. Ibid. 
37. AIR 1981 SC1675. 
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That was the proposition in 1981. Much time has passed since then. 
The trend of later judgements lead to the conclusion that even if no 
prejudice has been caused to the charged officer or accused, he can still 
complain of infringement of his right to speedy trial. The charge sheet or 
conviction or punishment imposed can be quashed or the sentence 
reduced, if the delay was not caused by the delay tactics of the 
accused/charged officer and further provided that the charges were not 
serious. 
One of the glaring lacunas of the existing Criminal Justice System is 
the inordinate delay caused in the disposal of the cases and detention of 
the accused in judicial custody pending trial.^^ 
It is undesirable that the criminal prosecution should wait 
everybody concerned who has forgotten all about the crime. 
Procrastination of trial often entails injustice. Because of an unduly 
prolonged process, much often-material evidence may perish as when 
witness die^^ or situations are altered to blurring of memories of available 
witnesses .40 "Justice delayed is Justice denied" is the well known maxim 
highlighting the importance of quick Justice.^i Thus, the significance and 
Judicial value of the speedy trial has been depicted by this well-known 
maxim. 
The legal basis of the right was provided by the Magna Carta^s 
(1215) which proclaims that Justice or right will neither be sold nor denied 
or deferred to any man. 
38. Shaija Chandra, "Justice Krishna Iyer on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles" 
p. 202. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Sixth Amendment to American Constitution, "Right to speedy Trial-and Public Trial" 
Retrieved from http;/www.law-corneIl.edu. 
41. Ahmad Siddique, 'Criminology', 5* (Ed.) 2006, p. 47. 
42. Id. p. 48. 
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According to Coke, prolonged detention without trial would not 
only be contrary to the law and custom of England but delay is a direct 
impact on the American colonies and the right of speedy trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of United States Constitution and 
also by all the States. 
The need of the speedy disposal of the cases has been recommended 
by various commissions from time to time. Before the recognition of the 
speedy trial as the fundamental human right and need of the hour in 
Hussainara Khatoon vs. state of Bihar. The judiciary has earlier observed that 
the Jurisprudence of quick acting in the comprehensive remedy of all evils. 
Justice Krishan Iyer in Schmitz's easels brought forward an 
importance of speedy trial and observed that a Jurisprudence of quick 
acting and comprehensive remedies, demanding restricting and 
streamlining of the Judicative apparatus, demanding operational speed 
and modernization of the whole adjective law and practice, is urgent and 
important. The legal instrumentality alone truly sustains the rule of law, 
which delivers Justice with inexpensive celerity, finality and fullness. The 
big right remedy gap is the basis of our system. 
In another case,**^  Justice Krishna Iyer suggested that systematic 
slow motion in dispensation of Justice must claim the nation's immediate 
attention towards basic reformation of the traditional structures and 
procedure, and therefore. Justice Krishna Iyer made the following 
recommendation: 
"Commercial cases should as far as possible, be adjusted by 
non-litigative mechanisms of dispute resolution, since forensic 
processes, dilatory and contentious hamper of the flow of trade and 
harm both sides ivhosoever wins or lose." 
43. Busching Schmitz vs. Menghani, AIR 1973 SC1569. 
44. Trustee, Bombay Port vs. Premier Automobiles, AIR 1974 SC 2122. 
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The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution perhaps being 
conscious of the formidable hurdles involved, did not incorporate the 
right, as such, in the Constitution but in Hussainara Khatoon (1) vs. Home 
Secretary State ofBihar^^ the Supreme Court held that the right to be implicit 
in Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In holding so the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling in 
Maneka Gandhi^ that to fulfil the requirement of Article 21 the procedure 
should be reasonable, fair and just, and a quick trial can be regarded as 
having these qualities. The petition in Hussainara's case was moved on 
behalf of certain pre-trial prisoners, many of whom had been languishing 
in Jails for years together waiting for the commencement of their trials. 
The court ordered the immediate release of all such prisoners. It has been 
hold by courts that the Constitutional rights of speedy trial includes within 
its sweep the expeditious filing and hearing of substantive appeals against 
convictions as well as acquittals. The right has been given extended scope 
to operate against long delay in the disposal of a mercy petition against the 
death sentence by the President of India. 
Justice Krishna Iyer, while dealing with the bail petition in Bahu 
Singh vs. Sate ofU.P'^'^ case remarked: 
"Our Justice System, even in grave cases, sujfers from slow motion 
syndrome which is lethal to fair trial whatsoever the ultimate decision. 
Speedy Justice is a component of social Justice since the community, as 
a whole is concerned in the criminal is being condignly and finally 
punished within a reasonable time and the innocents being absolved 
from the inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings". 
VI. Defects and Errors in Procedural Law: 
There is apparently widespread dissatisfaction with the way crimes 
and criminal are investigated, prosecuted and tried by the criminal system. 
45. (1980) 1 s e c 81:1981 SCC (cri.) 23 
46. Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI. I (1978) 1 SCC 248. 
47. AIR 1983 SC 527. 
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which raises question against the Indian legal system and suffers from 
crisis. The chief causal factors of crisis are inherent that India has no legal 
system of its own. It is the legacy of common law a foreign legal system 
imported into the country.*^ It has been unequivocally observed that 
modern Indian law is "notwithstanding its foreign roots and origin 
unmistakably Indian in its outlook and operation.^^ Obviously, the system 
suffers from the ailment of adversarial processes, deterioration in its 
prestige, maximization of quantity and minimization of quality, 
corruption, delay etc. The menace of delay not only discerns justice denied, 
but is now vision as justice circumvented, justice mocked, and the system 
of justice undermined.50 Delay culminates a sense of injustice; long 
period's denial emanates uncertainty.^^ 
The problem of judicial delay seems to have reached such a climax 
of notoriety that one can hardly escape from its vice. Courts are no more 
cathedrals; they are casino where the throw of the dice matters.^^ 
These terse comments upon the performance of Indian Judiciary 
compelled both the legislature and judiciary to have in depth introspection 
about the deficiencies in our legal system. Man lives in the short run, but 
litigation lives in the long run.53 Dispensation of justice becomes a mockery 
if it gets delayed and becomes long drawn out making it patently unjust 
and urifair to all concerned. 
48. Seetalvad, M.C. The Role of English law in India (1965). 
49. Vide Seetalval M.C. The Common Law India 225 (1961) 
50. Speech of Richard Nixon, an Ex-President of USA Delivered at the National Conference 
of the Judiciary, Williamsburg, Virginia, 11 March 1991 as Quoted by Katz. Litwin, et al. 
in Justice is Crime 35(1972). 
51. Mukherjee S.K. and A. Gupta: Delay in Administration of Criminal Justice (1978) 
Grewal, R.G., "Speedy Trial: A Fundamental Right" XVI Indian Bar Rev. 1 (1987). 
52. Speech of K.R. Narayanan, an Ex-President of India Delivered Golden Jubilee 
Celebration by Supreme Court of India, 28* Jan.(2000) Quoted by B.D. Aggarawal 
"New Road to Speedy Justice" AIR (2000) P. J18. 
53. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer Quoted by Ex-President of India A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, address 
at the National Seminar on Delay in the Administration of Criminal Justice', Published 
in (2007) s e c (J) p.l. 
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Indian laws are also characterized as obsolete, out dated primitive 
and non-functional. It is not because the laws were fundamentally 
defective, but the prime reason for rejection of some century old laws is 
that they do not match with the fast changing social scenario. However, 
some of the new enactments will certainly dispel the lurking 
fear-psychosis that the existing law will fail to maintain the rule of law, to 
protect the rights and privileges of its citizens, more particularly of 
downtrodden who cannot afford long-drawn litigation. 
Eminent jurist Mr. Nani A. Palkivala comments upon the sad affairs 
of delayed dispensation of Justice as follows: 
"I am not aivare of any country in the world where litigation goes on for 
as long as period as in India. The law may or may not he an ass, hut in 
India it is certainly a snail and our cases proceed at a pace which would 
he regarded as unduly slow in a community of snails. Justice has to he 
hlind hut I see no reason why it should also be lame here it just hobbles 
along, barely able to walk. If litigation were to be included in the next 
Olympics, India would he certain of winning at least one gold medal".^'^ 
I remember reading a Russian Poet in my days as a student who 
described Justice as a train that is always late.'^s 
Almost all the Hon'ble Chief Justices of India have shown their 
concern towards delayed justice and tried to find out the causes for the 
same and also suggested means and methods, in their own ways, to 
combat the same was the concern shown by the Governments Hon'ble 
Justice A.S. Anand, the then Chief Justice of India had expressed his 
anguish when an accused charged with murder had been in the custody of 
police for more than thirty seven years awaiting trial. 
One Ajay Kumar Gose was in the policy custody since his trial was 
stopped sine die in 1963 to get him treated for chronic Schizophrenia. 
54. We, The Nation The Lost Decades (2008) p. 216. 
55. Speech of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee, Judge Supreme Court of India 
delivered at the All India Seminar on Judicial Reform at Vigyan Bhawan, 23 February 
2008, Vol. II, p. 42. 
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A small boy who was badly beaten up by his employer for stealing 
three-packets from a shop and was thereafter handed over to the 
police is the another case in the line. The boy was detained for a long 
time on the ground that there was none to bail him out. Another such 
case is that of a gambler from whom only Rs.1.10 was recovered and 
was kept in custody for a long period. Likewise, an Assistant Engineer, 
who was caught while accepting Rs. 180 as a bribe, had to be in judicial 
custody for sixteen years and ultimately sentenced to two years 
imprisonment. Who is going to explain such grave aberrations? Trial 
courts are thronged with millions of cases. The causes for this delay are 
multi-faceted. Be it the shortage of presiding officers, the lack of 
adequate infrastructure, the complexity of the legal procedures, 
apathetical and indifferent attitude of witnesses or the all-pervasive 
callousness of investigating and prosecuting agencies but the fact 
remains that delay in imparting justice is the reality of the day.^^ 
Legal experts are unanimous in their opinion that the present 
system of Criminal Jurisprudence is destined to fail if the backlog of 
cases is not substantially reduced. Several Law Commissions have 
recommended a complete overhaul of the Criminal Justice System. 
They have exhorted for a radical change in the working of the law 
enforcement agencies, especially the police and the public prosecutors 
to contain such delays in the recent past. Recently the Law 
Commission has mooted the concept of Tlea-Bargaining' - pre-trial 
negotiations between the accused and the prosecution in which if the 
accused agrees to plead guilty for the charge levelled against him he 
would get in exchange certain concessions as a quid pro quo, by taking 
a lenient view by the courts, particularly in cases of lesser gravity.^^ 
Recently we have witnessed the respectable and responsible citizens 
56. Hari Om Maratha, 'Law of Speedy Trial - Justice Delayed is Justice Denied'. 2008, pp. 1-2. 
57. Ibid. 
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turning hostile and thus, becoming instrumental in delaying the 
delivery of justice and to defeat the very purpose of trials. 
The committee on reforms in Criminal Justice System, constituted by 
the Union Government under the Chairmanship of Justice V. S. 
Malimath, former Chief Justice of Karnataka and Kerala High Courts 
and also former National Human Rights Commissioner, went into this 
aspect. This committee was constituted because there has been a deep 
feeling of concern that the Criminal Justice System is collapsing 
gradually under its own weight. It was with a view to regain the lost 
confidence that the Union Government constituted the (CRCJS) with a 
comprehensive term of reference. The CRCJS was asked to examine, 
inter alia, the need to re-write Criminal Procedure Code, the Indian 
Penal Code and the Evidence Act, to make specific recommendation on 
simplifying the judicial procedure, suggest ways and means for 
developing synergy among judiciary, prosecution and police. 
Construction and Interpretation of Procedural Laws 
The purpose of procedural law is to regulate the procedure 
starting with filing of a case till the judgments, orders and decrees of 
the court are pronounced and enforced. As the procedural laws are 
viewed as means to achieve the ends of Justice, the Construction and 
interpretation of procedural laws by the courts are different from that 
of substantive law. In this process, the courts are always guided by the 
objects of procedural laws which are to facilitate justice but not to 
defeat justice. Statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedure of the 
court have also on occasions received beneficial construction.^^ 
Statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedure, if they relate to 
the infliction of penalties are construed strictly and if there is 
ambiguity or doubt, usually it will be resolved in favour of a party in 
58. Maxwell: The Interpretation of Statutes, 100 (1980). 
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the legal proceedings though such party may escape from the legal 
proceedings. In Ram Das vs Ram Lubhaya^^ Justice Swatantra Kumar 
observed that the provision of procedural law may be construed 
liberally to achieve the ends of justice but no party could be permitted 
to abuse the process of the law including emerging out of procedural 
law. 
Procedural law - Need for Simplification 
In Indian legal system, importance of Procedural law is very 
significant at every stage of criminal proceeding. In implementing 
and following the procedural law, the courts play a pivotal role. 
The importance of procedural law was aptly summarized by Justice 
Sir Barnes Peacock by stating that the litigants in the mofussil at times 
are not properly examined. And as such the law of procedure entrusts 
the courts with the powers for obtaining the truth of the cases by 
examining the witnesses themselves.^o The rights and duties of the 
people are dealt within substantive laws whereas the procedural 
aspects relating to the enforcement of the aspects in substantive laws 
are dealt within the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872 etc. Several provisions in these procedural laws 
overlap with each other due to the existence of elaborate explanation of 
the aspects relating to rules of procedure. 
The necessity for the simplification of procedural laws is being 
felt not only among the legal intelligentsia but also among the common 
people who want speedy and impartial justice. The simplified 
procedure will reduce the pendency of cases in the courts and renders 
the justice required in time. In Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, 
State of Bihar^^, the Supreme Court held that the litigants have a 
59. AIR 1998 Punj & Har 233. 
60. Field: Law of Evidence, 4793 (Vol. VI) (1967). 
61. AIR 1979 SC1369. 
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fundamental right to speedy justice. In India, some of the major 
procedural laws which invariably invite simplification are: Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and 
substantive law like the Indian Penal Code, 1860, by enacting a new 
major Act called the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000). 
The Procedural laws in India are to be renovated to utilize the 
technological developments. The procedural laws shall be modified to 
render speedy justice and the litigant should not suffer in person, 
property or in terms of financial aspects due to intelligible exploitation 
of procedural infirmities by the opposite party. Expeditious disposal of 
cases is the genesis of the basic rule of a procedural law. The complex 
nature of procedural laws is felt responsible for the pilling up of un-
disposed cases in the Indian courts. But there are other relevant causes 
which contribute to the increase of pendency of cases. In spite of the 
comment that the judicial process in India is slow, the courts in India 
are doing their best to render justice to the litigant. The procedural 
infirmities and errors in India could well be removed by the process of 
simplification of the procedural laws. Both the Bench and Bar play 
crucial role in the process of implementing the procedural laws, Justice 
Saghir Ahmad of Supreme Court attributed the inordinate delay in 
judicial decisions to the procedural laws both in the civil and criminal 
domains, which were a legacy of the British rule and he also called for 
enacting new procedural laws which might control the sprouting of 
off-shoots responsible for decisions at several levels.^^ 
Among the procedural laws relating to Criminal investigation 
and trial, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 occupies a substantive 
portion. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was repealed by the 
newly drafted code of crime and criminality underwent a rapid change 
62. Sriniwas, M.S.V. "Procedural Laws In India - Retrospective And Prospective Views" 
AIR 2001, J 238-239. 
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due to scientific advancements. Time has proved that the present Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not equipped well to cope up with all 
these factors in criminal investigation and trial. To review completely 
the criminal investigation sectors and investigating agencies, recently, 
the Union Home Ministry appointed a special committee headed by 
Justice V.S. Malimath. This committee is entrusted with the tasks of: 
(a) to review exhaustively the criminal investigating principles 
(b) the necessity to amend or rewrite the enactments like the Indian penal 
Code, 1860, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872, to suit to the changing time and 
(c) to suggest measures to provide easy, less expensive and quick justice 
to the common man. 
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is another major procedural law 
which is not in a position to tackle the litigation arising out of 
the developments in 'information technology' and new types of 
criminal cases including white collar and cyber offences. Biological 
developments in the subject of DNA and the advanced studies in the 
field of forensic science could be useful in crime detection. Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872 shall be amended conveniently to utilize the 
evidence arising out of these scientific innovations, since every piece 
of relevant evidence constitutes a veritable backbone of a case. 
Except new sections like 111-A, 113-A, 113-B and 114-A, there are no 
Amendments to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in terms of latest 
developments taking place in scientific fields. 
Information Technology Act, 2000 proposes drastic Amendments 
to some of the sections in Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in respect of 
collecting electronic data and cases relating to cyber offences etc. This 
Information Technology Act, 2000 caused Amendments in Indian Penal 
Code, 1860 Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and Reserve Bank of 
India Act, 1934. There must be more new and exhaustive provisions 
by way of Amendments in procedural laws in the fields like recording 
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of confessions, recording of statements by various grades of police 
officers, recording of dying declarations and granting of police and 
judicial remands etc. 
The exercise of discretion by the court in implementing 
procedural law is not uncommon in daily business in the court. There 
are many instances of such discretionary powers of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872. The proper use of these powers would certainly 
save the valuable time of the court by benefiting the litigant without 
giving scope for superfluous legal Wrangles across the Bar. No statute 
could be comprehensive to meet all the contingencies. In such 
circumstances, the inherent powers conferred upon the courts by the 
procedural laws will fill up the gaps in a statute; the courts shall use 
the inherent powers sparingly to avoid the prolonged legal battle. 
The procedural law to be followed in the courts is as important 
as substantive law. In the Charanlal Sahu vs. Union oflndia,^ it was laid 
down that Art. 14 of the 'Constitution condemns discrimination not 
only by a substantive law but also by a procedural law. 
It is established that the courts in India are always zealous and 
anxious to use the procedural law in deciding the cases. No doubt that 
certain word in the procedural law like 'shall' and 'must' sound that 
the section in the Act is mandatory. But it is not always so. Words 
appearing to be mandatory will also give the tone of directory in 
nature as could be found in Rosy vs. State of Kerala.^ 
The above discussion confirmed that the existing criminal 
substantive laws and procedural law in their present form, are unable 
to answer the present day requirements and they need to be reviewed 
63. AIR 1990 SC 1480. 
64. AIR 2000 SC 637. 
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them with a view to up-date them and to make them relevant to the 
modern and changed times and claims. It is disturbing that inspite of 
all efforts at national and international level, the goal of speedy trial 
as human rights for all people is still far off. The objective can 
be achieved by reviewing the law relating to registration of case 
(FIR), investigation of cases, means and method of producing 
evidence, definition of crimes, prosecution agency, system of bail and 
confessions. 
Under these pathetic conditions, speedy justice to under trials in 
the framework of fundamental rights, human rights. Constitutional 
guarantee and procedural law assume great significance. 
Chapter -11 
SPEEDY TRIAL - HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
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SPEEDY TRIAL - HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
(A) The system of criminal justice In Ancient India 
(I) An overview 
In the Rig-Veda, Sabha, Samiti and Vidatha have been defined as the 
meeting places of the people or the assemblies of the warriors. Since such 
assemblies exercised judicial functions, so they decided the disputes both 
private and public. In such assemblies, the King or the tribal chief, as the 
case may be, had been the Supreme authority. The Atharva Veda describes 
the Sabha and the Samiti as the two daughters of Prajapati (the Creator). 
According to Sayana, the Sabha was an assembly of learned men and the 
Samiti as an assembly of warriors. So whatever their nature and 
composition may be, it is well established that such assemblies exercised 
the judicial powers and both civil and criminal matters were within their 
purview. However, with the progress of Aryan Civilization, the Sabha 
usually with the King as its head came to exercise all judicial functions.^ 
Besides the Sabha and Samiti, Yajnavalkya also refers to judicial 
functionaries, which acted almost like courts. These were the King's 
functionaries, the village community the guilds and families, Narda has 
explained this almost similarly too. The objective of having such 
functionaries was to make justice available to the people in their own 
places and thus the justice was not only cheap but also expeditious. 
The parties and their witnesses were not travel far off places to seek 
Justice. In addition to these functionaries, the King had also appointed a 
lord over each village as well as lords for ten villages, lords for twenty 
villages' lords for a hundred villages and lords for thousand villages. 
The lord of one village was subordinate to the lord of ten villages, the 
1. Jain, "Outlines of Indian Legal History", p. 140. 
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latter to the lord of twenty and so on. Each subordinate lord was duty 
bound to inform his immediate superior lord full details about the crimes 
committed in his village or villages. In towns, there were superintendents 
of all affairs who were entrusted with the responsibility of personally 
visiting and supervising the system of justice at these levels. The King had 
a minister who kept a general control over the affairs of all the officials 
who were connected with the decisions of crimes committed in towns or 
villages. In the way a compact system of administration of justice was 
developed under which every official entrusted with judicial functions was 
under the control and supervision of his superior who not only prevented 
the miscarriage but also brought administration of justice at every village 
or town under the direct control of the King. Thus, the parties to the 
disputes were protected from capricious and arbitrariness of judicial 
officials which not only warranted fair and impartial justice but also a 
speedy Justice. Thus, the disputants were protected from ruinous litigation 
and justice was expeditious at all levels. 
(II) Review of Ancient literature 
The classical literature Ramayana, Mahabharata, Dharamsasatra, 
Nitisastra, Arthsastra, Smiritis, Rigveda, seem to have had warned that 
culpable delay in dispensation of Justice was in itself an act of injustice.^ 
The Anglo-Saxon Magna Carta is in a similar Vein.^ 
During the ancient times, Hindus inhabited the Indian 
Sub-continent predominantly and it was a homogenous society. 
2. Kane, P.V., History of Dhavamsastra, Vol. Ill pp. 243, 280; R.P. Kangla, The Kautiliya 
Arthsastra, pt. I, p. 16(1960); A.S. Altakar, State and Government in Ancient India 247-8 
(1958); Shardhakar Supakar, Law of Procedure and Justice in India 103(1986); 
Yajnavalkya 11 act 31 as quoted in M.K. Sharan, Court Procedure in Ancient India 16, 19, 
20 (1987); Narada I at 32 as quoted in M.K. Sharan, id., at 17; Manu, chapter VII, Verses -
226 as quoted in K,R.B. Sestry, Hindu Jurisprudence; A study in Historical Jurisprudence, 
16 (1961); R. Sharma Sastry, Kautilya's Arthsastra 36-38, (1967); Brahaspati, Chapter I at 
12 as quoted in K.R.R. Sastry, Id., at U.C. Saskar, Epoch in Hindu legal History 85 (1958); 
K.K. Mathew, Law's Delay: "How To Solve the Riddle". 2 C.U.L.R. 363 (1978) 
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The fountainhead of Justice has always been the domain and prerogative 
of the ones who yielded power. The Ultimate and absolute power of the 
State always remained with the King who used to administer law with the 
aid and advice of able ministers and learned Brahmins. The law applied 
was on the basis of ancient religious texts and social practices. Kautilya's 
"Arihashastra, Manusmriti", and other texts replete with knowledge and 
wisdom were the guiding force."* 
Justice delivery has always been looked as an important function of 
the state right from the beginning of the civilization. There were many 
schools of dharma shastras like Manu, Brahaspati, prasar and other shastras. 
Kings who did not follow the religious text and practices and who not 
deliver justice to their subjects are condemned with contempt even today. 
Kings also appointed Judges to administer law and maintain order 
amongst the subjects.^ 
The ancient law givers emphasised the evil of delay in disposal of 
cases. Sukra said that the King could not give much time for the 
preparation and trial of cases. Great evils flow from delay and it may 
amount to denial of justice. In certain types of cases, no delay be granted 
and the law givers laid down certain rules regarding this point. 
Yajnavalkaya's Rule 
Yajnavalkaya's laid down that in accusation of Sahasa (crimes with 
violance like murder, robbery etc) theft, defamation and abuse, hurt and 
assault and cow (killing) in accusation of the major suits character of 
women, the cases should be disposed expeditiously (speedily). In other 
cases, the court could grant delay at its discretion. 
An analysis of the above provisions should that most of the 
accusation named above were of criminal nature and therefore required 
4. Arora, B.L.,Law of Speedy Trial, p.2 
5. Ibid. 
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speedy trial unless a murderer, a robber, a prisoner, an incendiary and 
such criminals are brought to book and punished speedily, such culprits 
may commit other offences and spread terror in the locality of their 
operation causing serious danger to law and order. The witness may also 
forget the defamatory words alleged to have been uttered. 
In the case_of^ccusatiorL^ PaMaJike killing of Brahman, or 
drinking of wine etc., it is more serious type of defamation when a 
Brahman is falsely accused of having drunk wine, for example, unless the 
court takes prompt action in calling the accuser to prove his case, the 
Brahman's reputation is at stake. Similarly, accusation of unchastety or 
adultery against a women, required to be promptly tried by the court. 
Accusation of killing of cow by a Hindu was and is considered to be grave 
charge amounting to serious defamation and required prompt action. 
Narada's Rule 
Narda Said, "In matters relating to cows, land, gold, women, theft, 
parusya (defamation, insult, hurt, assault, etc.) Sahasa (murder, rape, etc.) 
accusation of pataka (like killing of Brahmana, drinking wines) are urgent 
matters, the cases must be disposed of immediately (as speedily as 
possible)". 
Katyayana's Rule 
Katyayana said, 'In matters relating to cows and bullocks, land, 
women, child birth, in the matters relating to rape and sexual offences with 
an unmarried girl, in theft, in quarrels, in violent crimes, in dispute over 
treasure troves, matters causing fear and false evidence, the case should be 
tried immediately.^ 
Some of the above disputes really required quick and early 
decisions. Either in cases of criminal misappropriation and criminal breach 
6. Katyayana quoted in Sm.c. III-I, 94. 
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of trust probably, the accused was to be punished for his crime at an early 
date after the charge or if he was innocent, the imputation against his 
character (involved in the charge) required to be cleared. The same 
argument of the alleged criminal breach of trust could also arise in Yacitaka 
case, where for instance, a woman borrowed an ornament from her friend, 
did not return the same, and claimed it as her own. In the matter of buying 
and selling, the purchased commodity might be punishable or be subject to 
fluctuation of price thereof. There was fixed rule of time, after which an 
article could not be returned etc. 
Therefore, when disputes over such matters came up before the 
court, they required speedy disposal. Intimidation was a matter involving 
the problem of law and order and required to be curbed with a strong 
hand and promptly. When a person was accused of giving false evidence, 
it was necessary that the accused should not be granted delay, because 
with the passing of time, the exact words used might be forgotten and he 
might be encouraged to be a false witness in these cases also. 
Period of Delay 
Katyaayana laid down the general proposition that when the 
occurrence was recent the dispute should be settled speedily. But where 
the cause of action took place in the long past, the court might grant 
adjournment.^ 
He elaborates this proposition by saying that if occurrence is recent, 
no time should be granted. If it took place a month ago, only one day's 
adjournment may be granted, if it took place six years ago three days 
adjournment, if it took place twelve years ago, a weeks time may be 
granted; if it took place thirty years ago ten days or fifteen days 
adjournment and if it occurred more than thirty years ago, an adjournment 
7. Katyaayana quoted in Sm.c. III-I 95. 
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of one month may be granted and an adjournment of three fortnights can 
be granted if the period is still longer. 
From the above provisions, it appears that the disposal of cases in 
ancient India was perhaps much quicker than it is today, when cases 
remain pending for years and even for filing the statements, adjournment 
of several months is granted. 
(Ill) Judicial Administration in Ancient India 
Judicial Administration in India was well developed in the ancient 
as well as medieval India. Almost all-third book of Kautilya is devoted to 
Judicial Administration. 
Both the Arthasastra and the Dharmasastras establish the fact that the 
King was the fountain of justice. In addition to the King himself as a court 
of ultimate resort, there were four classes of courts. The King's court was 
presided over by the Chief Judge, with the help of counsellors and 
assessors. There were three other courts of a popular character called 
PUGA, SRENI and KULA, these were not constituted by the King. 
There were not, however, private or arbitration courts but people's 
tribunals, which were part of the regular administration of justice, and 
their authority was fully recognized. PUGA was the court of fellow 
townsmen or fellow-villagers, situated in the same locality, town or 
village, but of different castes and callings. SRENI was a court of judicial 
assembly consisting of the members of the same trade or calling, whether 
they belonged to the different castes or not. 
KULA was the judicial assembly of relations by blood or marriage. 
KULA, SRENI, PUGA and the court presided over by the Chief Judge 
(PRADVIVAKA) were courts to which persons could resort for the 
settlement of their cases and were a cause was previously tried, he might 
appeal in succession in that order to the higher courts. As the Mitakshara 
puts it, 'In a cause decided by the King's officers although the defeated 
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party is dissatisfied and thinks the decision to be based on 
misappropriation the case cannot be carried again to a PUG A or the other 
tribunals. 
Similarly, in a cause decided by a Puga, there is no resort to Sreni or 
Kula. In the same way in a cause decided by a Sreni, no recourse is possible 
to a Kula. On the other hand in a cause decided by Kula, Sreni and other 
tribunals can be resorted it. In a cause decided by Sreni, Puga and the other 
tribunal can be resorted to. Moreover, in a cause decided by a Puga the 
Royal Court can be resorted to. These inferior courts had apparently 
jurisdiction to decide all lawsuits among men, excepting violent crimes. 
From the above account of the judicial system in ancient India, the 
following points may be noted: 
a) King was supposed to be fountain of justice in a figurative manner. 
The actual dispensation of justice was done by a complex system 
consisting of a hierarchy of people's tribimals and the Royal Court 
headed by the Chief Judge. 
b) People at large participated in the dispensation of justice through 
Kula, Puga and Sreni. 
c) There was more than an arm's length distance between the persons 
exercising the legislative function and the judicial system. 
d) King's will had no role to play in the dispensation of justice and it 
was neither possible for him to show any favours or disfavours in 
matters involving justice. We have seen earlier that King's will had 
no role in the legislative function also. 
In view of the above points, the following observations can be made 
about the role of Kings in ancient India: 
a) A King was supposed to be responsible for execution of the 
legislative will an administration of justice in his Kingdom. 
b) A King had no direct or indirect legislative powers. 
c) A King was supposed to be the "fountain of justice" but he had no 
direct role in the judicial process where an elaborate system of 
judiciary consisting of royal courts and people's tribunals was 
operational. 
d) In ancient India, a King and his ministers could not even act as 
interpreters of law. 
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However, a change in medieval times took place when Kings started 
patronizing the writing of commentaries and digests. The picture that 
emerges from the above observations is very different from the image of a 
King in Europe, where based on the theory of divine power of the King, 
'Sovereignty of the Crown is supreme' and 'A King does no wrong' were 
the well-accepted rules. 
A ritual that was carried out at the time of coronation of any Hindu 
King (until very recently) illustrates the position of the King in ancient 
India. After the coronation, the crowned King declares that he is 
all-powerful. As soon as he declares his acquired power, the Rajguru 
(the chief representative of the University) hits him with a Dand (a wooden 
rod) and tells him that Dharma and not he is the most powerful. The act of 
hitting him with a Dand is a symbolic punishment to remind him of his 
subordination to the law as decided by the intellectual class. This is 
unimaginable in the coronation of a European King. 
A satisfactory and rational system of criminal procedure should 
protect citizens from false, frivolous and vexatious complaints, and from 
undue restraint on account of petty offences and it should grant; the 
accused a reasonable and honest trial in which he has every facility to 
prove his innocence and should further provide for appeal or revision in 
cases where injustice has occurred owing to the imperfections of the 
human machinery. 
A court of justice is that place where the science of practical life i.e. 
the varied interests of men are enquired into and decided according to the 
dictates of the Dharam-shastras. Such a court had ten requisites according to 
Sukraniti and Brahspati. These are: 
The King, his chosen officer, the assessors, the Smriti, the 
accountant, the scribe, gold fire, water and the King's servant. The King's 
officer is the speaker, i.e. the mouthpiece of the court, the King is the 
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punishing authority and the assessors are the judges of evidence the Smrti 
gives the law, the accountant makes the calculations, the scribe writes the 
depositions, gold and fire are for administering ordeals, and water is 
required for the thirsty and the nervous, the King's servants are for 
enforcing the attendance of the accused and the witnesses. 
Initiation of Proceedings 
As in modern times, it was recognized that the State need not 
directly take up the prosecution of all kinds of offences. Similarly, the non-
cognizable offences were compoundable, on the score that an amicable 
settlement between the parties is more satisfactory in the case of petty 
offences, than a criminal conviction and the consequent ill feeling 
engendered between the parties. 
The King and his judges could enquire into a crime only after the 
presentation^ of a written complaint by the party aggrieved or some^ near 
relative or of his friend. Cognizance by the court based on information laid 
by Government spies or volunteer informers was allowed only in the case 
of chhalas or misdemeanours, Aparadhas or felonies and the cases in which 
the King was himself a party. Chhalas included destroying roads, water 
reservoirs, houses, house trespass and indecorous behaviour before the 
King. Aparodhas included disobedience of King's order, murder adultery, 
theft and destruction of foetus. The offences concerning the King included 
sedition, counterfeiting King's coin, disclosure of King's secrets, rescuing a 
prisoner, obstruction of public proclamations. 
A criminal trial began therefore, by the complainant or the informer 
presenting his complaint or laying his information before the court. 
8. Manu viii, p. 43. 
9. Sukra iv, 5 lines 220-21, (Political Legal & Literary history of India), Vol. 2, (H.S. Bhatia). 
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(IV) Theory of Justice 
Justice had various phases in ancient India. The word Dharma has 
also been used in the sense of justice. Manu has given a very interesting 
picture of justice in Chapter VIII of his book. Where justice is destroyed by 
injustice, truth by falsehood and judges connive at it, they are themselves 
destroyed. Therefore, justice being violated destroys; but justice being 
preserved preserves; therefore, justice must not be violated, lest violated 
justice destroys us. The only friend who follows men even after death is 
justice; for everything else is lost at the same time when the body perishes. 
One quarter of the guilt of unjust decision falls on him who commits the 
illegal acts, one quarter on the false witnesses, one quarter on the judges, 
and one quarter on the King". Judges must be virtuous having capacity to 
administer justice and at the same time being highly moral character. 
Manu further says - having occupied the seat of justice, with 
covered body and having worshipped the main deities with concentrated 
mind, the King should begin the trial of the cases. Legal philosophy of 
ancient India has a charming phase. The positive law of ancient India can 
be divided into the following forms: 
(i) Substantive Law - It had eighteen titles of law which contained civil 
and criminal law separately; 
(ii) procedural law- It had the following titles 
a) Requisite qualifications of a judge, 
b) Elegance of judicial procedure, 
c) Rules of witnesses, 
d) Documentary evidence, 
e) Rules of limitations, 
f) Rules of conduct in judicial trial, 
g) Decision of trial court, and 
h) Appeal 
i^ 
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In the modern world in the nature of legiii£^ghts'there are some 
changes due to the advancement of civilization and the growth of new 
social needs, but the fundamental ingredients of legal rights and the 
method of judicial procedure are practically the same. In the modern 
world, the horizon of law has become more widened due to the legislative 
system and systematised judicial precedents. In ancient India law, making 
mainly depended on the Rishis who were obliged to read the social 
feelings, mental vision and moral integrity of the individuals and the social 
thinking and above all the needs of the people. As they were great 
thinkers, so their fertility of brain enabled them to have creative and 
working visualization of the pulse of the nation. They ably succeeded in 
evolving law highly practical and efficacious for the society. 
(V) Distinctive Feature of Administration of Criminal Justice 
Sir Henry Maine's proposition that Crime and Sins are convertible 
terms in ancient law is applicable to the evolution in Hindu jurisprudence; 
but the Civil Law could not be said in Hindu jurisprudence to have 
originated from the Law of Crimes. The Smirits deal with contracts with a 
wealth of detail and penetrating insight. The contrary proposition may be 
ventured that "Criminal Law" was a creature of the "Civil Law"^o 
The preponderance of the idea of "Civil injury over that of public wrong is 
inseparable from the following features: 
a) No separate chapter is devoted to Criminal Law in the earlier 
Smiritis. 
b) Fewer references to it warrant the "mixed Civil and Criminal 
character of offences". 
c) In transgressions of Law besides punishment of the culprit, liability 
to pay substantial damage to the injured party is provided for. 
10. C. S. Sastry Fictions in Hindu Law texts; 35. 
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Yajnavalkya refers to abuse, assault, heinous offences, {Sahasas), theft 
adultery, and miscellaneous offences under the heading of Sahasa." 
Res Judicata is defined by Harita thus: Rules regarding persons who 
can be witness and who cannot be witness, admissible evidence, oaths 
resorted to where witnesses are not available, where witnesses are not 
necessary, punishments for perjury and for withholding evidence, and the 
examination of witnesses after being bound down firmly by oaths (Narada 
1.168) are found in great minuteness in the Smritis Narada^'^ says where an 
equal number of witnesses are found on both sides with a good memory 
the evidence is entirely valueless due to the subtle nature of the Law of 
Evidence". In prosecution for defamation, assault and violent offences, 
counter-charges are allowable.^^ Evidence is divisible into human and 
divine. Human evidence is to consist of document, possession, witnesses 
and the divine when and where necessary through ordeals. Document is 
divided into written by oneself and written by another. Or again into 
three, written by the King, written in public by a public scribe, and written 
by the party himself. (Brh. VIII. 3.) 
The Evidence must be from persons who are known to be learned. 
(Narada I. 147) (Also Manu VIII, 74). The following persons can be 
witnesses: Trustworthy men of all castes, a person who has personal 
knowledge of a thing, Manu. VIII 69), women of even slaves and other 
dependent souls may be heard in suits of a grave charge (Narada, 1.188). 
In competency to be a witness may be due to: (a) a text of law, 
(b) depravity, (c) contradiction, (d) volunteering nature, (e) intervening 
disease, (f) the relationship with parties. Eleven kinds of witnesses are 
mentioned (Narada I. 140-152). Possession as a juristic concept has been 
examined. Title generally is the root and possession is the branch. 
11. Yaj. Smriti, Book 11, Ch. XVIII to XXV. 
12. Narada, 1,230. 
13. (Yaj. II. 10). 
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Gradation of Courts 
The courts presided over by the King was the highest court. There 
were other courts, some of them appointed by the King and the others, 
which people's courts recognized by the Smiritis as having the power to 
administer justice.^* 
(1) Kula (gatherings or family councils), Shreni (Corporation), Gana 
(Assembly), Adhikrita (Court appointed by the King), Nripa (King 
himself). 
These are invested with the power to decide cases. Among these 
each of the courts mentioned later is superior to the one mentioned earlier. 
The People's Courts (Gram Nyayalaya) 
(i) Kula: An assembly of impartial persons belonging to the family or 
caste of the litigants, functioning as panchayatdars or panchayat 
mandali to decide disputes among those belonging in to the same 
family or caste.^^ 
(ii) Shreni: Corporation of persons following the same craft, profession 
or trade. 
(iii) Gana : Assembly of person belonging to one place but to different 
castes of following different avocations. 
Appellate Jurisdiction 
A Shreni can review the decision of a Kula, and a Gana has the power 
to review the decision of a Shreni^^. Judges have power to review the 
decisions of a Gana and the King is the highest court of appeal and his 
decision is final.^^ As regards the existence of these courts, after 
considering, the historical evidence and the indications available there 
from, the Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report has said: 
14. Kat.82. 
15. 1-2-3 Sm.Ch. P. 40; Gharpure, p. 33. 
16. Br. P. 281.29(p. 16.13-14-15-S); 
17. D.K. p. 54. 
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"Though ancient writers have outlined a hierarchy of courts as 
having existed in the remote past the exact structure that obtained cannot 
be ascertained with any definiteness; but later works of writers like Narada, 
Brihaspati and others seem to suggest that regular courts must have 
existed on a considerable scale, if the evolution of a complex system of 
procedural rules and of popular tribunals, particularly the village courts, 
survived for a long time and existed even at the time of the 
commencement of the British rules in India. Their continuance was 
favoured by their antiquity and the absence of any other effective tribunals 
within easy reach; the structure of the village society in those days; the 
nature of the principle functions which these tribunals discharged which 
were conciliatory; and the non-interference by local rules with the working 
of these tribunals.^^ 
Courfs Holiday - The eighth day {Ashtami) and the 14^*1 day {Chaturdasi) 
every fortnight and the full moon and new moon days were to be holy days 
for the King's Court.^^ 
Salient Feature of Judicial Administration in Ancient India 
Dharmadhikaran (*Hall of Justice) 
The court hall was called Dharmadhikarana (Hall of Justice). 
The Stnritis prescribed that a spacious hall in the palace should be reserved 
for holding the King's court. Br. P. 279-18 states that the court hall should 
be on the eastern side of the palace, facing East. Trees should be grown in 
the premises and water should be made available in the vicinity. It should 
be equipped with the required number of seats, decorated with flowers 
and jewels, and pictures and idols of deities should be displayed on the 
walls.20 
18. Fourteenth Report, Vol. 1, p. 27. 
19. Saraswati Vilasa, p. 72 Quoting Harita; H.D. Vol. Ill, p. 277. 
20. Kat.52; 
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The place where the truth (in a dispute) is investigated according to 
the Dharmasastms is called Dharmadhikarana (Hall of Justice). The court was 
called Dharmasana (seat of Dharma) by Manu and Narada, and 
Dharmasthana (place of Dharma) by Sankalikita. 
(VI) Kautilya; Law and Administration of Justice 
The administration of justice is treated in a special Adhikaran, book. 
Three, which also sets forth in detail the law to be administered in the 
courts. The judges are called Dharmasthas, a name which apparently refers 
to the Dharma or law, by which they are to be guided in their work. It may 
be noted that the Smritis generally do not show acquaintance with this 
designation., It is found only casually mentioned by Manu in a passage^^ 
which is very likely derived from the present Arthasastra texf^ or one very 
much similar to it. The usual word for a judge in later times is Nyayadhish. 
It is stated that three judges, of the status of an Amatya, should be 
appointed at each of the following places; ]anapa a frontier post the 
headquarters of ten villages, Dronamukha, the headquarters of 400 villages, 
and Sthaniya, the chief city among 800 villages, which in effect is the capital 
of the state^ -"^ . The reference to Anzgrahana as a seat for a judicial court 
implies that justice is intended to be made available to the subjects very 
much nearer their places of residence than seems possible even today, it is 
not clear if a gradation among the courts at the different places mentioned 
in contemplated and if appeals from a court at a smaller place are intended 
to be enter trained in a court at a bigger place. 
Since there is no reference to any gradation among the Dharmasthas 
and since all Dharmasthas wherever they work are to be understood as 
apparently enjoying the same status, it would appear that all courts at the 
various places mentioned are on the same footing. Perhaps the only appeal 
21. Manusmirt (8.57) i. 
22. Arthasastra (3.1.19) 
23. Arthasastra (3.1.1) 
60 
from the judgement of any court would be directly made to the King, 
whose final authority in pronouncing a judgement in any legal matter 
must be supposed to be unquestioned. 
In the Chapter, which refers to the King himself as the judge, a list of 
priorities is laid down for taKing up cases for consideration. The affairs of 
temples, hermitages, heretics, Brahmins learned in the Vedas and so on are 
to be taken up first in this order, then those of minors, old persons, and 
sick persons. It is, however, added that in urgent matters and in matters of 
great importance, the rule about priorities may be set aside.24 It may be 
supposed that the same considerations are meant to apply to cases coming 
before the Dharmasthas. 
The Dharmasthas are to look into what are called VyavaMrikaarthas, 
that is, cases arising out of mutual transactions{Vyavahara) among the 
subjects.25 A vyavahara is a transaction or an affair between two parties. It 
covers not only such transactions between two parties as marriage, 
incurring of debts, sale etc., but also such affairs as Sahasa or forcible 
seizure, Anupraveaaor trespass with criminal intent. Kalaha or scuffle and so 
on, in which two parties are involved, in all these cases of Vyavahdra, if one 
of the two parties feels aggrieved, he has to take the matter to a Dharmasthq 
court before the state can do anything about it. The nature of the wrong 
suffered may be a monetary or other loss or a physical or other injury. 
As Bellower says, we have in all cases a private suit for redress of wrong or 
injury. 
Ordinarily, unless the aggrieved party lodges a complaint, the judge 
cannot proceed in the matter. However, in the case of affairs concerning 
temples. Brahmins, ascetics, women, minors, aged persons, sick persons 
and orphans, the Dharnsstha is allowed to institute proceedings suo motto, if 
these do not approach the court. It is laid down in that connection, that the 
24. ArthaSastra (1.19.29-30.) 
25. ArthaSastra Vi 3.1.1) 
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affairs of these parties must not be dismissed on the plea of absence of 
jurisdiction o or by postponing them (kalacchala) or on grounds of adverse 
possession.26 When a complaint is brought before him, the judge is to get 
the following details written down by the clerk of the court the time and 
place of the transaction, the amount of debt, and the name, caste, place of 
residence etc. of the complainant as well as of the defendant. He is then to 
record the causations put to both of them along with their replies.27 Before, 
however, the case is proceeded with; the judge is to ask both parties to 
furnish competent sureties (Avastha). This is intended to ensure that the 
fine will be received by the state whichever party loses the suit. 
It seems that the law of procedure and the law of evidence were first 
framed in connection with suits concerning the non-payment of debts 
(Ruddana). Similarly, it is in the section on Madana that we have a 
discussion on witnesses, their number, their admissibility, trustworthiness 
and so on.^s It is obvious that debt was the most ancient and the most 
common form of Vyavahara, about which disputes were taken to the court. 
It is stated that when witnesses have to be called, there should be at 
least three of them or two if both parties agree, but never one in a dispute 
concerning a debt. That they should be trustworthy and honest or 
acceptable to both the parties is naturally emphasized.29 Some persons 
however, are inadmissible as witnesses, either because they have an 
interest in one of the parties to the suit, such as his kinsmen or dependents, 
or because they suffer from some physical or social disability, such as blind 
or deaf person as or outcasts, or because they hold certain positions, such 
as that of a state servant the King himself is not to be a witness. Women as 
such appear to be inadmissible as witnesses. Exceptions however, allowed 
26. ArthaSastra (3.20.22) 
27. ArthaSastraVi 3.1.17). 
28. ArthaSastra V43.11.26ft.) 
29. ArthaSastra (3.11.26-27) 
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in cases of abuse, assault theft or adultery, when the only inadmissible 
witnesses are declared an enemy of the accused, a wife's brother or an 
accomplice of the complainant.^^ 
When different witnesses give mutually contradictory 
evidence, the judge is to accept the testimony of the majority or that of 
those among them who are known to be upright or who are accepted by 
both sides. If witnesses testify to an amount less than, the one claimed by 
the plaintiff, a part of the excess claimed is to be imposed as a fine on him. 
However, they testify to an amount larger than the one claimed, the excess 
is to be taken by the state. Because of the plaintiffs' carelessness, the 
amount was heard wrongly by witnesses or was wrongly entered by him 
in the plaint; the testimony of witnesses is to prevaiP^ 
For perjury, the different schools of Arthasastra had recommended in 
various kinds of punishment, more or less severe. Disagreeing with them, 
Kautilya himself seems to recommend only a fine of 24 panas for giving 
false evidence and 12 panas for refusing to give evidence.32 Perhaps he 
thought that too severe a penalty might lead to difficulties in getting 
witnesses. It is possible that he also does not quite approve of the rule in s^ 
which makes a witness liable to pay the decretal amount for refusing to 
give evidence, though this cannot be proved. 
The text knows documentary evidence, but it does not discuss the 
question of their admissibility or validity. This shows that, it attaches more 
importance to the testimony of witnesses than to documentary evidence. 
Obviously, we have here an earlier stage in the growth of the law of 
evidence. Kautilya says in his Arthashastra - that the King should employ 
one fourth of the total revenue for the maintenance of the State servants. 
30. ArthaSastm (3.11.28-29) 
31. ArthSastra (3.11.41-43) 
32. ArthaSastra (3.11.48-49) 
33. ArthaSastra (3.11.38) 
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The King should look to the bodily comforts of his servants by providing 
such emoluments that may inspire them to work. 
The sons and wives of those v/ho die while on duty (EXTRA 
JUDICIAL STAFFS) shall get substantive wages and subsistence. 
The family members of the aged and deceased servants shall also be 
shown favour. On occasions of funeral, sickness or child-birth the King 
shall give presentations to his servants concerned therein. In the case of 
death, illness and child-birth etc. in the family of the State servants the 
King should extend pecuniary help to them 160 panas. 
(VII) The Present System- Comparison with Ancient Judicial 
System 
In answer to the criticism that the present system is unsuited to the 
Indian conditions and is some thing alien transplanted on the Indian soil, it 
may be observed that through the changes in the early period of British 
rule in India were influenced by the system prevailing in England in 
those days, the changes did not have the effect of ousting the personal 
laws, no judicial system in any country is wholly immune from, and 
unaffected by, outside influences, nor can such outside influence be always 
looked upon as a bane. The laws of a country do not reside in a 
sealed book, they grow and develop. The winds of change, and the free 
flow of ideas, do not pass the laws idly by. As has been observed,^^ even 
in procedural law, which was codified by the foreign rulers in this country, 
the basic principles of a fair and impartial trial, which were well known to 
their predecessors, were adhered to. New laws were enacted to provide for 
matters which were either not fully covered by the indigenous law, or 
where such laws were not clearly defined and ascertainable or were 
otherwise not acceptable to the modern way of thinKing. Such outside 
influences are, however an integral part of the historical process of 
34. Pakistan Law Reforms Commission Report, 1967-70, p.lOl. 
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development of thought and institutions all over the world, and once the 
new concepts get assimilated, they cease to be alien in character. Viewed in 
this light, it seems hardly correct to say that the present judicial system is a 
foreign transplant on Indian soil, or that it is based on ahen concepts 
unintelligible transplant on Indian soil, or that it is based on alien concepts 
unintelligible to our people. The people have become fully accustomed 
to this system during more than a hundred years of its existence. 
The procedures and even the technical terms used by the lawyers and the 
judges are widely understood by the large majority of litigants. 
Criminal justice in Ancient India 
It would appear that the criminal justice system was equally 
sophisticated. Ancient Indian lawgivers and commentators exhibit a 
richness of thought and variety; reminiscent of modem legal systems. 
In substantive criminal law, for Example, we find an elaborate 
classification of offences. The broad categories were fine, namely, abusive 
words, assault, theft, adultery and crimes of violence.^s There were, 
however, a number of variations in each of these broad categories. 
For Example theft was classified in to three kinds according to the value of 
the things stolen trifling, middling and grave or high.^^ Another interesting 
refinement was the classification of thieves into open or patent thieves and 
secret thieves, reminding us to a certain extent of the modern discussion 
about white-collar criminals and others. In open or potent thieves were 
included traders who employ false weights and measures, gamblers, 
quacks, persons giving bribes, persons who profess to arbitrate, persons 
who manufacture counterfeit articles and the like^^ "Concealed thieves" are 
illustrated by persons who move about with tools for house-breaKing 
without being observed. These were again sub-divided into nine 
35. Kane, "History of Dharmasastras", 1972, Vol. 3, p. 515. 
36. Id. p. 519 
37. Id., p. 520 
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categories.38 Learned discussion as to the right of private defense was not 
iinknown.39 
Punishment of Abetment 
Detailed rules are to be found for the punishment of abettors. 
The rules relating to abetment and the penalties for various species of 
abetment as provided by Katyayana^o offer an interesting parallel to the 
graded punishment in the Indian Penal Code for various species of 
abetment. 
Offences 
The range of offences itself was surprisingly large. Not only were 
offences such as murder, rape, dacoity and the like (which may be called 
conventional offences) punishable, but there were provisions punishing 
other crimes as well, for example not running to the rescue of another 
person in distress was an offence.^i This is surprisingly modern provision, 
as it should be noted that it is only during the last twenty years or so that 
the question whether such an omission ought to be made an offence has 
been seriously debated in Common Law Countries. 
Punishment is prescribed for causing damage to trees in city parks, 
to trees providing shade, to trees bearing flowers, and fruits, to trees, 
which are useful, to trees in holy places, or trees serving as boundary 
marks.42 
Even the giving of a wrong decision, if done corruptly by a judge, 
was regarded as punishable.'*^ 
38. Katyayana, Verses 832-834, as quoted by Kane, "History of the Dharmasastra", 1972, 
Vol. 3, p. 529. 
39. Kane, History of Dharmastras, 1972, p. 507. 
40. Katyanaya, verses 332, as quoted by Kane, "History of the Dharmasastra", 1972, Vol.3, 
p. 529. 
41. Kautiliya Arthasastra, 1965, part 3, p. 230. 
42. Id., p. 229 Chapt. 3.18. 
43. Kautiliya iv.9; Kane, "History of the Dharmasastra", 1972, vol. 3, p. 271. 
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Criminal Procedure 
As to judicial procedure in criminal cases, the lawgivers seem to 
have been aware of the presumption of innocence; there are texts, which 
forbid conviction merely on suspicion. Rules for the evaluation of evidence 
of various classes of witnesses met with. The famous Sanskrit play 
Mrichhakatikam has an interesting trial scene that reveals stages of 
procedure not very different from a modem criminal trial. 
Perjury and other offences by witnesses were punished severely by 
the criminal law,^^ the penalty being fine and banishment. 
There were six types of punishment, reprimand, torture, 
imprisonment, death and banishment. 
The punishment was graded according to several factors. It was 
material to consider whether the offence was the first crime of the 
offender*^ or whether it was his second criminal act, and so on. The time 
and place of the offence; and the strength and knowledge (of the offender) 
were to be fully considered.^^ 
It is one of the justified complaints against the modern penal law 
that in criminal proceedings the injured party is generally neglected. In 
ancient Hindu Law, the lawgivers were fully aware of the necessity of 
directly compensating the victim of the crime. Thus, Manu says:'*^ 
"If a limb is injured, or blood (flows) the assailant shall be made to 
pay (to the sufferer) the expense of the cure, or the whole (both the usual 
embracement and the expenses of the cure as a) fine (to the King)" 
44. Manu viii, 120; Vol. 25 Sacred Books of the East, p. 275 
45. Manu viii, 129; Vol. 25 Sacred Books of the East, p. 276 
46. Manu viii, 16; Vol. 25 Sacred Books of the East, p. 218 
47. Manu, vii, 207, 288; Vol. 25 Sacred Books of the East, p. 393 
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Manu adds -
"He who damages the goods of another, he it intentionally or 
unintentionally, shall give satisfaction to the (owner) and pay" "to the 
King a fine equal to the (damage)". 
It would appear that on the basis of the injunctions contained in the 
texts, one could construct an entire code of criminal law. 
We have just noticed that the present judicial system is the result of 
a gradual process which has been going on incessantly, and that it is not 
the product of one day. Changes, modifications and amendments have 
been made both in the hierarchy of courts as well as in the procedures 
followed by them, as the society gradually became more and more 
developed. The present day complications and delays in disposal of cases 
are not so much on account of the technical and cumbersome nature of 
our legal system as they are due to other factors operating in and outside 
the courts. Inspite of the fact that we are still heavily dependent on 
agriculture; we can no longer be regarded as an undeveloped peasant 
society, in view of the great strides that have been made in the direction of 
industrialization and urbanization of population, besides expansion of 
trade and commerce. It will be a retrograde step to the primitive method of 
administration of justice by, taking our disputes to a group of ordinary 
laymen ignorant of the modem complexities of life and not conversant 
with legal concepts and procedures. The real need appears to be to further 
improve the existing system to meet modern requirements in the context 
of our national ethos and not to replace it by an inadequate system, which 
has left behind long ago. 
B. Judicial Administration In India During Medieval Period 
(i) Concept of Justice in Islam 
The concept of justice in Islam is that it should be impartial and no 
respecter of persons, high or low prince or peasant, white or black, Muslim 
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or non-Muslim. The Book of God enjoins upon the believers to decide 
cases on the basis of equity, justice and upright testimony: 
0,ye who believe, be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for 
Allah's sake though it may be against your own slaves or your parents or 
near relations, be he rich or poor. Allah is most competent to deal with 
them both, therefore do not follow your low desires lest you deviate, and if 
you swerve or turn aside then surely Allah is aware of what you do.^ ^ 
O, ye who believe, stand out firmly for God, as witnesses to fair 
dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong 
and depart from justice. Be just, that is next to piety and fear God, for God 
is well acquainted with all that ye do.^^ The Muslim Canon law has also 
laid down strict rules for the guidance of the Qazis in administering justice 
without distinction of race and creed, friends and foes. The Second Caliph 
(Hazrat Umar) issued a farman to the governor of Kufa containing 
instructions for the administration of justice. One of the instructions is 
"Treat all men justly and on equal footing when they appear before you in 
the court.50Another farman containing the following instruction: in dealing 
justice regard all men as equal, and treat the near and remote on equal 
footing, and keep yourself free from corruption".^^ 
The two main functions of an Islamic state, according to historians, 
are firstly to establish peace and harmony in the state and afford protection 
to the weak against the strong, secondly, to punish evil doers and restore 
to the injured his due right. This last mentioned duty rests on the judge. 
Hence, the dignity of the judicial office has always been given great 
importance in Islam. 
48. {AL-Quran, TV: 135) 
49. {AL-Quran, Y. 9) 
50. Shibli: "Al-Farouq", Part II, p. 19 
51. "Kanz-ul Ammal", Vol. II, p. 1147 
69 
(ii) Extent and Application of Muslim Law 
It is ordinarily believed by the common people that the Muslim 
Sovereigns governed India with the laws of Shara (canon laws of Islam) 
"imported ready made from outside India"52 xhis is not wholly true. 
The fact that Muhammadan Law consists of two parts, religious and 
secular and that each portion has its special application, it is important to 
mention that the Shariat enjoins that the cannon law should be made 
applicable only to those who believe in the Islamic religion. Consequently, 
the whole body of the Muslim law is not applicable to non-Muslim.=3 
The Muslim jurists have classified the Muslim law under two broad heads 
- Tashri'yi, religious and Ghair-teshri'yi, secular. The purely religious 
portion of law is applicable to Muslims only. The secular portion which is 
in substance common to all nations, applies to Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. The principle is thus stated in the Fatawai-Alamgiri: "Non Muslim 
Subjects (Dhimmi) of a Muslim state are not subjects to the laws of Islam". 
Their legal relations are to be regulated "according to precepts of their own 
faith" .54 
Such being the policy of the Islamic law, the extent of its application 
to India during the Muslim rule may be stated as under: 
Civil Law 
(a) The purely personal law of Islam relating to inheritance, succession, 
marital rights, guardianship, will, endowment, gift, etc. was applied to 
Muslims only, as was the case under the British rule. 
(b) The secular portion of the civil law relating to trade, barter, exchange, 
sale, contract, etc., was made applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. 
The laws of the land - The system of taxation relating to land revenue, 
minerals, quarries, manufacture, agriculture, excise. Octroi (chungi), 
52. Sarkar: "Mughal Administration", p. 2-4. 
53. Baillie: "Digest of Muhammadan Law," p. 174 
54. Ibid. 
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merchandise, Sea- borne trade, etc;, were adopted from the people of this 
country by the Mushm sovereigns of India with necessary modifications. 
These taxes and imports were levied on and reaHzed from ail races 
(including Muslims) alike. 
The Religious and Personal Laws of the Non-Muslims - The 
Hindus, the Buddhists and other non-Muslim subjects were governed by 
their own respective religious and personal law. When the tribunal 
happened to be the court of the Qazi, or the court of the sovereign the suits 
involving the points of personal law of the Hindus, were used to be 
decided with the aid of the learned pandits and Brahmans, in the case of 
the other races, with the aid of their learned men.^^ 
Criminal Law 
(a) The portion of the Islamic canon law which deals with religious 
infringement, was applied to Muslims only; such as drinking, 
marrying within the prohibited degree, apostasy, etc. For such 
offences non-Muslims were not held liable to punishment under 
the laws of Shara.56 
(b) That portion of the Islamic criminal law which punishes the acts 
which constitute crimes in the estimation of all nations, was 
applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, e.g. adultery, murder, 
theft, robbery, assault, etc.s^ 
The Qanun-i-Shahi or the Edicts and Ordinance, contained in the Farmans 
and Dastur-ul-amal for the guidance of the officers of the State. They were 
the common law of the people of the country as opposed to the Canon law. 
These Qanun were binding upon the judicial and executive officers, and in 
compliance therewith the courts of common law were established in India. 
Such have been the scope and extent of the law applied to the 
Muslim and non-Muslims of India during the Muhammedan rule. It is 
55. Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, Vol. II p. 357. 
56. A. Rahim: Mohammadan Jurisprudence", p. 59. "Shar-i-Vagaya," Vol. III. Ch. On Qaza 
(Judicial Administration) 
57. Ibid. 
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clear that the body of laws which controlled the social life and regulated 
the legal relations of the Indians (including Indian Muslims) consisted at 
least of three kinds of laws - the Indian law,^^ the Muslim Law, and the lex 
loci or the municipal laws of the country, which did not properly come 
within the scope of the Hindu or Muhammedan Law, but many of them 
consisted of the various local taxes and duties and customs. This kind of 
law was often imposed by the Farmans and Edicts of the emperors. It 
should be noted that the municipal laws as well as the various local taxes 
and imposts which are mentioned in the books on Fiqqh as imposed by 
Caliphs, were not applied by the Muslim sovereigns to the Indian people. 
Further, the secular portion of the Muslim Law underwent changes and 
was often modified by the Shahi Farmans. Hence it is not correct to say that 
the Muslim Rulers governed outside India with the laws imposed were 
ready made from India.^^ 
iii) Administration of Justice during Musl im Rule 
The history of judicial system of India traced here relates to the 
period covered by the Medieval Age and extends upto the middle of the 
18* century. The age had its ideals of justice and standards of punishment. 
In order to make a clear picture, the administration of justice during 
Muslim rule is divided into four periods; 
(1) The period of conquest and military occupation - From the Arab 
conquest of Sindh till the invasion of Sabuktagin (712-991 A.D.) 
(2) The period of successive invasions without any attempt to establish a 
government in India - From the death of Sabuktagin till the invasion 
by Muhammad Ghori (999-1206 A.D.). 
(3) The period of settled government with judicial tribunals - From the 
time of Slave Dynasty till the death of Sher Shah (1206 - 1555 A.D.). 
(4) The period of well-established government with extensive judicial 
and administrative machinery from the Mughal Rule till the grant of 
the Diwani (1555-1765 A.D.) 
58. i.e. The laws of the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Jains, etc. 
59. Sarkar: "Mughal Administration," p. 6. 
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First Period 
The famous Arab general, Muhammad Bin Qasim defeated Rai 
Dahir and annexed Sindh and Multan. Although the provinces were held 
by the Arabs, it was merely a military occupation. There was no Muslim 
Government in the proper sense of the term. Muhammad Bin Qasim 
entrusted the internal administration of the conquered provinces to the 
Brahmans who held important positions in the reign of Rai Dahir. 
The administration of the country was, therefore, carried on by the 
Indians themselves without any interference by the conqueror.^o 
The administrative and judicial machinery remained the same in the hands 
of the Hindu officials, who held courts and administered justice in 
accordance with their Shastra. During this period no portion of the 
Mohammedan law not even the law relating to Dhimmi (non-Muslims), 
was applied to the conquered provinces. As regards the Muslim soldiers 
who remained in the occupation of the country, they were governed by the 
Muslim law, and their disputes were decided in the court of Qazi with the 
assistance of Mufti. In the case of miscarriage of justice the provincial 
Governor (Amil) used to hear appeal - more properly speaking, revise the 
judgement of the Qazi in consultation with the Qazi and Mufti who 
assisted him (the Governor) in arriving at a right conclusions^. 
Second Period 
The period of successive invasions and turmoil began from the 
incursions of Subuktigin (991 A.D.) and lasted till the permanent conquest 
of India by Muhammad Ghori (in 1206 A.D.) During this period. Sultan 
Mahmud of Ghazni led his famous expeditions to India. He did not 
establish any stable government. All his invasions were plundering 
60. Elphinstone; "History of India", pp. 302-303. H.M. Elliot "Arabs in Sii\gh," pp. 2-3. 
61. Waheed Husain, B.L, "Administration of Justice During the Muslim Rule in India" with 
A History of the origin of the Islamic Legal Institutions, p. 18 
73 
expeditions. "Of this period we have no record of the Muslim 
administration of justice in India" .^ ^ 
Third Period 
The period of the settled government commenced from the slave 
dynasty (1206 - 1290 A.D.) and continued during the reign of Khilji 
dynasty (1290 - 1321), the Tuglaq dynasty (1321-1413), the Lodi dynasty 
(1451-1526) and the Sur dynasty (1539-1555) during these periods there 
was a permanently settled government in India, and the administrative 
and judicial machineries were set up for the better working of the 
government. 
One of the noteworthy features of the Muslim Sovereignty of India 
is that from the time of the slave kings the Muslim sovereign adopted 
India as their home and Muslim became the permanent inhabitants of this 
country. There were no doubt influx and efflux, but the influx was greater 
than the exodus. Consequently, the monarchs began to devote greater 
attention to the consolidation of the government of the country. This led to 
the rapid improvement of the Civil and Judicial Administration. 
Pre-Mughal Period 
Before discussing the administiation of justice during Mughal 
Period, it is important to survey the administration of justice during 
Pre-Mughal period. The reason is obvious. The Mughal system of the 
administiation of justice was of slow growth; the judicial machinery was 
set up gradually and from time to time modified and improved upon what 
had existed in the pre-Mughal period. 
Tribunals 
During this period regular tribunals were established; judicial 
officers of different grades were appointed, court houses (Mahkuma-i-
62. Muhammadulllah: "The Administration of Justice of Muslim Law", p. 57. 
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adalat) built, rules of procedure as prescribed in the law books observed, 
and the decrees passed by the judges, enforced. Further, the court of 
revision [mimfi at) was constituted, censors Muhtasibs were appointed for 
the supervision of public morals and illegal traffic and for the control of 
grog shops and suppression of gambling dens. The chief Judge {Qazi-ul-
Quzat) was first appointed to supervise the work of the subordinate 
Qazis at the time of Qutbuddin Aybak. Hasan Nizami, the author of 
Taz-ul-Ma'sir to remark: "he extinguished the flame of discord by the 
splendour of the light of justice."63 
Suits and Appeal 
It was the practice of the Muslim sovereigns to administer justice in 
person. Almost all the Muslim monarchs of these periods used to hold 
court and hear suits and appeals. Al-Badayuni point out that Sultan 
Muhammad Tughlaq constituted himself "the Supreme Court of appeal", 
and used to revise the decisions of Qazis for the ends of justice.^^ 
Al-Badayuni says : 
"The Sultan used to keep four Muftis to whom he allotted quarters 
in the precincts of his own palace. So that when any one was arrested upon 
any charge, he might in the first place argue with the Muftis about his due 
punishment. He used to say, be careful that you do not fail in the slightest 
degree by defect in speaking that which you consider right, because if any 
one should be put to death wrongfully the blood of that man will be upon 
your head.' Then if after long discussion they convicted (the prisoner) even 
though it were midnight he would pass order for his execution" .^ 5 
From the above description, it is clear that the sovereign's court 
(Dizvan-i-Adalat) was original as well as appellate. 
63. H.M. Elliot: "History of India" Vol. I, p. 208. 
64. "Muntakhab-i-Taxvarikh," p. 311 (translated by G.I. RanKing) 
65. "Al-Badayuni (Translated by RanKing), p. 317. 
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Dr. MuhammaduUah points out that Muhammad Tughlaq 
"appointed distinguished officers of the state as judges irrespective of the 
fact whether they were Umama or not". Ibn Batuta speaks very highly of the 
Sultan; in his opinion "of all men this king is the most humble and of all 
men he most loves justice,the Sultan submitted to the decrees of the court 
passed against himself." 
Although the Muslim sovereigns of India were absolute monarch, 
they were subject to the court of justice and used to uphold the majesty of 
law. There have been cases in which Muslim sovereigns have bowed to the 
authority of the law courts sometimes against their will.^^ 
Raziya Begum 
Sultana Raziya (daughter of Altamish) furnished a striking example 
that a Muslim lady can be a Queen and Qazi under the Muslim law. Chand 
Sultan is another example which demonstrates that the daughters of Islam 
enjoy the same rights and privileges as her sons. 
Razia Begum "gave up the seclusion of Zanana and transacted 
business in open court like a King. She even put on the head dress of a 
man". She used to hold court and dispense justice in person with the Qazis 
and Muftis who attended the audience its duties in the usual manner. 
Ghia Suddin Balban 
He established a strong government and effected certain 
improvements in the administration of justice. He was an impartial 
dispenser of justice, and "never showed any partiality towards any of his 
subjects even if they were his kin and relations.Balban also established a 
system of espionage with a view to make the administration of justice 
efficient; the spies were called upon the report every act of misconduct and 
every instance of miscarriage of justice to the monarch directly".Hence the 
66. Vide State vs. Sidi Maula. Badaoni I, pp. 170-171. State us Nurjhan. Tuzuk Shibli, p. 30. 
Widow vs. King Ghayas. 
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system of espionage was carried to the extreme by the Mughal Emperors 
of India. 
During the reign of Sultan Sikandar Lodi the designation of Qazi-ul-
Qazat (chief Judge) was changed to Mir-i-Adl and the court of the chief 
judge was replaced by Dar-ul-Adl. He initiated several reforms in the 
Judicial and administrative machinery of the government but could not 
give effect to them owing to his death.^^ 
Judicial Reforms of Sher Shah 
During the sultanate of Sher Shah both the judicial and the executive 
machinery was greatly improved. He introduced various reforms, which 
may be summarized thus: The provinces of his empire were divided into 
administrative units called Sarkar's, which were again subdivided into 
Parganas. He appointed Shiqdars a new set of officials who were the 
executive officers for the administration of criminal justice, and Munsifs 
who used to try civil suits. The village administration was left to the 
village community, the autonomy of which was not disturbed. Sher Shah 
appointed Muqaddams or the village headmen who were held responsible 
for the commission of offence in the village, and required to produce the 
offenders before the proper authority. The duties of the Muqaddams were 
to keep watch over thieves, robbers and bad characters and to detect 
crimes when committed. 
During the reign of the predecessors of Sher Shah, the judiciary 
under the chief Qazi were called Dad-hak, i.e. the dispenser of justice.^^ 
iv) Mughal Period - Speedy Justice an Overview 
The Muhgal Dynasty was established in 1526 A.D. by Zahiruddin 
Babar, the period was the Golden Age of the Muslim rule in India. Babar 
defeated the last Lodi Sultan of Delhi and brought the Sultanat to an end. 
67. Dr. Muhammadullah : "Administration of Justice of Muslim Law", p. 58. 
68. H.M.Elliot: "History of India", Vol. Ill, p. 126. 
His son Humayun, was turned out of the cquXitry by Sher Shtah'Sur in 
1540, but he regained his Kingdom in 1555%^tdeJeatihg'.^l<andar at 
Sirhind, and from that date the Mughals ruled India effectively until 1750 
A.D. and nominally up to 1857, when the last Mughal Emperor was 
succeeded by Queen Victoria as Empress of India.^? 
The influx of cases was meagre in the Mughal period or because of 
some other reason there was no specific provision of speedy trial. 
The literature available concerning the criminal justice system 
during initial stages of the Mughal period in India succinctly discerns that 
it was endeavoured to dispose off the cases as quickly as possible so that 
neither the evidence of witnesses decayed nor the sequence of events were 
obliterated by lapse of time/o 
The Mughal Emperors were extraordinary hard working they kept 
an eye on all departments of the State including that of law and justice. 
The Mughal emperor used to hold his court everyday where ordinary 
cases were decided. Akbar held his court after prayers and administered 
justice there.7^ Every Muhgal Emperor, however, set apart a day of the 
week for administration of justice. In the case of Akbar, it was Thursday^^ 
for Jahangir Tuesday and for Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb Wednesday. 
William Hawkins who visited India during Jahangir's reign 
(1608-13) remarked that the Indian Kings sat "daily in justice every day" 
69 Muhammad Basheer Ahmad, "The Administration of Justice in Medieval India. 
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p. 133. 
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126(1967); R.C. Majumdar, et.al. An advanced History of India 552(1970); Vincent Smith 
Akbar the Great Mughal 344 (1918); Abul Fazal, Ain-e-Akbari translated by H. 
Blockmamu. Vol.III p. 399, K.C. Vyas and D.R. Saedesai, India through the Ages 142 
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Nicholas Withington (1612-16) observed that Jahangir sat in his court at 
Agra three times a day to do his 'great justice'. Edward Terry (1616-19) 
confirms this and adds that any complaint there could hold up his petition 
and was sure to receive a hearing. We learn from the account of William 
Hawkins that Jahangir came to the audience Hall at 3 O'clock and took his 
seat on the royal throne while his nobles and Mansabdars kept standing. 
For two hours, he "hearth all cases in this place". According to another 
account, he came to the court between 3 and 4 O'clock in the afternoon and 
did not leave till the evening.73 
The Mughal emperors even when out of the capital did not neglect 
the cause of justice. While embarking on the Bengal expedition, Akbar held 
his court in the boat and decided cases there-^'^Even while he was on March 
the King failed not to hold the court in tent and administer justice. 
"The king of Hindustan Seldom fails even when in the field, to hold this 
assembly twice during the 24 hours, the same as when in the capital. 
Besides the special day reserved for the administration of justice, the 
Mughal emperor used to hear cases in the Diwan-i-Aam also on almost all 
the days of the holding of the court. When the petitions of the aggrieved 
concerning different matters were presented, the persons involved were 
ordered to present themselves before the emperor who heard their 
complaints and delivered judgement usually on the spot. In certain cases 
full investigation ordered, sent for detailed report and then gave the 
decision. According to Bernier, Aurangzeb devoted two hours on another 
day to hear in private the petitions of ten persons selected from the lower 
order. One day he fixed to attend the justice chamber, called 'Adalatkhan, 
where he was assisted by two principal Qazis7^ 
73. Satya Prakash Sangar Dr., "Crime And Punishment in India" (1998) p. 21. 
74. Akhar Nama, III, 88; Bev. II, p. 124. 
75 Bernier, LP. 263; Manucci, II, p. 462. 
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The emperor was supposed to dispose of a large number of cases at 
a court of first instance and as the highest court of appeal. From the above 
finding one thing is clear that the trials in Mughal India by the Kings were 
'Speedy' and so the punishments. 
Functionaries under Administration of Justic^Courts 
During the Sultanate, the department of law and justice was named 
as Mahekmae Qaza. The word Qaza was, replaced by 'Adalat' under the 
Mughals and the word 'Mahekmae Adalat' was generally adopted for the 
Department of Justice as distinct from Mahekmae Shariya used for questions 
related with religion. 
The Qazi, Mir Adl, Mufti and Darogha-e-Adalat belonged to the 
Mahekmae Adalat, but there were also officers of the revenue and other 
departments who had power to try cases such as the Dizvan, Faujdar, Kotival 
and Amalguzar'^^ etc. 
In Mughal India, there were mainly three agencies in general charge 
of Judicial Administration, The Emperor and his agents like the provincial 
governor, the Faujdar in the Sarkar and the Kotival usually administered 
political cases. Robbers and rebels working in organized bands would 
claim the attention of and receive punishments from these secular officers. 
The Qazi administered Shar'i or sacred law. His jurisdiction was 
confined only to questions connected with religion. He decided disputes 
concerning family law and marriage, inheritance or auqaf and also criminal 
cases. 
For the Hindus and the village people there were the courts of the 
Brahmin Pandits and the castes elders. They administered the Common 
(unwritten law) or codes of tribal traditions. They were not subordinate to 
the Qazi, nor had anything to do with the Shar'i law.'^ 
76. Arbabe-e-Adalat,.Khsiii Khan II, p. 607. 
77. Satya Praksh Sangar Dr. "Crime and Punishment in Mughal India", (1998), p. 20. 
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(V) Procedure Adopted for Administration of Justice 
From the treatises on Adah-ul-Qazi, i.e. practice and procedure to 
observe by the court are as follows: 
The trial should be held in an open court. The Qazi is required to sit in 
the court of justice {Darul Qaza). The peons and orderlies must be present 
at a distance in the court. The public as well as the parties and their 
witnesses are allowed to have a free access to the court. The peons are to 
regulate the crowd and keep order in the court. The Katib, the writer or the 
clerk of the court, is to sit near the Qazi. His duty is to receive plaints and 
petitions and to record evidence under the direction of the court. The Qazi 
sit on the masnad, some times on a raised platform covered with carpet. 
The parties are to sit in front of the Qazi and must be treated on equal 
footing whatever may be their respective position. The Mufti and Ulama 
(the law officers of the court) are to take their seats near the Qazi. 
The usher calls in the parties. The Vakil represents the parties or the 
parties themselves state their case. No oath is to be administered in the 
first instance, because evidence is incumbent of the part of the plaintiff and 
oath on the defendant.''^ The Katib records the statements and the evidence. 
However, it is held better that the Qazi should himself take down the 
evidence. After hearing the plaintiff and his witnesses, if the Qazi thinks 
that a iprima facie case has been established, and that the statements of the 
witnesses are in the conformity with the allegations in the plaint, he will 
call upon the defendant for an answer. This can be done either by way of 
denial, or by a way of avoidance. If the parties desire to examine witnesses 
and ask for time, the Qazi must grant time and adjourn the hearing. 
Otherwise, he is to adjudge the case on materials before him. The order of 
the court is to be noted in the register of the case. 
78. Hidaya (Grady), p. 451 
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The judgement and decree are to be drawn up and Mahzur and Sijil 
(decree and records of proceedings) are to be prepared in accordance with 
certain rules and embodied in the prescribed forms7^ 
Jurisdiction 
Qazis were enjoined to watchful of their jurisdiction to whatever 
offices they appointed and were not to exceed it (Fiqh-e-Firoz Shahi). They 
were supposed to try only those classes of cases, which were specified in 
their letter of appointment (Fatawa Vol. III. Adabul Qazi). The King, Qaziul 
Quzat, the Subahdar within the Subah and the Qazi-e-Subah within his 
charge alone had inherent jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. 
The Qazis could not decide suits in which they were personally 
interested^o {Fatawa) but they could be appointed in their home district^^ 
vide letters of appointment in the Appendix. Emphasis was laid on the 
trial of case on the spot if possible. 
The powers of the Appellate courts and their jurisdiction in Revision 
were not defined. The principle underlying the system as followed by the 
Sultans and adopted by the Mughal Emperors was that a decision of a 
lower court could be challenged in a higher court and the political 
divisions of the State determined the status of the courts. From the nature 
of their office, the King and the Qaziul Quzat possessed jurisdiction to try 
cases all over the empire. 
Procedure in Criminal Cases 
In Mughal India, the procedure adopted for deciding Criminal cases 
was simpler. 
There was no system of 'commitment for trial' and the criminal 
courts followed a uniform practice. The criminal complaint was to be 
79. Baillie: "Digest of Muhammadan Law", pp.763-69 
80. Section 556, Criminal Procedure Code in British India. 
81. Ain-e-Akbari, Text I, p. 283. 
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presented to court personally, or through a representative. The 
government prosecutions w^ere instituted by Mohtasibs or Kotwals.^^ The 
court had power to call the accused at once or it could insist upon hearing 
the complainant's evidence before summoning him vide complaints of Sir 
Thomas Roe against Zulfiqar Khan and Asaf Khan.In petty cases, no 
record was kept except a note in register [Musajjilat). The sentence was 
pronounced in open court. 
Ex-Party Proceeding 
Evidence could be heard in the absence of an absconding accused, 
but prosecution witnesses were to be recalled when he was arrested and 
his trial Commenced. {Kitabul Ikhtyr Ms. Add. 22714 f. 35). {Kitabul 
Mafqud,Figh-e-Firoz Shahi). The practice in Mughal India that if the 
complainant was absent the accused was to be released. In a murder case, 
i.e. State vs. Sulaiman and others, the heirs of the deceased did not appear to 
prosecute the case and the accused were discharged.^3 
In another case. State vs. Sulaiman and others (collections) a murder 
case, the heirs of the deceased did not appear to prosecute the case and the 
accused were discharged.^^ This can only happen in British India if the 
alleged offence is punishable with not more than six-month's 
imprisonment. No judgement could be pronounced in the absence of both 
the parties and their counsel.^s {Yakil). 
Process of Prosecution 
In offences against religion, Mohtasib or the Censors of Morals were 
the prosecutors.86 i^ other state prosecutions, the Kotival had this duty or 
82. Lt. Col. A Dow, CUL, "History of Hindustan", Vol. Ill, p. 105 
83. Muhammad Basheer Ahmad, 'The Administration of Justice in Medieval India (1941) 
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86. Sir, Jadunath Sarkar Mughal Administration (1935) p. 30. 
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the Faujdar in places where there was a Faujdar but no Kotwal. Shiqahdars 
also could report the Qazis for cognizance of cases in Parganas. 
The sole purpose of the office of Qazi was to dispense justice. 
The procedures laid down in this connection are to help him and provide 
him facilities to carry out the judicial work, and not to bind him by the 
regulations of the work if the same are inconsistent with the fair and 
speedy administration of justice.Hence, there are some provisions in the 
procedure in courts to expedite the administration of justice. 
Law of Limitation 
The Shara' fixes no limitation for anything the author of Ikhtyar 
(Ms. Add. 22714) mentions at several places that in criminal cases evidence 
was to be produced without delay. For summoning the evidence, one 
month from the date of the presentation of the suit was recommended in 
Hidayah.^'^ In the old Turkish Empire, definite periods were prescribed 
within which evidence, oral and documentary had to be produced. 
This was not prohibited by any express rule of the Shara and therefore, the 
Ulema agreed to it. 
There are no records to show if any regulations were issued in 
Medieval India limiting the time within which suits or appeals were to be 
filed. The Dastural Amal Ms. 2907 (I.O.L.) prepared in 1793 A.D. by East 
India Company for its courts in South India fixed a limitation period, but it 
did not show whether the regulation was borrowed from the system 
previously in force. 
Arbitration (Tahkim) 
The Cannon law of Islam (Sharah) allows arbitration between the 
parties i.e. called Tahkim. The law confers the right upon the parties to refer 
their dispute to an arbitrator of their choice.The arbitrator has the power to 
87 VideBr.Mus. Add. 22714 f. 11. 
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examine witnesses, administer oath like a court, and give award according 
to the facts of the case and in accordance with the law to which the parties 
are subject. If the parties accept the award, the decision of the arbitrator 
will be binding upon the parties and will have the force of a decree. 
However, if a party does not accept the award and refers it to the Qazi for 
its revision {marafia) the letter has the power to interfere and set it aside if 
the award is not in accordance with the law; otherwise, the Qazi will pass a 
decree in terms of the award. 
No arbitration was allowed in certain criminal matters, which entail 
the specific punishment of hadd and retaliation.^^ Misdemeanours, i..e. 
offences of man vs. man were not subject to arbitration, which was allowed 
mostly in cases of Debt, Trade, Accounts, Commerce and Petty quarrels. 
{Hidayah, p. 329). 
Compounding of offences 
Generally, in private complaints, which were not prosecuted by 
State, compounding of criminal cases was allowed {Kitabul Ikhtayar p. 59). 
In other cases, the permission of the court was necessary. The present 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in India has laid down that certain offences 
which are of a private nature and relatively not quite serious as 
compoundable offences and some other as compoundable only with the 
permission of the court U/Sec. 320(1) and 320(2) respectively, but Qazis 
went so far as to allow a murderer to expiate his offence by payment of 
'Qisas' (blood fine) vide State Vs. Nurjhan, Tuzuk (Shibli) p. 30 and Ata 
Husain Vs. Ashiq Husain and others (1853) (Baqiat, p. 34), an obvious 
impossibility today. According to the Fiqh-e-Firoz Shahi the parties to a 
criminal case could compromise only if the accused was in the custody of 
the court lest a compromise should be exacted from him under pressure. 
88 Sharh-i-Vaqaya, Vol. Ill Chapt. On Arbitration 
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For the same reason no weight was given to confessions made to the 
pohce. 
VI. The Working of the Judicial Machinery 
Courts - The immediate successors of the Prophet (PBUH) organised^^ 
Court in mosques where every person could approach them without 
hindrance. The Abbaside Caliphs erected separate buildings for their Qazis. 
The earlier Emperors of Delhi and Mughal rulers did the same.^o The court 
buildings in the time of the Sultanates were known as Danil Qaza, or Darul 
Adl. The Mughals called them Adalat or Kachehri and built such court in 
every city and town. 
Court Working Hours 
The court hours were not fixed by the emperor till about 1672, and 
generally announced by the presiding officers themselves. When 
Aurangzeb learnt^^ from the report of Waqae Nigars that the courts in the 
province of Ahmadabad sat only on two days. He issued directions that 
the presiding officers should sit regularly on Saturdays, Sundays, 
Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays. On Wednesdays, the Qazi-e-Subah was 
to sit with the Governor on his Bench^^^ and Friday could be enjoyed as a 
holiday. 
European travellers and Persian historians have noted about the 
punctuality with which the first seven Mughal Emperors sat in court. 
Colonel Dow, in his enquiry, says,^^ "time had established into an almost 
indispensable duty that the Emperor with his assessors, the principal 
judges, was to sit for two hours every day in the hall of justice to hear and 
decide cases. Shahjahan who took great delight in promoting justice 
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frequently exceeded the usual time". The court Hours fixed by Emperor 
Aurangzeb^^ y^ e^re from two 'gharis' (hours) after surprise to a little after 
midday. These hours seem to have been maintained both in the hot and 
cold weathers. The practice of some of the Mughal Emperors was to sit in 
the court at 7.30 am.^s 
According to Monserrate "everything that goes on" in court was 
regulated clocklike. 
Court Vacations 
As Rae Bhara Mai has pointed out^^ there were meagre cases for 
disposal in courts, and we were not aware about any regular court 
vacations. According to Bemier the "Kings of Hindustan" Seldom failed, 
even when in the field, to hold trials "the same as when in the capital", and 
the custom was regarded as a matter of law and duty and the observance 
of it rarely neglected. 
Disposal of Cases 
The disposal of cases by the Qazis or the emperors may be 
ascertained or estimated by the description of some cases, which were 
disposed of speedily are as following: 
Case Widow Vs. King Ghyas'^'^ 
Court: Qazi Siraj Uddin Qazz-e-Subah, Bengal, 
"One day, while the King was amusing himself in the practice of 
archery, one of his arrows by chance wounded a boy, the son of a widow. 
The women immediately reached to the tribunal of the Qazi, Siraj-e-addeen, 
and demanded justice. The judge was confounded, and said to himself 
'if I summon king to my court, I shall run risk of being disobeyed; and if I 
94. Mirat Vol. I p. 275 
95. Alamgir Namaah, p. 1079. 
96. Elliot, Vol. VII. p. 172. 
97. Stewart - "History of Bei\gal", (About 1490 A.D.) pp. 90-91. 
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pass over his transgression, I Shall be one day summoned before the court 
of God, to answer for my neglect to duty'. After much reflection, he 
ordered one of the officers to go and summon the King, to answer the 
complaint of the woman. The officer, dreading to enter abruptly the palace 
with such an order, considered on some means to get introduced into the 
presence of the King. At length he ascended the minaret of the mosque 
adjoining the palace, and at an improper hour called the people to prayers. 
The King hearing his voice ordered some of his guards to bring before him 
the man who thus made a mockery of reUgion. 
When the officer was introduced into the royal presence, he related 
the circumstance of his call to pray for the King and also concluded by 
summoning His Majesty to the Qazi's tribunal. The King instantly arose, 
and, concealing a short sword under his garment, went before the Qazi; 
who, far from paying him any mark of respect, said to him with a tone of 
authority, 'you have wounded the son of this poor widow; you must, 
therefore, immediately make her an adequate compensation, or suffer the 
sentence of the law'. The King made a bow, and, turning to the woman, 
gave her such a sum of money as satisfied her: After which he said, 
"Worthy Judge, the complainant has forgiven me'. The Qazi asked the 
woman if such was the fact and if she was satisfied, to which the woman 
having assented, was dismissed. 
The Qazi then came down from his tribunal and made his obedience 
to the King: who, drawing the sword from beneath his garment, said, 
'Qazi, in obedience to your commands, as the expounder of the Sacred law, 
I came instantly to your tribunal. However, if I had found that you 
deviated in the smallest degree from its ordinances I swear that with this 
sword I would have taken off your head! I return thanks to God that 
matters have thus happily terminated and that I have in my dominions a 
Judge who acknowledges no authority superior to the law'. The judge 
taking up the scourge said, I also swear, by the Almighty God, that if you 
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had not complied with the injunctions of the law, this scourge should have 
made your back black and blue! It has been a day of trial for us both. 
"The King was much pleased and handsomely rewarded the upright 
judge. 
In another case -
Bail Appeal. MS. 3701. O.L., MS Raqaem-e-keram K.C.C.f. 15. 
Court - Emperor Aurangzeb 
The appellant was sent to the lockup on some charge details of 
which could not be ascertained. The following judgement was delivered: 
"The order, sending the appellant to jail is illegal. He should be 
released forthwith. The case is transferred to the court of the Chief Justice 
for decision in accordance with law so that justice should be done to 
everybody. By God's grace the Qazi is honest, pious and decides the 
disputes impartially". An order of the Qazi must be obeyed." 
A Murder case - State Vs. Sulaiman Beg'^^ 
Complaint of Nirman and Widow of Deceased 
Court - Saadat khan. Qazz'-e-Subah 
Judgement - "The complainants alleged that the accused killed Bishnath 
when he was sleeping in his threshing floor. The parties were summoned. 
The complainants are absent and there is no one to prosecute this case. 
The accused denies the allegation. The complainants were directed to 
produce evidence today, but there is none to support their complaint. 
The accused is, therefore, discharged; let a copy of the order be given to 
him". 
Theft Case -State Vs. Madari Faqir 
Court - Qazi of the District Parenda.^^ 
98. (Collections) Jaunpur, 1680 A.D. 
99. (Collections), South India 1670 A.D. 
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Judgement - "It is alleged that Madari Faqir entered the house of a widow 
at night, when she discovered his presence, she raised a cry for help. 
The police came up and arrested the accused, who was prosecuted for 
committing burglary. The accused denies the allegation and says that he 
had gone out to pass water when the widow shouted out and himself went 
to her help when the police arrested him. As nothing was found on the 
person of the accused, I consider his case doubtful and acquit him. 
He should be released forthwith." 
Delay in proceedings 
During the Mughal period mstructions were occasionally issued^^o 
by the Emperors to Judges to expedite trials "Those who apply for justice" 
states one of Akbar's Ains "let them not be inflicted with delay and 
expectation let him object to no one on account of his religion or sect." 
Bemier, a contemporary traveller in the 17* century, thinks that the suits 
were "speedily decided".^"^ According to Terry, a European missionary 
attached to the staff of Sir Thomas Roe, the trials were "Conducted 
quickly". 
Manucci says that the Emperor "Causes the judgement he 
pronounces to be executed on the spot." But, it seems, special emphasis 
was laid on speedy decision of criminal cases.^ 02 jj-^  ^ivil cases sometimes 
the proceeding took considerably more time. Abdul Wahab's civil suit was 
referred twice withm the space of one year by the Qazi-e-Subah to Jahangir 
for orders on preliminary issues only as the Defendant was a high 
personage of the Imperial court {Tuzuk. 306 S.A.). 
The Governor of Kara disapproved of the delay in Hamiyat Ai vs 
Gaun Shankar {Baqiat, p. 32) and Sikander Lodi is said to have taken to task 
his Chief Mir Adl for prolonging proceedings for two months in a suit. 
100 Am-e-Akbari, Translated by Jarret, Vol II, p 38 Mirat-e-Ahmadi I, pp 282-283 
101 Travels p 236 also Mannque Vol II, p 189 
102 Mtrat-e-Ahmadi, Supplement, Baroda, Vol I, p 278 
90 
which he could finish in one day. (Elliot IV, p. 454, Kennedy I, p. 110). 
The delay in civil suits may have been due to the emphasis laid in the 
Sharia on compromise (As such Khairun). 
According to Khafi Khan, Chief Justice Abdullah (1678-1690) was an 
over-scrupulous judge and usually tried to get the parties to compromise. 
Bemier thinks that compromise (Musaliah Baba) was often effected were 
the parties where poor. The law, however, did not suggest any delaying of 
proceedings in order to get a compromise only. The principle was stated. 
Individual rulers^^^ as Sir Henry Elliot observes, in most cases "never 
showed any delay". Fryer who visited India in the reign of Aurangzeb 
speaks of lawsuits being soon ended. 
VII Legal Reforms By Aurangzeb 
Among the Medieval rulers Aurangzeb's reforms in judicial 
administration stands out prominent of which survive to this day. 
• Firstly he started the system of "Remand" by the court to police 
custody {Mirat I, pp. 278-282). The Kotwals were ordered to obtain a 
written order from the Qazi to keep a man under custody. 
• The second step Aurangzeb took particular notice of the delay, which 
he marked in the disposal of work in some courts and issued directions 
that all criminal cases must be tried without delay.^o^ In this connection 
he issued a detailed Farman^^^ that prisoners were not to be taken into 
custody until prima facie 'Legal evidence' [Subut-e-Sharai) was available 
and that no prisoner was to remain in Jail without a lawful charge. By a 
curious coincidence when Aurangzeb was issuing these regulations in 
India 1679, the British Parliament was enacting Habeas Corpus Act for 
103. Lt. Col. A Dow, C.U.L. 'History of Hindustan' Vol. Ill, p. 334. "Delay in the execution of 
justice (under the Mughals) subjected the Judge to the risk of compensating the 
aggrieved party for the loss". 
104. Mirat-e-Ahmadi, Vol. I pp. 278-338, 275. 
105. British Musuem Manuscript Add. 6580. 
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England. Aurangzeb disliked long adjournments. If after the first date 
of hearing the case was not taken up, next day the Kotwal was required 
to send the under trial prisoners daily to the courts till matters were 
decided (Mirat I, pp. 282-283) he himself set the example by sitting in 
his court daily.^^^ 
The third important aspect of the judicial administration introduced 
was that the keepers of state records of rights were directed to permit 
the public to examine them.^ O'' 
Fourthly government" Vakils" were appointed in every district. 
Fifthly Aurangzeb, in addition to his notable achievement of compiling 
the Fatawa-e-Alaamgiri, framed written regulations (Zabth) on every 
conceivable subject and required strict adherence to every detail of 
them. 
Sixthly, according to Colonel Dow^os Aurangzeb reformed the system 
of appeals. Since the time of Akbar the Emperors had tried cases 
personally and their interest in giving 'impartial' decisions used to 
attract litigants from far off comers of the Empire. Aurangzeb realizing 
the expense and trouble to which such litigants were put in coming to 
capital, issued orders that parties should get their disputes decided by 
the local Qazi in the first instance,i°^ and that the laws of the Empire 
should be widely proclaimed, by the various state officials so that 
intending litigants should understand their position before starting on 
a journey to the capital. Civil appeals were only admitted "beyond a 
106. Alamgir Namah, pp. 1076-1077, Mirat I, p. 257. 
107. Dow III, P. XXVI "The Registers of rents to be left open for the inspection of all that the 
people might distinguish extortion from the just demands of the crown". 
108. Vol. Ill, p. XXXIII, p. 334. 
109. Mirat I, pp. 257-258. 
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certain sum", and in criminal matters appeal against a Governor's 
Bench could lie by way of petition only.iio 
Auagrangzeb appointed a court 'Diwan-e-Mazalim}'^^ on the model of 
the Abbasids rulers"^ "to redress wrongs". It resembles the Court of 
Crown cases reserved in medieval England. Its function was to admit 
petitions of appeal. Sir Jadunath Sarkar thinks that the Diwan-e-Mazalim 
was the name of the court held by Aurangzeb on Wednesday. Aurangzeb 
took special care to see that his orders in appeal were conveyed to inferior 
courts without the least possible delay. 
(C) THE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
DURING THE BRITISH REGIME 
The British regime in India started with the establishment of East 
India Company. The first few institutions introduced by the Britishers to 
the system of judiciary in India during the 17* century were the Mayor's 
Courts at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. After acquiring from the Mughal 
Emperor the Diivani, i.e. the power to collect revenue the Britishers 
established the Diivani Adalat (civil courts) and the Faujdari Adalats 
(criminal Courts). But appeals from the Diwani institutions had to be 
carried to the Governor-in-Council, and in criminal cases to the Nazim at 
Murshidabad, which took a long time for disposal of the case. Later 
appeals were taken in certain cases to the judicial committee of the Privy 
Council in London. With the establishment of British rule the common law 
got imported in India slowly and gradually in as much as the 
establishments by the East India Company became the nurseries of the 
English law in India which in course of time brought about tremendous 
influence over the laws and the system of administration of justice in the 
110. Dow III, p. XXXIII. 
111. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "History of Aurangzeb" (1935) p. 106. 
112. Ameer Ali; Saracens, p. 422; J.R.A.S. 1911. 
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whole of this subcontinent."^^^ Introduction of the Indian Penal Code, 
Evidence law, and Criminal Procedure Code bore the influence of common 
law solely for the purposes of the administrative expediency as well as to 
prolong the duration of Judicial Proceedings."^ 
Though, the Britishers did take the step of reducing delay in the 
disposal of cases. Lord Comwallis devised the plan of having a civil and 
criminal court at every 10 kilometres, and Lord William Benetik planned 
the establishment of intermediary courts of appeal so that the litigants do 
not have travel a long distance for appeals. The judicial business of the 
Privy Council was minimized by enlarging the jurisdiction of the appellate 
courts. Yet there was delaying the disposal of cases. One reason for this 
problem was that the judicial officers were mostly Europeans who availed 
vacations twice in a year. Thus allowing the work to remain attended for 
months together. 
The cumbersome procedures brought from England as part of the 
common law were yet another factor responsible for the problem of delay. 
The major concern of Government for delay in judicial business centred 
round the question of allowing reference, revision and appeal in various 
matters at various stages of the legal process. 
The Britishers had also introduced, on the pattern of their own 
system of administration, quasi-judicial institutions like the tribunals 
vesting them with a part of normal powers to decide disputes. These 
experiments had been initiated by way of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism. They also encouraged the system of arbitration mediation and 
conciliation so that the delay in disposal of cases was minimized. Several 
committees and commissions were appointed to examine the problems 
arising from the application of laws and the functioning of the legal 
institutions. 
113. M.C. Seetalvad, The Common Law in India, 225, (1961). 
114. Mukherjee S.K and A. Gupta, Delay in the Administration of Criminal Justice, (1978); 
R.G.Grewal, "Speedy Trial: A Fundamental Right", XVI Indian Bar Rev. 1, (1987). 
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Prominent among them was the law commission of India, which 
from 1850's onwards took upon itself the task of suggesting a reform of the 
judicial system and a revision of the substantive and procedural laws. 
Based on the recommendations of the law commission changes were made 
in the rules of law and the organization of judicial institutions. The Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861 are the most 
significant developments during the British Regime towards building a 
system of criminal justice. But that as it may, these laws produced, the ills 
of adverse processes which even continue in Independent India. 
II. Present Structure of Judicial Administration in India 
The concept of justice is neatly interwoven in the Indian society. 
Ours has been a democratic repubHc since time immemorial and we have 
glorious past of functional accomplishments and admirable social purpose 
which forms the justice administration in India. Our courts have a solid 
structural framework with well established laws and justice has been an 
outcome of a symbiotic relationship. 
Various types of courts and quasi-judicial bodies function under the 
vast canopy of Indian judicial system of the country. Here it would be 
worthwhile mentioning that the Supreme Court of India and law 
commission of India are the custodian and the patron of the system 
respectively. The present administration of criminal justice system in India 
is essentially a legacy of British rule but this statement does not imply that 
we had never been a good judicial set up in our country. As per the 
records in the annals of Indian Legal History, we have had a well 
flourished and organized criminal justice system. 
The Dharmshastras and the Arthashastra enumerate a full-fledged and 
well-developed system of criminal adjudication. The Neetishastra mentions 
King as a fountain of justice and it was his sacred duty to punish the 
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wrong doers and if he flinched from discharging this study, he was bound 
to go to hell.^ ^5 
Kautilya's Arthashastra is a monumental treatise on the judicial 
administrative system and it seems that this system was almost 
established. However we must accept this bare truth that the regular 
hierarchy of criminal courts was yet to fully evolve in the indigenous 
Hindu Kingdoms. 
During the medieval and Moghul's period Nawabs and Nazims 
were in charge of criminal justice administration and they could even 
decide cases punishable with capital punishment. Criminal courts were 
known as Sadar Faujdari Adalats. Mohammedan criminal laws were 
expounded by Hidaya and Fatwa. Hidaya contained the general principles 
of Muslim criminal law whereas Fatwa-e-Alamgiri was a collection of case 
laws for the guidance of criminal law courts. 
Then came the era of British rule in India and the criminal justice 
system introduced by the Britisher's was a queer mixture of Anglo-Saxon 
judicial principles and ancient and medieval norms of criminal 
jurisprudence as well as the available traditions and practices of 
indigenous people. This criminal justice system was an outcome and 
admixture of a churning off process, of all three aforementioned judicial 
systems, which resulted in such a fine structural system, which had been 
adopted by independent India with some minor changes in its 
superstructures. So now, ours is a system, which contains best of the both 
world. 
III. Present Structure Defective from Indian point of view 
The State of society and civilization which pervades the many 
millions of India, calls for a simple, cheap, expeditious administration of 
justice ours is neither cheap no expeditious."^ 
115. Vardachariar's. "Hindu Judicial System", (1946), p. 93. 
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It is said in some quarters that the present system of administration 
of justice does not accord with the pattern of our life and conditions. 
Large masses of our population are illiterate and live in the villages. 
These conditions demand, it is said, "a system of judicial administration 
suited to the genius of our country or an indigenous system". Even the 
Uttar Pradesh, Judicial Reforms Committee of 1950-51, stated, though by 
majority that "it cannot be denied that the rules of procedure and evidence 
which they (the British) framed to regulate the proceedings in court, were 
in some cases foreign to our genius and in many cases were made a 
convenient handle to defeat and delay justice".^^^ 
In India today, criminal trials take five to 10 years to conclude and 
civil suits are finally decided at times after 20 or 25 years. This is an 
intolerable situation. However, we inherited from the British a fine system 
of laws, the court system was creaKing even then, with considerable 
delays; 62 years of independence has only made the situation much worse. 
In the 1950s and 1960's, writ petitions in the Bombay High Court were 
heard in a year or two; today they are rarely heard for five to ten years! 
The situation is no better elsewhere, and is much worse in some High 
Courts. 
To cite one example - after the notorious security scam of the early 
1990s, Parliament enacted a special law designed for the sole purpose 
of ensuring a speedy trial of offenders. For this purpose, a special court 
consisting of a High Court judge was set up. Yet it took seven years for the 
first conviction of Harshad Mehta, and it will be a year or two more before 
the issue is finally concluded in the Supreme Court. If such a long time 
is taken to hold a trial under a special law, it is easy to imagine the time 
an ordinary criminal trial takes. 
116. Legal Fallings of the Colonial Rule - (Editorial), "Civil & Military law Journal", Vol. 35, 
Oct- Dec.1999 p. 239. 
117. Uttar Pradesh, Judicial Reforms Committee, (1950-51) Report, p. 1. 
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The plight of under trials languishing in jail for years without a trial 
became so unbearable that the Apex court stepped in with directions that 
those not accused of very serious crimes just be released on bail after some 
time and must be discharged if the period they have served in jail 
exceeded the maximum sentence they would have had to suffer even if 
they had been convicted. The orders of the Supreme Court were eminently 
fair and reasonable but they reveal a situation, which is grotesque and a 
negation of the first principle for the rule of law; a man, who may well be 
innocent, stays in jail without even being tried for the period he would 
have served had he been guilty."^ 
A former Minister of State for Law and Company Affairs, 
O. Rajgopal has called for a national debate for greater Indianisation of the 
judicial system. In an interview to the Malayalam daily "Janmabhoomi", 
he said the country had adopted the British Judicial system, which was 
continuing even 60 years after Independence. This was one of the main 
reasons for delay in disposal of cases, and the backlog, which kept 
mounting year after year. In the past 62 years, the British judicial system, 
which was based on the culture and life-style of that country, had been 
blindly adopted. We should have a system, which suits our needs. 
Need of Indigenous Judicial System - (An opinion) 
The Law Commission of India had elicited opinion on these views. 
The answer they have received state with almost complete unanimity that 
the system which has prevailed in our country for early two centuries 
though British in its origin has grown and developed in Indian conditions 
and is now firmly rooted in the Indian soil. It is analysed that it would be 
disastrous and entirely destructive of our future growth to think of a 
radical change at this stage of the development of our country. It is further 
submitted that the state envisaged by our Constitution which itself is 
118. Indianisation of Legal System, Legal System under Strain. Editorial, "Civil & Military 
Law Journal", Vol. 35, Oct. -Dec. 1999. p. 237. 
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based largely on the Anglo-Saxon model to think of remodelling its system 
of Judicial administration on ancient practices, adherence to which is 
totally unsuitable to modern conditions and ways of life.^ ^^ 
Required Modification - Need of the Hour 
According to the opinion of Law Commission, regarding reforms of 
judicial administration radical changes not necessary, and accordingly 
submits that we must nevertheless, fail to distinguish between essential 
principles of our present system and its subsidiary features like clumsy 
and cumbrous procedure. It should not be forgotten as pointed out those 
charged with fashioning our laws, have while regarding the English laws 
and institutions was a model, consciously and continuously attempted to 
modify and mould them to suit Indian life and Indian conditions. 
That attempt was continued throughout the period of British rule with the 
subsequent association in an ever-increasing degree of Indian legislators, 
Indian judges and Indian administrators in the making of laws and the 
administration of justice. It may be that we have failed to make our laws 
and our court systems and procedures conform sufficiently to the needs of 
our people. To that extent, no doubt, they require modification and 
adjustment. Law commission have endeavoured to give attention to these 
points of view, but such changes can only be made within the framework 
of a system suited to our present conditions and needs, which are 
industrial economy. We have necessary and practicable to make a 
distinction between the fundamentals, which must exist in any modern 
system for the administration of justice and the procedures and practices 
by which the system is to be operated. 
They agree with the observations of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial 
Reforms Committee that "the need of the hour is that rules and procedures 
and evidence should be simplified that justice may have available to the 
119. Law Commission of India, 14th Report on Reform of Judicial Administration, 
"Indigenous System" Vol. 2, (1958) p. 14.26. 
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rich and the poor alike and that it may be prompt and effective". 
But simplification cannot mean a sacrifice of fundamentals and essentials, 
"The real need of the hour is the inculcation of a higher sense of duty, a 
greater regard for public convenience, greater efficiency in all those 
concerned in the administration of justice". In any case, whichever way 
our needs are looked at, little is to be gained by an insistence on what has 
been called an indigenous system suited to the genius of our country.120 
The problem of delay in administration of justice has not been 
altogether ignored by the government. They have first, done the usual. 
They have appointed several commissions and committees to submit 
reports. After the reports come, usually after several years, many of the 
recommendations are not implemented, particularly those which involve 
spending substantial sums of money 
Immediately after Independence, the Government of India entrusted 
to the Law Commission of India the task of plugging loopholes in the 
criminal justice system and suggesting measures to correct the system by 
turning it to the avowed principles of constitutional morality, viz., social 
or disruptive justice, liberty and equality shorn in inefficiency, 
incorruptibility and inordinate delay. Unequivocally, the commission has 
been making indepth examinations of the system contained in the 
statutory books. It works indeed have staggering as well as telling 
revelations. It dealt with administration of Justice at length, and a fortiori, 
suggested reformative measures in improving the Criminal Procedure 
Code thus making the criminal justice process (Investigation, as well as 
trial) (i) speedy, (ii) inexpensive; (iii) lessening bottlenecks; (iv) minimising 
adversaries; and (v) reducing if not completely eliminating the official 
serfdom.121 
120. Ibid. 
121. Law Commission of India, 14th Report on Reforms of Judicial Administration, Vol. I, II, 
(1958). 
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Consequently, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was 
extensively reformed on the lines recommended by the Law Commission 
of Indiai22 viz., to (i) provide adequate facilities to every accused person to 
defend himself in a proper manner, and (ii) ensure at the same time, 
speedy disposal of all criminal judicial business. However, simplification 
and shortening of the procedure could not ameliorate the problem of 
protracted criminal justice business and its adverse effects. Naturally, on 
renewed terms of reference, the law commission has had occasions and 
opportunities to look into anomalies, ambiguities of the criminal justice 
process, and to suggest ways and means of speeding up trials and 
avoiding, long delays. 
Thirty Second,i23 Thirty Third,^ 24 Thirty Fifth,i25 Thirty Seventh,i26 
Forty First,^ 27 Forty Eight,^ 28 Seventy Seventh,^29 Seventy Ninth,^^° One 
Hundred Forty Second^^i and One Hundred Fifty Fourth.^32 
Report of the Law Commission is pointedly indicative in this 
perspective. However, the commission submitted a comprehensive report 
which, inter alia, suggested a whole-sale revision of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure in as much as it yielded results when the central government 
took serious as well as conscientious steps by bringing the new code of 
122. Old Cr. PC was replaced by Act of 1973. 
123. Law Commission of India, Thirty second report on Section 9 of Cr. PC, (1967). 
124. Id., Thirty Third Report on Section 44 of Cr. PC, (1967). 
125. Id., Thirty Fifth Report Capital Punishment (1967). 
126. Id., Thirty Seventh Report on Section 1 to 176 of Cr. PC, (1967). 
127. Id., Forty First Report on the code of Criminal Procedure (1898-1969). 
128. Id., Forty Eight Report on some questions under the code of Criminal Procedure Bill, 
(1970). 
129. Id., Seventy Seventh Report on Delay and Arrears in Trial courts (1979). 
130. Id., Seventy Ninth report on delay and Arrears in High Courts at others Appellate courts 
(1979). 
131. Id., One hundred forty Second, report on concessional treatment for offenders who on 
their own initiative choose to plead guilty without any bargaining (1991). 
132. Id., One hundred fifty fourth report on the Cr. PC, 1973 Act No. 2 of 1974, (1996) 
recommended concept of plea Bargaining 
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criminal procedure in the statutory books by dropping out the old one 
from it.^ 33 
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been enacted by 
embodying or bringing together the following considerations, viz.: 
(a) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with accepted 
principles of natural justice; 
(b) every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigations and trial 
which is harmful not only to individuals involved but also to society; 
and 
(c) The procedure should not be complicated and to the utmost extent 
possible, ensure a fair deal to poorer sections of the community. 
Some of the glaring changes made by the new code were to 
overcome the bottleneck of the adversarial process, and as such this code 
aimed at speeding up disposal of criminal cases with the unmentioned 
parameters in view: 
(i) The preliminary inquiry otherwise known as committal proceedings 
is abolished, since it causes delay;^ '^* 
(ii) The Jury trial is abolished;"^ 
(iii) A provision is made for the summons procedure for offences 
punishable with imprisonment upto two years;!^^ 
(iv) A provision is made for the summon procedure for all summary 
trials^^'' for offences punishable with imprisonment upto two years. 
(v) The powers of revision against interlocutory orders are taken away.^ ^^ 
(vi) The compulsory of proceedings by a subordinate court on more 
information from a party of his intention to move a higher court for 
transfer of the case is omitted.^39 
133. Criminal Procedure Code 1973, came into force in 1974. 
134. Sec. 206-20 of the old code fias been omitted from the new code. See, the 
recommendations of law commission of India, Supra note 127. 
135. Sec. 226-69, 274-83 of old code have been replaced; See supra Note 126, Vol. II, p. 873; 
Supra Note 127. 
136. See forty first reports. 
137. Supra note 125, also supra note 127. 
138. Sec 397 (2) of new code. There was no corresponding provision in S. 435 of old code. 
139. Forty fist report. Supra Note 127; S. 407, new code. 
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vii) A provision is made for payment of cost by the party at whose 
instance adjournments are granted.^^o 
yiii)A provision is made for the service of summons by registered post in 
certain cases.^^i 
ix) In petty cases, the accused is enabled to plead guilty by post and 
remit the fine.^ ^^ 
x) A re-trial need not necessarily be ordered in case a court of appeal or 
revision discovers any error, omission or irregularity in the charge 
leading to failure of justice;^*^ and 
xi) Continuation of part-heard cases by the successors in office in respect 
of courts of magistrate is extended to courts of sessions.^^ 
Section 167, 309 and 468 of the new code synthesis the above 
mentioned changes particularly relating to speedy trial, elimination of 
delays in investigating and trial proceedings. Section 167 has been 
designed to control the malady of protracted investigation. It is now 
mandatory on the part of the police to forward the accused to the nearest 
magistrate within 24 hours. He also can authorise the lock-up beyond that 
period but not exceeding 90 days where the investigations relates to an 
offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding 10 years, or 60 days the alleged accused person shall 
be released on bail. The procedure thus contemplated therein a time bound 
programme. Section 309 stipulates a positive move towards minimising 
the delay occurring at the trial level, and as such, it reads: 
"In every inquiry or trial, the proceeding shall be held as 
expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of 
witnesses has once began the same shall be continued from day to day 
until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court 
finds the adjournment the same beyond for reasons to be recorded". 
140. Id., para 24.26; S. 309, new code. 
141. Id., para 6.6; S. 69, new code. 
142. Id., para 17.6, 20.2; S. 2.53, new code. 
143. Id., para 45.9; S. 464(2)(b), new code. 
144. Id., para 24.77; S. 35, new code. 
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Section 468 of Cr. PC provides that no court shall take cognisance of 
an offence except as specified after expiry of the period of limitation. 
Such period shall be six months if the offence is punishable with 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. 
The cumulative effect or impression of these provisions is to ensure that 
the criminal justice process does not cause inordinate delay in 
administration of Justice and violative of Article 21 of the constitution of 
India. 
Be that as it may, not much progress seems to have been made, for 
the new criminal Justice process has not facilitated the speedy disposal of 
criminal cases and reduced the overcrowdness of the workload, and, 
naturally, this could not given a sound beguiling to improving the process. 
IV. Structure and composition of judicial system in India 
Modern judicial court system is a three tier structure namely 
Supreme Court of India at national level, which looks into the matter of 
union and federal level. Next in hierarchy are High courts, which are 
generally concerned with state or provincial level matters. At last but not 
the least subordinate courts are responsible for imparting justice at the 
district and sub-division level. 
Furthermore, there are several special courts formed for the purpose 
of dealing with specific nature of cases. All such courts along with all the 
subordinate courts have been kept under the superintendence of the 
concerned high courts for the purpose of administration of justice. 
The Structure of Judiciary in India 
The Preamble speaks of "We, the people of India resolving to 
secure inter alia "justice - social, economic and political to all its citizens. 
The juxta- position of words and concepts in the Preamble is important. 
Most significantly. Justice is placed higher than the other principles of 
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'Liberty', 'Equality' and 'Fraternity'. Again, the Preamble clearly enjoins 
precedence to social and economic justice over political justice. 
All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in 
the aid of the Supreme Court as ordained by Article 144. The power to 
make Rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme 
Court vests in it under Article 145. The jurisdiction of the High Courts in 
relation to the administration of justice in the Court including power to 
make rules of court is preserved by Article 225 of the Constitution.^^s 
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that, apart 
from Article 225, the High Court may derive Rule-making powers from 
substantive provisions, such as Article 235 (control over subordinate 
courts), where the nature of powers conferred by the Article would include 
power to make rules to regulate the exercise of the power.^ '^ ^ jhg power of 
superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in 
relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction conferred by Article 
227, includes under Article 227(2) (b), power to make and issue general 
rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and procedures of 
such courts. 
Thus, the Constitution of India envisages a major role to be played 
by High Court in relation to the administration of justice not only in the 
High Court but also in relation to the courts subordinate to such High 
Court. The power, by its very nature, is obviously coupled with the duty to 
render proper administration of justice. 
Role and Jurisdiction of Supreme Court in India 
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked by a 
certificate granted by the High Court concerned under Article 132(1), 
133(1) or 134 of the Constitution in respect of any judgement, decree or 
145. D. D. Basu,. Shorter Constitution of India. 
146. State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Batuk (1978) 2 SCC 102, (para 10-11). 
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final order of a High Court in both civil and criminal cases, involving 
substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court has also a very wide appellate jurisdiction over 
all courts and Tribunals in India in as much as, it may, in its discretion, 
grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution from 
any judgement, decree, determination, sentence or order to any cause or 
matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India. 
The Supreme Court has special advisory jurisdiction in matters, 
which may specifically be referred to it by the President of India under 
Article 143 of the Constitution. There are provisions for reference or appeal 
to this Court under Article 317(1) of the Constitution. Appeals also lie to 
the Supreme Court under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Advocates Act. 1961, 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Customs Act, 1962, Central Excises and Salt 
Act, 1944, Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970, Trial 
of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992, Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Consumer Protection Act, 
1986. Election Petitions under Part III of the Presidential and Vice 
Presidential Elections Act. 1952 are also filed directly in the Supreme 
Court. 
Under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
has been vested with power to punish for contempt of Court including the 
power to punish for contempt of itself. In case of contempt other than the 
contempt referred to in Rule 2, Part I of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings 
for contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, the Court may take action (a) 
Suo-moto, or (b) on a petition made by Attorney General, Or Solicitor 
General or (c) on a petition made by any person and in the case of a 
criminal contempt with the consent in writing of the Attorney General or 
the Solicitor General. 
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Under Order XI, of the Supreme Court Rules the Supreme Court 
may review its judgement or order but no application for review is to be 
entertained in a civil proceeding except on the grounds mentioned in order 
XLVII, Rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure and in a criminal proceeding 
except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.^4'' 
Roles and Jurisdiction of High Courts in India 
High Courts in our country form a substantial pillar of democracy. 
Understandingly they have got greater power in their respective 
jurisdiction when compared to the Supreme Court of India. They are 
having a monitoring power over the subordinate judiciary, which forms 
the justice dispensing system at grass root level. As far as judicial courts in 
India are concerned, the Constitution of India establishes a hierarchy of 
courts in the union of India and its states. The Supreme Court of India 
occupies paramount position in the hierarchy of courts in our country at 
the Union level. At the state level, the high courts are given the highest 
position and they occupy second hierarchical level. 
Roles and Functions of Subordinate Judiciary in India 
Highest court in each district is that of the District and Sessions 
Judge. This is the principal court of civil jurisdiction. The cases triable by 
Sessions Court are tried by it. It has the power to award any sentence 
including capital punishment. 
There are many other courts subordinate to the court of District and 
Sessions Judge. There are three tier systems of courts, on criminal side the 
lowest court is that of the judicial Magistrate. Civil Judge (Junior Division) 
decides civil cases of small pecuniary stake. Judicial Magistrates decide 
criminal cases. 
Judicial independence of each court is the characteristic feature of district 
judiciary. In each district there is a strong Bar which ensures that courts 
147. Supreme Courts Rule, Published By Supreme Court of India. 
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decide cases according to law and without fear or favour. The greatest 
problem of district courts is that of huge pendency of cases leading to 
undue delay in decision of cases. 
(V) Speedy Trial - Alternative Measures 
We would now advert to some of the positive measures that have 
been taken in the past which have already started results and are 
significantly contributing in increasing disposal in subordinate as well as 
the High Courts and those which are still required to be taken for 
dispensation of speedy and affordable Justice. The following measures that 
have already been taken are: 
1. Setting up of Fast Track Courts of sessions Judges. 
2. Setting up of Mobile Courts. 
3. Introduction of Shift system in subordinate courts. 
4. LokAdalats. 
5. ADR system. 
6. Setting up of e-committee. 
7. Setting up of Gram Nayalayas and, 
8. Insertion of chapter XXI-A in the code of criminal procedure about plea 
bargaining.^'*^ 
With the judicial system in most of the countries being burdened 
with cases, any new case takes a long time to be decided. And till the time 
of the final decision comes, there is a state of uncertainty, which makes any 
activity almost impossible. Commerce, business, development, work, 
administration, etc., all suffer because of long time taken in resolving 
disputes through litigation. Moreover, reminding of a pertinent 
observation made by Hon'ble Justice D.A. Desai, Chairman Law 
Commission of India, who has rightly pointed out.^ ^g 
148. Justice B.N. Aggarwal, Pendency of Cases & Speedy Justice SCC 2007, Vol. 6, Aug. 14, p. 
J-4. 
149. Law Commission of India 14th Report (Reform of Judicial Administration), 1958, Vol. 1, 
p. 587. 
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"In view of the our rising graph of arrears, tinkering at the fingers 
far from yielding the desired results, have further aggravated the situation, 
the consumers of justice have been patiently waiting for justice to become 
oriented." 
To get out of this maze of litigation, courts and lawyers chamber, 
most of the countries encourage alternative methods of dispute resolution. 
India has the long history of such methods being practiced in the society at 
the grass root level. These are called Panchayat and in the legal 
terminology, these are called arbitration. These are widely used in India 
for resolution of disputes relating to both commercial and non-commercial 
matters. Other alternative methods being used are Lok Adalat (people's 
court), where justice is dispensed summarily without too much emphasis 
on legal technicalities. Methods like negotiation, mediation and 
cancellation are being increasingly used to resolve disputes instead of 
going for litigation. There have been recent amendments in the procedural 
law of India to incorporate these methods so that people get Justice in a 
speedy manner and there is lesser conflict in the society. 
How to secure to all the citizens the Justice which the Constitution 
of India requires is a big question being faced by the judiciary. The courts 
dockets are overloaded and everyday new cases are being filed. It is 
getting humanly impossible to decide all these cases by the regular courts 
in a speedy manner. This is not the situation which India facing alone. 
This, unfortunately, is the situation in a large number of jurisdictions. 
It takes long time to get justice through the established courts 
system. Obviously, this leads to a search for alternative, complementary 
and supplementary mechanism to the process of the traditional court for 
inexpensive, expeditious and less cumbersome and also, less stressful 
resolution of disputes. But, the elements of Judiciousness, fairness, equality 
and compassion cannot be allowed to be sacrificed at the altar of 
expeditious disposal. The hackneyed saying is that 'justice delayed is 
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justice denied'. But justice has to be imparted: 'justice cannot be hurried to 
be buried'. The cases have to be decided and not just 'disposed off. 
Fast Track Courts 
On the recommendation of the 11* Finance Commission, 1734 Fast 
Track Courts of sessions Judges were sanctioned for disposal of old 
pending cases and the said scheme was to end on 31-3-2005. Out of 
18,92,583 cases, 10,99,828 have been disposed of by these courts. Keeping 
in view the performance of Fast Track Courts and Contribution made by 
them towards clearing the backlog, the scheme has been extended till 
31-3-2010. 
In view of the contribution made by the Fast Track Courts of 
Sessions Judges towards clearing of backlog, and number of huge 
pendency of cases triable by Magistrate Courts being 1,66,77,657 as on 31-
12-2006, there is an urgent need to formulate a similar scheme for setting 
up of Fast Track Courts of Magistrates in each state and Union Territory.^^o 
Mobile Courts 
Mobile Courts are also being set up which not only educate the rural 
folk about their rights and responsibilities and provide swift Justice and 
create a feeling of law and Judiciary being very close to them, but will also 
help declog the expanding docket of our overburdened courts.^^^ 
Shift System in subordinate courts 
The State of Gujarat has taken a lead in introducing shifting system 
in subordinate courts w.e.f. 14-11-2006. Sixty evening courts are already in 
place in different parts of the state. 
As per the figures made available, the number of cases that have 
been disposed off from 14-11-2006 to 31-3-2007 is 57, 384, which is highly 
150. Ibid. 
151. Ibid. 
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commendable. It is, therefore, high time that shift system is introduced in 
subordinate courts all over the country, as it would help reduce backing 
considerably. 
Lok Adalat 
In order to achieve the objective enshrined in Art. 39-A of the 
constitution of India, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted 
to provide free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of the 
society to ensure that opportunities for searching justice are not denied to 
any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. To achieve that 
objective, Lok Adalats are being held at various places in the country and a 
large number of cases are being disposed off with lesser costs. Mobile 
Lok Adalats are presently in place in different parts of the State of Bihar 
and on the lines of steps taken by the High Court of Patna of holding 
mobile Lok Adalats, the other High courts need also work on the same 
lines so that speedy and affordable justice could be made available to the 
litigants at their doorsteps.^52 
First Lok Adalat of Supreme Court: 
The Supreme Court, in its first Lok Adalat on May 3, 2008, settled 25 
cases arising out of appeals relating to Motor Accident Compensation 
claims and matrimonial and labour matters pending for years. 
Inaugurating, chief justice K.G. Bal Krishnan said courts should 
settle disputes through Lok Adalats at regular intervals to meet the biggest 
challenge to the Judiciary i.e. pendency. 
"Lok Adalat comes as a relief to a large number of litigants and as 
solution for the courts burdened with a large pendency of cases. 
Lok Adalat would help in the settlement of cheque dishonour cases; 
motor accident claims cases and other criminal cases which are 
compoundable." ^ 53 
152. s e c 2007, Vol. 6 Aug. 14, p. J-5 
153. The Hindu, May 4, 2008. 
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Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism (ADR) 
The philosophy of ADR system is well stated by Abraham Lincoln-
" Discourage litigation; persuade your neighbours to compromise 
whenever you can. Point out to them how the normal winner is often a 
looser in fees, expenses, cost and time." 
Litigation through the courts and tribunals established by the state 
in one way of resolving the dispute, which is an adversarial method of 
disputes Resolution what is tried to be achieved, is win-win situation for 
both the parties. There is nobody who is loser and both parties feel 
satisfied at the end of the day. 
Setting up of e-Committee 
For providing speedy and timely justice to the litigant. Information 
technology was first time introduced in the Indian Judiciary by Mr. Justice 
G.C. Bharuka in the year 1991 in the Patna High Court. After Mr. Justice 
Bharuka was transferred to Karnataka High Court, it was a boon in 
disguise for the people of Karnataka where he had done extensive work 
for introduction of IT in Indian Judiciary and was conferred a doctorate 
degree. His famous treatise "Rejuvenating Judicial System through E-
Govemance & Attitudinal change" was published in the year 2003 
appreciating the outstanding word done by Dr. Justice Bharuka in the field 
of IT, the Union Government constituted an e-committee under his 
championship. In June 2006, the Union Cabinet declared the project to be 
one of the Mission Mode project under the National E-Governance plan in 
February 2007 accorded sanction to the budgetary requirements for its 
implementation. For the first phase funds to the time of Rs. 441.80 crores 
have been approved. The e-courts project is to be implemented in three 
phase over a period of five years, has already commenced by providing 
laptops to all the Judicial Officers throughout the country and three 
months training would be provided to each and every Judicial officers. 
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In the first phase, the goals that are sought to be achieved, inter alia, are, 
capacity building of the Judges for delivery of speedy and quality Justice, 
availability of ICT modules for assessing work performance and cases flow 
management of all courts in the country online accessibility of order, 
judgements and case related data, instant availability of status of cases. 
Judgements and order of all courts through Internet, Kiosks and Judicial 
Service Centres, facility for e-filing in the Supreme Court and High Courts. 
In the second phase, the steps intended to be adopted are facilities of 
vide conferencing at all court complexes e-Filing in all district and 
subordinate courts. In the third phase, online information between the 
courts, prosecuting and investigation agencies, prisons and scientific tools 
to help in identifying habitual criminals professional witnesses and 
litigants and in resolution of complex factual disputes would be 
available-i^ ** 
Setting up of Gram Nyayalayas 
The Ministry of Law and Justice in drawling a Gram Nyayalayas, 
bill with an objective to secure speedy justice, both civil and criminal, at 
the gross root level to the citizens, which would be the longest court of 
subordinate Judiciary and shall provide easy access to justice to litigant 
through friendly procedures, use of local language and mobile courts 
wherever necessary. 
Plea Bargaining 
With the insertion of new chapter XXI-A in the code of criminal 
procedure by Act 2 of 2006, the concept of "plea bargaining" became a 
reality and part of our criminal jurisprudence. The practice of plea 
bargaining is prevalent in Western Countries, particularly the United 
States and the United Kingdom and Australia whereas it applied only in 
restricted sense in the other two countries. Plea bargaining benefits both 
154. Id, p. J-6-7. 
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the state and the offender while the state saves time, money and effort in 
prosecuting the subjects, he later gets a lenient punishment by pleading 
guilty. One of the merits of this system is that it helps the court to manage 
its load of work and hence it would result in reduction of backlog of cases. 
Prior to the criminal law (Amendment) Act, 2005, the concept of plea 
Bargaining was totally alien to our Indian Criminal Justice process and the 
Apex Court examining the concept of plea bargaining in State of U.P. vs. 
Chandrika^^^ observed it to be against public policy. In the same year the 
Apex Court also observed that neither the trial court nor the High court 
has jurisdiction to by pass the minimum sentence prescribed by law on the 
premise that a plea bargain was adopted by the accused.^56 
However, a formal proposal for incorporating it into the Indian 
Criminal Justice process was put forth in 2003 through the Criminal law 
(Amendment) Bill, 2003. However, those provisions failed to come through 
and were reintroduced with slight changes through the criminal law 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, which was passed by both the houses of 
parliament. And was thus finally incorporated into the code of criminal 
procedure, 1973, and came into operation from July 5, 2006. 
The plea-bargaining lays down a procedure with a distinct feature 
of enabling an accused to file an application for plea-bargaining in the 
court where the trial is pending, the Act further requires the court after 
receiving the application, must examine the accused in camera to ascertain 
whether the application has been filed voluntarily. Once the court is 
convinced that the accused is participating in the plea-bargaining 
voluntarily, the court must then issue notice to the public prosecutor or the 
complainant to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case. 
The negotiation of such a mutually acceptable settlement is left to the free 
will of the prosecution (including the victim) and the accused. If a 
155. AIR 2000 SC 164. 
156. Kripal Singh vs. State of Haryana 2000 (1) Crimes 53 (SC) 
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settlement is reached, the court can award compensation based on it to the 
victim and then hear the parties on the issue of punishment. The court may 
release the accused on probation if the law allows for it, if a minimum 
sentence is provided for the offence committed, the accused may be 
sentenced to half of such minimum punishment, if the offence committed 
does not fall within the scope of the above, then the accused may be 
sentenced to one fourth of the punishment provided or extendable for such 
offence, the accused may also avail of the benefit under section 428 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which allows setting off the period of 
detention undergone by the accused against the sentence of imprisonment 
in plea -bargained settlements. The court must deliver the judgement in 
open court according to the terms of the mutually agreed disposition and 
formula prescribed for sentencing including victim compensation. It may 
be noted that this judgement is final and no appeal lies apart from a writ 
petition to the State High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the 
constitution or a special leave petition to the Supreme Court under Article 
136 of the constitution.^57 
In addition to above the Act also provides: 
1. If the accused is a first-time offender, the court will have the option of 
releasing him/her on probation. Alternatively, the court may grant half 
the minimum punishment for the particular offence. 
2. The plea-bargaining is applicable only in respect of those offences for 
which punishment of imprisonment is upto a period of 7 years. It does 
not apply where such offence affect the socio-economic condition of the 
country or has been committed against a woman or a child below the 
age of 14 years. 
3. The application for plea-bargaining should be filed by the accused 
voluntarily. 
4. The statement or facts by an accused in an application for plea 
bargaining shall not be used for any other purpose other than for 
plea-bargaining.^58 
157. Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri is a sitting Judge of Delhi High Court assisted by Ms. 
Shreya Arora, Final Year students, Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies, Naya 
Deep - The Official Journal of NALSA, Vol. VII, issue 3: July 2006, pp.78-80. 
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SPEEDY TRIAL IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
(A) International Covenants and Conventions 
The speedy trial as a modem concept owes its origin to the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. 
It provides "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
speedy and public trial". 
The right to speedy trial has been endorsed in almost all relevant 
International Charters and Conventions, most notably the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which India ratified on 
10* April 1979. The (ICCPR) provides explicitly for the right to speedy 
trial. Article 19 (1) declares that "every one has the right to liberty and 
security of person and that no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or 
detention". 
Article 9 (3) declares further that "Any one arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a Judge or other officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be general rule that the 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody but release may be 
subject to guarantees to appear for trial at any stage of the judicial 
proceedings and should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment. 
Article 10 (1) says "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person." Article 17 declares that the primary honour and 
reputation of an individual shall not be interfered with unlawfully Article 
2 (2) creates an obligation upon the ratifying States to enact domestic 
legislation to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. Article 3 
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creates a further obligation upon such States to ensure that the rights 
guaranteed by the Covenant are made available to all their citizens. 
The enforceability of International Conventions has come up before 
the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court in People's Union of India 
vs. Union oflndia,^ has observed that -
The provisions of the Covenant, which elucidate and go to 
effectuate the fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution, can, 
certainly be relied upon by courts as facets of those fundamental rights 
and hence enforceable as such. 
In Vishaka and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others,'^ the Supreme 
Court observed: 
"The International Conventions and norms are to be read into them in 
the absence of enacted domestic law occupying the fields when there is no 
inconsistency between them. It is now an accepted rule of judicial 
construction that regard must be had to International Conventions and 
norms for construing domestic law. When there is no inconsistency 
between them. It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that 
regard must he had to International Conventions and norms for 
construing domestic law. When there is no inconsistency between them 
and there is a void in the domestic law while propounding the above 
proposition. The court also referred to Nilabati Behera vs. State of 
Orissa^ a provision in the ICCPR was referred to support the view taken 
that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of 
enforcement of a guaranteed right as a public law remedy under Article 
32, as distinct from the private law remedy in torts. The court said that 
there was no reason why these International Conventions and norms 
could not be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly 
guaranteed in the Constitution of India". 
Any International Convention, not inconsistent with the Fundamental 
Rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to 
enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the 
Constitutional guarantee. 
1. 1997 (3) s e c 433. 
2. 1997 (6) s e c 241. 
3. 1993 (2) s e c 746. 
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However, it must be appreciated that at present treaties, agreements 
and Covenants that the government signs and ratifies do not automatically 
become a part of the domestic law but require parliament or State 
legislature to undertake legislation to so. As such, no one can lay claim or 
found any rights upon the provisions of an agreement or Covenant alone. 
However, on the question of human rights, the courts have declared that 
insofar as the rights contained in such International instruments are 
consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by part III of the 
Constitution of India, they can be read as facets of those rights and 
elucidate its contents. 
International Charter 
The right of a person arrested or detained on a criminal charge to a 
trial within a reasonable time is guaranteed by Article 9 (3) of the 
International Covenant. And Article 5 (3) and 6 (1) of the European 
Convention. 
European Convention: While Article 5 (3) of the European Convention 
deals with the pre-trial stage. Article 6(1) relates to the trial on a criminal 
charge. While the object of Article 5 (3) is to bring the arrested person to 
trial, that is to say, to ensure that the accused person is not detained, 
pending trial, beyond reasonable time, the object of Article 6 (1) is to 
ensure that the proceeding of the criminal trial should not be protected 
beyond any reasonable time.^ 
But the reasonableness of the detention pending trial may be upheld 
in cases where the accused is likely to abscond or to commit further 
offence if released.^ But mere suspicion would not justify detention after a 
4. Wembhoffs case, (1968) ECHR (A), Vol. 17; Biguzzi vs. Rank Leisure, (1991) 1 WLR 1926; Bell 
vs. DppofJamacia (1985) AC 937; Barker V5. Wingo (1972) 407 US 514. 
5. Neumeister case (1968) II YBECHR 810 (820); Matznelter case (1969) II YBECHR 406 (428). 
118 
reasonable time, there must be a reasonable belief that the person has 
committed a crime and must be brought to trial.^ 
Coming to the National Constitution it would be suitable to discuss 
the law of speedy trial under two heads - (a) pre-indictment stage, and (b) 
post-indictment stage. 
Pre-indictment Stage 
In the U.S.A. though there has been some wavering of judicial 
opinion on this question, the prevailing view is that the word 'prosecution' 
in the 6^ ^ Amendment suggest that the guarantee of 'speedy trial' attaches 
only when a formal criminal charge or indictment is made and the criminal 
prosecution begins.^ 
Apart from any length of time that has elapsed from the moment of 
arrest, if delay in commencing the trial has caused prejudice to the 
accused. He can involve the 'due process' clause of the 5* or 14* 
Amendment, e.g. where the delay interferes with the ability of the accused 
to defend himself, by causing loss of evidence,^ impairment of the 
memories of witnesses and the like, which may induce the court to quash 
the indictment.9 
In India, the right to be produced before the court at the 
pre-indictment stage is guaranteed by cl. (2) of Article 22 of the 
Constitution and section 61 of the Cr. P.C. 
In case of inordinate delay in framing the charge, the High Court 
would quash the prosecution as an abuse of the process of court.^o 
Under the unwritten Constitution of England, it has been held that 
where the delay in launching the prosecution since the alleged date of 
6 . Stogmuller cse (1969) 12 YBECHR 364 (394). 
7. US vs. Mc Donald (1982) 456 US I (6-8); Barker vs. Wingo, (1972) 407 US 514. 
8. USv.?. Marion, (1971)404 US 307 (313, 321) 
9. Toussie vs. US (1970) US 112 (114-15) 
10. State of U.P. vs. Parshattam (1991) Supp. (2) SCC 124 (para 3) 
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commission of the offence is so prolonged as to render the delayed 
prosecution to be an abuse of the process of court, the High Court may 
stop the proceeding by issuing the writ of prohibition.^! 
In such cases, the subordinate court may also decline jurisdiction to 
continue the proceedings in the exercise of its inherent discretion.^2 
Adopting the foreign English view, it has been held in Kenya gives 
unfettered discretion to the Attorney General in the matter of prosecution. 
This discretion should be exercised in a quasi-judicial manner, and that the 
High Courts has inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings on the 
ground of abuse of proceedings where there is an inordinate delay in 
prosecution, unless good and valid reasons are shown.^^ 
Post-indictment Stage 
Article 14.3 (c) of die International Covenant says- "In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the 
following minimum guarantees in full equality to he tried without delay" 
The Six Amendment to the American Constitution provides-
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to 
speedy and public trial". It has also been attributed to 'Due 
Process'.^4 
Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Right provides-
"Whereas any person is charged with a criminal offence he shall he 
afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time." 
From the words 'charged with an offence', it has been held that the 
right to reasonable trial arises only after the person is charged, so that the 
11. K.vs. Gray'sJJ., (1982)3 All ER 653 (658) (2 BD) 
12. D.P.P. vs. Humphreys (1976) 1 All ER 497 (527-28) (HL). 
13. Githungiri v*. Rep. of Kenya, (1986) LRC (Const.) 618 (625-27) Kenya. 
14. Kolferv5. NCardina (1967) 396 U.S. 213. 
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reasonable time is to be calculated from the time of indictments and any 
pre-indictment delay would not be the violation of Section ll(b).i5 
Section 20 of the Jamica (Constitution) order in Council, 1962, provides-
"Whereas any person is charged with a criminal offence he shall he 
afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time." 
This provision has been reviewed by the Privy Council in several 
cases. ^ ^ 
The Privy Council has held^'' that where a conviction is set aside on 
appeal and a retrial is ordered, any unreasonable delay in commencing the 
retrial would be treated as a violation of Article 20 of the Constitution and 
that in determining the unreasonableness of delay, the court would adopt 
a more stringent standard in the case of a retrial than in the case of initial 
prosecution.^^ Since the right to trial within a reasonable time follows from 
the wider concept of 'due process' which means that an incarcerated 
person should not be left to languish without any proper determination of 
the criminal proceeding against him owing to an unreasonable delay on 
the part of the State machinery. Under some Constitutions which do not 
explicitly guarantee a right to trial within a reasonable time, such right has 
been deduced from the comprehensive guarantee of 'Due process', as in 
section 4 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.^^ The principle is that 
when a person convicted by a court is kept in prison in excess of the 
sentence awarded by the court it would no longer be justified by law.20 
In India, the right to speedy trial has been deduced from the concept 
of procedural 'fairness' which has been held to be inherent in Article 21 of 
15 Re Regina & Carker, (1984) 8 DLR (4"") 156 (BC) proper view, to contrary has been taken m 
India, Antulay vs Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 (para 86 (2)) 
16. Riley vs A G , Jamica (1982) 3 All ER 459 (476-79) (PC), Bell vs D P P (1985) 2 All ER 585 
(589, 592, 593) (PC) 
17 Bell vs D P P . (1985) 2 All ER 585 (589, 592, 593) (PC) 
18. Ibid 
19. Abbott vs A G. of Trinidad (1979) I WLR 1342 (P.C.) 
20. Ibid. 
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the Constitution, and has been extended to pre-trial stages, including 
investigation as well as trial proceedings, including subsequent proceeding 
up to execution of the sentence, including delay in disposal of accused's 
mercy petition.^^ The court had already issued directions for speedy trial of 
criminal cases, which were given in the main Judgement in Rajdeo Sharma 
vs. State of BiharP- however, further clarifications were made to promote 
justice and effective implementation of the directions in a later case of 
Rajdeo Sharma. 
The most conspicuous development of the Indian law on this point 
has been the consideration of the effect of delay in execution of a sentence 
of death, where our Supreme Court has followed the principles laid down 
by its American counterpart. 
Question of unreasonable delay 
Following American precedents, consensus has been arrived at by 
courts under various Constitutions on the following points: 
1. In order to be a violation of the Constitutional guarantee for speedy 
trial or trial within a reasonable time: 
(a) The alleged delay must be due to some act or omission on the part 
of State, e.g. congestion in the court's docket,^ inordinate delay in 
executing a death sentence,^^ and not due to delay in the part of 
the accused himself^ ,^ e.g. in appealing against his conviction or 
sentence, or in bringing other motions .^ ^ 
(b) In order to determine whether a particular period of delay in a 
proceeding on the part of the State should be held to be 
reasonable, the court has to take into consideration various factors, 
e.g.: 
21. State of Punjab vs. Babu (1991) 3 SCC 18 (para 3). 
22. (1998) SC 3281 : 1998 Crl. J. 4596 
23. State of Maharashtra vs. Chanalal (1981)3SCC610 (para 2) 
24. See Spura note 19. 
25. A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Barker vs. Wingo (1952) 407 US 514 (530-31) 
26. Re-applications by Thomas (1986) LCR (Const.) 285 (Trinidad). 
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(i) Length of the delay - In order to be unreasonable, the delay 
must be 'inordinate' or 'undue'^^ having regard to all the 
circumstances, but no time schedule can be laid down in this 
behalf. 
(ii) Nature of charge - what would be an inordinate delay in the 
case of an ordinary crime cannot be so in the case of a 
complicated charge, like that of conspiracy .^ s In other words, 
in order to determine whether the detention since the arrest 
was unreasonably prolonged, the court should take into 
account the 'complexity' of the case.^^ 
(iii) The reasons given by the prosecution to justify the delay, 
a valid reason, for instance, would be the absence or no 
availability of an important witness.^o 
On the other hand, where the attempt to delay the trial is 
deliberate in order to hamper the defence, it would weigh 
heavily against the Government. 
(iv) Prejudice to the accused, where the delay is such as to cause 
the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of their 
memory, the accused can rely on this ground even though he 
has not led evidence on this point.^^ 
2. The standard of reasonableness will vary from case to case, having 
regard to its circumstances, the test being whether the delay would 
deprive the accused of a 'fair trial' or an adequate opportunity to defend 
himself. 
3. Each and every delay, of course does not necessarily prejudice the 
accused; some delays may indeed work to his advantage. But inordinate 
long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. Next, the 
accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that 
he did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make 
such a demand and he was not tried speedily, it would be extra point in 
27. Cf. Article 14, 33 (c), (Ic) 
28. Supra Note 24 
29. (1961)4YBECHR240(252) 
30. Wemhoff case (1968) 11 YBECHR 796 (804) 
31. See Supra Note 17 
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his favour, but the mere fact that he did not ask for it cannot be put against 
the accused. 
4. In every case of complaint of denial of the right to speedy trial, it is 
primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay .22 
Remedies for the Violation of Right to Speedy Trial 
(a) Right to challenge detention in court: 
Article 9 (4) of the International Covenant provides -
"Anyone who is deprived of his Uberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take -proceeding before a court, in order that, that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful". 
Article 5 (4) of the European Convention is substantially the same. 
The object of this provision is to have judicial review or control over 
detention, so that it may not violate any Constitutional or Statutory 
provision or made unreasonably prolonged. 
The European court has held^s that this agency of review must be 
judicial. Hence, where a magistrate orders the detention in an 
administrative capacity, and there is no provision for appeal against his 
order, there is a violation of Article 9 (4) of the Convention. 
In countries such as United Kingdom^"*, U.S.A. and India and 
European Human Right Court, the judicial remedy through which this 
review is ensured is the writ of habeas corpus. 
An application for the writ lies to a superior court, which may issue 
the writ commanding the detaining authority to produce the prisoner 
before it, and if the court finds the detention unlawful, it will set the 
prisoner free, at once. 
32. See supra note 25 
33. Vagrancy cases (against Belgium) 1971) 14 BECHR 786 (824-86) 
34. See O' Higgins, Cases & Materials on Civil Liberties (1980), pp. 221 ff, Halsbury's Laws of 
England, 4* Edition, Vol. XI 
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(B) Development of the Right to Speedy Trial 
At the outset, it would be important to look into how other legal 
systems respond to the problem of delay in criminal trials. The recognition 
of a defendant's right to a speedy trial stems from the Magna Charta,^^ 
which the English barons exacted from King John. Colonial America 
embraced the right to a speedy trial as part of its common law heritage. 
This right was formalized in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States; similar provisions exist in every State Constitution. 
A wide source exists to justify the right to speedy trial such as Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, 1776 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 19763 .^ The Indian Supreme Court has interpreted the 
right to seedy trial as an essential ingredient of fair trial and the right 
directly flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
The focus on speedy trial issue is important because society expects 
its criminal courts to be a forceful instrument both in controlling crime and 
in protecting the rights of the accused, the inability of the criminal courts 
to dispose of cases in a timely manner has emerged as a major concern. 
Delay between arrest and trial affects the ability of the court to determine 
the truth of the matter in controversy, diminishing the verdict's reliability. 
Western nations particularly U.S.A., England, Japan and Canada 
have succeeded to significant extent in arresting the menance of galloping 
pace of litigation by increasing number of Judges corresponding to case -
load and not population-wise, adopting leap-frog procedures and 
regulating the hearings. Majority of appeals stop at High Courts. 
Appellate proceedings at every level are conducted through written briefs 
and transcript. Supreme Court and High Courts have not only limited the 
35. 17 John, C. 39 (1215) (England) 
36. Aticle 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, 1976. 
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number of cases argued orally and amount of time allotted each argument 
but have recently reduced considerably the time for oral arguments .^ ^ 
In England some intermediary stages of appeals and revisions need 
to be abolished by adopting leap-frog procedures. It may be made no 
more necessary to write Judgements in dismissal of appeals as is prevalent 
in England. Large number of cases needs to be taken out from the arena of 
division benches. 
Doctrine of "plea negotiation" and "charge reduction" as prevalent 
in USA and other countries would help in easing the criminal pressure. 
This is an agreement between prosecutor, lawyer and defendant after 
advice by the courts large numbers of cases are handled by this process, 
which involves intensive selectivity. 
Another significant measure is to address social philosophy of 
'de-criminalization' to deplete the unnecessary backlog of cases. 
In U.S.A., Canada and England, many actions have been 
de-criminalized, which means removal of certain broad areas of offences 
from the status of criminal-acts like road traffic violations and some minor 
and petty offences.^^ 
However, Indian judicial scene is comparatively more dismal and 
disturbing. Long procrastinated trials moving at ambling pace, amending 
criminal trials, the torture of long waits for final decisions, repeated visits, 
enormous waste of man-hours in the courts that are over-burdened cause 
social tensions and frustrations and tend to weaken the system from 
within. Ultimately, it tells heavily upon the quality of justice. The way out 
of this crisis does not lie in condemnation of judiciary or Judges or lawyers 
or administrators. The phenomenon requires profound analysis. To start 
with there is immediate need for three-directional reforms to strengthen 
37. Kapoor, J.D. "Strengthening Administration of Justice" AIR, 2002, p.J88 
38. Ibid. 
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the administration of justice. First, there is need for substantive changes in 
laws and procedures with emphasis on alternative dispute resolution; 
Second, to treat judicial management as a philosophy by taking advantage 
of modern management and technology for system analysis and third, for 
making the judiciary as single authority to manage its affairs. 
(1) Position in United States of America (USA) 
> Source and Rationale 
The right to a speedy trial have been derived from a provision of 
Magna Charta and it was a right so interpreted by Coke, "We will sell to 
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right" .39 
Much the same language was incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights of 1776 and from there into the Sixth Amendment.''^ Unlike other 
provisions of the Amendment, this guarantee can be attributable to 
reasons, which have to do with the rights of and infliction of harms to both 
defendants and society. The provisions is "an important safeguard to 
prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize 
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the 
possibility that long delay will impair the ability of an accused" to defend 
himself.*^ The delay alone may lead to the loss of witnesses through death 
or other reasons and the blurring of memories of available witnesses. But 
on the other hand, "there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial 
which exists separate from and at times in opposition to the interests of the 
accused". Accused persons in Jail must be supported at considerable 
public expenses and often families must be assisted as well. Persons free 
in the community may commit other crimes, may be tempted over a long 
39. Ch. 40 of the 1215 Magna Carta, a portion of Ch. 29 of 1225 reissue Klopfer us. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967). 
40. 7F. Thrope, The Federal and State Constitution, H. Doc. No. 357, 59 The Congress, 2"'i 
Sess. 8, 3813 (1909) 
41. United States vs. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,120 (1966) also see 386 Klopfer vs. North Carolina, 
U.S. 213, 221-22, 1967, Smith vs. Hooey, 393, U.S. 379, 377-379 (1969): Dickey us. Florida, 
389, U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970). 
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period of time to jump bail, and may be able to use the backlog of cases to 
engage m plea bargammg for charges or sentences which do not give 
justice to society. And delay often retards the deterrent and rehabilitative 
effects of the criminal law.42 
The United States of America is the only country, which has enacted 
a legislation to implement the Constitutional guarantee of speedy trial to 
all accused persons. The Americans base the right to a speedy on the 6'^  
Amendment to their Constitution.'*^ Most of the States have, in their 
respective Constitutions, provision similar in effect to that of the 6'^  
Amendment.^'* Moreover, most of the States have enacted statutes, which 
provide for speedy trial of offences. Though most such statutes can be 
traced to the 18* century and even earlier the Speedy Trial Act was 
enacted only in the year 1974,^ 5 more as a response to growling protection 
against crimes being committed by accused out on bail.''^ 
> Scope and Application 
The guarantee of a right to speedy trial is one of the most basic 
rights provided by the U.S. Constitution. It is one of those "fundamental" 
liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights, which the due process clause of the 
14th, Amendment makes applicable to the States.^^ The safeguard "is 
activated only when a criminal prosecution has initiated and extends only 
to those persons who have been accused in the course of that prosecution". 
Invocation of the right need not await indictment, information or other 
42 Barker vs Wingo, 407, U S 514, 519 (1972), Dickey vs Florida, 398, U S 30, 42 (1970), 
(fustice Brennan Concurring) Congress by the Speedy Trial Act 1974, pub , L No 93-619, 
88 State 2076, 18 U S C 3161-74, has codified the law with respect to the right, intending 
to "give effect to the 6* amendment right to a Speedy Trial" S Rep No 1021, 93'^ 
Congress, 2"^  Sess 1 (1974) 
43 The relevant portion or the 6* Amendment reads "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public trial by an important jury " 
44 Note, "Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial", 57 Col L R 84 (1957) 
45 Marc 1. Steinberg, "Right to Speedy Trial The Constitutional right and its apphcabihty to 
the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 66 J Crim L r C 229(1975) 
46 Richard Frase, "The Speedy Trial Act of 1974", 43 VS Chi, L R 667 (1976) 
47 Klopfer vs North Carohna, 386 U S 213, 226 (1976) 
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formal charge but begins with the actual restraints imposed by arrest if 
those restraints precede the formal professing of charges.*^ 
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall disagreed, arguing that the 
"right to a speedy trial is the right to be brought to trial speedily which 
would seem to be as relevant to pre-trial indictment delays as it is to post-
indictment delays," but concurring because they did not think the 
guarantee violated under the facts of the case. In United States vs. 
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982), the Court held the clause was not implicated 
by the action of the United States when, in May of 1970, it proceeded with 
a charge of Murder against defendant under military law but dismissed 
the charge in October of that year, and he was discharged in December. In 
June of 1972, the investigation was reopened and an investigation was 
begun, but a grand jury was not convened until August of 1974, and 
possible prejudice that may result from delays between the time 
government discovers sufficient evidence to proceed against a suspect and 
the time of instituting those proceedings are guarded against by statutes of 
limitation, which represent a legislature Judgement with regard to 
permissible periods of delay.^9 
In two cases, the court held that the speedy trial guarantee had been 
violated by States, which preferred criminal charges against persons who 
were already incarcerated in prisons of other jurisdictions following 
convictions on other charges when those States ignored the defendants 
requests to be given prompt trials and made no effort through requests to 
prison authorities to obtain custody of the prisoners for purposes of trial^o 
A State practice permitting the prosecutor to take nolle-prosequi with leave, 
48. United States us. Marion, 404, U.S. 307, 313, 320, 322 (1971). 
49. United States vs. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1971) Cf. United States vs. Toussle, 397 U.S. 
112, 114-15 (1970) In some circumstances, pre-accusation delay could constitute a due 
process violation but not a speedy trial, problem. If prejudice results to a defendant 
because of the governments delay, a court should balance the degree of prejudice against 
the reasons for delay given by the prosecution. 
50. Smith vs. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) Dickey vs. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970). 
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which discharged the accused from custody but left him subject at any 
time thereafter to prosecution at the discretion of the prosecutor, the 
statute of limitations being tolled was condemned was violative of the 
guarantee.5^ 
The Speedy Trial prescribes a set of time limits for carrying out the 
major events in criminal proceedings such as the giving of information and 
indictment in the prosecution of criminal cases. 
The Speedy Trial Act divides the pre-trial stage into three and there 
are different limits for each stage. The first interval is from arrest to filing 
of charge/information with the court, for which the prosecution has 30 
days. In the event the accused is not arrested, this period begins to run 
from the time accused is summoned. The Second interval is from filing of 
the charge till arraignment for which the limit is 10 days. From 
arraignment till commencement of trial, further 60 days is provided. Thus, 
once the accused is served with the summons or is arrested, the trial has to 
commence within 100 days.52 
If the delay occurs in the first stages, that is, between arrest and the 
arraignment the termination of the prosecution is automatic. But, once he 
is arraigned the accused has to make a demand for dismissal. The Court 
has the discretion to dismiss the prosecution with or without the liberty to 
bring a fresh prosecution. However, such fresh prosecutions may be 
barred by limitation. This discretion is to be exercised with reference to 
three factors.^^ 
51. Kolpfer vs. North Caralina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) In Pollard vs. United States, 352 U.S. 354 
(1957), the majority assumed and the dissent asserted that sentence is part of the trial and 
that too lengthy or unjustified a delay in imposing sentence could run afoul of this 
guarantee. 
52. On a comparison, under the Indian System, these stages roughly correspond to filing of 
the final report under section 173 cr. P.c. or earlier proceedings framing and reading over 
of charges and commencement of trial respectively. 
53.18 u s e S. 3162 (1) (2), quoted by Suzanne Isaacson, "Speedy Trial Act of 1974- Dismissed 
sanction for non-compliance with the Act: Defining the range of District Courts discretion 
to dismiss" 78J. Crim. L. re. 997. 
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(i) Seriousness of the offence. 
(ii) Facts and circumstances leading to the dismissal. 
(iii) Impact of the dismissal on the administration of justice. 
These factors were considered and interpreted by their Supreme 
Court in United States vs. Taylor.^'^ In that case, lack of malice on the part of 
the prosecution is causing the delay, and granting of the offence 
(drug trafficking) were considered to justify the grant of leave to bring a 
fresh prosecution while dismissing the case. The court also held that these 
questions warrant detailed and reasoned decisions by the trial court for 
they will be considered as questions of the law for the purpose of review 
by the higher courts. 
The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to 
prevent undue and oppressive incarceration but it serves to minimize 
anxiety and concerns that accompany the accusation. This right helps to 
limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend 
himself. This right is actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid 
down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental right. 
In fact, more cases are coming before the courts for quashing of 
proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the 
invocation of this right even need not await formal arraignment of charge. 
The guarantee of a speedy trial is one of the most basic rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution of U.S.A. it is one of these Fundamental 
liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights which the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States.^s The protection 
given by this guarantee is activated only when a criminal prosecution has 
begun and extends only to those persons who have been 'accused' in the 
course of the prosecution. 
54.108 S. ct. 2413 (1988) See comment by Suzanne Isaacson, ibid. 
55. Kolpfer vs. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (226) (1967). 
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The invocation of the right need not await arraignment, information 
or other formal charge but begins with the actual restraints imposed 
by arrest if those restraints precede the formal preferring of charge.56 
Any prejudice that may occur from delays between the time governments 
discovers sufficient evidence to proceed against a suspect and the time of 
instituting those proceedings are guarded against by statutes of limitation, 
which represent a legislative Judgement with regard to permissible 
periods of delay .57 In these cases, the court held that the speedy trial 
guarantee had been violated by States which, preferred criminal charges 
against persons who were already incarcerated in prisons of other 
jurisdictions following convictions on other charges when those States 
ignored the defendant's requests to be given prompt trials and made no 
effort through requests to prison authorities to obtain custody of the 
prisoners for purpose of trial.^s 
> Constitutional Test 
A defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition. States have 
provisions in their Constitutions that guarantee the same right. The text 
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as to 
whether a defendants' right to a speedy trial has been violated is a 
balancing test. The balancing test involves four factors: 
1. the length of the delay 
2. the causes of the delay 
3. the extent of the defendants' assertion of his or her right to speedy 
trial; and 
56. United States us. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (313, 320, 322) (1971) 
57. Id. Cf. United States vs. Toussie, 397 U.S. 112 (114) 115 (1970) in some circumstances, 
pre-accusation delay could constitute a due process violation but not a speedy trial 
problem. If prejudice results to a defendant because of the government's delay a court 
should balance the degree of prejudice against the reasons for delay given by the 
prosecution. 
58. Smith VS. Hooey, 393 US 374 (1969); Dickey VS. Florida, 398 US 30 (1970) 
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4. the nature and extent of the prejudice to the defendant as a result of 
the delay. 
The-balancing test requires a court to make a determination on a 
violation of the defendants' speedy trial rights on a case-by-case basis. 
The Supreme Court in case of Barker vs. Wingo^^ formulated the 
Constitutional test for speedy trial; the court rejected a specific number of 
days or months as the Constitutional test. The court has also held that 
when the balancing test establishes a violation of the defendant's 
Constitutional right to speedy trial, the only appropriate remedy is 
dismissal of the criminal charges with prejudice.^o 
In Barker case, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a 
five-year delay was offset by the justification for the delay, by the 
defendant's acquiescence in the greater part of the delay, and by the 
absence of prejudice to the defendant. 
Firstly, the length of the delay serves as a trigger for the 
application of the remaining factors of the balancing test. If a delay is not 
long enough to be considered prejudicial to a defendant, a court will not 
look to the other three factors. If the length of the delay is presumed to be 
prejudicial to the defendant, the other three factors are considered. A 
delay for a certain amount of time does not automatically result in a 
violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights. The length of the delay is 
usually considered according to the facts of the defendant's case, the 
seriousness of the defendant's offence, and any action or inaction on the 
part of a trial court or the prosecution. Analysis under the Barker case a 
delay that is "presumptively prejudicial" calls for the balancing test. 
A presumptively prejudicial delay is determined by the facts and 
circumstances of the case and by the pending charge. Thus, the court 
contended that - "the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street 
59. 407 U.S. 514 (1972) 
60. Stmnk us. United States, 412 U.S 434 (1973) 
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crime is considerably less than for a serious complex conspiracy charge" .^ ^ 
An analysis of cases using the Barker test shows that a delay of one year is 
generally considered sufficient to raise Sixth Amendment issue and invoke 
the balancing process,62 although is less complex cases the Barker test is 
generally invoked when the delay exceeds six months, as discussed in 
United States vs. Rucker.^'^ 
Secondly, in the case of United States vs. Herman^'^ it was held that, 
once an unreasonable delay is established, the reason for the delay must be 
considered delay caused by the defendant cannot be the basis for claiming 
a violation of his Sixth Amendment right. The second test, the cause of 
delay, involves a consideration of the reasons for the delay and whether 
the delay should be weighed in favour of the prosecution or the defence. 
Over controlled court, dockets and an unintentional delay on the part of 
the prosecution is considered to neutral reasons for the delay. However, 
neutral reasons are generally weighed in favour of a defendant because the 
prosecution and trial court both have a duty to prevent an unreasonable 
delay. Therefore, over controlled dockets are not excuses for a delay. 
If the prosecution deliberately attempts to delay a trial in order to 
impair a defendants' case, the delay is weighed heavily against the 
prosecution However, good faith plea negotiations are considered a valid 
reason for a delay and are not weighed against the prosecution. If the 
defendant is responsible for the delay, the delay is weighed against the 
defendant. 
In Barker case, the Supreme Court categorised the reasons for delay 
attributable to the prosecution into three classes, declaring that in the 
balancing test, different weights must be assigned to various reasons. 
61. Barker us. Wingo, 531 U.S. 514 (1972). 
62. Rudstein, pp. 11,17 
63.496 F. 2d 1241 (8* Cir. 1974). 
64. 576 F. 2d 1139,1145 (5* cir. 1978). 
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An intentional delay by the prosecution for the purpose of harassing the 
defendant or hampering the defence normally tips the balance in the 
defendants favour and is sufficient ground for dismissal of the charges. 
As for the neutral reason for the delay, courts have not blamed the 
government when the delay is caused by court congestion or 
undermarmed prosecution staffs and tend to treat these as justifiable 
reasons for delay.^s 
Finally, in Barke, the court found that a valid reason adduced by the 
government, such as the unavailability of a key prosecution witness, 
would excuse an appropriate delay without further balancing. Implicit in 
this justification for delay is a belief that the prosecution is not responsible 
for the witness unavailability and that a diligent effort to locate him must 
be made. Only reasonable delay on account of a missing witnesses will be 
considered appropriate, a criminal prosecution cannot be left spending 
indefinitely because of the disappearance of the witness^^. Other justified 
causes for delay are in competency of the accused,^'' the complexity of the 
easels and the unavailability of a defendant.^^ 
The third test, a defendants' assertion of his or her right to a 
speedy trial, is not in and of itself determinative of the violation of a right 
to a speedy trial. However, the defendant's assertion of his or her right 
does receives strong weight under the balancing test. If the defendant fails 
to assert his or her right, he or she will have difficulty claiming that his or 
her right to speedy trial was violated. In Barker case it was held that the 
defendant's demand for a speedy trial to be merely one factor that should 
be weighed in the balancing test. The court specifically rejected the idea 
65. d. strunk, 436, United States vs. La Borde, 446 F. 2d 965, 968 (6* Cir. 1974). 
66. United States us. Auderson, 471 F. 2d 201 (5* Cir. 1973). 
67. United States ex rel. little vs. Twomey, 477 F.2d 767 (7* Cir. 1973). 
68. United States vs. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100,1111 (5* Cir. 1976). 
69. United States vs. Annerino, 945 F. 2d 1159,1162-1164 (7* Cir. 1974). 
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that a defendant's failure to demand trial could constitute waiver of the 
speedy trial right. Most courts that have considered this issue however, 
have indicated a belief that a defendant who fails to assert the right does 
not in fact want a speedy trial. Those courts have weighed this failure 
against the defendant.^o 
The fourth test, prejudice to a defendant as a result of the delay, is 
determined in accordance with the defendant's interests. Such interests 
include the prevention of pre-trial incarceration, the minimization of 
anxiety and concern on the part of the defendant and the limitation of the 
opportunity to prepare a defence. The defendant initially has the burden of 
showing prejudice as a result of the delay. The defendant does not need to 
show actual prejudice. Once the defendant has shown some prejudice, the 
prosecution has the burden of proving that the defendant was not 
seriously prejudiced by the delay. 
The final factor in the Barker formula, three interests were identified 
by the court -
(1) preventing oppressive pre-trial incarceration; 
(2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and 
(3) limiting the possibility that the defence will be impaired. 
The Supreme Court found the last interest to be pre-eminent since 
the inability of a defendant to prepare his case adequately impairs 
the fairness and reliability of the guilt determining process. 
The Supreme Court in Barker dismissed the ten months pre-trial 
incarceration as causing only minimal prejudice to the defendant, most 
courts have deemed this factor to weigh very little in the balancing test. 
Some courts, however, have found similar periods of incarceration to be 
oppressive within the Supreme Court's use of that term.^^ 
70. cf. United States vs. Greene, 578 F. 2d 648, 655 (5* Cir. 1978); United States us. Lane, 561, 
F. 2d 1075,1079 (2d Cir. 1977); United States vs. Roberts, 515 F. 2d 642 (2d Cir. 1975). 
71. Chism vs. Koehler, 392 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Mich. 1975); United States vs. Perry, 353, F. 
Supp. 1235 (DDC, 1973). 
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Although the court in Basker case recognized that personal 
prejudice, such as the loss of employment or the experience of public 
scorn, is a factor to be considered, it held that such injury is a normal effect 
of being accused of criminal charges. Before delay can be considered to 
cause personal prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate more than the 
normal anxiety, embarrassment, and concern suffered by all defendants 
awaiting trial. 
The most significant prejudice is that which impairs the defendant's 
ability to defend himself. Such prejudice arises when the defendant's 
witnesses have died or disappeared or is unable to recall past events 
accurately owing to the delay. Courts have expanded this list to include 
the destruction of documents or physical evidence,^^ and the death of the 
defendant's attorney.^^ The Supreme Court has held that a defendant need 
only show that one of these has occurred. The defendant need not make 
an affirmative showing of prejudice beyond the loss,^^ although other 
courts have generally held that he must demonstrate actual prejudice as a 
result of the loss caused by delay .^ ^ 
The most serious type of prejudice is the impairment of an 
opportunity to prepare a defence. Witnesses may become unavailable and 
evidence may be lost during a lengthy delay. 
A defendant often files a motion for a speedy trial as part of his or 
her pre-trial motions. The purpose of the motion is to secure an early trial 
date and to preserve any error that may result from a lengthy pre-trial 
delay. 
If the defendants' right to a speedy trial has been violated, the case 
against the defendant must be dismissed. When the defendant files a 
72. United States us. Burnett, 476 F. 2d 726 (5'h Cir. 1973). 
73. State us. Bishop, 493S.W. 2d 81 (Tenn. 1973) 
74. Moore vs. Artzona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) 
75. Smith vs. United States, 577 F. 2d 1025 (5'h Cir. 1978). 
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motion to dismiss based on a violation of his or her right to a speedy trial, 
the motion should allege that the delay was unduly lengthy, that the delay 
did not caused by the defendant and that the delay was prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
Speedy Trial Act of 1974 - An Overview 
The Federal Act of 1974 is titled the Speedy Trial Act and was 
passed in 1974. The Act establishes time limits for completing the various 
stages of a federal criminal prosecution, such as the giving of information 
and indictment etc. 
The Speedy Trial Act require the trial of defendant to commence 
within seventy days from the filing date of the indictment or from the date 
on which the defendant appears before a judicial officer of the court in 
which the charge is pending, whichever date is later.^^ The information or 
indictment must be filed within 30 days from the date of arrest of the 
service of summon.'''' 
Moreover, in order to ensure that accused persons are not rushed to 
trial without an adequate opportunity to prepare, the congress amended 
the Act in 1979 to provide a minimum time period during which trial must 
commence. The legislation has three major provisions: 
First: it requires that a defendant be indicted and then tried within a 
mandatory period of time. 
Second: it attempts to limit delay by curtailing a trial Judge's discretion to 
grant continuances (postponements of the action to a subsequent 
day). 
Third: it authorises the imposition of sections upon attorneys who 
unjustifiably cause delay. 
Thereby, the Act provides that trial may not begin less than thirty 
days from the date the defendant first appears in court, unless the 
76. U.S.C. § 3161 (c) (1) 
77. Id,(b) 
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defendant agrees in writing to an earlier date. In United States vs. Raja 
Contreras'^^, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this thirty-day trial 
preparation period not restarted upon the filing of a substantially 
similar superseding indictment. The indictment is dismissed at the 
defendants' request; the provisions of the Act's apply afresh upon 
reinstatement of the charge.^^ If the indictment is dismissed at the request 
of the government, the seventy days time begins to run again upon the 
filing of the second indictment.^o If trial ends in a mistrial, or the court 
grants a motion for a new trial, the second trial must begin within seventy 
days from the date, the decision of trial becomes final.^ ^ 
Certain pre-trial delays are automatically excluded from the Act's 
time limits, such as delays caused by pre-trial motions. In Henderson vs. 
United States^ the Supreme Court held that the Act excludes all time 
between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that 
motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is 'reasonably 
necessary'. The Act also excludes a reasonable period (upto 30 days) 
during which a motion is actually 'under advisement' by the court.*^ 
Other delays excluded from the Act's time limits include delays 
caused by the unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness's^ 
delays attributable to a co-defendant^s and delays attributable to the 
defendant's involvement in other proceedings; including delay resulting 
from an interlocutory appeal. (Note, however, that 30 day defence 
preparation period provided for in § 316 (c) (2) is calculated without 
reference to the section 3161 (h) exclusions). 
78. 474 US 231 (1985) 
79. 18U.S.C. §3161 (d)(1) 
80. Id (h) (6) 
81. Id;(e) 
82. 476 U.S. 321 (33) (1986) 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h) (1) (J) 
84. Id (h)(3) 
85. Id (h)(7) 
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A defendant may not expressly waive his rights under the Speedy 
Trial Act. This was ruled in United States vs. Saltzman.^^ However, if the 
trial Judge determines that the 'ends of justice' served by a continuance 
outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, the 
delay occasioned by such continuance is excluded from the Act's time 
limits.s^ The Judge must set forth, orally or in writing, his reasons for 
granting the continuance^^ the government should make sure that the 
Judge enters an 'ends of justice' continuance and that he sets forth his 
reasons for doing so. It is the duty of the prosecution to bring a defendant 
to trial, and the failure of the defendant to demand the right is not to be 
construed as a waiver of the right. 
The Act provides a sanction of dismissal for violation of its time 
limits that may be with or without prejudice to re-prosecution. In assessing 
whether dismissal should be with prejudice, the court must consider the 
seriousness of the offence, and the circumstances leading to dismissal, and 
the impact that re-prosecution would have on the administration of the 
Act and on the administration of justice.^^ 
In United States vs. Taylor,^ the Supreme Court held that a trial court 
must examine each statutory factor in deciding to dismiss charges with 
prejudice. The court in Taylor found that a minor violation of the time 
limitations of the act that did not prejudice the defendants' trial 
preparation did not justify the dismissal with prejudice of an indictment 
charging serious drug offences. 
While a defendant cannot unilaterally waive his rights under the 
Speedy Trial Act, he can forfeit his to obtain a dismissal of the case for a 
claimed violation of the Act by failing to move for dismissal prior to trial. 
86. 984 F 2d 1087,1090-1092 (10* Cir. 1993) 
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h) (8) (A) 
88. Ibid 
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (a) (1) - (a) (2) 
90. 487 U.S. 326(1988) 
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The statute provides that [failure of the defendant to move for dismissal 
prior to trial, shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this 
section.9^ 
The Speedy Trial Act 1974 is not applicable to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, v^hich have their own speedy trial provision.^2 
Furthermore, the Inter-State Agreement on Detainer (IAD) provides 
its own time limits for persons incarcerated in other jurisdictions.^^ ij^ g^ch 
a case, the government must comply with both the time limits of the IAD 
and Speedy Trial Act. 
> When the Right is denied: 
The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent 
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a 
defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.^^ No length of 
time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this guarantee.^^ But on the 
other hand neither does the defendant have to show actual prejudice by 
delay.^^ The court rather has adopted an adhoc balancing approach. We can 
do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess 
in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his 
right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four 
such factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of right, and prejudice to the defendant.^'' 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a) (2) 
92. Id. § 5036 (Speedy trial provision of the Juvenile Delinquency Act). 
93. Id. Appendix 2 § 2, Articles III-VI 
94. Beavers vs. Havbert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (holding that the guarantee could not be 
invoked by a defendant first indicted in one district to prevent removal to another district 
where he had also been indicted). 
95. cf. pollard vs. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States vs. Ewell 383 U.S. 116 
(1966). See United States vs. Provoo 350, U.S. 857 (1955), aff, g 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 
1955). 
96. United States vs. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Barker vs. Wingo 407 U.S. 514 536 
(1972) (fustice White Concerning) 
97. Barker vs. Wingo, 407 US 514 (530) (1972). 
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> Features 
A few important features of the Speedy Trial Act, 1974 have noted, 
firstly, it was implemented in a phased manner. The Act initially imposed 
a time limit of 180 days for the first year after it was enforced. In the 
second year, this was reduced to 120 days, and from the third year 
onwards, the limit is 100 days. A presiding officer of the court can ask for 
exempting his court from the purview of the Act, if he feels that his court is 
not in a position to meet the requirements of the Act on account of heavy 
workload.98 
Secondly, there are provisions which enable the courts to exclude 
delays arising on account of certain specified factors like absconding or 
non-availability of the accused or a key witness, delays caused by other 
preliminary proceedings like those held to determine the mental fitness of 
the accused etc.^ ^ 
The third feature of the Act is that an elaborate administrative 
set-up has been created by the Act to collect statistical data regarding 
implementation and impact of the time limits imposed by the Act on the 
administration of Justice. Relying on such, data have been found that 
there is frequent invocation of the time exclusion provisions in the Act, 
and at least 10% of the total cases take more than one year to conclude.^™ 
> Delay at pre-arrest Stage 
The effects of delay upon a defendant have plagued the 
Anglo-American Justice System for many centuries. There is often 
significant delay when evidence of alleged criminal behaviour surfaces 
during the course of an investigation and a decision is made to postpone 
98. This provision was inserted by an amendment of the Act in 1979. George S. Bridges, 
"The Seedy Trial Act 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal Litigation", 73 J. Crim. 
L. & C. 50 at p. 56 (1982). 
99. S. 3161 (h), as quoted by Bridges, Ibid. 
100. Ibid, also see, Julie Vennard, "Court Delays and Speedy Trial Provisions", 1985, Crim. 
L.R. 73. 
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an arrest until the investigation is concluded. This is specially true when 
the evidence surfaces during an undercover operation and an arrest would 
terminate the cover. Such delay can be prejudicial since the accused is not 
even aware that he is a suspect and the passage of time may impair 
memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, 
and generally interfere with his ability to defend himself. The Supreme 
Court has declined to press the 6* Amendment right into service in such 
instances, relying generally upon statutes of limitation, which perform this 
function by governing the permissible time between commission of a 
crime and prosecution. In United States vs. lovasco,^^^ the Supreme Court, 
faced with the issue of pre arraignment delay, held that "to prosecute a 
defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due 
process, even if his defence might have been somewhat prejudiced by the 
lapse of time." The court concluded that even if a defendant could 
establish that he was prejudiced by pre-accusation delay, the charges 
should not be dismissed if the delay is justified or necessary. 
> Speedy Trials in the States 
The administration of Justice in the States is a matter left to each 
State government, provided that the procedures and rules adopted in each 
State do not fall below the minimal level of fairness guaranteed by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Barker case. 
Priority is given for the criminal cases, many States have followed 
the lead of Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal procedure and the 
recommendations contained in the standards for criminal justice prepared 
by the American Bar Association (ABA). The standards provided that 
Criminal trials be given preference in the scheduling of court calendars 
and that among criminal trials preference be given to the trials of 
101. 431 U.S. 783 (1977). 
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defendants in custody and defendants whose pre-trial freedom is 
reasonably believed to present unusual risks to the community.102 
However, according priority to criminal cases often affects the civil 
calendar adversely. 
> Controlling Continuances 
The greatest obstacle to the speedy disposal of criminal cases is the 
case with which an attorney is able to delay the commencement of a trial 
by obtaining a continuance. This fact is recognized in the American Bar 
Association (ABA) standards, which stipulate that a continuance should be 
granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for as long as is 
necessary. Underlying the stipulation is recognition that the need for 
prompt disposition of criminal cases should take precedence over the 
desires and convenience of the parties to the dispute. The emphasis is on 
the court's responsibility independently to determine whether there is in 
fact cause for the continuance. John Poulous and Jerry Coleman have 
characterized the law of continuances in the States as falling into three 
main categories and a residual one. The three categories are the "good 
cause" requirement, the slightly lesser standard of "sufficient cause", and 
the strictest standard, which requires that "exceptional circumstances" be 
shown before a continuance is granted. However, the majority of States fall 
into the residual category because they authorize granting continuances 
for such reasons as "in the ends of justice" or "in the interest of justice",^°^ 
and grant continuances merely "for cause",^^^ a^^j grant continuances 
merely "for cause" .^ ^^  
102. (cf. Mich. Compt. Laws Arm. § 768.1 (1968); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (McKinney) § 30.20 
(1971 r 1972-1980 Cum. Supp.) 
103. (Alaska Crim. R. 45(d) (2) (1980); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (McKiimey) § 30.30 (4) (g) 
(1972-1980 Cum. Supp.)) 
104. (Ohio Reus. Code Ann. § 2945.72 (H) (1975 r 1980 Supp.)) 
105. (D.C. R. Crim. P. I l l (1978-1979 Supp.)) 
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> State Speedy trial- Time limits 
More than half of the States have statutory provisions and court 
rules requiring that in criminal cases commence within a certain number of 
days following a specific event. These time limits range from a minimum 
of Seventy-five days to a maximum of nine months. Illinois, for example, 
has stipulated 120 days from arrest; Pennsylvania, 180 days after the filing 
of the complaint; Ohio, 90 days from arrest for a defendant who is in 
custody and 270 days from arrest for a defendant who is free on bail; and 
Washington, 90 days from preliminary appearance.^o^ 
A substantial minority of States still measure by terms of court the 
time limits within which trial must begin, requiring that it commence 
within a fixed number of terms of court following the term in which the 
defendant was arrested.^o^ Finally, States such a Hawaii and New Jersey 
provide no certain time period within which trial must begin, leaving the 
matter entirely to the discretion of the trial court.^^^ 
Although the ABA standards stipulate that certain period of time be 
excluded in computing the time to trial, there is no clear trend among the 
States. Delay caused by court congestion illustrates the lack of 
uniformity.^09 Arizona has adopted the ABA standards position that 
"congestion attributable to exceptional circumstances" will justify delay 
but that delay caused by chronic congestion is not excused. On the other 
hand, in Florida,i^o docket congestion, no matter how exceptions, is not 
considered an excusable delay. Some States, such as Indiana, do excuse 
delay caused by docket congestion, Arkansas excuses delay "for want of 
106. (III. Rew. Stat. Ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (1977); pa. R. Crim. P. 1100 (1980); Ohio Reus. Code 
Ann. § 10.46.080 (1980); Wash. Super, ct. Crim. R. 3.3 (c) (1980). 
107. (Ga. Code Ann. § 27-1901 (1978)) 
108. (Hawaii Reus. Stat. § 635 (1976); N.J.R. Crim. ct. 3:25-2 and -3 (1981)) 
109. (Ariz. R. Crim. p. 8.4 (c) (1973 r 1980-1981 Supp.)) 
110. (Fla. R. Crim. p. 3.191 (f) (1975 r 1981 Supp.)) 
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time to try the case" and such States as Kansas and Texas excuse delay 
where there is "insufficient time" to try the case.i" 
(2) United Kingdom (U.K.) 
The English criminal Justice system recognizes accused's right as far 
back as 1679 in the Habeas Corpus Act.^ ^2 Section 6 of the Habeas Corpus 
Act, provided for release on bail or discharge of persons detained on 
accusation of high treason or felony in the courts of Assizes or Sessions, 
if indictment could not take place in the second term after committal.i^^ 
Assizes Relief Act 1889, Section 3 provided for released on bail of persons 
committed for trial to courts of sessions if they are not tries in the next 
sessions.^^4 j h e Criminal Justice Act, 1925, Section 14 (5) which was 
replaced by Section 10 (3) of Magistrates Courts Act 1952 also provided for 
release on bail of persons who could not be tried at the next Quarter 
sessions."^ These provisions only limit the pre-conviction custody of the 
accused. 
> Statutory Regulations 
Some steps to regulate and limit the actual duration of the 
prosecution process was made in the Crown Court Rules and Indictment 
Rules, which are statutory regulations, issued in 1982 and 1983. Under 
these rules, the bill of indictment is to be prepared within 28 days of 
committal^^^ and the trial is to commence within 8 weeks of committal.^^'' 
Both these limits may be extended by the court. 
111. (Ind. R. Crim. p. 4 (4) (B) (1981); Ark. Stat. Arm. § 43-1710 (1964 r 1979 Supp.) Kan 
Stat. Arm. § 22-3402 (3) (d) (1974 r 1980 Supp.); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 29.01 (3) (1966 
r 1980-81 Supp.) 
112. Mahesh T. Pai, "Delay in Criminal Justice System; Common Cause Evaluated" 1996 
(Sept.-Dec.) 20 C.U.L.R. p. 400. 
113. Halsbury's Statutes, Ilnd ed. VS. 6, p. 89. 
114. Id., VS. 5, p. 916. 
115. Now, Bails Act, 1976. 
116. Halsbury's laws of England, 4* ed., reissue VS. 11(2) para 916. 
117. Id., para 979. 
146 
> The Prosecution Offenders Act, 1985 
Section 22 enables the Secretary of State to prescribe custodial and 
overall time limit in respect of preliminary stages of trial. "Preliminary 
Stage" meanS; in Crown Court, proceedings prior to arraignment and in 
summary trials, proceedings prior to taking of evidence for the 
prosecution.^18 The actual time limit has to be prescribed by the Secretary 
of State through delegated legislation."^ 
The consequence of non-adherence with custodial time limit is 
bail.^ 20 Consequence of non-adherence with overall time limits is 
acquittal. ^ 21 
According to the provision now in force, the custodial limits vary 
between 58 to 112 days depending on whether the offence is triable 
summarily or indictable and other factors like place of trial.^ 22 J^^Q courts 
have the power to extend time limits on a case-to-case basis. Depending on 
factors like - 'good cause', where prosecution has 'acted with all due 
expedition'^23 gt^., and where the accused escapes or jumps bail,^ 24 such 
orders are appealable, except when the accused is convicted.^25 
(3) Australia 
In Australia, there is no express provision of speedy trial governing 
the time, which may be taken for completion of criminal proceedings. 
The right to speedy trial is a creation of the courts proceedings', doctrine as 
118. Prosecution of offenders Act, S. 22(11) 
119. Id. S. 22(1) and (2) 
120. Prosecution of offences (Custody time limit) Regulations, 1987 also see Supra n. 85 
paras 851-855 
121. Prosecution of offenders Act, 1985 S. 22(4) 
122. Supra n. 5. 
123. Prosecution of offenders Act, 1985, S. 22(3) 
124. Id,, S, 22(5) and (6). 
125. Id., S. 22(7), (8), (9) and (10). 
147 
enunciated by the English House of Lords in Connelly vs. DPP^26 and DPP 
vs. Humphrys^^'^ and developed by the High Court of Australia in Barton vs. 
The Queen.^^^ None of these cases deal with delay. All that was laid down 
in these cases is that the courts have been power to dismiss prosecutions 
for abuse of their process. 
Therefore, relying on these decisions, the lower courts in the country 
developed a preposition that were efflux of time will amount to an abuse 
of their process.^29 
This was reversed by the High Court of Australia in Jago vs. District 
Court of New South Wfl/es.^ o^ In Jago, the accused, an ex-company director 
was indicted of an offence related with misuse of company funds, 
committed between April 1976 and June 1979. The High Court found that 
there is no common law right to a speedy trial in Australia. However, a 
proceeding may be permanently stayed if abuse of proceedings is proved 
as a matter of fact. Whether delay amounts to abuse is a question to be 
decided on a case-to-case basis.^ ^^ The court expressly laid down that 
permanent stay order granting immunity from trial is undesirable and 
ought to be the last resort. It was realistically accepted by the court that 
delay, especially in complex cases, is inevitable and on facts, found that 
Jago did not involve imreasonable delay. 
C. Problem of Backlog And Delay-A Comparative Study 
The change over from the Indian to the Anglo-Indian or the English 
legal and judicial system did not prove advantageous to this country. 
Rather we find ourselves now in enormous legal and judicial mess, the 
126. (1964) AC 1254, 
127. (1977) AC 1. 
128. 147 CLR 75 (1990). 
129. Cases quoted bvy Justice John H. Phillips in "Delay and abuse of process", (1989) 63 
ALJ 698. Also see, Richard G. Fox, "Jago's Case; Delay Unfairness and abuse of process 
in the High Court of Australia" 1990 Crim. L.R. 552. 
130. 63 ALJR 340 (1989). 
131. Ibid. 
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delays and heavy backlog making it worse. To quote Sir Henry Durand 
from his Article; "The State of society and civilization which pervades the 
many millions of India calls for a simple cheap and expeditious 
administration of justice. Ours is neither cheap nor expeditious. Indeed, it 
has become so complicated system that the people never presumed to 
understand it, whilst the pleaders and the subordinate ministerial officers 
are perfect adopts at making profitable use of intricacies. The English 
legal system was the greatest curse that could be inflicted on India."^^^ 
The judicial and Court administration in India bears important 
dissimilarities to its British progenitor. These differences are substantial. 
Some of them, however, are subtle and seem to gain scant recognition. 
The direction for improving the Indian Court system is to be found by 
recognising those differences.^^s j h e comparisons with courts in other 
jurisdictions are not only useful and appropriate, but demonstrate new 
opportunities for reforming the Indian Court system that may either have 
been overlooked. Here making International Comparisons it may offer 
novel and it may also be proud as a means of identifying court system 
reform strategies in India. 
1. Two major System of Trial 
Coming more specifically to criminal procedure two major systems 
compete today, viz. -
(i) Inquisitorial System; and 
(ii) Adversary or accusatorial system.^^^ The first is exemplified by 
the 18* and 19* century European codes, and the Anglo-
American legal procedure, which has been adopted in India 
also. The two systems involve different conceptions of the 
appropriate role of; the court; the police; the counsel for the 
accused, the prosecutor, the accused, and the victim.^^s 
132. Civil r Military law Journal, Oct-Dec. 1999, p.; 226. 
133. Judicial in India, Edited by Arnab Kumar Hazara Bibek Debroy, An article by Barry 
Walsh, p. 71. 
134. Rene David, English law and French law (1980); at 23,158-160. 
135. P.M. Bakshi, "Continental System of Criminal Justice" Journal of ILI Oct-Dec. 1994, 
p. 420. 
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(a) Inquisitorial System 
Under the inquisitorial system, the court and its adjuncts 
(the examining magistrate and the public prosecutor) exercise full control 
over the preliminaries that is to say, the investigation and presentation of 
case at the trial. The offender, once formally accused, is the central party in 
the investigation, in the sense that he and his counsel are entitled to see all 
statements of witness and exhibits amassed by the police and examining 
magistrate, and to suggest further leads to be investigated. The victim of 
the offence is also a full party, in the sense that he may (with of his own) 
intervene as a "ipartie civile" in the pre trial investigation and in the trial, 
and have its claim to the civil relief (arising out of the crime) adjudicated in 
the criminal proceedings. The court exercises an affirmative role, rather 
than the role of an umpire in the conduct of the prosecution.^36 
(b) Adversary System 
Under the accusatorial or adversary system, on the other hand, the 
accused (and his counsel, if any) are outside the preliminary investigation 
and have little right, any disclosure in advance of the prosecution 
evidence. At the trial, the court functions more as an umpire, leaving the 
presentation of the official case to the prosecuting attorney and 
responsibility of presenting whatever evidence could be presented on 
behalf of the accused (and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses) to 
the accused and his counsel. 
> Difference of Approach 
The differences between the two systems are mainly due to different 
approaches. In an adversary model of procedural justice, it is assumed - at 
least in theory^^^ - that justice will emerge from the contending sides 
(prosecution and defence) possessing equal resources, doing their best to 
136. Ibid. 
137. Mc. Conahay, "Social Science in Trials", Law & Com temp, prob., Vol. 41, No. 1. 
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present the strongest possible case, or to look after the interests of clients in 
the strongest possible way. These are of course restrictions on what the 
advocates can do in pursuing their clients' interest. They cannot for 
example, perjury or temper with evidence.^^s 
"Procedural Justice" refers to the procedures for settling disputes or 
determining guilt or innocence. This form of justice should be 
distinguished from "distributive" justice, which refers to the just allocation 
of outcomes and resources.^^^ j h e distinction between distributive and 
procedural justice is elementary, but still relevant to the present 
discussion. 
> Decision Maker 
In the adversary system, the decision maker is a third party, the 
Judge and/or jury. This third party is supposed to remain neutral and 
render the decision after hearing both cases made by the contending 
advocates. 
Other legal systems depart from this basic procedural theory is 
critical ways.^^o The prosecutor and decision maker may be the same 
person, or the fact finder may combine both the prosecutorial and defence 
attorney roles. But in American system (which is a variety of the adversary 
systems), the three roles (prosecution, defence and decision-maker) are 
kept district. As a consequence, if someone wishes to introduce certain 
skills or knowledge into the adversary system and that person does not 
happen to be a Judge or juror, the usual way is to enter on behalf of one of 
the adversaries. 
In this respect, the practice in USA presents an extreme contrast 
with the other system. If even diverges from English system. In USA, 
138. J. Thibaut and L. Walker, procedural Justice: A psychological Analysis 29 (1975). 
139. Id. At 3 
140. Id. At 22-27 
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there is minimum of pre-trial disclosure of evidence of the accused and a 
maximum latitude and obligation imposed as the defence counsel to make 
his own pre-trial investigation and to himself interview the witnesses. 
> Practices and Expectations - Differences 
India has introduced economic reforms as back as in 1991, and has 
included itself in the race for globalisation but the legal system in India 
does not confirm global norms as globalisation requires legal system that 
confirms global norms.^^i 
In 2001, the Union Minister of Law commented, "If there is one 
sector that has kept away from the reform process, it is the administration 
of Justice".142 
The differences that evolved regarding the entire legal system; the 
organisation of judiciary, training of lawyers, importance attached to 
juristic opinion, codification, case, law and so on. 
The Indian court system suggests that it is very much modelled on 
the English adversarial common law system. With notable qualifications, 
such as the abolition of the Jury System in 1956, Indian trial and appellate 
courts follow the English model. The application of that system in India 
however has resulted in practices, which are significantly divergent from 
those of England, and other English speaking former British dominions 
that adopted English law - Such as USA, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. Unlike India, these other systems have been generally successful 
over the last 20 years or so in overcoming endemically large backlogs and 
delays in case of disposals. Through trial and error, and bitter experience 
in some cases, those other systems have identified the causes of backlog 
141. Bibek Debroj, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies in India, Chapter 12 
"Some issues for law reforms in India". 
142. R.N. Malhotra Memorial Lecturer on Judicial Reforms at Indian International Centre, 
New Delhi, February 14, 2001. 
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and delay and successfully applied usually similar methods to overcome 
them. 
2. Judicial Productivity 
Lack of Judges has been a view widely shared among Judges and 
commentators on the Indian judicial system are that there are not enough 
Judges for the workload, they have to bear. Three arguments are 
commonly offered in support of this. The first is that high rates of case 
pendencies^43 across India are a reflection of there being not enough Judges 
to dispose of the cases before them. There is a logical and proper 
numerical relationship between a society's population and the number of 
Judges needed to service that population. The World Bank Report on 
justice sector at a glance, which surveyed the data in 30 countries in the 
2000 came out with the finding that average number of Judges per 1,00,000 
inhabitants was 6.38, however in India the corresponding number is 2.7 
Judges.^ '*'* The proportion of Judges relating to the population in India is 
very low by world standards. Moreover, in those societies which are 
particularly litigious, and possibly India is one, the proportion of Judges 
relating to population should be even higher compared with less litigious 
systems. However, one necessary assumption, which seems to be implicit 
in this argument, is that Indian Judges are efficient in disposing of their 
caseloads. If, for example, there were good reasons why Indian Judges can 
be expected to be less productive than Judges in other countries, then 
presumably there would be an argument for having more of them relating 
to population. Similarly, if for no good reasons Indian Judges are less 
productive than other systems then there might be an argument for not 
increasing their numbers until their productivity is improved by other 
means. But evidence about the productivity of Indian Judges, as distinct 
143. Pendencies mean the number of pending cases. The terms pendency caseload and 
backlog are also used to describe such cases. 
144. World Bank Report on Justice Sector at glance, 2000. 
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from their workloads, is seldom if ever raised as a major factor in support 
of a case for increased judicial numbers. More commonly it seems to be 
assumed that Judges are sufficiently productive perhaps as productive as 
they will ever be. 
It is difficult to ascertain judicial productivity without identifying an 
objective benchmark to indicate just how productive a Judge could be. 
If Judges across India share common managerial problems, such as low 
numbers and poor resources, as many believe to be the case, then it is 
unlikely than an objective bench mark of judicial productivity can be 
found within India. The problem in looking to other systems, 
or International comparisons, however, is in finding a system that 
is sufficiently similar so, as to permit reasonable comparison. 
The differences can be compensated for when data relevant to productivity 
is available. Here data has been readily accessible about court practices in 
Australia and the Delhi court system. As it turns out, comparing the court 
system of the National Capital Territory of Delhi with courts of Australia 
does offer some useful insights into the question of judicial productivity in 
India. Delhi, for instance, has 13.8 million people wherein Australia's 
population is not much greater than 20 million. Both are common law 
systems that rank their courts into generally three levels. Both operate 
under codified Constitutional federal systems and each has jurisdictional 
ranges that are generally comparable for criminal and expellable 
jurisdictions. Here are some figures about each system that can be related 
to judicial productivity.^^^ 
> Judge Population Ratio 
India is a vast country with more than one hundred crore 
population. Hence, the rate of crime and court legislations is also high. Till 
recently more than two crore cases were awaiting disposal in different 
145. Supra n. 102 page 173. 
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court of the country. This over-crowding in the docket is due to several 
factors, like inadequate Judge-population ratio, poor infrastructure, slow 
investigation of criminal cases, cumbersome litigation procedure etc.^ 46 
Presently, Judges ration in our country is less than 13 per million 
population where as it 41.6 in Australia; 50.9 in England, 75.2 in Canada 
and 107 in United Sates of America.^^? i^ the case of All India Judges 
Association vs. Union of India,^"^^ reiterated in the case of Brij Mohan Lai vs. 
Union oflndia}'^'^ the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed the Government 
to at least increase the Judges ratio to 50 per million in the next year at the 
first instance. 
As for High Court Judges in Delhi, excluding the Supreme Court 
Judges there are 30.8 Judges in Delhi per million of population.i^o 
The comparable Australian figure is 44 Judges per million of population.^si 
This shows that Australia has half as many Judges again as Delhi 
when compared proportionality to population. Acknowledging the poor 
strength of Judges the above comparison strongly supports the argument 
for increasing Judge numbers in Delhi to match the ratios in Australia 
represent as appropriate of course, that the ratios in Australia represent an 
appropriate benchmark for India.^ 52 
146. Aggarwal B.D. "New Read to Speedy Justice" AIR Journal Section 2003 p. 18. 
147. Ibid. 
148. (2002) 4SCC 247; 2002 SCC (LrS) 508. 
149. (AIR 2002 SC 2096). 
150. Sanctioned rather working numbers of Judges are used to ensure comparability with 
Australia. The working number of Judges in Delhi is closer to 21.5 Judges per million of 
population. The sanctioned numbers used are 33 High Court and 392 district court 
Judges in Delhi as against a population of 13,782,976 as determined in the year 2001 
census. 
151. Australian Judges were 881 as at January 2005 - Source Website of the Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration http.7 /www.aija.org.au/Judges magistrate.htm. 
Australian Court disposal figures in 2003-04 were 742,900 Criminal cases. Source: 
Productivity Commission of Australia, Report on Government Services 2005, chapt.6. 
152. E.g., Australia's Judges are distributed over a landmass 2.5 times the size of India, 
where as Delhi is effectively a city-State, a factor which implies that Australia might 
need more Judges than Delhi to cover a more widely dispersed population. 
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Recently Delhi High Court released its second Annual Report for 
2007-08 has made these revealing facts public, claiming that it has 
acquitted well despite the crushing workload and less than required and 
sanctioned strength of the Judges. 
Chief Justice A.P. Shah, released the Annual Report at a function on 
the court campus. The report claims that the court has been able to reduce 
arrears of main case from 79, 818 in April 2007 to 74, 599 by the end of 
March 2008. 
The reduction in arrears includes 57.30 percents criminal cases that 
were more than 10 years old, the report says. The court disposed of 56, 612 
cases in 2007-08 while it received 47, 017 cases.^ 53 jhg court achieved these 
feats despite the fact that it did not function at its full sanctioned of 48, 
average number of Judge in 2007-08 were only 32, two-thirds of the 
sanctioned strength, the reports States.^^^ 
> Ratio of Judges to disposals 
Regarding judicial productivity, it is better to consider disposals, 
rather than pendencies, because disposals represent actual productivity, 
whereas pendencies represent productivity that is yet to happen. Looking 
at disposals is useful because it gives an insight into judicial productivity 
in terms of what they do, rather than in terms of the population there 
serve. It also offers an indicator that can be related individually to each 
Judge. In Delhi courts, this ratio was 70% disposals per Judge per year.^ ^s 
The comparable figure for Australian courts was 1,511 disposals per Judge 
153. The Hindu, 12.02.2009, p. 4. 
154. Ibid. 
155. Based on disposals of 79,297 civil and 95,898 criminal in district courts and 32,346 
disposals in the High Court in 2004. Judge to disposal ratios are based on working 
rather than sanctioned number numbers of Judges which is taken to be 296 in Delhi in 
early 2005. Source: Barry Walsh 'pursuing best practice levels of judicial productivity'. 
"Judicial Reforms in India", issues and aspects (2007). 
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or around double the level of Delhi disposals.i56 This suggests that Delhi 
Judges have to work twice as hard to dispose of as many cases as Australia 
Judges. 
> Judges per Lakh of Disposals 
There are 9 Judges in the U.S. Supreme Court for a lawyering people 
of 260 million, whereas the Indian Supreme Court has 26 Judges for more 
than 1000 million populace and often the later working under-capacity. 
The former Chief Justice of America Warren Burger concerned at the rising 
number, declared that no nine Judges in the world could decide nine 
thousand cases. But if the 26 Judges of the India's Apex Court can resolve 
tens of thousand of cases a year, we easily beat the American Judges in 
speed race. Then, a question will be asked whether our jurisprudence is on 
a qualitative or quantitative assessment? The strength of a judicial decision 
is the strength of the reasoning with which it is supported so said the great 
law-giver John Marshal. In the American Supreme Court, there is no 
Judgement like "Heard Dismissed" or Heard no merits dismissed". Every 
case is argued in detail but within reasoned and well-documented 
Judgement. We will be surprised to know that a Judge in the U.S. Supreme 
Court decides only between 100 and 120 cases a year but the Indian tally is 
a many multiple. This quantum jump is possible only by discarding 
merit.^ 57 Another indicator of judicial productivity is to measure the 
number of Judges needed to dispose of 100,000 cases in a year. This is 
useful for the purpose of justifying additional Judge appointments in 
tandem as a consequence of increases in caseloads. In Delhi District 
Courts 153 Judges are needed to dispose of 100,000 cases. The comparable 
figure for Australian Courts, however, is 66 Judges; which verifies the 
156. The Productivity Commission of Australia, Report on Government Services 2005, 
chapt,. 6. 
157. Haridas, N. "Laws delay and Fast Tract Courts" AIR Journal section, (2001), p. 171.^  
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point already made that Australian Judges have double the disposal 
capacity of Delhi Judges. 
> Disposals per lakh of population 
In Delhi, the number of cases disposed per 100,000 of population is 
1,506. The comparable Australian figure, however, is 6,651 or almost four 
and a half times greater. This suggests that the population of Delhi is at 
most, one quarter as litigious as the Australian population. It would seem 
that level of litigation is not necessarily a factor affecting the ability of 
Delhi Judges to dispose of cases. If litigation rates in Delhi rose to levels 
equivalent to Australia, then the average productive capacity of the Delhi 
courts would need to increase at least eight fold to cater for the additional 
work. If the working number of Judges in Delhi were to be double so as to 
match the ratio of Judges to population in Australia, it would only account 
for around half of the required increase in productive capacity.^^s 
Thus, it could be said that no increase in judicial numbers would 
overcome the reality that Delhi Judges are only half as productive as 
Australian Judges in terms of case disposal capacity. 
Hence, the question arises why are Judges in Delhi, and presumably 
across India, so much less productive than Australian Judges? The answer 
is that, despite the similarities of each system. Indian courts administer 
cases in ways that are significantly different from the ways of Australian 
Judges. It is unlikely that Australian Judges work harder than Indian 
Judges' work nor are they necessarily more learned or experienced. What 
is different is that they generally use case management and court 
management methods and practices which Indian courts generally do not 
referred to in this chapter as 'best practice'. Many courts in England, USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand we best practice methods, but not all 
of them. And those that do use best practice methods are not without their 
158. Supra note 124. 
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problems from time to time. But the judicial leadership of each would 
vouch for the fact that when those practices are consistently used, they 
work so how is it that Indian practice differ from best practice.i^^ 
> Low Criminal Plea Guilty Rates 
Plea rates are the proportion of criminal cases in which the accused 
person pleads guilty and thereby avoids a trial. Sentencing a person who 
pleads guilty requires fewer resources for a court and the prosecution; and 
avoids the uncertainty of putting the accused to trial. 
In Australian magistrates, courts over three quarters of criminal 
cases are disposed by plea or by comparable processes that do not involve 
a defended hearing.i^o In contrast, rates of guilty pleas are not measured or 
reported by Delhi sessions courts or magistrates courts. Presumably, the 
same applies to most other Indian Criminal Courts. However, feedback 
from Indian Judges and advocates suggests that plea rates are uncommon 
if not rare, except possibly in non-custodial matters. The sad reason for 
this is likely to be that there is no incentive to plead guilty when there is a 
high probability in Indian criminal courts that the accused will be 
acquitted, either at trial or on appeal. Conviction rates indeed appear to be 
low. Presently the conviction rate in the trial courts is hovering around 
60% an average. Hardly 10% convictions ultimately sustain after scanning 
of convictions by the successive appellate courts.^^^ 
Hence, the 2003 Annual Report of the Delhi district courts for 
example, reported that only 31 per cent of criminal session's cases and 55 
percent of magistrate's cases resulted in a conviction. To date little 
159. Ibid. 
160. Magistrates courts in the Australian State of New South Wales disposed of 133,105 
criminal cases in 2003. 86% of those cases were disposed of other than by defended 
hearing. Source: Website of the NSW Bearve of crime statistics and Research at 
http://www.la wlink.nsw.goi;s.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/pages/bossar_Ic_Sta 
tes,9903. 
161. Aggarwal B.A. "Speedy and Visible Justice" Cr. LJ. 2004 June, 110, p. J. 193. 
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information is available on plea rates. It is clear that in most Australian 
and other criminal court systems that apply best practice methods the rates 
of guilty plea account for sizable propositions of criminal lists, allowmg 
Judges of criminal courts much higher disposal rates than are achieved m 
Indian criminal courts. 
> Problem of Adjournment 
In Indian courts, most cases are adjourned multiple times and m 
unpredictable ways, even after a trial begin. In Australian courts, the 
reduction of the average number of case adjournments has been a major 
managerial priority in backlog and delay reduction for at least the last 20 
years. Criminal case attendance rates^^^ for most courts in Australian 
States range from 0.3 to 6.3 adjournments per disposed cases.^ ^^ In India, 
attendance rates appear not to be counted by any court. Estimates offered 
by individual Indian Judges and advocates; however, put the rate of 
adjournments in Indian trial courts as typically between 20 and 40 times 
over the life of a case. An ADB study revealed that on a single randomly 
selected day in March 2004 the High Court of Delhi had listed before it an 
average of 100 cases per Judge of which 80 per cent were adjourned to 
another day.^^ 
> Absence of Continuous Trial 
Unlike India the Australian courts share with many courts in 
England, the USA, Canada and New Zealand a Convention that a trial 
should as far as possible be conducted continuously, i.e. ordinarily a Judge 
162 The terms 'attendance' is used in Australia in lieu of adjournment when counting to 
total number of counted The American term 'appearances' has not been adopted m 
this chapter as it can mean different thmg in other jurisdiction i e m Austraha 
'appearance' usually refers to whether or not a particular party or legal representative 
actually attended a scheduled hearing 
163 Average attendance rates can be less than one because many cases are disposed before 
bemg listed before a Judge 
164. Final Report of the ADB/GOI Administration of Justace Technical Assistance Project, 
TA 4153IND 26 May 2004, p 44 
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should conduct a trial in a particular case, and normally no other, from 
start to closing submissions with minimal interruptions. This Convention 
probably stems from the Jury System, which demands that evidence be 
presented to jurors as quickly as possible so that they can deliberate on 
their verdict and then be discharged. Even in those jurisdictions in which 
Juries are no longer used, the commitment to pursuing continuous trials 
remains because of the recognised efficiencies they provide. 
For reasons unclear, however, continuous trials in India have 
become largely extinct. Whilst Indian jurists and advocates would agree 
that continuous trials are desirable, it almost never happens.^^s 
High adjournment rates in India appear to have two distinct causes, 
the first what it appears to be a well established practice that there is a 
separate hearing for each of the main stages of a trial. It is an undisputed 
practice, for example, that once the prosecution evidence has been given 
and cross-examination is complete, then the case should normally be 
adjourned to another day for the purpose of hearing the defence evidence. 
Australia does not have this Convention - there is normally an expectation 
that evidence for all sides and submissions will occur within a continuous, 
mostly unbroken trial. Indian courts on the other hand work on the 
assumption that a trial ought to occur in no less than five stages each 
separate by an adjournment i.e. -
• Cases fixed for prosecution evidence. 
• Cases fixed for defence evidence. 
• Cases fixed for appearance of the accused. 
• Cases fixed for charge or particular of a statements. 
• Cases fixed for final argument, and 
• Cases fixed for accused statement, judgment or order. 
165. The practice exists under legislative authority that a higher court in India can direct a 
lower court to try a particular case 'from day to day'. But even in these circumstances 
such a direction is taken to mean no more than a requirement to bear one case at lest for 
part of the day, each consecutive day, whilst other cases are also heard. 
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The second cause of high adjournment rate is the effect of 
rising backlogs and case delays. Delhi High Court in its Annual 
Report for 2007-2008 reveal that the High Court registry received 
3,32,141 cases for consideration and they were allotted for hearing to 
24 benches, each of which had to deal with 13,839 listed matters in 
2007-2008. Referring to a comparative study on courts in India and 
England, the report says that on an average each Supreme Court in 
that country has to decide only 150 cases every year.^^ 
Generally, as case lists have grown, individual cases have been 
listed for hearing no less frequently; but less time is available for 
them at each hearing by reason of there being more cases in each 
cause list. There is a common practice in India to take the evidence 
of one available witness and then adjourn, rather than risk that 
witness not being available on the next occasion. Australian courts 
avoid this practice. Instead, Australian courts would seek to deal 
with caseloads by maintaining a commitment to continuous trial and 
by applying other measures to deal with rising caseloads. So 
continuous trials offer outcome date certainty but fragmented trials 
do not. So, it would seem that if Indian courts aimed at more 
continuous trials then they could induce more case settlements with 
consequential reduction in their trial volumes and pendencies. 
> Recording of Evidence - A s low process 
In most of the Indian courts oral evidence is generally 
recorded by the presiding Judge's stenographer using a word 
processor. In some cases, manual typewriters are also used and 
sometimes the Judges themselves record evidence by hand. In most 
cases, the Judge dictates the words typed by a stenographer after the 
Judge hears the questions asked by advocates and the answers given 
166. The Hindu dated 12.2.2009, p.4 
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by witnesses. Much court time is often spent supervising the typing 
of testimony in this way including dealing with arguments from 
advocates about the accuracy of the words dictated. Consequently, 
oral evidence in Indian courts tends to be taken slowly. It become 
more onerous if the language of the witness is not English, then 
Judge also act as interpreter when dictating in English. 
In Australia, no court uses this method. They use shorthand 
writers, stenotype machine operators or electronic sound recording 
with associated verbatim transcript production. Noise recognition 
technology is still unreliable in a court environment. The preferred 
technology in courts that apply best practice is sound recording of 
court proceedings and full or partial text transcription from 
the recordings by typists working outside the courtroom. 
The introduction of sound recording to Indian courts would be 
possible by installing new courtroom hardware sound recorded 
courts would enable evidence to be taken much faster, possibly at 
twice the speed. 
In this regard, the 188* Law Commission Report on proposal 
for Constitution of hi-tech, fast-track commercial divisions in High 
Courts has made various recommendations, where video 
conferencing is to be used for recording of evidence. Specifically, 
the report under "Functioning of video conferencing" mentions, in 
each court. There will be a video conferencing system with two 
cameras, one facing the Judges in the court, which can be viewed by 
the Judges and the advocates. There will also be a document camera 
for projecting paper documents on the plasma screens. A good 
public addressing system with wireless, microphones, two 29 inch 
TV sets, DVD recorder for recording the video conferencing 
proceeding and a computer system with Internet connectivity. This 
VC system will be connected to a remote VC system installed either 
163 
within or outside the country. These two locations can be connected 
using three pairs of ISDN hnes, providing 384 kbps connectivity. 
With this capacity of connectivity, though the pictures will not be of 
the quality of usual TV pictures, but it will provide comfortable 
viewing of people on the screen. If the remote VC unit with which 
the EC 135 court's VC is connected is not in the same city, then STD 
rates of that city will be applicable as call charges during the period 
of VC conference.^^^ As the VC facility is easy to operate, with little 
training to the Court staff it can be operated by themselves without 
any difficulty. 
167.188'hLaw Commission Report, 2003 
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SPEEDY TRIAL: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATE 
A. An Overview 
Justice is the natural urge of all human beings. The Constitution of 
India in its Preamble contains 'Justice' at the highest pedestal and 
significantly noticed justice higher than the other principles i.e. liberty, 
equality and fraternity. Again, the Preamble clearly demonstrates the 
precedence to social and economic justice over political justice. But, in 
reality even after 58 years of the adoption of Constitution, we find crores of 
cases rotting in courts in India, some of which are pending for several 
years/decades. Some people die fighting their cases but do not get justice 
during their lifetime, while thousands of under-trials languish and die in 
jails without conviction. It is well known "Justice delayed is Justice 
denied". 
The biggest challenge being faced by the Indian justice delivery 
system is that of delay in the dispensation of justice. Heavy backlog of 
cases in the courts and inevitable delay in dispensing the justice has been 
to such an extent that it is shaking public trust and confidence in the legal 
system and it is tending to erode the quality of social justice and 
hampering the socio-economic development of the country.^ The Hon'ble 
Supreme Court in Hussain Ara Khatoon vs. State ofBihar^ taking note of the 
problem of delay observed: 
"There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which 
is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under trial prisoners 
and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a sad reflection 
on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not 
even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in 
the commencement of trial is bad enough; how much worse could it be 
when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is 
1. Sikri A.K. Sitting Judge, Delhi High Court, 'Reforming Criminal Justice System', Naya 
Deep, Vol. Ill, Jna. 2007, p. 39. 
2. AIR, 1979, SC, 1360 
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of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delays 
in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice." 
Famous Jurist late Nani A. Palkhivala has gone on record to say: 
"If I were asked to mention the greatest draw back of the administration 
of justice in India today, I would say that it is delay. There are 
inordinate delays in the disposal of cases. We, as a nation, have some 
fine qualities, but a sense of the value of time is not one of them. 
Perhaps there are historical reasons for our relaxed attitude to time. 
Ancient India had evolved the concepts of eternity and infinity. So 
what do thirty years, wasted in litigation, matter against the backdrop 
of eternity? Further, we believe in reincarnation, what does it matter if 
you waste this life? You will have many more lives in which to make 
good". 
I am not aware of any country in the world where litigation goes on 
for as long a period as in India. Our cases drag over a length of time, 
which makes eternity intelligible. The law may or may not be an ass but in 
India it is certainly, a snail and our cases proceed at a pace, which would 
be regarded as unduly slow in a community of snails. Justice has to be 
blind but I see no reason why it should also be lame, here it just hobbles 
along, barely able to walk.^ 
It is a paramount importance to reform the problem of delay at the 
earliest and provide justice to citizens of this country in a reasonable time. 
It is imperative so that the faith of the society in the justice delivery system 
can be maintained. In a country like ours where people consider, the 
judges only second to God, efforts should be made to strengthen that belief 
of common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to 
raise eyebrows some time genuinely, which, if not checked, may shake the 
confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come when the 
judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards 
for attainment of the rule of law. 
3. Nani A. Palkhivala, We the Nation - Lost decades, (1994) UBS Publishers Distributors, 
pp. 215-216. 
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For the fault, of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the 
judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and 
purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be 
made to come to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, 
untainted and unpolluted justice.^ 
One of the reasons for the huge backlog indicted by the 120* Law 
Commission Report being inadequate strength of judges compared to the 
population of the country. The appointment of Judicial Officers in the 
lower courts and the Judges in the High Courts should keep pace with the 
volume of institution of cases. The strength of the Judges and Judicial 
Officers has not been proportionately increased either with the growth of 
population or with augmentation of litigation. 
The report of the Commission to review the working of the 
Constitution ^ has raised certain pertinent questions and issues: 
About half a century of the Constitution at work has tossed up 
many issues of the working of the judiciary, from the difficult problems of 
appointments to the superior judiciary to the problems of the court 
clogging and judicial delays, a wide variety of issues have arisen. 
Who should appoint the judges? Should they be 'Judges' or 'people's 
judges? Should the composition of the judiciary reflect the pluralism of the 
society? Particularly disturbing has been the chronic and recurrent theme 
of the near collapse of the judicial trial system, its delays and the mounting 
costs. The glorious uncertainties of the law have frustrated the aspirations 
for an equal, predictable and affordable justice. 
One may remind oneself that the Indian Judiciary is held in high 
esteem in many of the developing and developed countries of the world. 
The judgments delivered by our courts, particularly the Supreme Court, 
4. Anil Rai VS. State of Bihar, AIR, 2001, SC, 3173. 
5. Report of the National Commission, 2002, para 2.22.5, Vol. I, Universal Law Publishing., 
New Delhi 
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are oft-quoted by jurists and judges around the world, who are 
appreciative of the quality of the judgements. However, these are all about 
the content and quality of justice. The concerns are more about delays, 
costs, transparency, probity and accountability.^ 
According to Justice R.C. Lahoti, former Chief Justice of India, 
criticism is often from uninformed or misinformed quarters that the Indian 
Judiciary is unable to clear the backlogs of the cases. According to him, at 
times, question marks have been placed on the credibility of the judiciary 
on account of some aberrations which are not the product of system, but 
are individual in nature and are isolated cases. These actors have a 
tendency of bringing a bad name to the entire system. He, after setting out 
the figures and statistics showing satisfactory disposals by the Supreme 
Court, High Courts and Subordinate Courts, posed a pertinent question, 
"whether the judiciary is solely responsible for the backlongs?"^ 
B. Constitutional Provisions for Speedy Trial 
The Constitutional law is the fundamental law of the land. 
It establishes the various branches of government conferring powers on 
them for various purposes. At the same time, it imposes limitations on the 
authority of the state. As far as the Constitution of India is concerned, 
stating with the Preamble, there are a large number of provisions in this 
important instrument, which contain the essential principles as to the 
organization, and functioning of the institutions having the responsibility 
of administering justice to the people. For example, the principle of 
Federalism is followed in regard to the distribution of legislative, executive 
and administrative powers between the union and the states in various 
matters including the matters affecting the system of criminal justice. Part III 
of the Constitution contains the principles of equality to which the state 
6. Judicial Reforms in India: Issues and Aspects. Justice G.C. Bharuka - Contemporary 
Views on Access to Justice in India, p. 103. 
7. Ibid. 
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shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of 
the law. 
Then there are certain other principles also in the form of safeguards 
guaranteed to the individuals under Article 20 of the Constitution. The 
first safeguard guaranteed in this Article is that no person shall be 
convicted of an offence if the act charged against him was not an offence 
under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 
The Principle of Double Jeopardy incorporated in clause (2) of Article 20 
requires that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same 
offence more than once. 
Protection against compulsory testimony is incorporated in clause 
(3) of Article 20, which declares that no person accused of an offence shall 
be compelled to be a witness against himself. 
Likewise, Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees protection 
against life and personal liberty. Thus, Article read with Article 22 
specifies the rights available to persons arrested for the commission of 
crimes and the persons detained for the prevention of crimes and lays 
down the manner in which the persons arrested or detained may be dealt 
with. 
Inevitable and one of the most important obligations of the state is 
administration of justice through its one organ, i.e. judiciary. In Ancient 
and Medieval time, justice was administered in consonance with Dharma, 
Truth and Natural Law. At present time, the justice is administered 
according to law alone, i.e. Constitution, Statutes and Rules etc. In strict 
compliance of Taw' in name of administration of justice there happens 
victory of lie and defeat of the truth and injustice is imparted to poor, 
illiterate people of India, under English system of justice delivery viz. 
justice delivery system of colonial ruler based on tenets of England for 
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exploitation of the colonial people. English system of justice is solely based 
on law.^ 
(i) Protection of Life and Personal Liberty- General Observation 
Article 21 - Constitution of India - "No person shall he deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law". 
The first and the foremost right, of not only human beings but any 
living being is the right to life. All other rights totally depend 
on this right because without life there can be no other right. 
Our Constitution framers have distinguishably placed personal liberty 
with right to life under Article 21. Freedoms have been enumerated in 
Article 19. The conspicuous distinction between Articles 19 and 20 is that 
Article 19 provides exhaustive list of 6 freedoms, while Article 21 does not 
provide but leaves to possible widest interpretation to this small Article 
than any other Articles of the whole Constitution.^ 
The Article prohibits deprivation of life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law. In a sense, it corresponds to the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the relevant 
portions of which read: 
"Nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" 
and; 
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law".^° 
Protection of Article 21 is available to all persons whether citizens or 
foreigners or free or arrested or detained person. 
Supreme Court through the process of interpretation gave possibly 
the widest scope of Article 21 for protection of life and liberty of all 
individuals free as well as arrested and detained. 
8. Kanahaiyalal Sharma, 'Reconstruction of the Constitution of India', Deep & Deep Pub. 
(2002), pp. 242-243 
9. Id., p. 129. 
10 . Jay M. Feinman, 'Law 101 Every you Need to know About the American Legal System', 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 47. 
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From the sequence of words used in Article 21 'life' and 'Personal 
liberty', it is clear that 'life' is that the first right on which consequent right 
of personal liberty depends. Not only personal liberty, but all other rights, 
duties and functions, etc. depends upon existence of life because inanimate 
have no rights, duty and function etc. Liberty is necessary for the 
development and dignity of an individual, law is a scheme of social control 
over the liberty of the individual. Prof. Wills says that we are concerned 
with question of how much liberty is the best." 
In 1755, Benjamin Franklin reminded his fellow citizens that 
freedom comes with a high price tag. "Those who would give up essential 
liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor 
safety", he said.^^ 
The Protection of the Bill of Rights is most often tested at times of 
national emergency or war. During the early days of World War II, 
following the December 7,1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese 
Americans became the target of widespread prejudice and suspicion, even 
though there was no evidence of espionage or disloyalty among them. 
Bending to public and military pressures. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
authorized the forced relocation of more than 110,000 people of Japanese 
ancestry from their homes on the west coast to desolate camps surrounded 
by barbed wire and armed guards. 
The internees were never charged with crimes or given a hearing. 
The majority were women and children. About two-thirds were native-
born American citizens, deprived of their civil liberties. Some were kept 
imprisoned for three years or more, and many lost their homes, farm or 
businesses.^ '"^ 
11. Prof. Wills, Hugh Evander, Constitutional Law of U.S., p. 477. 
12 . Russell Freedman, "In Defense of Liberty" (The Story of Americans Bill of Rights), 2003, 
p. 128. 
13 . Id., pp. 124-126. 
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After four decades, in 1983, a Presidential Commission reported that 
the Japanese Americans had suffered a 'grave injustice'. Finally, Congress 
passed the civil liberties Act of 1988. 
Recently in 2001, following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
New York City and Washington D.C., around twelve hundred foreigners, 
mainly Arab and Muslims were detained on mere suspicion and their 
names were kept secret from the public. Most of them were picked up 
for minor visa violations or because of neighbours suspicions. 
The government continued to keep in prison long after their immigration 
cases were resolved, but failed to charge any of them for terrorist activity. 
These mass arrests and secret detention sparked a national debate: 
can we find security from terrorist attacks without giving up the 
Constitutional freedoms, we are fighting to preserve? The government 
justified the detention and civil rights advocates supported the same as 
precaution. But they argued that indefinite detention without framing 
charge it violates Constitutional rights. 'Secret arrests', said federal judge 
Gladys Kessler, "is a concept odious to a democratic society". 
The Bill of Rights makes no distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens. It refers throughout to 'the people' or to 'persons'. The right 
to a speedy and public trial, to consult with a lawyer beyond the range of 
government microphones, and to protection against being held in secret 
for minor crimes are not for Americans alone.^4 
Absolute freedom would result in chaos, anarchy and ruin; whereas 
the absolute control of the state over the liberty would result in tyranny. 
There must be striking balance between individual liberty and state control 
over it. Such view was held by Mukherjee J. in A.K. Gopalan vs. State of 
Madms.'^^ 
14 . Id., p. 127-8. 
15 . AIR 1950 SC 27. 
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In Constituent Assembly there was a debate over whether 
American doctrine of 'due process' is to be adopted in our Constitution for 
enjoyment of personal liberty. B.N. Rau, Adviser to Constituent Assembly 
was against inclusion of due process clause in our Constitution on the 
ground that it may hinder legislation for social purposes. Rajaji and A.K. 
Ayyar were of the view that under due process clause the executive cannot 
detain a person without trial. Alexandronlicze observe that liberty has 
been greatly narrated in scope and meaning by qualifying the word liberty 
by personal.^^ 
Despite inclusion of due process clause in American Constitution, it 
has also there been controversial. A.K. Ayyar opposed due process clause, 
as preventive detention was considered to be the best weapon for curbing 
communal riots that had shocked the country. Twenty-one members of 
Constituent Assembly moved an amendment for making personal liberty 
as justiciable right. K.M. Munshi was against 'due process' as it would 
imbalance individual liberty and social control. Many of the members of 
the CA expressed that they were not against social legislation but liberty is 
to be protected against arbitrary and prejudicial executive action. O.H. 
Bayley was of the view that in absence of due process clause a nation 
would be at the mercy of the legislature and the executive.^^ 
He observed that Gopalan's decision was upheld because Supreme 
Court could not interpret 'law' in Article 21 as meaning of 'just' as distinct 
from lex', 'jus' includes natural law, whereas 'lex' stresses only on enacted 
law by the state. The court should have seen whether the procedure 
established by the statute was followed or not. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in 
Constituent Assembly pointed out, "the due process clause in my 
judgment would give judiciary the power to question the law made by 
16. Alexandronlicze, C.H., Constitutional Development of India. Prasad, Hoti, Judicial 
Review and Right to Personal Liberty, Kerala Law Journal, 1978, vol. 4. 
17. Bayley, O.H., Preventive Detention in India, p. 10. 
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legislature with certain fundamental principles relating to rights of 
individuals. The law may be perfectly good and valid so far the authority 
of the legislature is concerned, but it may not be good law if it violates 
certain fundamental principles, that judiciary would have that additional 
power declaring the law invalid".^^ 
Alladi, Krishna Swamy Ayyer in Constituent Assembly said about 
the doctrine of due process, "the Supreme Court of U.S.A. did not take 
consistent view in all decisions, some of them are conflicting". 
He suggested for adoption of phrase "Except according to procedure 
established by the law". 
In Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P.^^, the Supreme Court held that 
personal liberty is more than mere animal existence and it is not limited to 
bodily restraints or confinement. It includes all varieties of rights, which go 
to make up personal liberty other than dealt in Article 19 (1). Particular 
species or attributes of personal liberty in Article 21 comprises the residue. 
But in the case of Govind vs. state ofM.P.^o the Supreme Court retrograded 
its approach of Kharak Singh's case. In Satuwant Singh vs. Assistant Passport 
Officer^'', the Supreme Court accepted the plea of Satuwant Singh that to 
travel abroad was part of his personal liberty, which could be restricted by 
the authority of law, and government carmot deny passport in exercise of 
executive powers. 
In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India^^^ the Supreme Court gave 
possibly widest meaning to personal liberty; it overruled Gopalan's case 
and applied American doctrine due process. Justice P.N. Bhagwati spoke 
for majority that procedure contained in Article 21 must be just fair and 
reasonable. The principle of reasonableness, which is an essential element 
18 . Constitutional Assembly Debate (CAD), Dec. 14,1948. 
19 . AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
20 . AIR 1975 SC 1379. 
21 . AIR 1967 SC 1836. 
22 . AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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of equality, has been provided in Article 14. Impounding of passport 
without assigning reason is not only breach of statutory provisions but 
also in violation of audi altrem partem; (No one should be condemned 
unheard) a principle of natural justice. By adopting principle of natural 
law. Supreme Court moved towards justice in Maneka Gandhi's case 
against purely legal approach of Gopalan's case. 
In Sharda vs. Dharampal^^ the Supreme Court relying on Govind 
Singh's case, the right to privacy has been read into Article 21 with the 
expansive interpretation of "personal liberty" but this right is not an 
absolute right and, if there were conflict between Fundamental Rights of 
the two parties, that right which advances the public morality would 
prevail. 
In Som Mittal vs. Govt, of Karnataka^^, the Supreme Court held that 
Right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution is a valuable right, and 
hence should not be lightly interpreted. 
In Anuj Garg vs. Hotel Association of India^^, personal freedom is a 
fundamental tenet which carmot be compromised in the name of 
expediency until and unless there is compelling state purpose. 
Article 21 is to meet the following conditions: 
(i) There must be valid law, and 
(ii) The valid law must lay down just, fair and reasonable procedure. 
Justice P.N. Bhagwati declared that the expression 'personal liberty' 
in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers variety of right who 
go to constitute personal liberty and some of them raised the status of 
distinct Fundamental Rights and given additional protection under Article 
14 and 19. 
23 . (2003) 4 s e c 493, 513-14 (paras 54-60): AIR 2003 SC 3450. 
24 . (2008) 3 s e c 753, 766 (para 46). 
25 . (2008) 3 s e c 1,18-19 (Para 47). 
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Some of the important rights have been recognized by the judiciary 
under Article 21 are enumerated as under: 
> Right to live with Human Dignity 
In Maneka Gandhi case Supreme Court held that the right to live is 
not confined merely to physical existence but includes right to live with 
dignity. In Francis Coralie vs. Union Territory ofDelhi^^, Supreme Court held 
that the right to live is not limited to protection of any faculty or limb 
through which the life is enjoyed or the soul communicates to outside 
world, but includes to live with human dignity. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha 
vs. Union of India^'', this principle was further extended to include 
protection of the health and strength of workers, prevention of abuse of 
children opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy 
manner and conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just 
and human conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the 
minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to 
live with human dignity. Recently in Bombay Dying Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay 
Environmental Action Group^^, held that as the factors governing the quality 
of life have been included in the expression "life". Article 21 require not 
only compliance with procedural requirements, but also the substantive 
rights of a citizen. 
> Right to life includes Reputation 
Reputation is an important part of one's life. It is one of the finer 
graces of human civilization, which make life worth living. 2? 
The Supreme Court referring to an American decision^", in Smt. Kiran Bedi 
26 . AIR 1981 SC 746. 
27. AIR 1984 SC 802: (1984) 3 SCC 161 . 
28 . AIR 2006, SC 1489: (2006) 3 SCC 434, 521. 
29 . Prof,. S.N. Hedge vs. Lokayuktha, Bangalore, AIR 2004 NOC 169 (Kant.). 
30 . D.F. Marion vs. Minnie Davis, 55 American LR 171. 
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vs. Committee of lnquiry^\ held that a good reputation was an element of 
personal security and was protected by the Constitution, equally with the 
right to the enjoyment of life and liberty. The court affirmed that the right 
to enjoyment of a private reputation was of ancient origin and was 
necessary to human society. 
Recently, in State of Bihar vs. Lai Krishna Advani^^, the Supreme Court 
ruled that it was amply clear that one was entitled to have and preserve 
one's reputation and one had a right to protect it. The court further said 
that in case any authority, in discharge of its duties fastened upon it under 
the law, traversed into the realm of personal reputation adversely affecting 
him, it must provide a chance to him to have his say in the matter. 
The court observed that the principle of natural justice made it incumbent 
upon the authority to give an opportunity to the person, before any 
comment was made or opinion was expressed which was likely to 
prejudicially affect that person.^^ 
In another recent case,^'', the Apex Court held that no judicial order 
can ever be passed by any court without providing a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be affected by such 
order and particularly when such order results in drastic consequences of 
affecting one's own reputation. In the instant case the High Court had 
erred in directing enquiry and investigation against an institution without 
impleading the same. 
3 1 . AIR 1989 SC 714. See also B.O.T. of Port of Bombay vs. Dilip Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 109, 
wherein the SC ruled that the right to reputation was a facet of a right to life of a citizen 
under Article 21. The court referred to the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1965 which recognizes right to have opinions and the right of freedom 
of expression subject to the right of reputation of others. 
32 . AIR 2003 SC 3357: (2003) 8 SCC 361, 364. In this case two Members of a Commission of 
Inquiry appointed to inquire into the communal disturbances in Bhagalpur District on 
24th October, 1989, made some remarks in their report, which impinged upon the 
reputation of the respondent as a public man, without affording him an opportunity of 
being heard. 
33 . See Section 8B of Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, to the same effect. 
34 . (2008) 3 SCC 542, 565 (para 51). 
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> Right to die (Euthanasia) 
If Article 21 of the Constitution confers on a person the right to live 
a dignified life, does it also confer a right not to live if the person chooses 
to end his life? If so, then what is the fate of the provisions for attempt to 
commit suicide penal?^^ This question came for consideration first time 
before the Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Maruty Sripati 
Duba?^, High Court held that desire to die is not natural but merely 
abnormal and uncommon. Everybody has no right to end his life as and 
vv^ hen he desires, therefore Section 309 of IPC provides punishment for 
attempt to commit suicide as it is unconstitutional. Andhra Pradesh High 
Court took reverse view in case of Chena Jagdeeswar vs. State of A.P.^^, held 
sec. 309, PC valid and not violative of Article 14 or 21. In P. Rathinam 
Nagbhushan Patnayak vs. Union of India^^ Apex Court approved decision of 
Bombay High Court, however Supreme Court rejected eugthanasia/ mercy 
killing. In case of Giankaur vs. State of Punjab, Supreme Court unanimously 
overruled its own decision in Patnayak's^"^ case and held that right to life 
does not include right to die or to be killed. 
> Right of Education (Article 21-A) 
A man given birth by parents but his existence is made meaningful 
by education as Chanakya says, without learning a man in fact remains an 
animal with tail and hoop. 
There are only two enemies of man, first is poverty and second 
ignorance. Education brings refinement on the personality of a man. 
Therefore, it is said: Imparting education is the greatest donation. Ignorant 
person can be cheated at any time and at any place. The progress of culture 
35 . Prof. Jam M.P, Indian Constitution al Law, Fifth Ed. 2004, p 1141. 
36. AIR 1997 SC 411: (1996) 6 s e c 42. 
37. 1988 Cr.LJ 549. 
38 . (1994) 3 s e c 394. 
39 . AIR 1992 SC 1858: (1992) 3 SCC 666. 
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and civilization of mankind largely contributed by education. The whole 
development of science and technology is based on education. Education is 
the pivot on which all development of society hinges.^o 
In the garb of importance of education the Constitution 
(86* Amendment) Act, 2002 added Article 21A4i that makes education up 
to age 6 to 14 years , Fundamental Right within the meaning of part III of 
the Constitution. 
Article 21A may be read with new substituted Article 45^ 2 
and new clause (k)^ ^ inserted in Article 51A by the Constitution 
(861^  Amendment) Act, 2002. 
Recently in Modern School vs. Union of India^^, the Supreme Court 
held that the state have a duty to impart education and particularly 
primary education having regard to the fact that the same is a 
Fundamental Right within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
> Article 21 and Prisoners Rights 
In Maneka Gandhi case^^, the Supreme Court gave a new dimension 
to Article 21. Though worded in negative terms, it has been held that 
Article 21 has both negative and affirmative contents. Positive rights have 
thus been held to be well conferred under Article 21. The court has 
interpreted Article 21 so as to have widest possible amplitude. Protection 
of Article 21 is well extended to under trials, prisoners and even to the 
convicts. It has been ruled that a prisoner, he a convict, under trial or a 
40 . Supra Note 8, p. 137. 
41 . "The state shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six 
to fourteen years in such manner as the state may, by law, determine". 
42 . Obligates the state "to endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all 
children until they complete the age of six years". 
43 . Imposes a fundamental duty on parents/guardian "to provide opportunities for 
education to his child or as the case may be, ward between the age of six and fourteen 
years". 
44 . (2004) 5 s e c 583. See also State of Bihar vs. Project Uchacha Sikshak Sangh (2006) 2 SCC 
545. Superstar Education Society vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 315. 
45 . AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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detenu does not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in the jail, 
he continues to enjoy all his Fundamental Rights including the right to life. 
On being convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in accordance 
with the procedure established by law prisoners still retain the residue of 
Constitutional rights .^ 6 In this context, it may, therefore, be stated that the 
Supreme Court while interpreting Article 21, has laid down a new 
Constitutional and prison jurisprudence. The rights or protections 
recognized for the prisoners have been discussed as follows. 
> Right to Free Legal Aid 
The concept of Legal Aid to the indigent has its roots in the well-
settled principle of natural justice 'audi alteram partem' (hear the other side). 
Even in primitive society, the leader would hear the parties before passing 
his judgment. In today's society where there is large number of Acts, Rules 
and Regulations with complex procedure, the assistance of a lawyer is 
necessary for ensuring justice. In a welfare state it is obligations of the state 
to ensure to the citizen justice according to law. It is crystal clear that due 
to poverty people are not in position to knock the doors of courts for 
getting justice from judiciary, so sometime even in genuine cases people 
are to suffer unnecessarily in prison. In M.H. Hoskot vs. state of 
Maharashtra^^, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the lawyer's 
services constitute an ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner who is 
seeking his liberation through the court procedure. In Hussainara Khatoon 
case^^, Bhagwati, J., has observed: 
"Now, a procedure which does not make available legal services to 
an accused person who is too poor to afford a lawyer and who would, 
therefore, have to go through the trial without legal assistance, cannot 
possibly be regarded as 'reasonable, fair and justice". 
46 . State of A.P. vs. Challa Ramkrishna, AIR 2000 SC 2083. 
47 . AIR 1978 SC 1548: (1978) 3 SCC 544. 
48. AIR 1979 SC at 1373. 
180 
In the Constitution of India there is implicit in Article 142 read with 
Article 21 and 39A, the state is to pay the amount to lawyer fixed by the 
court. 
Article 39A equal justice and free legal aid was inserted by the 
Constitution 44th Amendment Act, 1978, on the basis of report of the 
expert committee on legal aid in 1973. In the case of Sukhdas vs. UT of 
Arunachal Pradesh'^^, Supreme Court held that failure to provide free legal 
aid to an accused at the state cost, unless refused by the accused, would 
vitiate the trial. Free legal aid is implicit in requirement of just, fair and 
reasonable procedure under Article 21. The Magistrate is under an 
obligation to inform the accused of this right. 
It may thus be noticed that Article 21 imposes a positive obligation 
on the Magistrate or the committing judge, to inquire as to whether the 
accused is not in a position to engage a lawyer on account of his poverty or 
indigence. If so, then the accused must be provided with a lawyer at the 
state cost. 
> Right to a Fair Trial 
Free and fair trial has been said to be the sine quo non of Article 21. It 
is said that justice should not be done but it should be seen to have been 
done. "If the criminal trial is not free and fair and not free from bias, the 
judicial fairness and criminal justice system would be at stake, shaking the 
confidence of the public in the system and would be the rule of law". 
So said, the Supreme Court in K. Arbazhagan vs. Superintendent of Police^'^, 
the trial of cases pending against the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, 
transferred from the court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Chennai to the state of 
49. (1986) 25 s e c 401. 
50. AIR 2004 SC. See also Police Commr., Delhi vs. Registrar, Delhi H.C., AIR 1997 SC 95; 
Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI, AIR 1979 SC 468; D.P. Agarulal vs. R.C. Agarwal, AIR 2003 SC 
2686; Maneka Gandhi vs. Rani Jethmalani, AIR 1979 SC 468. 
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Kamataka with the direction to later to appoint special judge for the trial 
of the cases. 
In Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh vs. State ofGujarat^'' (Best Bakery case) 
the Apex Court said that a trial which is primarily aimed at ascertaining 
truth, has to be fair to all concerned. Not only the accused be fairly dealt 
with, but also the victims or their family members and relatives. Denial of 
a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused as is the victim and the 
society. 
A fair trial the court said would obviously mean a trial before an 
impartial judge, a fair prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm, that in 
which bias or prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses or the 
cause which was being tried was eliminated. Where the witnesses got 
threatened or were forced to give false evidence or where material 
witnesses were not heard, fair trial would be said to have been denied. 
The state, the court ruled thus had a definite role to play in protecting the 
witnesses; to start with, atleast in sensitive cases involving those in power, 
having political patronage, could wield muscle and money power to avert 
trial getting fainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. 
The principle of fair trial now informs and strengthens many areas 
of law. It is reflected in numerous rules and practices. It is a constant 
ongoing development process continually adapted to new changing 
circumstances, and exigencies of the situation - peculiar at times and 
related to the nature of crime, persons involved directly or operating 
behind, social impact and social needs and even so many powerful 
balancing factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal 
justice system.52 
51. AIR 2004 SC 3114. 
52 . Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 3 SCC 374, 394: AIR 2006 SC 1367. 
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Failure to observe fair hearing to the accused or the prosecution 
violates even minimum standards of due process of law. It is inherent in 
the due process of law that condemnation should be rendered only after 
the trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere farce and 
pretence. Since the fair hearing requires an opportunity to preserve the 
process, it may be vitiated and violated by an overhasty stage managed, 
tailored and partisan trial. The fair trial for a criminal offence consists not 
only in technical observance of the frame, and forms of law, but also in 
recognition and just application of its principles in substance, to find out 
the truth and prevent miscarriage of justice.53 
"Fair trial" includes fair and proper opportunity allowed by law to 
the accused to prove his irmocence. Adducing evidence in support of the 
defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair triaP^ 
and violate the right enshrined in Article 21 and Section 243 of Cr.P.C. 
1973. 
> Right to Bail 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines, in effect, nor 
cruel unusual punishments inflicted. Bail, of course, is not actually 
punishment but rather a sum of money a defendant must deposit in order 
to stay out of jail until the case goes to trial and the jury reaches a verdict. 
It is a guarantee that the defendant will show up for trial on the date set. 
The clause banning "excessive bail" was intended to prevent the 
government from jailing people indefinitely without a trial. In the past, 
judges had sometimes fixed bail at impossibly high rates, far more than a 
defendant could hope to raise. As a result, a person accused of crime but 
not convicted might languish behind bars for months or years.5= 
53 . Id, 396 (paras 38-39). 
54 . Kalyani Baskar vs. M.S. Sampoornam (2007) SCC 258, 262 (para 12). 
55 . Russell Freedman in Defence of Liberty - The Story of America's Bill of Rights, the Eighth 
Amendment, p. 134. 
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The Supreme Court of India has analysed the root cause for long 
pre-trial incarceration to be the present day unsatisfactory and irrational 
rules for bail which insist merely on financial security from the accused 
and their sureties.s^ Large number of under trials being poor and indigent 
are unable to provide any financial security,. Consequently, they have to 
languish in prison awaiting their trial. The Apex Court has characterized 
the provision of bail in India as 'antiquated'. It is oppressive and weighted 
against the poor and indigent. The system of granting bails needs to be 
improved as in Babu Singh vs. State of (i.P.^'', the Supreme Court held that 
"refusal to grant bail" to an accused person without reasonable grounds 
would amount to deprivation of his "personal liberty" under Article 21... 
the issue is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden on the public 
treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is 
integral to a socially sensitive judicial process". 
The court has suggested to change provisions for bail so that these 
provisions need no longer be based merely on financial sureties but that 
other factors should also be taken into account so that the poor can get 
their release from the prison pending their trial. 
The court has laid down that even iinder the law as it exists, if the 
trial court feels satisfied than an accused has his roots in the community 
and he is not likely to abscond, it can safely release him on his personal 
bond without sureties. The Supreme Court has laid down guidelines to 
enable the lower courts to determine whether the accused has his roots in 
the community which would deter him from fleeing from justice. 
Imposing unjust or harsh conditions, while granting bail, is violative of 
Article 21.5« 
56 . Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360: (1980) 1 SCC 93; Also Mantoo 
Mazumdar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 SC 847: (1980) 2 SCC 406. 
57 . AIR 1978 SC 527. 
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(ii) Right to Speedy Trial 
A free generation of India fashioned a Constitution and a Republic 
whose founding faith is the Supremacy of law, social justice and secular 
democracy. The conscience of this document serves as the philosophy of 
our jurisprudence and the rule of law plays the part of social engineering, 
whereby a new order may be created. 
Dedicated as our country is to build a modern society, benevolent 
humanism, mutation of social cultural values and development of 
economic structure assume supreme importance. While technological 
know how dictate the directions and pace of new order, actual change over 
can effectively be achieved only through legal process, so long as we are 
Constitutionally wedded to rule of law. The criminal justice system in 
India is founded on the bedrock of the Constitution. 
Right to speedy trial is the essence of justice as "justice delayed is 
justice denied". Speedy trial is not mentioned as a specific Fundamental 
Right in the Constitution; even criminal procedure does not guarantee 
specifically any right to speedy trial. Nor is there any specific provision 
which prescribing the maximum period for which a magistrate can keep 
an under trial in jail without trial. 
The right to speedy trial has been said to have its roots at the 
foundation of criminal proceedings, and the US Supreme Court has traced 
its roots back to the twelfth century.^^ The right to speedy trial is reflected 
in the major human right instruments (for example Article 14(3) of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 7(5) of 
the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and is reflected in the 
statutes of all of the international criminal courts and Tribunals.^o 
59 . Klopfer vs. North Carolina, 386 US 213 1967). 
60 . Gideon Boas, The Milosevic Trial, Cambridge (2007), p. 64. 
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In the United States speedy trial is one of the Constitutionally 
guaranteed right. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that-
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial".^^ 
The Supreme Court of India in its landmark judgment in Hussainara 
Khatoon vs. Home Secretary State of Bihar^^explicitly held speedy trial as part 
of Article 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing right to life and liberty. 
The Supreme Court took the matter up when the Indian Express 
newspaper carried a news story about the state of under-trial prisoners in 
Bihar, some of them were in jail for as many as five, seven or nine years 
and few of them for even more than ten years without their trials having 
begun. Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed: 
"There is also one qther infirmity of legal and judicial system which is 
responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under trial prisoners 
and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a bad reflection 
on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not 
even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in 
the commencement of the trial is bad enough; how much worse could it 
be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial 
is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay 
in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. We think that even under 
our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as 
a Fundamental Right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of 
Article 21 as interpreted by this court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of 
India.^^ We have held in that case that the Article 21 confers a 
Fundamental Right on every person not to be deprived of his life or 
liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it 
is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of the 
Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, 
but that the procedure should be "reasonable, fair and just". 
If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 
'reasonable fair and just', such deprivation would be violative of his 
Fundamental Right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce 
61 . Russell Freedman, In Defence of Liberty, The Story of America's Bill of Rights (2003). 
62 . (1980) (1) s e c 98. 
63 . AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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such Fundamental Right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure 
prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 
"reasonable, fair or just" unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for 
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not 
ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded as "reasonable, fair or just" 
and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that 
speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is 
an integral and essential part of the Fundamental Right to life and liberty 
enshrined in Article 21. 
The court comes down harshly on the state for pleading financial 
and administrative constraints in providing speedy trial. The state cannot 
avoid its Constitutional obligation to provide speedy trial to the accused 
by pleading financial or administrative inability. The state is under a 
Constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial and whatever is necessary 
for this purpose has to be done by the state. It is also the Constitutional 
obligation of this court, as the guardian of the Fundamental Rights of the 
people, as a sentinel on the qui vive, to enforce the Fundamental Right of 
the accused to speedy trial by issuing the necessary directions to the state 
which may include taking of positive action, such as augmenting and 
strengthening the investigative machinery, setting up new courts, building 
new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the courts, 
appointment of additional judges and other measures calculated to ensure 
speedy trial. 
The Apex Court also criticized monetary based approach of bail. 
One reason why our legal and judicial system continually denies justice to 
the poor by keeping them for long years in pre-trial detention is our highly 
unsatisfactory bail system. It suffers from a property-oriented approach 
which seems to proceed on the erroneous assumption that risk of 
monetary loss is the only deterrent against fleeing from justice. 
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The court further observed that the practice of release of accused 
only against bail with monetary sureties had done more harm than good. 
It noted that if the accused has roots in the community and is not likely to 
abscond, a personal bond should usually be adequate to issue a release 
order. 
In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anothers^'^, a Constitutional 
Bench of the Supreme Court went into the meaning of the expression 
"procedure established by law" in Article 21. The court held that the 
procedure established by law does not mean any procedure but a 
procedure that is reasonable, just and fair. The Court read Article 19 and 14 
into Article 21 of the Constitution for this purpose. 
The law must therefore now be taken to be well settled that Article 
21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a 
procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is 
consequently no infringement of the Fundamental Right conferred by 
Article 21, such law, insofar as it abridges or takes away any Fundamental 
Right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that Article. 
Now, if a law depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and 
prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 
has to stand the test of one or more of the Fundamental Rights conferred 
under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation, it must also 
be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. 
There can be no doubt that (Article 14) is a founding faith of the 
Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests on the foundation of our 
democratic republic. 
In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies: one belongs to 
the rule of law is a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an 
absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is 
64 . (1978) (1) sec 248. 
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unequal according to both political logic and Constitutional law and is 
therefore violative of Article 14. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state 
action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of 
reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential 
element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a 
brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 
must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with 
Article 14. It must be 'right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or 
oppressive, otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement 
of Article 21 would not be satisfied. 
In Sheela Barse vs. Union of India^^, a social worker had taken up the 
case of helpless children below age of 16 years illegally detained in jails. 
She prayed for the release of such young children from jails, supply of 
information as to the existence of juvenile courts, homes and schools and 
other necessary directions for proper looking after of the children in 
custody. 
The Supreme Court deciding the matter observed that where the 
court comes to a conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has 
been infringed, the charge or conviction, as the case may be must be 
quashed. The court directed the state governments to take steps for 
completing an investigation within three months in cases lodged against 
children. 
Further, it directed the establishment of an adequate number of 
courts to expedite the trial of children detained in various jails. 
In Abdul Rehman Antulay and Others vs. R.S. Nayak and Anothesr^^, a 
five judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated the position 
that a right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. In 
65 . (1986)(3) s e c 632. 
66 . (1992)(1) s e c 225. 
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this case the court also laid down detailed propositions of law on speedy 
trial. 
The court observed that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code were consistent with the right to speedy trial and if followed in letter 
and spirit, there would not be any grievance but, unfortunately, these 
provisions are honoured more in breach than in compliance. The Court 
specifically mentioned Section 309 of Cr.P.C, which provides that the 
proceedings shall be held as expeditious as possible and in particular that 
when the examination of witnesses has begun it shall be held as 
expeditiously as possible and in particular that when the examination of 
witnesses has begun it shall continue from day to day until all the 
witnesses in attendance have been examined. 
Another landmark judgment was Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee 
Representing Undertrial Prisoners vs. Union of India^''. In this judgment, the 
Supreme Court of India, while dealing with the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, laid down certain conditions for 
mandatory release of undertrial prisoners on bail where trial was not 
completed within a specified period of time. The Court's directions with 
respect to pending cases included: 
(i) Where the under trial is accused of an offence(s) under the Act 
prescribing a punishment of imprisonment of five years or less and 
fine, such as under trial shall be released on bail if he has been in jail 
for a period which is not less than half of the punishment provided 
for the offence with which he is charged and where he is charged 
with more than one offence, the offence providing the highest 
punishment. If the offence with which he is charged prescribes the 
maximum fine, the bail amount shall be 50% of the said amount 
with two sureties for like amount. If the maximum fine is not 
prescribed bail shall be to the satisfaction of special judge concerned 
with two sureties for like amount. 
(ii) Where the under trial accused is charged with an offence(s) under 
the Act providing for punishment exceeding five years and fine. 
67.1994 (6) s ec 731. 
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such an under trial shall be released on bail on the term set out in (i) 
above provided that his bail amount shall in no case be less than Rs. 
50,000 with two sureties for like amount. 
(iii) Where the under trial accused is charged with an offence(s) under 
the Act punishable with minimum imprisonment of then ten years 
and minimum fine of rupees of one lakh (100,000), such an under 
trial shall be released on bail if he furnishes bail in the sum of rupees 
one lakh with two sureties for the like amount. 
(iv) Where an under trial accused is charged for the commission of an 
offence punishable under Section 31 and 31-A of the Act, such an 
under trial shall not been titled to be released on bail by virtue of 
this order. 
The Court subjected the directives in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) above to 
the same general conditions as ordinarily apply, which include deposition 
of the under-trial prisoner's passport with the court, reporting to the police 
station prosecuting the case at prescribed periods and an obligation not to 
leave the jurisdiction of the trial court without the court's express 
permission. Further, the court denied the benefit of the above directions to 
those accused that are likely to tamper with evidence or influence 
prosecution witnesses. 
The issue of huge number of pending and delayed criminal 
cases came up before the Supreme Court in a petition filed by a 
non-governmental organization. The Supreme Court in the case reported 
as - Common cause vs. Union of India & Others^^, observed: It is a matter of 
common experience that in many cases where the persons are accused of 
minor offence punishable for not more than three years or even less with 
or without fine, the proceedings are kept pending for years together. If 
they are poor and helpless, they languish in jail for long periods either 
because there is no one to bail them out or because there is no one to think 
of them. The very pendency of criminal proceeding for long periods by 
itself operates as an engine of oppression. Quite often, the private 
complaints institute these proceedings out of oblique motives. Even in case 
68 .1996(4) sec 33. 
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of offence punishable for seven years or less - with or without fine - the 
prosecution are kept pending for years and years together in criminal 
courts. In a majority of these cases, whether instituted by police or private 
complainants, the accused belong to the poorer Sections of the society, 
who are unable to afford competent legal advice. Instances have also come 
before courts where the accused, which are in jail, are not brought to the 
court on every date of hearing and for that reason also the cases undergo 
several adjournments. It appears essential to issue appropriate directions 
to protect and effectuate the right to life and liberty of the citizens 
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. It is also necessary to ensure 
that these criminal prosecutions do not operate as engines of oppression. 
The court issued detailed guidelines for the release of under-trial 
prisoners and the ending of proceedings. The court ordered the release of 
under-trial prisoners on bail in cases involving offences under the IPC or 
any other law in force at the time if the offences are punishable with 
imprisonment not exceeding 
i. Three years with or without fine and if trials for such offences have 
been pending for one year or more and the accused concerned have 
been in jail for a period of six months or more. 
ii. Five years, with or without fine, and if the trials for such offences 
have been pending for two years or more and the accused 
concerned have been in jail for a period of six months or more. 
iii. Seven years, with or without fine, and if the trials for such offences 
have been pending for two years or more and the accused 
concerned have not been released on bail but have been in jail for a 
period of one year or more. 
The court ordered the quashing of criminal proceedings and 
discharge or acquittal of accused persons in cases involving offences under 
IPC or any other law in force at the time in cases of: 
i. Traffic offences, if the proceedings have been pending for more than 
two years on account of a non-serving summons to the accused or 
for any other reason. 
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ii. Offences compoundable with the permission of the court, if the 
proceedings have been pending for more than two years and trials 
have still not commenced. 
iii. Non-cognizable and bailable offences that have been pending for 
more than two years and trials have still not commenced. 
iv. Offences punishable with fine only and are not of recurring nature, 
and have been pending for more than one year and trials have still 
not commenced. 
V. Offences punishable with imprisonment of up to one year, with or 
without fine, and have been pending for more than one year and 
trials have still not commenced. 
The court said that the period that a criminal case has been pending 
must be calculated from the date that the accused are summoned to appear 
in court. Further, the court excluded offences 
i. Of corruption, misappropriation of public funds, cheating, whether 
under the IPC, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, or any other 
statute; 
ii. Concerning smuggling, foreign exchange violation and offences 
under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; 
iii. Under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Food Adulteration Act, 
and acts dealing with the environment or any other economic 
offences; 
iv. Under the Arms Act, 1959, Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, 1987; 
V. Relating to the army, navy and air force; 
vi. Against public tranquility; 
vii. Relating to public servants; 
viii. Relating to coins and government stamps; 
ix. Relating to elections; 
X. Relating to giving false evidence and offences against public justice; 
xi. Of any other sort against the state; 
xii. Relating to taxation; and 
xiii. Of defamation as defined in Section 499 of the IPC. 
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In the second Common Cause Judgment^^, the Supreme Court clarified 
that the time-Hmit mentioned regarding pending criminal cases in the first 
judgment shall not apply to cases wherein the delay of criminal 
proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted 
by the accused or on account of any other action of the accused which 
results in prolonging the trial. It added further categories of offences from 
its directions above, regarding offences 
i. Of matrimony under the IPC including Section 498A or under any 
other law; 
ii. Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, including offences under its 
Section 138; 
iii. Relating to criminal misappropriation of property of the 
complainant as well as offences relating to criminal breach of trust 
under the IPC or under any other law; 
iv. Under Section 304A of the IPC or any offence pertaining to rash and 
negligent acts which are made punishable under any other law; and, 
V. Affecting public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals as 
listed in chapter XIV of the IPC or such offences under any other 
law. 
The Supreme Court in Shaheen Welfare Association vs. Union of India^° 
granted relief to under-trial prisoners held under the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act, 1987, due to delays in their 
trials. The court divided the TADA under-trial prisoners into four classes 
for the purpose of granting bail, specifically, those 
i. Whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose 
liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the 
complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular, and who 
cannot therefore receive liberal treatment; 
ii. Whose overt acts or involvement directly attracts Section 3 or 4 of 
the TADA Act, who can be released on bail if they have been in 
prison for five years or more and whose trial is not likely to be 
completed within the next six months, unless the court comes to the 
conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may 
69. [1996 (6) s e c 775,199] 
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be harmful to the lives of the complainant, the family members of 
the complainant, or witnesses. 
iii. On trial not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 
4, but by virtue of Section 120B or 147 of the IPC, who can be dealt 
with leniently and can be released if they have been in jail for three 
years; and, 
iv. Found possessing incriminating Articles in notified areas booked 
under Section 5 of the TADA Act, who can be dealt with leniently 
and can be released if they have been in jail for two years. 
In Raj Deo Sharma versus State of Bihar/'' the Supreme Court issued 
certain directions for effective enforcement of the right to speedy trial as 
recognized in Antulay's Case^^^ and prescribed time limits for completion 
of prosecution evidence in criminal trials. During the hearing of this case, 
certain facts were brought to the notice of the court. It was foimd that in 
Bihar alone, several cases were pending for more than 25 years. A report 
submitted by the Special Judge, CBI Court, Patna in December 1996 
pointed out that in one case pending from 1982 the prosecution had cited 
as many as 40 witnesses but had examined only three witnesses up to 1996, 
the last in 1993. The report also pointed out that thereafter, the prosecution 
had taken 36 adjournments to examine the remaining witnesses, but had 
not produced even one of them. After discussing the existing case law, the 
Supreme Court laid down, among other things, that if an offence is 
punishable with imprisonment for a period. 
i. Not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the 
court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period 
of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the 
charges framed, irrespective of whether the prosecution has examined 
all the witnesses or not and the court can proceed to the next stage of 
trial. Furthermore, if the accused has been in jail for a period of over 
half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, 
bail shall be granted. 
ii. Exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court 
shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of 
71. [1998 Indlaw SC 1131], 
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three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the 
charges framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the 
witnesses or not. 
In the second Raj Deo Sharma Case^^, the court clarified that if the 
delay in trial has been caused on account of the conduct of the accused, no 
court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the period 
prescribed. Further, if the trial has been stayed by the orders of the court or 
by operation of law, the time during which the stay was in force shall be 
excluded from the period established for closing prosecution evidence. 
While examining the outcome of judicial attitude, one discerns that 
the Apex Court seemed to be vacillating on the debate of right to speedy 
trial. Would it not be safe to submit that this vacillating attitude, be 
contributory to piling of cases resulting in arrears and, ultimately, 
(i) culminating in delay in disposal of cases (ii) collapsing of judicial 
process under its own weight; and (iii) the death knell of the Indian legal 
system? From the type of attitude, one may gather the impression that the 
problem of speedy disposal of cases seems to remain at the same juncture 
where it was originally, and the several reports'''* and judicial 
pronouncements have not been able to lessen the bottlenecks of the 
problem. 
(iii) Structure, Role and Management of the Judicial System 
The Indian Judiciary consists of one Supreme Court with 26 judges, 
21 High Courts with sanctioned strength of 725 justices (working strength 
73. [1997 (7) s e c 604] 
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597 as on 1.3.2007) and 14, 477 Subordinate Courts/judges. (Working 
strength only 11,767 as on 31.12.2006). 
Justice K.G. Balakrishnan the Honourable Chief Justice of India on 
the occasion of Law Day inaugural address,''^ said "I consider it my duty as 
head of the Judiciary to inform the people of the state of administration of 
Justice in our country reflecting on its performance in the past and efforts 
being made for better implementation of tasks assigned to it under the 
Constitution". 
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India has raised the question from above 
statistics is why such large number of vacancies are allowed to remain 
vacant particularly at the trial court level where the arrears are constantly 
on the increase. That takes us to the selection and appointment process 
where the Government has a greater role than the judiciary. A way has to 
be found by the government (which includes all states and Union Territory 
Governments) and the Judiciary to address this problem in order to 
maintain a zero-vacancy situation all the time.^^ 
There is unanimity of opinion that the judge strength in India has to 
considerably increase to cope with the needs and demands. In fact, the 
Supreme Court of India as early as in 2002 in All India Judge's Association 
(III) case^ has directed the state and the Central Governments to increase 
strength five time over a period of five years. Governments have not yet 
acted on it keeping the number of judges by and large the same for too 
long, despite mounting and consequent delay. Judiciary has no power to 
increase the strength of Courts or appoint additional judges without 
government sanction and budgetary support. 
75. Supreme Court Bar Association "Law Day Celebrations" on 26th Nov. 2007 at Supreme 
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Meanwhile in another judgement Salem Advocate Bar Association 
(II) vs. Union of India''^ the court desired that a judicial impact assessment 
should accompany every fresh legislation so that the judiciary will be 
prepared to assist the enforcement of new laws properly and efficiently 
while dispensing justice under it. 
The courts do not possesses a magic wand, which they can waive to 
wipe out the huge pendency of cases, nor can they afford to ignore the 
instances of injustices and illegalities only because of the huge arrears of 
the cases already pending with them. There are volumes of Law 
Commission recommendations, expert committee reports and opinions of 
Jurists, highlighting the problem and suggesting ways and means. 
The need of the hour is to act upon those suggestions swiftly and 
decisively. The real problem is that the institution of cases in the courts far 
exceeds their disposal. Though there is a considerable increase in the 
disposal of cases in various courts, the institution has increased more 
rapidly.''^ 
The High Courts increased their annual disposal from 9,80,474 cases 
in the year 1999 to 14,50,602 cases in the year 2006, the cumulative increase 
being 48% in seven years, without there being commensurate increase in 
the strength of judges. However, the institution increased from 11,22,430 
cases in the year 1999 to 15,89,979 year 2006 leading to increase in 
pendency from 27,57,806 as on 31.12.1999 to 36,54,853 cases as on 
31.12.2006. 
Subordinate Courts disposed of 1,58,42,438 cases in the year 2006 as 
against 1,23,94,760 cases in the year 1999, thereby, increasing the disposal 
by 28% in seven years without any substantial increase in the strength of 
judges. However, the institution increased from 1,27,31,275 cases in the 
78. (2005) 6 s e c 344: AIR 2005, SCC 3353 
79. Efficient Functioning of India's Justice Delivery System by Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, CJI 
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year 1999 to 1,56, 42,129 cases in the year 2006, resulting in the pendency 
getting increased from 2,04,98,400 cases as on 31.12.1999 to 2,48,72,198 
cases as on 31.12.2006.8° 
The average disposal per judge comes to 2374 cases in the High 
Courts and 1346 cases in Subordinate Courts, if calculated on the basis of 
disposal in the year 2006 and working strength of judges as on 31.12.2006. 
Applying this average, we require 1539 High Court judges and 18,479 
subordinate judges to clear the backlog in one year. 
The requirement would come down to 770 more High Court judges 
and 9239 more subordinate judges if the arrears alone have to be cleared in 
the next two years. The existing strength being inadequate, even to 
dispose of the actual institution, the backlog cannot be wiped out without 
additional strength, particularly, when the institution is likely to increase 
and not come down in the coming years.^i 
Several statutes like the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the Negotiable Instruments Act etc., which contribute to more 
than 50% to 60% of the litigation in the trial courts are central enactments, 
referable to list I or list III and these laws are administered by the courts 
estabhshed by the state governments. The number of central laws which 
create rights and offences to be adjudicated in the Subordinate Courts are 
about 340. It is obvious that the Central Government must establish courts 
at the trial level and appellate level and make budgetary allocation to the 
states to establish these courts to cut down backlog of cases arising out of 
these central statutes. The Central Government must estimate and pay for 
the recurring and non-recurring expenditure of the state courts to the 
extent the courts spends time to adjudicate disputes arising out of central 
statutes. 
80. Ibid 
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Article 247 of the Constitution enables the Union Government to 
establish additional courts for better administration of laws made by 
Parliament or of any existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in 
the Union list.^ ^ 
So far backlog in Subordinate Courts is concerned, additional court 
must be created and additional Judicial Officers must be appointed till the 
backlog is cleared, hd hoc judges under Article 224-A of the Constitution 
should be appointed to clear the backlog in the High Courts for a period of 
five years or till the backlog is cleared. All the cases which are pending in 
the High Courts for two years or more can be allocated these ad hoc judges. 
Since the annual institution in the High Courts as well as in sub-ordinate 
courts exceeds their respective annual disposal, additional judges in the 
High Courts as well as in Subordinate Courts should be appointed on 
permanent basis to deal with increase in institution over the disposal.^^ 
The Law Commission in its 120* Report submitted in 1987 
examined the problem of understaffing of judiciary and recommended 50 
judges per million of population instead of 10.5. 
• Sanctioned strength of the High Court was 725 and working 
strength was 597 as on 1.3.2007 leaving 128 vacancies. 
• Sanctioned strength of subordinate judge was 14,477 and working 
strength of 11,767, leaving 2710 vacancies as on 31.12.2006.84 
As per the information collected by the First National Judicial Pay 
Commission, every state except Delhi has been providing less than 1% of 
the budget for subordinate judiciary whereas the figure is 1.03% in case of 
Delhi. 
During the 10* plan (2002-2007) Rs.700/- crores have been allocated 
for priority demands of Judiciary, which is 0.078% of the total plan outlay. 
82. (2007) 4 sec J 17 
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Such meagre allocations are grossly inadequate to meet the requirements 
of judiciary. The Government should place adequate funds at the disposal 
of the High Courts for augmenting the infrastructure.ss 
In the state of Gujarat Evening Courts have already started 
functioning since 14.11.2006. Presently there are 60 such courts and they 
have disposed of 57,422 cases between 14.11.2006 and 31.3.2007. 
On the recommendation of the 11* Finance Commission, 
Fast Track Courts of Session Judge were set up for disposal of long 
pending sessions and other cases. These courts have been quite successful 
in reducing the arrears. Most of the criminal cases in Subordinate Courts 
are pending at the level of Magistrates. 1, 66, 77,657 criminal cases were 
pending before magisterial courts as on 31.12.2006. Keeping in view the 
performance of Fast Track Courts of Session Judges, the Government of 
India should formulate a similar scheme for setting up Fast Track Courts 
of Magistrates in each state, as recommended by the previous conference 
of Chief Ministers and Chief Justices held on 11.3.2006. 
Our justice delivery system in spite of innumerable drawbacks and 
failings, still commands high esteem and the citizens have placed the 
judiciary on a high pedestal. 
C. Emergence of Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right in India 
India has a written Constitution and Codified Central and State 
Laws. Its judiciary is of the highest integrity. The Supreme Court of India 
is a shining symbol of the great faith, the people have in the judiciary and 
to great pride the Supreme Court has earned high praise all over the 
world. Generations of learned judges have worked to uphold and to 
nurture this sacred national trust. The Indian legislature and judiciary 
85. Id J -19 
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make constant efforts to bring about improvements in Courts and dispense 
justice speedily. 
The right to speedily trial is not expressly enumerated as one of the 
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of India unlike the sixth 
Amendment*^ the USA Constitution, which expressly recognises this right 
in the United States. 
It is inter-alia declared that in all criminal prosecutions accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. This is in addition to the Fifth 
US Constitutional Amendment, which declares "no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without the process of law". 
This corresponds broadly to Article 21 also to the deleted clause I of Article 
31 of the Indian Constitution. Article 21 declares that no person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law." 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India confers upon every 
individual a Fundamental Right not to be deprived of his life or liberty 
except in accordance with due procedure prescribed under law. 
The procedure prescribed under law has to necessarily be reasonable, fair 
and just. Under Article 21 of the Constitution, the right to speedy trial is a 
fundamental requirement. No procedure, which does not ensure a 
reasonably quick trial be regarded as "reasonable, fair and it will fall foul 
of Article 21 and hence is not valid under law. Breach of this Fundamental 
Right has the potential of making the entire prosecution liable to be 
quashed and closed and the accused in all such cases will have to be 
declared innocent and set free. 
86. The relevant portion or the 6th Amendments reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury". 
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Speedy trial is hence the essence of criminal trial and there can be no 
doubt that a delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice.^^ 
There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy and reasonably 
expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the Fundamental Right 
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Right to speedy trial 
encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, 
appeal, revision and retrial is applicable not only to proceedings before a 
court but also to police investigation preceding it. ^^  
The Supreme Court while acknowledging speedy trial to be part of 
the Fundamental Rights implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 
21 has posed some pertinent questions to itself. First, what would be the 
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is 
sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long 
delayed trial in violation of his Fundamental Right under Article 21? 
Second, would be entitled to be released unconditionally, freed from the 
charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly 
long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute 
violation of his Fundamental Right under. Article 21 ? Third, what would 
be outer limit which would declare a trial to have exceeded the unduly 
long period? Fourth, what if the trial got delayed unduly due to the fault 
of the accused or dilatory tactics adopted by him? Fifth, factors responsible 
for delayed trial and last but not the least whether speedy trial ensures a 
fair trial or acts as a hindrance to the same. These questions are well 
answered by the Supreme Court in the Hussainara Khatoon's case and in 
the subsequent cases like Sheela Barse vs. Union of India^^. Madhesh -
Warhari Singh vs. State ofBihar'^'^ A.R. Antulay and others vs. R.S. Nayak and 
87. Hussainara Khatoon (iv) vs. Home Secretary state of Bihar, AIR, 1979, SC 1369 (1980) 1 
s e c 98:1980 SCC (Cri) 40:1979 (Cri) 1045. 
88. Madheshwardhari Singh us. State of Bihar, AIR 1986, Pat. 324:1986 (Cri.) J1771 (FB), 
89.1986 (3) SCC, 632 
90. AIR 1986 Pat. 324 
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anothef"^'^, Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab,^^ Common Cause vs. Union of 
India and others'^^, Raj Deo Sharma vs. State ofBihar^'^ and also in the case of 
P. Rama Chandra Rao vs. State ofKarnataka.^^ 
For the Saka of convenience both the first and second points can be 
taken together for discussion. Basically two broad propositions emanates 
from the decision of Hussainare Khatoon's case. They are (1) right to 
speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21; and 
(2) that unless the procedure proscribed by law ensures a speedy trial it 
cannot be said to be reasonable, fair or just. Expeditious trial and freedom 
from detention are part of human rights and basic freedom and that a 
judicial system which allows incarceration of men and women for long 
period of time without trial must be held to be denying human rights to 
such under trials. 
Likewise in the case of the State of Maharashtra vs. Champalal Punjaji 
ShaW^ the Supreme Court observed; 
"In deciding the question whether their has been a denial of the right to 
a speedy trial the court is entitled to take into consideration whether the 
defendant him self was responsible for a part of the delay and whether 
he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the 
delay. The Court is also entitled to take into consideration whether the 
delay was unintentional, caused by over crowding of the Court's docket 
or under stajfing of the prosecution". 
This case is significant for the approach it adopts to the problem. 
According to this decision it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast 
rule in judging the complaint of denial of speedy trial and that all the 
circumstances of the case have to be taken in to account before making a 
91. 1999 (1) s e c 225 
92. 1994 s e c 936 
93. 1996 s e c (Cri) 589 
94. 1998 (7) Supreme 556 :1999 (II) OLR (SC) 512 
95. 2002(3) Supreme 260. 
96. 1981 (3) s e c 610 
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pronouncement. As pointed out in the A.R. antulay's case, the important 
consideration to be kept in mind by the Court: 
1) Whether the accused is responsible for day; 
2) Whether he is prejudiced by such delay in any manner. Of course, in 
some cases the delay may itself amount to prejudice; 
3) Nature of offence with which the accused is charged. The court 
should also take into consideration the nature of offence like an 
economic offence, which jeopardises the economy of the country and 
those cases should be dealt within a different manner. 
In T.V. Vatheeszvaran vs. State of T.N^^ the Supreme Court reiterated 
the significance of the right to speedy trial and extended it even to post 
conviction stage. It was held that undue delay in carrying out the death 
sentence entitles the accused to ask for lesser sentence of life 
imprisonment. This opinion is based upon the immense psychological, 
emotional and mental torture a man condemned to death suffers. But this 
decision was overruled later by a Constitution bench. 
However, in Sheela Barse vs. Union of India, a Division Bench of the 
Supreme Court comprising Bhagwati and R.N. Mishra J.J. reaffirmed that 
the "right to speedy trial is a Fundamental Right implicit in Article 21 of 
the Constitution " and observed "the consequence of violation of 
Fundamental Right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself 
would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is a breach of the 
Fundamental Right. Thus, the Court answered the question, which 
Bhagwati J. had posed in the first Hussainare Khatoon case. This trend 
continued in the subsequent stages and the same is in conformity with the 
judicial trend of U.S.A. and other democracies. In Struck vs. United States'^^ 
it was held that dismissal of charges was the only possible remedy where a 
speedy trial has been denied. 
97. 1983 (2) s e c 68 
98. 37 LED 2d 56 
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However, it has been recognised in the Hussainare Khatoon's case 
and in other cases that the accused would be entitled to be released 
unconditionally if the accused charged with multiple offences have been in 
imprisonment for more than the total maximum period permissible for all 
the offences taken together. It was held that accused is entitled to bail if no 
challan is filed within the period of90 days or 60 days as the case maybe in 
which punishment prescribed is above or less than 10 years, as per proviso 
(a) to sec. 167 (2) Cr.P.C. 1973. It was also held that the State is bound to 
provide free legal aid to enable the accused to exercise that right and the 
Magistrate must ensure that he is so provided. 
Hence, the point No.l and 2 are well answered. In a nutshell accused 
is to be released from custody on bail if investigation or trial could not be 
completed on time and if trial takes an unduly long time then he is to be 
discharged or convicted and even conviction can be quashed. 
Now coming to the point No.3 as to what should be the outer limit, 
which would declare a trial to have exceeded the unduly long period it is 
pertinent to discuss the observations made by the Supreme Court in 
Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar. After examining the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in Strunk vs. United States and Willie Mae 
Barker vs. John Wingo and also the Privy council in Bell vs. Director of Public 
Prosecution, Jamaica, the Court posed the following relevant questions. 
"Several questions arise for consideration. Was there delay? 
How long was the delay? Was the delay inevitable having regard to the 
nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other 
relevant circumstances? Was the delay unreasonable? Was any part of the 
delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting 
agency? Was any part of the delay caused by the tactics of the defence? 
Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and 
defending agencies? Did the accused have the ability and the opportunity 
to assert his right to a speedy trial? Was there a likelihood of the accused 
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being prejudiced in his defence? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice 
in the conduct of his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently 
prejudicial to the accused?" 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that deprivation of the 
right to speedy trial does not purse prejudice the accused ability to defend 
himself, right to speedy trial is more vague concept than other procedural 
rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the 
right has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a 
system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a 
consequence, there is no fixed point in the criminal process when the state 
can put the defendant to the choice of either exercising or waiving the right 
to speedy trial. 
However, in Madheshivardhari Singh vs. State ofBihar'^ , the Full Bench 
of the Supreme Court had held: 
"TTzflf a callous and inordinate prolonged delay often years or more, 
which is no way arises from the accused default (or is otherwise not 
occasioned due to any extraordinary and exceptional reasons). 
In the context of reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge, would 
be per se prejudicial to the accused and would plainly violate the 
Constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article-21." 
"that another time limit to concretes the right to speedy public trial is 
envisioned both by principle and precedent. It is further held that a 
callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which 
does not arise from the default of the accused or is othenvise not 
occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason). In investigation 
and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violate the 
Constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21." 
The other important findings of the Full Bench are that the right to 
speedy trial applies not only to major crimes but to minor offences as well 
as and that it takes in its fold not only the proceedings in Court but also 
the preceding police investigation. 
99. AIR 1996 Pat. 324 
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Conversely, in the A.R. Antulay's case, while acknowledging that 
right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, 
namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial 
the Supreme Court refused to prescribe any time limit. The Court had held 
that while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in 
violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant 
circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and 
witnesses, the workload of the Court concerned, prevailing local 
conditions and so on what is called, the systematic delays. It is true that it 
is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and state includes 
judiciary as well; but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted 
in such matters instead of pedantic one. 
More importantly, the Court had held: 
"/f is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of 
offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot 
also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to 
the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of 
right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and 
explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh 
all the circumstances of a given cause before pronouncing upon the 
complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too has repeatedly refused to 
fix any such outer time limit inspite of the sixth Amendment. Nor do 
we think that nor fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the 
guarantee of right to speedy trial". 
In the Kartar Singh's case also it was held by the Supreme Court that 
whether a trial has been delayed was to be determined from the facts and 
circumstances of the case. However, this trend has been reversed in the 
subsequent decisions. In the case of Common Cause vs. Union of India a 
time limit of two years for traffic offences and offences with punishment 
not exceeding three years under l.P.C. or any other law was fixed and for 
offences punishable with imprisonment. Upto one year with or without 
fine a time limit of one year was fixed after which the Courts were directed 
to discharge or acquit the accused. This trend was further reinforced in the 
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Raj Deo Sharma's case in which direction was given to close the evidence 
after two years or three years of framing charges for offence punishable 
with imprisonment for less than 7 years and more than 7 years 
respectively. In both the cases, some modifications were done in the way 
of subsequent classifications. But all the four cases of Common Cause and 
Raj Deo Sharma were over ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of 
P.Rama Chandra Rao vs. State of Karnatak ^ o° , by its Constitution Bench 
which also held that it was not necessary to have limitation bars 
terminating all criminal trials and proceedings and that the propositions 
and guidelines of the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay's case are held to 
be good and reaffirmed. 
However, in all the above referred decisions and clarifications it was 
affirmed that if the trial got delayed unduly due to the fault of the Accused 
or the dilatory tactics adopted by him, he cannot be allowed to take the 
ground of denial of speedy trial to him. It was held in the aforesaid 
decisions that each and every delay did not necessarily prejudice the 
accused. Some delay may indeed work to his advantage. It is often pointed 
out that delay is a known defence tactic. Since the burden of proving the 
guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, non-availability of 
witnesses; disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against 
the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be causes where the 
prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, 
in every case it is required to be seen as to who is responsible for the delay. 
If, it is the accused himself responsible then he would not be entitled to 
enjoy the benefit of acquittal under the pretext of vacation of his right to 
speedy trial. Hence, point No.4 needs no further elaboration. It is, 
however, relevant to reproduce a portion from the judgment of A.R. 
Antulay's case: 
100. 2002(3)SC 260 
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"Delay is usually welcomed by the accused. He postpones the delay of 
reckoning thereby. It may impair the prosecution's ability to prove the 
case against him. In the meantime, he remains free to indulge in crimes. 
An accused cannot raise this plea if he has never taken steps to demand 
a speedy trial. A plea that proceedings against him be quashed because 
delay has taken place is not sustainable if the record shows that he 
acquiesced in the delay and never asked for an expeditious disposal". 
Now coming to the last point, several factors are responsible for trial 
getting delayed. First there is only one trial judge each for about 10 lakhs 
population and as stated earlier about 2.5 million cases are pending in 
India for disposal. Congestion of the Court Calendar, unavailability of 
adequate number of judges is among the prime reason of delayed trial. 
Second, delay caused by the prosecution, accused to seek adjournments 
and taking recourse to various legal devices contributes to the cause of the 
delay. Third, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, delay is also caused by 
orders, whether induced by the accused or not, of the Court, necessitating 
appeal or revision or other appropriate actions or proceedings. Fourth 
nature of case and antiquated procedures still practised in India are also 
contributory factors, getting a key witness from outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of Courts, and those who are avoiding summons to 
appear also kill lots of time. Moreover, modern techniques are as 
videoconferencing tale conferencing etc., could have saved the valuable 
time of the court and expedite trial in India. Last but not the least, lack of 
infrastructure, manpower in the ministerial level, resources and clubbing 
up many administrative works with judicial functions retard the trial 
process. 
However, the main point for discussion here is that if denial of 
speedy trial also deprives a fair trial and ultimately fails to deliver justice 
or else insistence^ speedy trial promotes injustice as it denies a fair and 
proper trial. As pointed out in the first Hussainare Khatoon's case, the 
right to a speedy trial is not an expressly guaranteed Constitutional right 
in India but is implicit in the right to a fair trial, which has been held to be 
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part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Constitution. It was also held in the State of Maharashtra, vs. Chamalal 
Punjaji Shah^°^ that while a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair 
trial, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily 
true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. The tactics or conduct 
of the accused himself may cause the delay. The delay may have caused no 
prejudice whatsoever to the accused". The question whether a conviction 
should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial is dependent on the fact 
as to if the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend 
himself otherwise there would be no justification to quash the conviction 
on the ground of delayed trial only. 
Fair trial can no means be equated with any trial on the ground of 
denial of speedy trial. It is both in the interest of the accused as well as in 
the interest of the society that a criminal case is concluded soon. If the 
accused is guilty, he ought to be declared so. Social interest lies 
in punishing the guilty and exoneration of the innocent but this 
determination of guilt or innocence must be arrived at with reasonable 
despatch reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. The nature of 
offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the workload of 
the court, the means of communication available to the witnesses and 
several other circumstances have to be taken into consideration. Last the 
very purpose of trial should be defeated be it a fair trial conducted 
expeditiously or else a delayed but not necessarily an unfair one. On the 
conclusion, it can be said that fair trial cannot be necessarily speedy but in 
order to ensure speediness in the trial process fairness of the trial may be 
lost. 
101.1981(2) s e c 610 
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Judicial Response to Speedy Trial as Fundamental Rights 
In India, the right to speedy trial is not enumerated as a 
Fundamental Right under the Constitution. Unlike the Sixth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution which recognizes this right in addition to the Fifth 
Amendment which inter-alia, declare that "no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without the due process of law" which 
corresponds broadly to Article 21.^^^ Due to the narrow and restricted 
interpretation of Article 21 in A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras''°^ probably 
this right was not claimed or recognised as a Fundamental Right flowing 
from Article 21. But with the over ruling of A.K. Gopalan in R.C. Cooper vs. 
Union oflnida^^'^ and by injecting dynamism of 'fair, just and reasonable' to 
Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India,^05 t^g said Article has come 
to acquire a new meaning and extended content and connotation. In the 
instant case the Supreme Court has emphatically stated that Article 21, 
which guarantees a Fundamental Right to every person not to be deprived 
of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure 
established by law does not mean some semblance of procedure 
established by law. However, the procedure should be reasonable, fair and 
just and if not so would amount to violation of Article 21 and detune will 
be entitled to be released. The Supreme Court by widening the scope of 
Article 21 has intended to protect the life and liberty of the individuals. 
However, the Apex Court was shocked to note the state of 
administration of criminal justice in the first Hussainara Khatoon's case, 
where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by number of under 
trials who were languishing in jails for years without trial for offences, 
which perhaps they might not have committed. The court while 
102. Clause (1) of Article 31 deleted by Constitution (Forty fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. 
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emphasising that procedure prescribed by law under Article 21 must be 
'reasonable, fair and just', observed that the procedure could not be so 
unless it ensure a speedy trial for determination of guilt of such person. 
The court speaking through Justice Bhagwati (as he then was) held^o^ that 
although unlike the American Constitution speedy trial is not specifically 
enumerated as a Fundamental Right, it is implicit in broad sweep and 
content of Article 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi.^O'' 
Thus, there is no doubt that 'speedy trial' by which we mean 
'reasonably expeditious trial is an integral part of Fundamental 
Right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Constitution.ios 
In the Hussainara Khatoon 11 case the Supreme Court deserved that 
under trial prisoners against whom no charge sheet has been filed by the 
police within the period of limitation laid down in Section 468 of Cr. p.c. 
cannot be proceeded against at all. And directed their release forthwith 
because any further detention of such persons would have been unlawful 
and violative of Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 21. 
In Hussainara Khatoon (111) vs. State of Bihar''^^ the scope of the 
Constitution was again explained so as to include speedy trial as an 
essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure guaranteed by 
Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In State of Bihar vs. Uma Shanka KotrivaV^^ the Supreme Court 
observed that a trial which did not make much headway in 20 yeas means 
considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by 
way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearances in court 
106. AIR 1979 SC1365 
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apart from anxiety. "There has to be a limit to the period for which 
criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage". 
Again in Kadra Pahadiya vs. State of Bihar,^'^^ while reaffirming the 
principle of Hussainara Khatoon that 'speedy trial' is a Fundamental Right 
implicit in Article 21. The Supreme Court declared that an accused who is 
denied the right of speedy trial is entitled to approach this court for the 
purpose of enforcing such right. It had power to give necessary direction 
to the Government and other appropriate authorities for securing the right 
of the accused and gave necessary direction to the Government of Bihar 
and High Court including a direction to create additional courts for speedy 
disposal of pending cases since long. In the instant case, four boys 
languished in Bihar Jail as under trial prisoners for over ten years. The 
court directed the session judge to proceed with the case immediately. 
The Supreme Court considered the applicability of right of speedy 
trial again in State of Mahrashtra vs. Champalal Punjaji Shah^'^'^ where 
Chinnappa Reddy ]., speaking for himself and A.P. Sen and Bahrul Islam, 
judges. While affirming the principle of Hussainara Khatoon observed that 
if, delay caused by conduct of the accused himself or there is nothing to 
show that the accused had been prejudiced in conduct of his defence there 
will be no justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed 
trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.^ ^3 
In T.V. Vatheesxvaran vs. state of Tamil Nadu''^'^, the court reiterated the 
significance of the right to speedy trial and extended it even, to post 
conviction stage, the court held that undue delay in carrying out the death 
sentence entitles the accused to ask for lesser sentence of life 
imprisonment. Though this case has been over-ruled by the Constitutional 
111. AIR 1981 SC 939. 
112. AIR 1981 SC 1675 
113. AIR 1983 SC 381. 
114. AIR 1986 SC 1773 
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Bench but it is relevant to the limited extent as it reaffirmed the right of 
speedy trial as enunciated in Hussainara Khatoon case. 
In Sheela Barse vs. Union of India^^^ a Division Bench comprising of 
Bhawati and R.N. Misra, JJ., re-affirmed that the right to speedy trial is a 
Fundamental Right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. And in case 
of violation of the said Fundamental Right the prosecution is liable to be 
quashed on the ground that it is in breach of Fundamental Right. 
The court directed that so far as an offence committed by a juvenile 
punishable with imprisonment of not more than 7 yeas is concerned. 
A period of three months from the date of filing of complain or lodging of 
FIR shall be deemed to be the maximum time permissible for investigation 
and a period of six months from the filing of the charge sheet as the 
reasonable period within which the trial should be completed. The court 
has specifically directed that if these time limits are not obeyed, the 
prosecution against child should be quashed. 
In Raghubir Singh's case, the question before the court was whether 
delay in police investigation and trial was sufficient ground for holding 
that right to speedy trial under Article 21 is violated? The court observed 
that whether the right to speedy trial, which forms part of the 
Fundamental Right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21, has been 
violated will depend upon various factors such as was there delay? 
How long was the delay? Was the delay reasonable? Was any part of delay 
caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecution agency? Was 
any part of delay caused by the tactics of the defence? Was the delay due 
to cause beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies? 
Did the accused have ability and the opportunity to assert his right to 
speedy trial? Was there likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his 
defence? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his 
115. AIR 1979 SC 149 
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defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudiced to the 
accused?"^ 
In the instance case the court held that delay was caused because of 
the tactics of the accused as they did assert their rights, which was evident 
from the number of petitions filed before the magistrate and the special 
judge from time to time. The investigating agency could not be blamed for 
the slow progress made in investigation of the case and the delay in 
investigation and trial was the result of nature of the case and the general 
situation prevailing in the country. The court directed the trial court to 
proceed from day-to-day in the trial of the case. 
In Srinivas pal's case, while dealing with the problem of delay the 
Supreme Court has observed as follows: 
"Quick Justice is sine quo non of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Keeping a person in suspended animation for QVz years without any 
cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or 
before the High Court or before us, cannot be with the spirit of the 
procedure established by law. In that view of the matter, it is just fair 
and in accordance with equity to direct the trial or prosecution of the 
appellant to proceed no further. We do accordingly" .'^'^'^ 
In Diwan Naubat Rai vs. State (Delhi Administration)^^^ where charges 
were not framed even after the direction of the Apex Court for trial of the 
case on day-to-day basis, it refused to quash the proceedings in as much as 
it was found that the accused himself was mainly responsible for the delay 
of which he was complaining. The delay on the part of prosecution was 
found to be of thirty days only. 
This case clearly shows that in those cases were an accused himself 
is mainly responsible for the delay; the court will refrain from quashing 
the proceedings for the denial of right of speedy trial. In Abdur Rehman 
116.1980 Cri. LJ1803. 
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Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak''''^ the Supreme Court after analysis whole of trio 
case law, laid down the following propositions meant to serve as 
guidelines for speedy trial of the accused with the warning that "these 
propositions are not exhaustive. It is neither difficult to foresee all 
situations nor is possible to lay down any hard and fast rule". 
These propositions are as follows: 
1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure, which is implicit in Article 21 of 
the Constitution, creates a right in accused to be tried speedily. It is in 
the interest of society as well as the accused that guilt or innocence of 
the accused is determined as quickly as possible under the 
circumstances. 
2. The right to speedy trial, which flows from Article 21 encompasses all 
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, 
revision and re-trial and there is no reason to take restricted view of 
this right. 
3. The period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short 
as possible so that the accused is not subjected to urmecessary 
incarceration prior to his conviction and his worry, anxiety, expense 
and disturbance to vocation and peace resulting from an unduly 
prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial are minimal. The undue 
delay may result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend 
himself whether on account of death, disappearance or non-
availability of witnesses or otherwise. 
4. It is usually the accused, who is interested in delaying the 
proceedings, as "delay is a known defence tactics". Since burden of 
proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay 
ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, 
disappearance of evidence by loses of timework against the interest of 
prosecution. In every case where the right to speedy trial is alleged to 
have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is who 
is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in 
good faith, to indicate their rights or interests as perceived by them, 
cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken pursuing 
such proceedings be counted towards delay. 
5. For determining whether undue delay has occurred one must take 
note of all attendant circumstances including nature of offence, 
number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court 
concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on. 
119.1992 Cri. L.J. 2717. 
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6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. 
Some delays may work in his advantage. The prosecution should not 
be allowed to become persecution when does the prosecution 
becomes persecution again defends upon the facts of a given case. 
7. The plea of accused that he has been denied speedy trial cannot be 
defeated by the argument that the accused did at no time demand it. 
8. The court has to balance and weigh the several factors, i.e. balancing 
test has to be applied for finding out whether the right to speedy trial 
has been denied in the given case. 
9. Ordinarily court shall quash the charges or conviction if the right to 
speedy trial is infringed. But it is not the only course open. 
The nature of the offence and circumstances of the case may be such 
that quashing the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In 
such cases it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order 
including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time or 
reducing the sentence where the trial has been concluded as may be 
deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. 
10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix time limit for trial of 
offences. 
11. The objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and relief on the 
account should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High 
Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the 
proceedings except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. The 
High Court must dispose of such proceeding on priority basis. 
Again in Chote Lai Jain vs. State of Rajasthan''^^ the Rajasthan High 
Court has laid down the following propositions to serve as guidelines. 
1. The right to speedy trial as a Fundamental Right being well settled 
the question whether the said right has been violated or likely to be 
violated on account of delay in the trial will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case and no other outer limit can be fixed in a 
general way for all the cases. 
2. For calculating delay, the court would take into account the period 
consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in 
actual proceedings in the court after filing of the charge sheet. The 
letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also 
mandates a speedy investigation and trial. 
3. For deciding question of delay the court shall take into account the 
working of the judicial conditions in judicial courts including large 
120.1992 Cri. L.J. 2620 (Raj.) 
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number of pendency and institution of the cases, inadequate, judge 
strength and understaffing etc. 
4. Whether in a pending case criminal proceedings should be quashed 
or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court to secure 
ends of justice will depend on number of factors to be taken into 
consideration. Such as, the gravity and seriousness of the offence, 
whether delay caused by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself, 
whether accused objected at any stage to the delay occasioned and 
whether accused is prejudiced on account of the delay. 
5. If the accused has been prejudiced in conduct of his trial and defence 
the pending criminal proceedings should normally be quashed 
because the accused in such a case is said to be denied an adequate 
opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable. 
6. In grave and serious offences against the society in relation to nation's 
economy, defence or security the criminal proceeding should not be 
normally quashed on the ground of delay simplicited without 
anything further. 
In trivial offences, which have very little impact on the society, 
quashing of criminal proceeding on the ground of delay simpliciter shall 
be in the interest of justice as it will give room for serious and grave 
offences and will lesson the burden of the court with heavy workload. 
The Supreme Court refused to issue orders for enforcement of 
guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay^^^ and Chote Lai's Case^^a ^^d instead 
asked the Chief Justice of the High Courts to undertake the review of such 
cases in their states and issue appropriate direction wherever required for 
effective implementation of the guidelines. According to the Apex Court, 
the pending of criminal proceeding for a long period itself operates as an 
engine of oppression.^^s 
A far-reaching judgement was delivered by the Delhi High Court in 
B.L. Wadehra vs. State (NCT ofDelhip^^ where the court held the strike by a 
121. AIR 1992 SC 1701. 
12Z 1992 Cri. L.J. 2620 (Raj.) 
123. AIR 2000 Del. 266. 
124. AIR 2000 SC 2544 
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lawyer as illegal and unethical because it had infringed the Fundamental 
Right of the litigants to speedy trial. 
The Supreme Court Ramon Services Ltd vs. Subash Kapoor^"^ held that 
the litigants who suffered entirely on account of his advocate's non-
appearance in court could sue the advocate for damages. 
The Supreme Court has made another significant pronouncement in 
Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar}'^^ where it took a serious note of the lapse on the 
part of the High Court, which delivered the judgement after a long time of 
the concluding of the arguments. The court very aptly remarked that while 
justice delayed is justice denied, Justice withheld is even worse than that, 
in the instant case court observed that any inordinate, unexplained and 
negligent delay is pronouncing judgement of the High Court was an 
infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In every case, where right to speedy trial is alleged to have been 
infringed, the first question to be put and answered is who is responsible 
for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate 
their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be taken as delaying 
tactic nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted 
towards delay. 
While determining whether undue delay has occurred one must 
have regard to all the circumstances, including nature of offence, number 
of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing 
local conditions and so on. 
Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. 
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of 
prejudice. Prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But 
when does the prosecution become persecution, depends upon the facts of 
125. 2001 (6) SC 515 
126. AIR 2001, SC 3173 
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a given case. Accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by 
saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. The court 
has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-balancing tests - and 
determine in each case whether the right of speedy trial has been denied in 
a given case. 
Charge or conviction is to be quashed if the court comes to the 
conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed. But 
this is not the only course open. It is open to the court to make such other 
appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed 
time where the trial is not concluded or the sentence where the trial has 
concluded- as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of 
the case. 
It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of 
offences. Not fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee of 
right to speedy trial. An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial 
and for relief on that account should first be addressed to the High Court. 
Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay 
the proceedings, except in a ease of grave and exceptional nature. 
Such proceedings in High Court must be disposed of on a priority basis. 
The Supreme Court has laid down great importance on speedy trials of 
criminal offences and has emphasized: 
"It is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article llM^Afair 
trail implies speedy trial. No procedure can he reasonable, fair or just 
unless that procedure ensures a speedy trail for determination of the 
guilt of such person". 
The Supreme Court has observed: 
"No procedure which doesnH ensure a reasonably quick trial can he 
regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it zvould fall foul of Article 21. 
There can, therefore be no doubt that speedy trail and by speedy trail 
we mean reasonably expeditious is an integral and essential part of 
the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty enshrined in Article 21". 
127. Varkey Joseph vs. State of Kerala, AIR, 1993 SC 1892:1993 SUPP (3) SCC 745. 
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The Supreme Court has emphasized and re-emphasized this 
preposition again and again. In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab,^^^ the court 
has observed: 
"The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential 
part of the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty guaranteed and 
preserved in our Constitution , This right to speedy trial begins with 
the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration 
and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, 
enquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that 
may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of 
the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can 
averred". 
The guideHnes laid down in Antulay's case were adhered to in a 
number of eases, which came to be considered by the court subsequently. 
But a different note was struck in "Common Cause" a registered society 
through its director vs. Union of India.^ 29 i^ this case, the court directed 
release of under trials on bail if the trial is going on for a certain period and 
the accused has been in prison for a certain period. It also directed 
acquittal or discharge of an accused where for an offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a certain period, the trial had not begun even after a 
lapse of the whole or 2/3^"^ of that period. But the court excluded certain 
economic and other offences from the application of these guidelines. In a 
subsequent case^^o the Supreme Court clarified its order in "Common 
Cause" and excluded from its application those cases where the pendency 
of criminal proceedings was wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory 
tactics adopted by the accused or on account of any other action on part of 
the accused which resulted in prolonging the trial. The court also 
explained the expressions, "pendency of trial" and "non-commencement 
of trial" 
128. (1994) 3 s e c 569, 638:1994 SCC (Cri) 899. 
129. (1996) 4 SCC 33; followed in Rajiv Gupta vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2000) 10 SCC 68. 
130. "Common Cause" a registered society though its director us. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 
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The initiative taken by the court in "Common Cause" case was taken 
ahead by the court in R.D. Upadhyay vs. State of Andhra Pradesh."^^^ 
In this case the court gave directions with respect to the under trials 
languishing in Tihar Jail. Directions were given for nomination of special 
judges for disposing of cases of murder. The cases were directed to be 
disposed of within a period of six months. The court also gave directions 
for release of under trials on bail. 
Another attempt was made to concretize the right to speedy trial as 
in Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar.^^'^ In this case the court directed the 
closure of prosecution evidence on completion of two years in cases of 
offences punishable with imprisonment for period not exceeding 
to seven years and on completion of three years in cases of offences 
punishable with imprisonment for period exceeding seven years. But again 
the effect of this judgment was whittled down in the subsequent 
clarification order. In the clarification order it was laid down that the 
following periods could be excluded from the limit prescribed for 
completion of prosecution evidence in Raj Deo Sharma (1): Period of 
pendency of appeal or revision against interim orders, if any, preferred by 
the accused to protract the trial; Period of absence of Presiding officer in 
the trial court. 
Period of three months in case the office of public prosecutor fails 
vacant (for any reason other than expiry of tenure). 
In Akhtari Bi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,^^^ the court held that if an 
appeal is not disposed of within a period of five years, for no fault of the 
convicts, such convicts may be released on bail on such conditions as may 
be deemed fit and proper by the court. 
131. (1996) 3 s e c 422. 
132. A.I.R. 1998 SC 3281. 
133. (2001) 4 s e c 355. 
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In Santosh De vs. Archna GuhaP"^ the Supreme Court quashed the 
prosecution on the ground of inordinate delay as the trial for corruption of 
a government servant was kept pending for 14 years. 
In Union of India vs. Ashok K. Mehta,^^^ there was delay in trial but it 
was not attributable only to the prosecution and the respondent himself 
had contributed to the delay. Refusing to quashing the prosecution in the 
instant case, the Court observed that the respondent could not be allowed 
to take advantage of his own wrong and take shelter under speedy trial to 
escape from prosecution. 
The Supreme Court has stated in Common Cause;!^^ that even 
persons accused of minor offences have to wait their trials for long 
periods. If they are poor and helpless, they languish in jails as there is no 
one to bail them out. The very pendency of criminal proceedings for long 
periods by itself operates as an engine of oppression. According, to protect 
and effectuate the right to life and liberty of the citizens guaranteed by 
Article 21, the Court issued certain general directions for releasing the 
under trials on bail or personal bonds where trials had been pending for 
one year or more. 
A government employee was prosecuted and convicted on certain 
charges of corruption. The prosecution started in 1985 on the basis of the 
events which occurred in 1983. In an appeal, the Supreme Court found in 
1997 in Manushukla,^'^'^ that the sanction given by the government for this 
prosecution was invalid. The Court barred initiation of fresh prosecution 
against the appellant. The court observed: 
"Normally when the sanction order is held to he had, the case is 
remitted hack to the authority for reconsideration of the matter and to 
pass a fresh order of sanction in accordance ivith law. But, in the 
134. AIR 1994 SC 1229:1984 Supp (3) SCC 735. 
135. AIR 1995 SC 1976: (1999) 2 SCC 768. 
136. Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India, AIR, 1996 SC 1619. 
137. Mansukhlas Vithaldas Chauhan vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1997, SC 3400: (1997) 7 SCC 622. 
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instant case, the incident is of 1983 and, therefore, after a lapse of 
fourteen years, it will not, in our opinion, be fair and just to direct that 
the proceedings may again be initiated from the stage of sanction so as 
to expose the appellant to another innings of litigation and keep him on 
trial for an indefinitely long period contrary to the mandate of Article 
21 of the Constitution which, as part of Right to Life, philosophizes 
early end of criminal proceedings through a speedy trail." 
In 1982-83, an FIR was filled against a government employee 
alleging that he acquired disproportionate assets by misusing his official 
position. An investigation was undertaken but no prosecution was 
launched till the year 2000 as the permission for the same was not granted 
by the government till then. The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings 
saying that further prosecution would be travesty of justice. The Supreme 
Court has observed recently in Ramachandra: 
"It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draiv 
or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceeding." 
Speedy trial is an important limb of Indian Criminal Jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court has given it utmost importance and has reduced it to 
the statutory right. 
E. Speedy Trial and Judicial Dynamism 
The Indian Judiciary plays a very vital role in the dispensing of 
justice by providing fair and just trial to all its citizens. 
Even under the old Code (1898) the judiciary was aware of the 
necessity for a speedy trial. In Agha Nazar Ali Sultan Mohammad vs. 
Emperor,^^^ the Sind High Court observed: "The phrase that this case 'has 
lingered on long time' appears to show an inadequate appreciation of the 
gravity of delay which has occurred in the case." And the court ordered: 
"The trial of this case, the delay of which is now beyond all reason, 
must be continued by the magistrate from day to day " 
138. AIR 1941 Sind 186, at p. 187. 
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The court was not speaking of delays running into decades, as now 
become common. It was speaking on 9th December, 1940, of a trial, 
concerning offences alleged to have taken place between 18th October and 
19th November, 1939, a mere 13 months after the alleged commission of 
the offence. 
In another case arising under the old code, setting aside the 
conviction for murder on the ground that certain evidence was improperly 
admitted and the accused was not examined under Section 342 of the 
Code, 1898 (now S. 313), the Supreme Court observed : 
"We are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives 
under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty, we 
have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties while 
it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape, it is even 
more necessary to see that persons accused of crimes are not 
indefinitely harassed. While every reasonable attitude must be given to 
those concerned with the detection of crime and entrusted with admin-
istration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they 
may go."^^^ 
The court refused to remand the case for a fresh trial, because the 
'indefinite suspense's lasted from December 1950, when the offence was 
committed, till September 1955, when the Supreme Court rendered its 
judgment. It would be interesting to note that the Sessions Court's sentence 
was confirmed by the High Court in September 1951 and out of a delay of 
5 years, 4 years was caused in the Supreme Court alone. 
The next major decision was in Veerahadram Chettiar vs. E.V. 
Ramaswami Naicker,^'^^ in respect of an offence allegedly committed on 
27.5.1953 was rejected by the magistrate without taking cognizance. Both 
the Sessions and the High Court confirmed the order. Reason given by 
these courts was that the act alleged did not constitute an offence, for an 
"object held sacred" as per Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code was not 
139. Machander vs. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1955, SC 792. 
140. A.I.R. 1958 SC 1032. 
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involved. The Supreme Court reversed the concurrent findings of law, but 
did not allow the matter to proceed, on the ground that it had become 
"stale".^ '^ ^ In Chajoo Ram vs. Radhey Shyam,^'^^ delay was only one among 
other factors considered by the court in dropping further proceedings. 
In Stale of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kapil Deo Shukla,'^'^^ reference was made 
to both the above cases by the Supreme Court while upholding the High 
Court's decision to acquit the accused. The case involved forgery of 
documents. The first information report was filed in 1946. The case had 
already come up in appeal once before, the Supreme Court, when the 
earlier conviction was set asidei44 and a fresh trial ordered, by the time, 
second trial started, certain documents and statements made by some 
witnesses in the earlier trial could not be traced. In this context, the Court 
held that the new trial would amount to an abuse of the process, because 
vital evidence was lacking. 
A close examination of the ratio of all these cases would reveal that 
they were decided on their own factors, and delays, if any, was only one 
among other factors compelling acquittal/discontinuance of the 
proceedings.^''^ The deeper jurisprudential question of why delay should 
justify the termination of proceedings was never raised nor decided in any 
of these cases. 
There are various pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India on 
the subject of speedy trial wherein the Apex Court has questioned the 
delays, set aside the following prosecution, and discharged the accused. 
There are other cases where the Apex Court has laid down elaborate 
guidelines in the absence of any legislation in this area. 
141. Id., p. 1035. 
142. A.IK 1971 SC 1367. 
143. (1972) 3 s e c 504. 
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The key to judicial activism in India is the judgment in the case of 
Maneka Gandhi^ -^^ wherein the phrase "procedure established by law" in 
Article 21 was explained as not meaning, "any procedure" laid down in the 
statute but as meaning one that is necessarily a "fair, just and reasonable" 
procedure. The Apex Court in this trend setting and landmark judgment 
also observed that the term "law" under Article 21 of the Constitution 
envisages a law which is "right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or 
oppressive". 
The most important and guiding ruling of the Apex Court on 
speedy trial is the case of A.R. Aniulay vs. Avdesh Kumar}^'' wherein, ten 
main guidelines on the subject were laid down. The concerns underlying 
the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: the 
period of remand and pre-conviction, detention should be as short as 
possible. In other words, the accused" should not be subjected to 
unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction. 
The 'worry, anxiety, expenses and disturbance to his vocation and peace, 
resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should 
be minimized. 
Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of 
justice. It is prejudicial to a person to be detained and be deprived of his 
liberty without that in accordance with the law. It is prejudicial to a 
person to be denied fair trial. The process of justice should be such that it 
should not harass the parties and from that angle, the court may weigh the 
circumstances.^48 
146. AIR 1378 SC 597: (1978) ISCC 248: (1978) 2 SCR 621 
147. (88) A SC 1531 
148. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi us. Ram Jethmalani, AIR 1979 SC 468: (1979) 4 SCC 167-1979 Cr 
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The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive.i49 Even a 
delay of one year in the commencement of trial is bad enough; how much 
worse would it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or even 10 years.^ 50 
While each days delay is important and must be considered, there is no 
magical formula, the slightest breach of which should lead to the release of 
the accused or convicted. 
In State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar^^^ it was held that "the 
necessity of a speedy trial is too vague and uncertain to form the basis of a 
valid and reasonable classification. It is too indefinite as there can hardly 
be any definite objective test to determine it. It is no classification at all in 
the real sense of the term as it is not based on any characteristics which are 
peculiar to persons or to cases which are to be subject to the special 
procedure prescribed by the Act." 
In Macherla Hanumimtha Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh^^^ the 
Legislature has provided for a clear classification. Between the two kinds 
of proceedings at the commitment, stage based upon a relevant 
consideration namely, whether or not there has been a previous inquiry by 
a reasonable public servant whose duty it is to discover crime and to bring 
criminals to speedy justice. 
In S. Veerbhadra vs. Raniaswamy Naickar^^'^, the court refused to send 
back proceedings for retrial on the ground that already a period of five 
years has elapsed and it would not be just and proper in the circumstances 
of the case to continue the proceedings after such a lapse of time. 
149. Francis Coralie vs. W.C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCC 275: 1980 Cr LJ 548: AIR 1980 SC 849 
and also Sleema vs. B.B. Gujral, AIR 1981 SC 1191: (1981) 3 SCC 317: 1981 Cr LJ 889, 
(1980) 3 SCR 647. 
150. Hussainara Khatoon's case (1980) 1 SCC 98:1980 SCC (Cri) 40: AIR 1979 SC 1369 
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In Gopi Ckand vs. Delhi Administration^^'^ there is no doubt that the 
procedure prescribed for the trial of summons cases is simpler, shorter and 
speedier. When the dangerously disturbed areas were facing the problem 
of unusual civil commotion and strife the legislature was justified in 
enacting the first part of Section 36 so that the cases against persons 
charged with the commission of the specified offences could speedily tried 
and disposed oi. Therefore, the challenge to the vires of the iirst part oi 
sub-section (1) of Section 36 cannot be sustained. 
In Chajju Ram vs. Radhey Sham,^^^ the court refused to direct a retrial 
after a period of 10 years having regard to the facts and circumstances of 
the case. 
In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kapil Deo Shukla,^^^' though the Court 
found the acquittal of the accused unsustainable, it refused to order a 
remand or direct a trial after a lapse of 20 years. 
In Maneka Gandhi vs. Ram Jethmalani,^^'^ the phrase "procedure 
established by law" in Article 21 was interpreted widely as meaning not 
"any procedure" laid down in the statute but as one that-is necessarily 
"fair, just and reasonable" procedure. The Court in this trend setting and 
landmark judgment also observed that the term "law" under Article 21 of 
the Constitution envisages not any law but a law which is "right, just and 
fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive". 
In Hussainara Khatoonjos. Home Secretary State of Bihar, Patna,^^^ Even 
under our Constitution , though speech trial is not specifically enumerated 
as Fundamental Right, it is implicit in the broad sweep & content of Arhcle 
21 as interpreted by this an essential ingredient of "reasonable fair and 
154. AIR 1958 SC 1032:1959 SCR 1211:1958 Cr. LJ1565 
155. AIR 1959 SC 609: 1959 Supp (2) SCR 87: 1959 Cr.LJ 782 
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just" procedure guaranteed by Article 21. Speedy trial is the essence of 
criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delays in trial by itself 
constitutes denial of justice. A procedure prescribed by law for depriving a 
person of his liberty cannot be termed as reasonable, just or fair unless it 
ensures speedy trial for the determination of guilt of such person by 
speedy trial meant expeditious trial. 
In Aladankandu Puthiyapurayil Abdulla vs. Food Inspector,^^'^ it was 
held that the trial courts should ensure that, in the spirit of Article 21, food 
adulteration case, which involve imprisonment, are tried expeditiously so 
that neither the prosecution nor the accused is prejudiced by unusual 
judicial procrastination. The High Court concerned will issue peremptory 
directions to trial Judges demanding expeditious disposal of such cases. In 
State of Bihar vs. Uma Shankar Kotriwal,^^ F.I.R. lodged in April 1960, 
Charge sheet filed in 1962 charges framed September 1967. Thereafter, 
progress of the case was very slow. In 1979 the High Court quashed the 
proceedings on the ground that police report did not disclose any evidence 
against respondent and that prosecution started in 1963 and still in 
progress in 1979 is an abuse of the process of law and hence should not be 
allowed to go on further. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court 
decision on the second ground. 
In Kadra Petzvdiya vs. State ofBihar^^^ it was held that speedy trial is a 
Fimdamental Right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty 
enshrined in Article 21. And any accused who is denied this right of 
speedy trial is entitled to approach Supreme Court for the purpose of 
enforcing such right and the Court in discharge of its Constitutional 
obligation has power to give necessary directions to the State Government 
and other appropriate authorities for securing this right to the accused. 
159. AIR 1979 SC 1360; (1980) 1 SCC 81:1979 Cr LJ 1036 
160.1979 SCC (Cri) 948: (1979) 4 SCC 187 
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In State of Maharastra vs. Champalal Punjaji Shah,^^^ while a speedy 
trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 21, the 
converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair 
trial. While a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial guaranteed 
by Article 21, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not 
necessarily an unfair trial. Whether a conviction should be quashed on the 
ground of delayed trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of the 
case. If the accused is found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his 
defense and it could be said that the accused had thus been denied an 
adequate opportunity to defend himself, the conviction would certainly 
have to go. However, if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances 
entitling the Court to raise a presumption that the accused had been 
prejudiced there will be no justification to quash the conviction on the 
ground of delayed trial only. 
In Ranjan Dwivedi vs. Union of India,^^^ it is well settled that the 
requirement of compliance with natural justice is implicit in Article 21 and 
that if any penal law does not lay down the requirement of hearing before 
affecting him then the court can intervene so that the procedure prescribed 
by law is reasonable and is not arbitrary. 
In T. V. Vaihseswaran vs. State of Tamil Nadu,^^ Court again reiterated 
the significance of the right to speedy trial and extended it even to 
post-conviction stage. It was held that undue delay in carrying out the 
death sentence entitles the accused to ask for lesser sentence of life 
imprisonment. This opinion is based upon the immense psychological, 
emotional and mental torture a man condemned to death suffers. 
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In Madheshwari Singh vs. State of Bihar}^^ the right to speedy trial is 
inherent in and flows from Article 21. The court stated the four principles 
as flowing from Article 21. That, the basic human right to a speedy public 
trial in all criminal prosecutions has expressly written as the rights 
relating to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of our 
Constitution . Further, that this right is identical in content with the 
express Constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the 
American Constitution. That once the Constitutional guarantee of a speedy 
trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 
has violated, then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release 
and the charges leveled against him would fall to the ground. That a 
callous and inordinate prolonged delay of ten years or more, which in no 
way arises from the accused's default (or is otherwise not occasioned due 
to any extra ordinary and exceptional reasons). In the context of reversal of 
a clean acquittal on a capital charge, would be per se prejudicial to the 
accused and would plainly violate the Constitutional guarantee of a 
speedy trial under Article 21. 
In Sheela Barse vs. State of Maharashtra,^^ A Division Bench 
comprising Bhagwati and R.N. Misra, JJ. re-affirmed that the 'right to 
speedy trial is a Fundamental Right implicit in Article 21 of the 
Constitution' and observed "the consequence of violation of Fundamental 
Right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to 
be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the Fundamental Right." 
In S. Guin vs. Grindlays Bank Ltd.,'^^'^ a delay of 7 years after the 
judgment of acquittal led to the Supreme Court securing justice to the 
accused by terminating all the criminal proceedings. 
165. AIR 1986 Pat 324 
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In State vs. Maksudan Smg/i,i68 Cr. P.C. provides for an early 
investigation and for a speedy & fair ti-ial. It is sufficient that the 
Constitutional guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Article 21 
properly reflected in the provision of the code. 
In Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar,^^'^ the Court affirmed that the 
right to speedy trial is one of the dimensions of Fundamental Right to life 
and Gist of Judicial Pronouncement on Speedy Trial in India liberty under 
Article 21 and to act fairly is one of the essences of the principles of natural 
justice. 
In Anurag Bhatia vs. State ofBihar'^'^^ a callous and inordinate delay in 
hearing appeal, court's inability with no fault of accused and when there is 
no extraordinary of exceptional reasons for delay is a relevant 
considerations for quashing of prosecution case. Further delay in 
commencement of trial amounts to violation of Fundamental Right of the 
accused and the consequences should be borne by the prosecution. 
All charges are liable to be quashed. It was further held that once the party 
is able to prove that the Constitutional guarantee to Speedy Trial and the 
right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 have been 
violated, the accused is entitled to unconditional release and charges 
leveled against him. An Unwarranted delay of 20 years in investigation & 
trial is manifestly a procedure which cannot be said to be fair, reasonable 
or just. 
In Rakesh Saxena vs. State,^'^'^ the proceedings were quashed on the 
ground that any further continuance of prosecution after a lapse of more 
than 6 years was uncalled for. 
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In Sahabiiddin Kureshi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,^'^^ the delay in 
prosecution was of 18 years. The court observed after reading the charge 
sheet that the manner in which the charges had been framed of an incident 
that took place 18 years ago, prosecution of the accused will be nothing but 
an instance of gross abuse of the process of law. 
In Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Sclndia vs. Sambhaji Rao Chandraji Rao,^"^^ the 
court cannot be utilized for any oblique purposes and where in the opinion 
of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak, and, therefore no 
useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing criminal prosecution to 
continue, the court may quash the proceedings. 
In T.J. Stephen vs. Park Bottling Co. (P) Ltd.}'^'^ though the order of the 
High Court quashing charges against the accused (under Section 5 of the 
Imports and Exports (Control Act, 1947) was unsustainable in law. 
It would not be in the interest of justice to allow a prosecution to start and 
trial to be proceeded with after a lapse of twenty years even though one of 
the accused was himself responsible for most of the delay caused by his 
mala fide tactics. The order is merely based on the fact that it would not be 
in the interest of justice to allow a prosecution and trial to recommence 
after a lapse of 20 years. 
In Srinivas Pal vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh-''^^ the Court 
quashed the proceedings against the appellant on the ground of delay in 
investigation and commencement of trial, in this case, investigation 
commenced in November, 1976 and the case was registered on completion 
of the investigation in September, 1977. The Court took cognizance in 
March 1986. These facts were held sufficient to quash the proceedings 
172. (1998) All Cr Cas 303 
173. AIR 1988 SC 799: (1988) 1 SCC 692:1988 Cr LJ 853 
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particularly when the offence charged was a minor one namely, Section 
304A read with Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code. 
In Madhu Mehta vs. Union of India,'''^ the right to speedy trial is 
implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of Constitution of 
India and is part of a citizen's Fundamental Right to life and liberty. At the 
same time it must be remembered that speedy trial in criminal cases by 
itself is not a Fundamental Right. 
In case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Narayan Singh,''^'' the Supreme 
Court quashed the criminal proceeding which was pending for more than 
15 years observing that allowing the prosecution to continue would mean 
that the accused would have to suffer for another decade in the 
trial/appeal. 
In case of State of Punjab vs. Kailash Nath,''''^ even if the principle that 
there should be speedy trial in view of Article 21 is not disputed. The said 
principle cannot invoke in support of the interpretation of the third 
proviso to clause (b) of Rule 2.2 framed under Article 109 whose purpose is 
not to place an embargo on prosecution. It is always open to quash a 
prosecution on the ground of unexplained unconscionable delay in 
investigation and prosecution on the facts of a given case. 
In case of the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 422 of 1988 the 
F.I.R. was lodged after about six years of the accrual of the cause of action 
or taking place of the events and after about three years even from the date 
of his retirement from service in 1982. Now in 1988 it would be pursuing a 
state matter. Hence, the order of the High Court quashing the F.I.R. as 
against this respondent deserves to be maintained, though on a different 
ground. But the facts with regard to the respondent in Criminal Appeal 
Nos. 423-24 of 1988 are different. 
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In case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. P.V. Pavithran,^^^ decision of the 
High Court quashing the F.I.R. on the ground of inordinate delay in 
completing the investigation was upheld. The court ruled that while 
examining the plea of delay in completing the investigation, the court 
should have regard to all the relevant circumstances and that it is not 
possible to formulate any inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of 
uniform application for speedy investigation nor is it possible to stipulate 
any arbitrary period of limitation for completing the investigation. 
In Mihir Kumar vs. State o/West Bengal,''^^ it was held that where a 
criminal proceeding had been pending for 15 years from the date of the 
offence it amounted to violation of the Constitutional right to speedy trial 
of a fair, just and reasonable procedure and hence the accused was entitled 
to be set free. 
In Sanat Kumar Saha vs. State of Bihar,^^'^ if juveniles are involved in 
trial outer limits should be one year for its completion. 
In Mohanlal Shamji vs. Union of India^^^ under Section 311, 
Cr. P.C. the court must ensure recalling or calling any witness during the 
trial only if it present railure of justice and for a just reason of the case at 
any stage should not be enlarged to delay the trial. Retrial under Section 
386 by trial court or by appellate court in death sentence other criminal 
case should not one allowed. Once it is tried it cannot be subjudice. 
In Containment Board vs. Taramani Devi''^^, opportunity to hearing is 
integral part of fair trial. 
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In A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak,''^^ Fair, just and reasonable procured 
implicit in Article 21 creates a right in the fact that a speedy trial is also in 
public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any 
the less the right of the accused. Social interest lies in punishing the guilty 
and exoneration of the innocent but this determination {of guilt or 
innocence) must be arrived at with reasonable dispatch - reasonable in all 
the circumstances of the case. It is in the interest of all concerned that the 
guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in 
the circumstances. Every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. 
Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately 
long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, 
the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. 
The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when 
does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of 
a given case. Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion 
that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or 
the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only 
course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given 
case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest 
of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other 
appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed 
time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the 
trial has concluded - as may be deemed just and equitable in the 
circumstances of the case. 
While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in 
violation of right to Speedy Trial one must have regard to all the attendant 
circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and 
witnesses, the work load of the court concerned, prevailing local 
conditions and so on - what is called, the systemic delays. Though it is the 
184. (1992) 1 s e c 225:1992 Cr ij 2717:1992 SCC (Cri) 93: (1992) 1 Crimes 193 (225, 226) SC. 
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obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary 
as well/ but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in each 
matter instead of a pedantic one. 
Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant 
factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and determine in each case 
whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. It is 
neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences. 
Such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved 
merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of 
the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial or right to speedy 
trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At 
the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a 
given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. 
In Rabindmnath Rout,^^^ a period ranging from 12 to 23 years 
had elapsed after the alleged acts of commission of the offence. 
The prosecution had not given any explanation for the long delay nor was 
any case made out that any part of the delay had been contributed by the 
accused. Hence, the Court dropped all charges and quashed the 
proceedings. 
In Srinivasa Theatre vs. Government of Tamil Nadu^^^ speedy and 
natural justice should not violated in any form. 
In Bhuwaneshxoar Singh vs. Union of India,^^? t^g basic object of trial 
is to dispose of court- martial cases expeditiously and to minimize the 
period of pre-trial detention. So that person charge should not be 
unnecessarily deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of 
an offence tribal by the court martial. Keeping in view the limited nature of 
judicial review in matters arising after court martial proceeding it is not 
185.1992 Cri LJ 2309 (Ori). 
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187. (1993) 4 SCC 327:1994 SCC (Cri) 1. 
239 
only desirable but necessary that the authorities under the Army Act 
strictly follow the requirement of the act and the rules the authorities 
cannot be permitted to deal with the liberty of a person subject to the 
Army Act in a casual manner and can not be allowed by their commission 
or omission to frustrate the object of the speedy trial as to envisaged by the 
act of the persons to be tried by a court martial. 
In J.P. Unni Krishnan vs. State ofAndhra Pradesh,^^^ the right to speedy 
trial was held to be covered under Article 21. 
In Santosh De vs. Archana Guha,'^^^ the court ruled that an 
unexplained delay of 8 years in commencing the trial by itself infringes the 
right of the accused to Speedy trial. The delay being entirely and 
exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution, the proceedings 
were quashed. 
In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab,^^ it was held that speedy trial is 
one of the facts of the Fundamental Right to life and liberty enshrined in 
Article 21 and the law must ensure 'reasonable, just and fair' procedure, 
which has a creative connotation. The Constitutional guarantee of speedy 
trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Cr. P.C. The right to a 
speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue 
oppressive incarceration, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying 
the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an 
accused to defend himself but also there are societal interest providing a 
speedy trial. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint 
imposed by arrest. And consequent incarceration and continues at all 
stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision 
so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and 
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avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it 
consummates into a finality, can be averted. 
In Ramanand Chaudary vs. State of Bihar,^^^ the Supreme Court 
quashed the criminal proceeding, which v/as pending for more than 13 
years observing that allowing the prosecution to continue would mean 
that the accused would have to suffer for another decade in the 
trial/appeal. 
In Biswanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar^'^'^ the court observed that 
calling upon the accused persons to enter defence after a period of 16 years 
was bound to cause prejudice to them as the right to Speedy Trial has been 
infringed and hence quashed the criminal proceedings. 
In State of Maharashtra vs. Manubhai Vashi,^'^'^ the right to free 
legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed Fundamental Rights under 
Article 21. 
In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar vs. Vishwanath Pandit Runic,^^'^ the 
right to life under Article 21 comprehends within its ambit right to 
education, health, speedy trial, and equal wages for equal work as 
Fundamental Rights, providing adequate means of livelihood for all the 
citizens and distribution of the material resources, to the community for 
common welfare. Enable the poor, Dalits and Tribes, to fulfill the basic 
needs to bring about a fundamental change in the structure of the Indian 
Society, which was divided by erecting impregnable walls of separation 
between the people on grounds of caste, sub-caste, creed, religion, race, 
language and sex. Equality of opportunity and status thereby would 
become the bedrocks for social integration. 
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In State of Punjab vs. Ajaaib Singh,^^^ keeping an accused in custody 
for a day more than it is necessary is Constitutionally impermissible and 
violative of human dignity, freedom of life and liberty. The overcrowded 
court dockets, the phenomenal rise of public interest litigation, duty to 
ensure enforcement of Fundamental Rights undoubtedly keeps the 
Supreme Court under stress and strain. But that cannot be an excuse for 
keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite 
period of time. It does not do any credit rather makes one sad. If the 
accused is not granted bail and serves out the sentence then the appeal is 
rendered academic for all practical purposes. And the right to establish 
innocence fades away in lack of enthusiasm and interest. 
In R.D. Upadhyay vs. State of Andhra Pradesh^^^ it was held that 
speedy trial is guaranteed as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. So far as 880 murder cases are concerned, we request 
the Delhi High Court to nominate/designate ten Additional District 
Judges to take up exclusively the trial of these cases. The High Court may 
consider directing the Additional District judges, as nominated, to dispose 
of these cases within a period of six months or so. 
In Anukul Chandra Pradhan vs. Union of India}'^'^ it is important to 
have utmost expedition in the trial and its early conclusion is necessary for 
the ends of justice and credibility of the judicial process. Unless prevented 
by any dilatory tactics of the accused, all trials of such kind involving 
public men should be concluded most expeditiously, preferably within 
three months of commencement of the trial. This is also the requirement of 
speedy trial read into Article 21. 
195. (1995) 2 s e c 486:1995 SCC (Cri) 418 A.I.R. 1995 SC 975. 
196. (1996) 3 SCC 422. 
197. (1996) 6 SCC 354:1996 SCC (Cri) 1338. 
242 
In Common Case vs. Union of India,^^^ cases relating to various types 
of offences pending in criminal courts for long periods in respect of under 
trials languishing in jail for long periods directed to be released on 
conditions laid down in the order. Guidelines and directions for disposal 
of other category of cases, whether instituted on police report or private 
complaint, were also issued. These directions shall be valid for all the 
States and Union Territories and would apply not only for pending cases 
but also to future cases. 
In Ibrahim alias Munna Salim Shiekh vs. State of Maharashtra,^^ the trial 
has to be conducted according to the "Procedure established by Law" 
which in turn means that the procedure has to not only be reasonable, fair 
and just but it also stipulates that it has to be a speedy and expeditious 
procedure. 
In Phoolan Devi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,'^^ the mere fact that the 
alleged terms offer immunity from death penalty and trial of all cases in 
Madhya Pradesh even for crimes committed in Uttar Pradesh indicates 
that the question of the punishment to be imposed on petitioner in each 
case depends on the final outcome at the trial. The imprisonment to be 
imposed on the petitioner in each case depends on the final outcome at the 
trial, and the imprisonment of eight years mentioned in one of these terms 
does not conclude the prosecutions. The Petitioner's contention that the 
violation of her right to speedy trial is proved by these facts alone to justify 
quashing of all the prosecutions is, therefore. Untenable. 
In Kailash Chand Gupta vs. State^^'' it was held that speedy trial is a 
Fundamental Right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty 
enshrined in the aforesaid Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
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This right, i.e., the speedy trial is one of the dimensions and an integral 
and essential part of the Fundamental Right to life and liberty guaranteed 
under the aforesaid Article. Once the Constitutional guarantee of speedy 
trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 
has been followed, then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release 
and the charge levelled against him would fail. 
In Police Commissioner, Delhi vs. Registrar Delhi High Court,^^^ 
assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice. 
In D.K Basu vs. State of West Bengal,'^^^ Supreme Court issued the 
guidelines in case of detention arrest by the police. The court did not leave 
to the Police Department to frame rules, which should be followed at the 
time of arrest. But framed the above guidelines itself meaning that failure 
to comply with these requirements shall render the concerned police 
personnel liable to be punishable for contempt of court. In case of 
Mansukhlal Vithaldas vs. State of Gujarat'^^'^ the prosecution wanted to retry 
the matter after a lapse of 14 years, due to the sanction order being bad in 
law, the Supreme Court observed that this was not fair, and just and hence 
quashed the criminal proceedings. 
In Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar,"^^^ the right to speedy trial flows 
from Article 21 and encompasses the stages right from the date of 
registration of the F.I.R. and onwards. Where the trial has been stayed by 
orders of the court or by operation of law, the period of such stay shall be 
excluded from the said period by closing the prosecution evidence. 
In C. Sahni vs. State,^^^ proceedings under FERA, 1973 were quashed 
when the delay gap between the institution of complaint and recording of 
pre-trial evidence was of 13 years. 
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In Rajiv Gupta vs. State of Himachal Pradesh/^'^ it is clear that if the 
trial of a case for an offence, which is punishable with imprisonment up to 
three year, has been pending for more than two years and if the trial had 
not commenced, then the criminal court is required to discharge and 
acquit the accused. 
In Satya Brat Gain vs. State of Bihar,'^^^ Five years had elapsed since 
the accused was taken into custody and the slow-paced progress of the 
proceedings against him was without any reasons. The Court refused any 
incarceration for a further period without the adjudication being finalized 
and therefore orders him to be released on bail on executing a bond to the 
satisfaction of the trial Judge. 
In Arivazhan vs. State^'^^ the requirement to file list of witnesses is 
made with the object of ensuring speedy trial of cases. Accused has no 
right to examine witnesses outside that list. If court thinks that the list is 
intended, to delay the proceedings that it can reject even the entire list. 
In Akhtari Bi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,'^^^ it was held that to have 
speedy justice is a Fundamental Right. Prolonged delays in disposal of and 
thereafter appeals in criminal cases, for no fault of accused, confers the 
trails upon him right to apply for bail. 
In Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat^^'^ accused was in jail for 
more than 7 years due to insensitivity of trial court to take swift action by 
adopting appropriate procedures instead of archaic ones. He was hence 
released on bail. 
In Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar,^^^ justice not only be done but should 
also appear to have been done. Similarly, whereas justice delayed is justice 
denied, justice withheld is even worse than that. 
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The intention of the legislature regarding pronouncement of 
judgments can be inferred from the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Sub Section (1) of Section 353 of the Code provides that the 
judgment in every trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction shall 
be pronounced in open court immediately after the conclusion of the trial or 
on some subsequent time for which due notice shall be given to the parties 
or their pleaders. The words "some subsequent time" mentioned in 
Section. 353 contemplate the passing of the judgment without undue 
delay, as delay in the pronouncement of judgment is opposed to the 
principle of law. Such subsequent time can at the most be stretched to a 
period of six weeks and not beyond that time in any case. The 
pronouncement of judgments in the civil case should not be permitted to 
go beyond two months. 
It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of 
judgment is contemplated either under the Civil Procedure Code or under 
the Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the judgment 
is a part of the justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. 
In P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka/^^ the Constitutional 
philosophy propounded as right to speedy trial has though grown in age 
by almost two and a half decades, the goal sought to be achieved is yet a 
far-off peak. It must be left to the judicious discretion of the court seized of 
an individual case to find out from the totality of circumstances of a given 
case. The quantum of time consumed up to a given point of time 
amounted to violation of Article 21, and if so, then to terminate the 
particular proceedings, and if not, then to proceed ahead. The test of 
whether the proceedings or trial has remained pending for such a length of 
time that the inordinate delay can legitimately be called oppressive and 
unwarranted. However, the guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case are 
not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as 
213. (2002) 4 s e c 578: A.I.R. 2002 SC 1856. 
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hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their 
applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. 
In Mahendra Lai Das vs. Union of India,2i4 if the prosecution of the 
accused becomes a mere formality, it directly amounts to an abuse of the 
process of law, an unnecessary burden on court. 
In State vs. N.W. Nerukar,'^^^ the proceedings were quashed on the 
ground that there was unnecessary delay in the conclusion of the trial. 
The plea of the prosecution that the delay was due to the large number of 
documents that had to be exhibited was not accepted as a relevant ground 
to justify the delay. The Court observed that while the maximum 
punishment for the offence is charged with was only three years the 
accused had suffered custody for two years and faced the agony of trial for 
12 years. Hence the accused was set free. 
In case of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India,^^^ it is a 
Constitutional obligation of the Supreme Court to ensure that the backlog 
of the cases is decrease and efforts are made to increase the disposal of 
cases. Apart from the steps, which may be necessary for increasing the 
efficiency of the judicial officers, it appears that time has come for 
protecting one of the pillars of the Constitution, namely, the judicial 
system, by directing increases, in the first instance, in the judge strength 
from the existing ratio of 10.5 or 13 per 10 lakh people to 50 judges per 10 
lakh people. 
In Naminderjit Singh Sahni vs. Union of India,'^^'^ the right of an 
accused to have speedy trial is now recognized as a right under Article 21. 
The procedural fairness required by Article 21, including the right to a 
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speedy trial has, therefore, to be observed throughout and to be borne in 
mind. 
In Usha Mahajan w / o Roshan Lai vs. State/^^ the petitioner in jail for 
the last four and half years. Case of accused in judicial custody for long 
time cannot be on same pedestal as those enlarged in bail- keeping accused 
in jail without trial not augur well for criminal justice delivery system. 
Direction to trial court to proceed with trial on day to day basis. 
In Ahmad llahi vs. State,^^^ it was held that in view of the long and 
procrastinated proceedings it is directed that the learned trial court shall 
record the remaining evidence on day-to-day basis and decide the 
question of framing of charge positively within one month. Failing which 
the proceedings against the petitioner shall stand quashed as no court can 
be taken for a ride. 
In Durga Datta Sharma @ Durgalal Sharma vs. State^'^ trial in this 
criminal case under Section 420/467/477A/120B, of IPC and under Section 
5 of the prevention of Corruption Act had not commenced after a period of 
25 years. No charges had framed and chances of commencing and 
concluding the trial in the near future were not stiong. 
Observing that the accused persons had already suffered a lot, both 
mentally and physically during the last 25 years, the court dropped all 
charges against the accused, as right to speedy trial stood violated. 
In Atul B. Kohly vs. Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)^^ it was held that 
right to speedy trial includes the right of speedy disposal of appeal also. 
For recording satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that an accused is not guilty of the offence court is not to find out as to 
218. (08/09/2003), 2003 (6) AD (Del) 486. 
219. (08/09/2003), 2003 (6) AD (Del) 591: 2003 (71) DRJ 9:2003 (3) JCC 1483. 
220. 2004 (1) Crimes 171 (Gav.) 
221.(23.04-2002), 99 (2002) DLT 135; 2002 (4) AD (Del) 824. 
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whether he is proved to be innocent or not. Under criminal law, innocence 
of the accused recording satisfaction by court is the duty of the court. 
Surinder Singh vs. State of Punjab^^ In this case the appellant was 
found guilty of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the 
Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life 
and pay a fine of Rs.2000. He preferred an appeal before the High Court of 
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh against his conviction and sentence. 
The said appeal was admitted for hearing. The appellant's application for 
grant of regular bail was dismissed. One of co-accused was granted bail 
by High Court since he had suffered imprisonment for three years after his 
conviction and therefore was covered by the ratio of the judgement in 
Dharam Pal vs. State of Haryana (2000) 1 Chan LR 74. 
It was observed that speedy trial is a Fundamental Right implicit in 
the broad sweep and content of Article 21. The aforesaid Article confers a 
Fundamental Right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty 
except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. If a person is 
deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair or 
just such deprivation would be violative of his Fundamental Right under 
Article 21. The procedure so prescribed must ensure a speedy trial for 
determination of the guilt of such person. Some amount of deprivation of 
personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of deprivation 
pending trial becomes unduly long, fairness assured by Article 21 would 
receive a jolt. 
Having noticed that the people in India were simply disgusted with 
the state of affairs, and losing faith in the judiciary because of the 
inordinate delay in disposal of cases. The Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar 
Verma vs. State of Bihar^^^ required the authorities to do the needful in the 
222. (2005) 7 SCC 387: AIR 2005 SC 3669. 
223. AIR 2007 SC 3057 
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matter urgently to ensure speedy disposal of cases, if the people's faith in 
the judiciary was to remain. 
Though no general guideline can be fixed regarding speedy trial by 
the court and that each case has to be examined on its own facts and 
circumstances, but it is the bounded duty of the court and the prosecution 
to prevent unreasonable delay.224 
In Pankaj Kumar vs. State of Maharashtra & Others^^, The Apex Court 
held that the Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 of the Constitution 
extends to all criminal prosecutions and applicable not only to actual 
proceedings in court but also in police investigation. 
In this case, the appellant and his father charged with 
misappropriation of huge amounts in purchase of spare parts. The FIR was 
recorded on 12* May 1987 for the offence allegedly committed in the year 
1981, and after unwarranted prolonged investigation; the charge sheet was 
submitted in court on 22i^ «i February 1991. Nothing happened till April 19, 
1999, when the appellant and his deceased mother filed criminal writ 
petition seeking quashing of proceedings before the trial court. The Apex 
Court considering the long delay in investigation and trial held that 
it would be unfair to the appellant to remit the matter back to the 
High Court for examining the said plea of the appellant. Apart from the 
fact that it would further protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful 
purpose would be served as learned counsel for the state very fairly stated 
before the court that he had no explanation to offer for the delay in 
investigations and the reason why trial did not commence for eight long 
years. The Apex Court also stated, nothing being established to show that 
the delay was in any way attributable to the appellant. Moreover, having 
regard to the nature of the accusations against the appellant, who was a 
young boy of about eighteen yeas of age in the year 1981? When the acts 
224. Motilal Saraf vs. State of J&K 4, AIR 2007 SC 56. 
225. 2008 Cr. LJ 3944 
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and omission were allegedly committed by the concerns managed by his 
parents, who have since died, the court feel that the extreme mental stress 
of prolonged investigation by Anti Corruption Bureau and the sword of 
Damocles hanging perilously over his head for over fifteen years must 
have wrecked his entire career. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed 
to show any exceptional circumstances, which could possibly be taken into 
consideration for condoning the prolongation of investigation and trial. 
The lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a period of four 
years in a case of this type and inordinate delay of over eight years 
(excluding the period when the record of the trial court was in the 
High Court), is amply clear. The Apex Court on facts in hand and held 
that the appellant has been denied his valuable Constitutional right to 
speedy investigation and trial and therefore, criminal proceedings against 
the appellant quashed on the ground of delay in investigation and trial. 
In Vakil Parasad vs. State of Bihar^'^^ the court opined that the delay 
clearly violates the Constitutional guarantee of speedy investigation and 
trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court held that under gross 
delay further continuance of criminal proceedings, pending against the 
appellant in the court of special Judge, Muzaffarpur is unwarranted and 
despite the fact that allegation against the accused are quite serious, they 
deserve to be quashed. 
The brief facts of the case are that on 8* April 1981 a search 
operation was conducted by the Crime Investigation Department, on a 
complaint lodged by a civil contractor against the appellant, an Assistant 
Engineer in the Bihar State Electricity Board (Civil) Muzafarpur, allegedly 
demanding a sum of Rs.lOOO/- as illegal gratification for release of 
payment for the civil work executed by him. In the trap, the chemically 
treated currency note has been recovered from the appellant's pocket. 
The charge sheet was filed on 28* February 1982. The Magistrate took 
226. 2009 (2) Scale 
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cognizance on 9* December 1982. Nothing substantial happened in 6 yeas 
i.e. till 6* July 1987 except for dismissal of an application dated 30* June, 
1983 field by the prosecution for reinvestigation of the case, when the case 
was transferred from Muzaffarpur to Patna. 
On 7* December 1990, the appellant filed a petition under Section 
482 Cr. P.C. before the Patna High Court against the order passed by the 
Special Judge, Muzaffarpur taking cognizance of the offences, on the 
ground that the investigations on the basis whereof the charge sheet was 
filed, had no jurisdiction to do so. The High Court accepting the plea of 
the appellant quashed the order dated 7* December 1990, with a direction 
to the prosecution to complete the investigation within a period of three 
months from receipt of the order. No further progress was made in the 
case till the year 1998, when the appellant field yet. Another petition under 
Section 482 Cr. P.C. seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceedings 
pending against him on the ground that re-investigation in the matter had 
not been initiated. Even after the lapse of seven and half years of the order 
passed by the High Court on 7* December , 1990 and in the process the 
appellant had suffered undue harassment for over eighteen years. On 20* 
November 1998, the petition was admitted to final hearing for 11* May 
2007. Almost after nine years, counsel for the Vigilance department sought 
time to seek instruction in regard to the stage of investigation. The Deputy 
Superintendent started investigations on 28* February 2007 and ultimately 
filed a fresh charge sheet on l^' May 2007. 
The High Court has dismissed the petition, acknowledging that the 
accused has prejudiced due to long delay and concluded that this reason 
by itself was not sufficient to quash the entire criminal proceeding against 
the accused keeping in view the seriousness of the allegations. The learned 
Judge, however, directed the trial court to trial the matter on day-to-day 
basis and completes the same within four month. Being aggrieved by the 
said decision, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 
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The counsel for the appellant submitted that about twenty-eight 
years, since the registration of the case against the appellant has elapsed. 
The Trial according to law is yet to commence and thus, the appellant has 
been deprived of his Constitutional right to speedy investigation and trial 
owing from Article 21 of the Constitution. And this is a fit case where the 
charge sheet against the appellant should be quashed. The learned counsel 
for the state contended that the delay in trial was also to same extent, 
attributable to the appellant because he belatedly questioned the 
jurisdiction of the investigating officer. The Hon'ble High Court analysing 
the fact and circumstances of the case stated that the delay clearly violates 
the Constitutional right of speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 
of the Constitution. Further, the court held that continuance of criminal 
proceedings, pending against the appellant is unwarranted despite the fact 
that allegations against him are serious; the court dismissed the 
proceeding against the appellant. 
Chapter - V 
SPEEDY TRIAL IN STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
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SPEEDY TRIAL IN STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
A. Speedy Trial in Criminal Procedure Code 
i) Brief History- An Outline 
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the back bone of Indian 
Criminal Justice System. The Code was given a new shape in the year 1973 
by way of repealing the old Code, 1898 that later formed the basis of the 
present procedure. The main thrust of bringing this new legislation was 
to separate the judiciary from the executive in order to bring uniformity 
in the criminal justice administration throughout the country. 
Simultaneously, the new Procedural Law of 1973 accommodated various 
recommendations made by the Law Commission of India with a view to 
simplify the procedure for speedy trial of criminal cases.^ The Code of 
Criminal Procedure 1973 underwent drastic Amendments in 1955 by the 
Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1955. In the Statement of 
objects and reasons of the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill, 
1954 it was stated that the aim of a sound criminal procedure is two fold: 
(1) to provide adequate facilities to every accused person for defending 
himself in a proper marmer; and 
(2) at the same time, to ensure speedy disposal of all criminal judicial 
business, so that innocent persons must not suffer from protracted 
proceedings and the real offenders must be punished as early as 
possible after proper trial. 
In practice, it is apparent that the present Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 does not encourage speedy disposal of cases and it leaves 
many loopholes that encourage guilty persons to postpone the 
proceedings as much as possible. This is very undesirable state of affairs 
1. Aggarawal B.A., Speedy and Visible Justice, Cr. LJ, June 2004; 110: P J 169. 
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and there is a growing public demand for simplification of procedure, 
so that the proceedings may be brought to a speedy end.2 
Despite right to speedy trial is a fundamental right of an accused 
under Article 21 of Constitution of India, majority of the accused could not 
enjoy this right because of so many reasons. Whatever reasons they may 
be, the result is the long term detention of the accused. Such a long term 
detention deprives the basic human right of the accused, viz., right to live 
with basic human dignity, right to individual liberty, etc. At the same time 
such detention is quite contrary to the basic principles of criminal 
jurisprudence that the 'accused shall be presumed innocent till he is found 
guilty.3 
Several schemes for the Separation of judicial and executive 
functions of the magistrates were introduced the State legislature from 
time to time and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was accordingly 
amended and various other Amendments, were made at the state level. 
There was, however, a demand for the revision of the Code of 1973, partly 
to simplify the procedure to the extent possible, and partly to introduce a 
uniform system in the country in relation to judicial and executive 
functions of the magistrates, and to make the judiciary more effective. 
It was also considered desirable to introduce the special set up of criminal 
courts in the Presidency was in big cities. The Law Commission, therefore, 
submitted a revised draft for the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in its 
13* report, which, after it underwent some changes at the hands of the 
Joint Select Committee of the Parliament, was passed in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in 1973.'^  
l ! - •»> tK ^ R 
2. Halsbury's Laws of India, Criminal Procedure-I, Vol. 32 (2007) p. 13-14. 
3. K.Rama Chandra Reddy, 'Suggestions for Speedy Justice in Criminal Trials. SCJ-1990, 
Vol. 3, p. 8 
4. Sohoni's Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Vol. I, 20th end. P. 1. 
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Therefore, sweeping changes were made to make Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 19735 effective from 1974. The changes were intended mainly to 
bring speedy and fair justice to the litigants. 
Important changes made by the new Code of Criminal Procedure 
1973 to speed up the disposal of the criminal cases are as following: 
(1) The provision for stoppage of proceedings by a Subordinate Court 
on the intimation from a party to move a higher court for transfer of 
the case was omitted and a further provision was made that the 
High Court or the Court of Session will not stay proceedings unless 
it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. 
(2) Limitation period for prosecution were now prescribed in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973; 
(3) In some cases, provision was made for the service of Summons by 
registered post; 
(4) The powers of revision against interlocutory orders was no more a 
part of the law, as it had a delaying effect on the disposal of criminal 
cases; 
(5) The preliminary inquiry which preceded the trial by a Court of 
Session popularly known as committal proceedings under the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 had been abohshed. 
(6) The power to order costs was given to the court when adjournment 
was granted at the instance of a party to the preceding. 
(7) The scope of summary trials was widened by including offences 
punishable with imprisonment upto two years instead of six months 
as was under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Summons 
procedure wad adopted for all summary trials; 
(8) The order as to retrial in case of any error, omission or irregularity 
in respect of a change was no more a necessity; 
(9) A sessions judge was empowered to conclude all sessions trial left 
part heard by his predecessor after the Code of Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act ,1978; 
(10) Provision was made to adopt Summons procedure for the trial of 
offences punishable with imprisonment upto two years instead of 
up to one year as was under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 
enabling a large number of cases to be disposed of expeditiously; 
5. Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, received the assent of the president on 25 January 
1974, which was published in the gazette of India. 
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(11) There was no need to prove the genuineness of documents 
presented to the Court in case the opposite parties admitted its 
genuineness. Provision was made for obtaining admissions or 
denials regarding the genuineness of the documents filed by the 
parties in criminal cases; 
(12) The accused was enabled to plead guilty by post and to remit the 
fine specified in the Summons in petty cases. 
Some of the important changes intended to provide relief to 
the poorer sections of the commimity, as provided in the Statement 
of Objects and Reasons, which was published in gazette of India dated 
December 22,1970, are as follows: 
(a) provision was made for giving Legal Aid to an individual accused in 
case triable by a Court of Session, the state governments was given 
power to extend this facility to other cases too; 
(b) the courts were empowered to order payment of compensation by 
the accused to the victims of crimes, to a larger extent; 
(c) Provisions as to costs were made for the defence in case of issue of 
commissions for examination of witnesses. 
(d) Opportunity to make representation against the punishment before its 
imposition was provided to the accused. 
Amongst the important changes introduced were separation of 
executive and judiciary in the country, abolition of Committal proceedings 
in cases exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and abolition of third 
class magistrates. 
The recent Amendments by two Amending Enactments^ made in 
2006, the concept of Plea bargaining and some more Amendments'' have 
been incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
While formulating the new Criminal Procedure Code, a special 
importance was given to speedy justice and fair trial. These are the 
following consideration of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
6. le by Act No. 2 of 2006 w.e.f. 16 April 2006 and 5 July 2006 and by Act No 25 of 2005 
which was further amended by Act No. 25 of 2006 w.e.f. 23 June 2006 
7. Amendments in Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
2005 was effective from 11 January 2006. 
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(i) An accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the 
accepted principles of natural justice; 
(ii) Every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation and trial 
which is harmful not only to the individuals involved but also to 
society, and 
(iii) The procedure should be to the utmost extent possible ensure fair 
deal to the poorer sections of the community. 
ii) The Process of Criminal Trial in India 
The Code of Criminal Procedure is the Procedural Law providing 
machinery for trial of offenders under the substantive criminal law, be it 
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or any other penal statute. The Cr.P.C 
contains elaborate details about the procedure to be followed in every 
investigation, inquiry and trial, for every offence under the Indian Penal 
Code or under any other law. It divides the procedure to be followed for 
administration of criminal justice into three stages; namely: 
> Investigation 
> Inquiry, and 
> Trial 
Investigation is the preliminary stage conducted by the police and 
usually starts after the recording of a First Information Report (FIR) in the 
Police Station. If the officer in charge of a Police Station suspects the 
commission of an offence, from statement of FIR or when the magistrate 
directs or otherwise, the officer or any subordinate officer is duty bound 
to proceed to the spot to investigate facts and circumstances of the case 
and if necessary, takes measures for the discovery and arrest of the 
offender. Investigation primarily consists of ascertaining facts and 
circumstances of the case. It includes all the efforts of a police officer for 
collection of evidence.^ Proceeding to the spot; ascertaining facts and 
circumstances; discovery and arrest of the suspected offender; collection of 
8. Section. 2(h) see also Narayan Swamy vs. State of Karnataka, 1991 Cri LJ 2125 (Kant 
H.C.) and Tung Nath Ojha vs. Haji Nasirudin Khan, 1989 Cri LJ 1896 (Pat. HC) 
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evidence relating to the commission of offence, which may consist of the 
examination of various persons including the accused and taking of their 
statements in writing and search of places or seizure of things considered 
necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial; formation of 
opinion as to whether on the basis of the material collected there is a case 
to place the accused before a magistrate for trial and if so, taking the 
necessary steps for filing the charge sheet. Investigation ends in police 
report to the magistrate. 
An 'Inquiry' according to the Code, means every inquiry which is 
conducted by a magistrate or court and which is not a trial.^ Inquiry 
consists of a magistrate, either on receiving a police report or upon a 
complaint by any other person, being satisfied of the facts. 
Trial is the judicial adjudication of a person's guilt or irmocence. 
The term has not been defined in the Code. Under the Cr.P.C criminal 
trials have been categorized into three divisions having different 
procedures, called (1) Warrant (2) Summons and (3) Summary trials. 
A warrant case relates to offences punishable with death, as 
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for term exceeding two years.^o 
The Code provides for two types of procedure for the trial of 
warrant cases by a magistrate, triable by the magistrate, viz., those 
instituted upon complaint. In respect of cases instituted on police report, it 
provides for the magistrate to discharge the accused upon consideration of 
the police report and documents sent with it. 
In respect of the cases instituted otherwise than on police report, the 
magistrate hears the prosecution and takes the evidence. If there is no case, 
the accused is discharged. If the accused is not discharged, the magistrate 
holds regular trial after framing the charge, etc. In respect of offences 
9. Section. 2(g) Cr.P.C. 1973. 
10. Section 2(x) Cr.P.C. 1973. 
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punishable with death, life imprisonment for term exceeding seven years, 
the trial is conducted in session's court after being committed to the court 
by a magistrate. 
A Summons case means a case relating to an offence not being a 
warrant case," implying all cases relating to offences punishable with 
imprisonment not exceeding two years. In respect of Summons cases, there 
is no need to frame a charge. The court gives substance of the accusation,^^ 
which is called notice to the accused when the person appears in 
pursuance to the Summon. The court has the power to convert a Summons 
case into a warrant case, if the magistrate thinks that it is in the interest of 
justice. 
The High Court may empower magistrates of first class to try 
certain offences in a Summary way. Second class magistrates can 
summarily try an offence only if punishable only with a fine or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. In a summary trial, no 
sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months can be passed 
in any conviction. The particulars of the summary trial are entered in the 
record of the court. In every case tried summarily in which the accused 
does not plead guilty, the magistrate records the substance of the evidence 
and a judgement containing a brief statement of the reasons for the 
finding. 
Stages in Trial 
The common features of the trials in all the three of the above 
mentioned procedures may be divided into the following different stages: 
> Framing of Charge 
This is the beginning of a trial. At this stage, the judges are required 
to weigh the evidence for the purpose of finding out whether or not a 
11. Section 2 (W). Cr.P.C. 1973. 
12. Section 251 Cr.P.C. 1973. 
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prima-facie case against the accused has been made out. In case the material 
placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused that 
has not been properly explained, the court frames the charge and proceed 
with the trial. If, on the contrary, upon consideration of the record of the 
case and documents submitted, and after hearing the accused person and 
the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient 
ground for proceeding, the judge discharge the accused and record 
reasons for doing so. The words "no sufficient ground for proceeding 
against the accused" mean that the judge is required to apply a judicial 
mind in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by 
the prosecution. It may be better understood by the proposition that 
whereas a strong suspicion may not take the place of proof at the trial 
stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the court in order to 
frame a charge against the accused person. 
The charge is read over and explained to the accused. If pleading 
guilty, the judge shall record the plea and may with discretion, convict 
him. If the accused pleads not guilty and claims trial, then trial begins. 
Trial starts after the charge has been framed and the stage preceding it is 
called inquiry. After the inquiry, the charge is prepared and after the 
formulation of the charge, trial of the accused starts. A charge is nothing 
but formulation of the accusation against a person who is to face trial for a 
specified offence. It sets out the offence that was allegedly committed. 
> Recording of Prosecution Evidence 
After the charge is framed, the prosecution is asked to examine its 
witnesses before the court. The statement of witnesses is on oath. This is 
called examination-in-chief. The accused has a right to cross-examine all 
the witnesses presented by the prosecution. Section 309 of the Cr.PC 
provides that the proceeding shall be held as expeditiously as possible and 
in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same 
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shall be continued day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have 
been examined. 
> Statement of Accused 
The court has power to examine the accused at any stage 
of inquiry or trial for the purpose of eliciting any explanation 
against incriminating circumstances appearing before it. However, it is 
mandatory for the court to question the accused after examining 
the evidence of the prosecution if it incriminates the accused. 
This examination is without oath and before the accused enters a defence. 
The purpose of this examination is to give the accused a reasonable 
opportunity to explain incriminating facts and circumstances in the case. 
> Defence Evidence 
If after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the 
accused and hearing the prosecution and defence, the judge considers that 
there is no evidence that the accused has committed the offence, the judge 
is required to record the order of acquittal. However, when the accused is 
not acquitted for absence of evidence, a defence must be entered and 
evidence adduced in its support. The accused may produce witnesses who 
may be willing to depose in support of the defence. The accused person is 
also a competent witness under the law. The accused may apply for the 
issue of process for compelling attendance of any witness or the 
production of any document or thing. The witnesses produced by him are 
cross-examined by the prosecution. The accused person is entitled to 
present evidence in case he so desires after recording of his statement. 
The witnesses produced by him are cross-examined by the prosecution. 
Most accused person do not lead defence evidence. One of the major 
reasons for this is that India follows the Common Law System where the 
burden of proof is on the prosecution and the degree of proof required in 
criminal trial is beyond reasonable doubt. 
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> Final Arguments 
This is the final stage of the trial of a case. The provisions of the 
Cr.P.C. provide that when examination of the witnesses for the defence, if 
any, is complete, the prosecutor shall sum up the prosecution case and the 
accused is entitled to reply. 
> Judgment 
After conclusion of arguments by the prosecutor and defence, the 
judge pronounces his judgment in the trial. Here it is relevant to mention 
that the Cr.P.C. also contains detailed provisions for compounding of 
offences. It lists various compoundable offences under the Indian Penal 
Code, of which 21 offences may be compounded by the specified 
aggrieved party without the permission of the court and 36 that can be 
compounded only after securing the permission of the court. 
Compounding of offences brings a trial to an end. 
Under the Cr.P.C. an accused can also be withdrawn from 
prosecution at any stage of trial with permission of the court. If the 
accused is allowed to be withdrawn from prosecution prior to framing of 
charge, this is a discharge, while in cases where such withdrawal is 
allowed after framing of charge, it is acquittal. 
iii) Legal position- Speedy Trial versus Judicial Delay 
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the Procedural Law 
providing for machinery for punishment of offenders under the 
substantive criminal law. The substantive criminal law may be Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 or any other penal statute. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 
governs rules of evidence. 
The administration of justice does not deal with the punishment of 
the guilty alone; it also means acquittal of the innocent. Fairness and speed 
are equally important in the administration of justice. Speedy justice serves 
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the best interests of the accused the survivors and the society at large. 
However, judicial delays in India are endemic. No person can hope to get 
justice in a fairly reasonable period. Proceedings in Criminal cases go on 
for years, sometimes decades. 
In India, neither the Constitution nor any existing laws or statutes 
specifically confer the right to speedy trial on the accused. Most of the 
existing laws do not provide any timeframe in which a trial must be 
concluded in case where some timeframes have been provided; the courts 
have held them to be 'directory' and not 'mandatory'. The Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides a statutory time limit to complete an 
investigation. Section 167 further provides that a failure to complete 
investigation within the statutory timeframe shall lead to release of the 
accused in custody on bail. 
Though numerous provisions exist in the Code, 1973 to provide for 
an early investigation and speedy trial and fair trial, in reality the problem 
of delay and backlog is rather acute in criminal cases, as compared to civil 
cases. The Indian justice process appears to be on the verge of collapse due 
to diverse reasons as visible from the following figures for the year 2005; 
Trials were completed in 10,13,204 IPC crime cases out of total 
69,91,508 cases pending for trials. 58,22,752 cases remained pending for 
trial in courts as on December 31, 2005. Conviction rate for IPC crimes 
remained almost static at 42.5 and 42.4 in 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
> 28.7% of trials were completed in less than 1 year (2, 91,210 out of 10, 
13,240). 
> 37.7% of trials (3,41,560) were completed between within 1 to 3 years. 
> 22.6% (2,29,103) were completed between 3 to 5 years 
> 11.8% of trials were completed between 5 to 10 years (1,19,761) and 
> 3.1 % (31,606) cases took more than 10 years.^^ 
13. Justice A.K. Sikri, 'Reforming Criminal Justice System": Can Plea Bargaining be the 
Answer? Naya Deep, Vol. VIII, Jan. 2007, pp. 41-42. 
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The above huge figures call for urgent remedial steps that the malice 
does not become irreparable. The delay in dispensation of justice within a 
time frame has brought a sense of frustration amongst the litigants who 
are compelled to live with these delays, leading to frustration, loss of faith 
and dissatisfaction amongst them. Such feeling amongst the litigants on 
account of delayed justice is a major threat to our country and such erosion 
of faith cannot be afforded at any cost. The public outrage over the failure 
of the criminal justice system in some recent high profile cases shook us all 
up into realization that something needs to be urgently done to revamp the 
process, though steering clear of knee jerk reactions, remembering that law 
is a serious business.^ 
Speedy trial though recognized as an essential feature of right to fair 
trial has so far remained a distant reality in our criminal Justice Process. 
Speedy justice is an assurance extended to a citizen under the ambit of 
'right to life' guaranteed under Article 21 of our Constitution. 
iv) Right of Accused and Victim 
In our criminal justice system, the legal ethics is very clear, 
"let thousand of criminals be let out but a single innocent should not be 
punished". Following this principle the judiciary requires all cases to be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In our system while "onus of proof" lies 
on prosecution to prove the accused guilty, the 'benefit of doubt' is always 
given to the accused. Starting from first step of arrest till end of trial in 
every stage the accused is conferred with several rights by the Supreme 
law of the land i.e.. Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Code and also 
according to verdicts of the higher and apex judiciary of the country. 
Before the trying court, till his guilt is proved, the accused is also 
considered to be innocent and even as an under trial prisoner any violation 
of his rights is considered as Human Rights violation. To protect human 
14. Id. Speech of Former CJ of India, Hon'ble Mr.Justice Y.K. Sabharwal at the Inauguration 
of the Joint Conference of Chief Justices and Chief Ministers held on 11th March 2006. 
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right of the accused, the Apex Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West BengaU^ 
has held that transparency of action and accountability are perhaps the 
two possible safeguards which courts must insist upon. In this judgment, 
the Supreme Court has laid down more concrete and specific guidelines 
concerning arrest. 
The rights available to accused under the Criminal Procedure Code, 
1973 are as follows: 
1. Right to be informed of the ground of arrest and right to bail - Ss. 50, 
55 and 75. Cr.P.C. 
2. Right not to be subjected to unnecessary restraint - S 49 Cr.P.C. 
3. Right against arbitrary or illegal detention in custody Ss. 56,57, 50 and 
76 Cr.P.C. 
4. Right to be released on bail if arrested - Ss. 436, 436A, 437, 50(2) and 
167 Cr.P.C. 
5. Right to be produced before Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest - S. 
57 Cr.P.C. 
6. Right to a fair and speedy trial - S. 309 Cr.P.C. 
7. Arrest without warrants is not possible in non-cognizable offence -
Ss. 42, 151 and 155, Cr.P.C. (But in cases to prevent commission of 
cognizable offences or to ascertain correct name and address it is 
possible). 
8. Right of the accused person to be examined by a Registered Medical 
practitioner to disprove the commission of an offence by him - S. 54 
Cr.P.C. Reference 53 Cr.P.C. 
9. Right to free Legal Aid at the expense of the State in certain cases - S. 
304 Cr.P.C. 
10. Right to obtain a receipt when property of the accused are seized S. 
100(6) and (7) Cr.P.C. 
v) Statutory Provisions 
Though numerous provisions provided in the form of time limit in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to provide for an early investigation 
and a speedy and fair trial, in reality, due to various factors such as 
15. AIR 1997 SC 610; 1997 Cri LJ 743. 
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overcrowded court dockets, absence of prosecution motivation, defence 
tendency to prolong the trial, speedy trial is yet an illusory goal. There are 
some provisions aims at curtailing the delay in investigation and trial of 
offences are as following: Section 157(1) of Cr.P.C. requires the offices-in-
charge of a Police Station to send forthwith the report of the commission of 
an offence to the concerned magistrate. Perusal of Section 167 (1) Cr.P.C. 
indicates that the investigation is expected to be completed within 24 
hours of arrest of the accused. In case it appears that the investigation 
cannot be completed within 24 hours and the allegation against the 
accused is well founded, the investigating officer has to forward the case 
dairy along with the accused to the magistrate in order to seek further 
custody of the accused. At this stage the magistrate can extend the period 
of detention of the accused by 15 days, which can further be extended to 60 
or 90 days depending upon the gravity of the offence.^^ The accused 
becomes entitled to be released on bail on the expiry of the period of 60 or 
90 days as the case may be. 
If in a case triable by a magistrate as a Summons case, the 
investigation is not concluded within six months from the date on which 
the accused was arrested, the magistrate is required to stop further 
investigation into the offence.^ ^ The investigation is allowed to go on 
beyond six months only if the investigating officer satisfies the magistrate 
that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of 
investigation is not completed within the prescribed time frame, the 
magistrate will not take cognizance of such offences. 
Section 173 (1) of Cr.P.C. requires the police officer to complete the 
investigation 'without unnecessary delay' and forward the report to the 
magistrate 'as soon as it is completed'. Further section 207Cr.P.C requires 
that the copy of documents like the police report, copy of F.I.R., statements 
16. Section 167(2), The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
17. Section 167(5), The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
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recorded under section 161(3) except those portions for which request for 
exclusion is made, confessions and statements under section 164 or any 
other documents or relevant extract thereof is to be given free of cost to the 
accused "without delay". Section 208 requires that where, in a case 
instituted otherwise than on a police report, it appears to the Magistrate 
issuing process under section 204 that the offence is triable by the Court of 
Session the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to the accused, free of 
cost, a copy of statements and confession recorded under section 200, 202, 
161orl64ofCr.P.C. 
All the above mentioned provisions in Criminal Procedure Code 
pertain to the stage of investigation into an offence. These provisions, 
besides laying down in broad terms, certain time limits subject to which 
investigation is to be carried out, also put time limits upon detention 
pending investigation. Section 468 of Cr.P.C. also in a way impose a time 
limit for completion of investigation as it debars courts from taking 
cognizance of certain, minor offences after expiry of certain period of 
limitation.^ s Section 469 marks that the period of limitation commences 
from the date of offence, or the first on which such offence comes to the 
knowledge of aggrieved person. 
Sec. 309 of Cr.P.C. mandates expeditious conduct of trial. 
In particular it requires that when the examination of witnesses has once 
begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until the witnesses in 
attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of 
the proceeding beyond the following day to be necessary for that reasons 
to be recorded. Though the Code recognizes the power of the court to 
18. The period of limitation prescribed in Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is as: 
• Six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only. 
• One year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
one year. 
• Three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year but not exceeding three years. 
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adjourn the proceedings from time to time after the cognizance of the 
offence is taken or after commencement of the trial after recording reasons 
for doing so, yet it provides that when witnesses are in attendance, no 
adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, 
except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. 
Prior to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of 
Hussainara Khatoon vs. home Secretary, State of Bihar,'^^ which held the right 
to speedy trial to be part of Article 21 of the Constitution, the only solitary 
provision which empowered the criminal courts to ensure speedy trial 
including speedy recording of evidence (as also exist today) was Section 
309, Cr.P.C. which reads as follows: 
Section 309, power to postpone or adjourn proceedings 
(1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously 
as possible and in particular, which the examination of witnesses has once 
begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses 
in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment 
of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be 
recorded. (2) If the court, after taking cognizance of an offence or 
commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the 
commencement of or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to 
time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such 
terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it, considers reasonable and may by a 
warrant remand the accused if in custody; 
Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to 
custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time. 
Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no 
adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, 
except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. 
19. AIR 1979 SC 1360. 
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Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose 
only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence 
proposed to be imposed on him.^o 
Explanation 1 - li sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a 
suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears 
likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a 
reasonable cause for a remand. 
Explanation 2 - The term on which an adjournment or postponement may 
be granted include in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the 
prosecution or the accused. 
The mandate of section 309 has been pointed out by the Supreme 
Court in various cases such as State ofU.P. vs. Shambu Nath Singh.^^ But the 
fact remains that in spite of this legislative mandate, criminal cases are 
getting prolonged causing unnecessary harassment to the under trials. 
As in the said case itself the Apex Court observed, "Now we are distressed 
to note that it is almost a common practice and regular occurrence that trial 
courts flout the said command with immunity. Even when witnesses are 
present, cases are adjourned for less serious reasons or even on flippant 
grounds. Adjournments are granted to suit the convenience of the 
advocate concerned. We make it clear that the legislature has frowned at 
granting adjournments on that ground. At any rate inconvenience of an 
advocate is not a special reason for by passing the mandate of Section 309 
of the Code". 
As mentioned hereinbefore, the right to speedy trial held in 
Hussainara Khatoon's Case to be a part of the right conferred on an 
accused by Article 21 of the Constitution. In this case, writ petitions were 
field by a number of under trials in the nature of Habeas Corpus under 
20. Ins. By Act No. 45 of 1978, Section 24 (w.e.f. 18-12-1978). 
21. AIR 2001 SC1403. 
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Article 32, seeking directions for their release as they were confined in jails 
in the state of Bihar for years awaiting their trials to begin for the offences 
charged with. The Supreme Court referred to the Sixth Amendment in the 
U.S. Constitution which provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial" and Article 30 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights provides that "every one 
arrested or detained shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or a 
release pending trial". 
Reiterating the above view, again in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) vs. 
Home Secretary, state of Bihar,'^'^ the Apex Court held that detention of under 
trials in jails for a period longer than what they can be sentenced if 
convicted, was illegal as being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
The scope of the right to speedy trial of a criminal case was widened 
enough by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S.Nayak, wherein this right 
was held to include the stages of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, 
revision and re-trial. Observing that an accused should not be subjected to 
unduly or unnecessary or long incarceration prior to his conviction, it was 
held by the Apex Court that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in 
Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried 
speedily, right to speedy trial is the right of the accused and it is in the 
interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is 
determined as quickly as possible. 
The Apex Court refused to give recognition to the 'demand rule and 
held that an accused cannot try himself. He is tried by the court at the 
behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy 
trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did not at any time 
demand a speedy trial and mere none asking of speedy trial cannot be put 
against him. 
22. AIR 1979 SC1360. 
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Though the Apex Court held that it is neither admissible nor 
practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences. But at the same time 
also held that it is open to the court to make such appropriate orders 
including an order to conclude the trial is to be concluded or reducing the 
sentence where the trial has concluded as may be deemed to be just and 
equitable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 
However, in spite of these judicial pronouncements of the 
Apex Court, the legislature did not reform its duty of ensuring speedy 
trial of criminal cases by improving its prosecution branch, speedy 
investigation and proper infrastructure in the courts. As a result, the 
Apex Court, being concerned about accused persons lodged in facts for 
very longer periods, passed various directions for release on bail of the 
under trials and speedy disposal of their cases in the case of Common Cause 
of Register Society vs. Union oflndia?^ The matter came up before the court 
in the form of a public interest litigation filed by the petitioner - Society 
under Article 32 of the Constitution, highlighting the plight of the under 
trails confined for years in jails without any disposal of their cases. Some of 
the directions given by the Apex Court regarding grant of bail are as 
follows: 
1. Where, the accused is charged with the commission of an offence 
under IPC or any other law for the time being in force punishable 
with imprisonment not exceeding three years with or without fine. If 
the trial is pending for one year or more and the accused have not 
been released on bail and are in jail for a period of six months or 
more, the accused shall be released on bail subject to such conditions 
as may be necessary in the light of Section 437, Cr.P.C. 
2. Where such an offence is punishable with imprisonment not 
exceeding five years with or without five and if the trial is pending for 
two years or more and the accused have not been released on bail 
and are in jail for more than six months or more shall be released on 
bail by the concerned criminal court. 
23. AIR 1966 SC1619 
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3. Where the offence is punishable with seven years or more with or 
without fine and if the trial for such offences is pending for two years 
or more and the accused have not been released on bail and are in jail 
for one year or more, shall be released on bail by the concerned 
criminal court. 
Though these direction were given by the Apex Court in the year 
1992 and although accused have been released on bail by the Apex Court 
in cases of undue delays in the begirming of the trial or during its 
pendency such as Satya Brat Gain vs. State of Bihar and Vivek Kumar vs. State 
ofU.P. But the fact remains that a large number of accused persons are still 
languishing in jails for longer periods due to non-release on bail, due to 
various reasons such as past antecedents of the accused, manner of 
commission of offence, likelihood of witnesses being tempered with, etc. 
> Amendment of Section 309 Cr.P.C. 
Through the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008, 
Section 309 of the Code has amended to expedite the inquiry or trial of 
rape cases and the same provision is made to complete the trial within a 
period of two months. The new provisions are as follows: 
In Section 309 of the principal Act -
(a) in sub-section (1), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely: 
"Provided that when the inquiry or trial relates to an 
offence under sections 367 to 376D of the Indian Penal Code 
(45 of 1860), the inquiry or trial shall as far as possible be 
completed within a period of two months from the dates of 
Commencement of the examination of witnesses.''^-* 
(b) in sub-section (2), after the third proviso and before Explanation I, 
the following proviso shall be inserted, namely : 
(a) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, 
except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that 
party' 
(b) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another 
court, shall not be a ground for adjournment. 
24. Section 309, The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008, (Act No. 5 of 
2009), (to come into force w.e.f. a date to be notified). 
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(c) Where a witness is present in court but a party or his pleader is not 
present the other party or his pleader though present in court, is not 
ready to examine or cross-examine the witness. The court may, if 
thinks fit, record the statement of the witness and pass such orders 
as it thinks fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-
examination of the witness, as the case may be.^s 
Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the 
trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence is not concluded within a 
period of sixty days from the date fixed for taking evidence, such person is 
to be released on bail if he is in custody. 
Provision of Speedy Pronouncement of Judgment 
In addition to the above provisions, which directly provides for 
expeditious conduct of trial, there is another provision, which aim at 
achieving the same end e.g. Section 355 (1) of the Code, which provides 
that the judgement in every trial in court of original jurisdiction shall be 
pronounced in open court by the presiding officer immediately. 
After the termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of, which 
notice, shall be given to the parties or then to the pleaders. Thus the 
provision clearly requires that the judgment to be pronounced soon after 
the completion of the trial so that there is no delay in the pronouncement 
of the judgment to the same. 
Delay in pronouncing the judgment after the conclusion of 
arguments adds salt to the injury of the litigant public. Such a practice has 
been strongly disapproved by the various High Courts and they have 
exercised their supervisory authority quite often to chide or take action 
against erring officers of the subordinate judiciary. 
The Calcutta High Court in Surendra Nath Sarkar vs. Emperor^^ and 
Patna High Court in, Jagannath Singh vs. Francis KhariaP had set- aside the 
25. Ibid. 
26. AIR 1942 pat., 225.. 
27. AIR 1948 pat. 414. 
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judgment holding them bad in law only on the ground of delay in 
pronouncing the judgment for a period banning between six to ten 
months. 
The Hon'ble judge of Patna High Court expressed his Wrath 
in Sohagiya vs. Ram Briksh Mahtd^^ in the following words when a 
magistrate took months to pronounce a judgement. 
"The Magistrate who cannot find time to write judgement within 
reasonable time for hearing arguments ought not to do judicial work at all. 
This court strongly disapproves of the magistrate making such 
tremendous delay in the delivery of his judgement". As Section 353 (1) of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly provides that the judgement in 
trial shall be pronounced in court immediately after the close of the trial or 
at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties. 
The Supreme Court of India has elaborated that the words 'Some 
subsequent time' mentioned in section 353 contemplate, the passing of the 
judgement without undue delay, as delay in pronouncement of judgement 
is opposed to the principle of law such subsequent time can at the most be 
stretched to a period six weeks and not beyond that time in any case. 
The Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi's case has evolved it, through a 
process of interpretation that speedy trial though not a specifically 
enumerated fundamental right in the Constitution, is an integral and 
essential part of Article 21 of the Constiution.^^ The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly in Husainara Khatoons^^, A.R. Antuley vs. R.S. Nayak,^^ Raj Deo 
Sharma vs. State ofBihar^^ I & 11); and Akhtari Bi vs. State ofM.P.^^ held that 
the speedy trial of an accused is his fundamental right for being implicit in 
28. 1961 BILR 282. 
29. AIR 1978 SC 597. 
30. AIR 1979 SC 1360 
31. AIR 1992 SC 1701 
32. AIR 1998 SC 3281 
33. AIR 2001 SC 1528 
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the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution though 
neither the Constitution nor legislation provides any time limit for High 
Courts to pronounce their judgements but it has to be without delay. 
Justice Thomas of Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in Anil Rai vs. 
State ofBihar^^ expressed himself as follows: 
"The Constitution did not provide anything in that area presumably 
because the architects of the Constitution believed that no High Court 
judge would cause such long and distressing delays. Such expectations 
of the makers of the Constitution remain unsullied during the early 
period of the post Constitution years. But unfortunately, the later years 
have shown slackness on the part of a few judges of the superior Courts 
of India with the result that once argument in a lis concluded before 
them the records remain consigned to hibernation. Judges themselves 
normally forget the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points 
advanced. Sometimes the interval is so long that the judges forget even 
the fact that such a case is pending with them expecting judicial 
verdict. Though it is an unpleasant fact is a stark reality". 
In another case'^ s the Apex Court observed a long delay in delivery 
of the judgement gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of the 
parties; Bhagwandas F. Daszvani vs. HPA International. 
In Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar^^ the problem of delay in delivery of 
judgements has been elaborately treated. In this case the session's court 
convicted nine persons on May 4, 1991. While they remained in Jail, a 
Division Bench of the Patna High Court heard their appeals. 
The arguments were concluded on August 23,1995 and the judgement was 
reserved. The judgement was pronounced on August 14,1997 when one of 
the judges reached near the date of his superannuation. One of the 
appellants had died in jail by then. In appeal before the Supreme Court 
justice Sethi and Thomas JJ took a serious note of "the inordinate, 
unexplained and negligent delay m pronouncing the judgement and 
34. (2001) 7 s e c 318: AIR 2001 SC 3173. 
35. AIR 2000 SC 775. 
36. 2001 AIR s e w 2833:(2001) 7 SC 318, 328. 
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termed it as a 'horrible situation' and 'Shocking state of affairs prevalent in 
some High Courts'. 
In the words of learned Sethi, J.: 
"Such a delay is not only against the provisions of law but in fact 
infringes the right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. Any procedure or Course of action, which does 
not ensure a reasonable quick adjudication, has been termed to be 
unjust. Whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is 
even worse than that".^^ 
The learned judge further said. 
In a country like ours where people consider judges second to God, 
efforts make the judges only to strengthen that belief of the common man. 
Delay in disposal of cases facilitates the people to raise eyebrows, 
sometimes genuinely, which if not checked, may shake the confidence of 
the people in Judicial System. A time has come when the judiciary itself 
has to assert for preserving its stature respect and regards for the 
attainment of the rule of law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and 
glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is 
the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy for which efforts are 
required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society by 
ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.^s 
Thomas J. felt equally concerned and commented, "It is difficult to 
comprehend how the judges would have kept the details and the nuisance 
of the arguments in their memory alive after the lapse of a long period." 
He lamented by saying, it is disheartening that a handful of few are 
unmindful of their obligation and the oath of office they have solemnly 
taken as they cause such inordinate delay in pronouncing judgements.^^ 
He was of the view that the situation, instead of improving has only 
worsened. 
37. Ibid, 330. 
38. Ibid. 343. 
39. Ibid, 344. 
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For the expeditious pronouncement of judgements, Sethi J. issued 
detailed guidelines as mandate of the court by way of remedial measure. 
In the absence of any legislation, these instructions of the Apex Court until 
have to be followed and implemented. However, the chief Justice of the 
High Court was permitted to substitute these guidelines if he, to slash the 
interval between conclusion of arguments and delivery of judgement, 
evolves more effective measures. These guidelines can be enumerated 
succinctly as follows: 
1. The Chief justice of the High Courts will direct that the date of 
reserving the judgement and that of its pronouncement be 
mentioned on the title page of judgement. 
2. The chief Justice will ask various Benches in the High Courts to 
furnish every month other list of cases in which judgements 
reserved are not pronounced within that month 
3. The Chief Justice shall point it out to the concerned Bench when 
reserved judgement is not pronounced within a period of two 
months. 
4. Where reserved judgement is not pronounced within three months, 
the application of either party for early pronouncement shall be 
listed before the concerned Bench within two days. 
5. When the judgement is not pronounced within six months, either 
party may apply to the chief Justice for putting the case before some 
other Bench for fresh arguments; the chief Justice may grant the 
said prayer or pass any other appropriate order. 
Thomas, J., the other judge on the Bench, reiterated these 
instructions in his separate concurring judgement for providing added 
emphasis on them. The Arrears Committee constituted by the Government 
of India had made somewhat similar recommendations. The Government 
of India constituted the Arrears Committee on the recommendation of 
chief Justices' conference in its report of 1989-90. 
vi) Provision of Summary Trial 
Summary trial implies speedy disposal. Summary trial of a case 
means a case, which can be tried and disposed of without following the 
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lengthy procedure of a normal trial. Summary trial is not intended for a 
contentious and complicated case, which necessitates a lengthy inquiry. In 
summary trial cases, though record sufficient for the purpose of justice has 
to be present yet not so lengthy as may impede speedy disposal of cases. 
The procedure prescribed for trial of Summons cases should be folio wed.^ o 
No formal charge is framed. At the conclusion of the Summary trial, the 
Magistrate enters the accused plea and the findings in a form prescribed 
by Government. There is no appeal in such a trial if there is a sentence of 
fine only not exceeding two hundred rupees. There can, however, be an 
appHcation for revision to the High Court. 
Section 260, Cr.P.C. States - Notwithstanding anything contained in 
the Cr.P.C. 
a) any Chief Judicial Magistrate, 
b) Any Metropolitan Magistrate, 
c) Any Magistrate of first class specially empowered in this behalf 
by the High Court, may, if he thinks fit, try in a summary way, 
all or any of the following offences; 
(i) offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or 
imprisonment for a term exceeding two years; 
(ii) theft, under section 379, Section 380 or Section 381 of the Indian 
Penal Code, where the value of the property stolen does not exceed 
two thousand rupees; 
(iii) receiving or retaining stolen property, under Section 411 of the 
Indian Penal Code, where the value of the property does not exceed 
two thousand rupees; 
(iv) assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, under 
section 414 of the Indian Penal Code, where the value of such 
property does not exceed two thousand rupees' 
(v) Offences under section 454 and 456 of the Indian Penal Code. 
(vi) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under section 
504 and criminal intimidation, under section 506 of the Indian Penal 
Code; 
(vii) abetment of any of the foregoing offences; 
40. See 262 of Cr.P.C. 1973. 
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(viii) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such 
attempt is an offence; 
(ix) any offence constituted by an act in respect of which a complaint 
may be made under Section 20 of the Cattle-Trespass Act, 1871. 
Section 262 to 265, Cr.P.C. lay down the procedure, which should be 
followed by the Court in a summary trial. 
In a case of summary trial, the court must give the substance of 
offence by mentioning all the necessary facts constituting the offence. Mere 
mention of section is not sufficient. 
vii) Malimath on Trial Procedures-Recommendations 
The committee is concerned with enormous delay in decision 
making, particularly in trial courts. At present, a large number of cases in 
which punishment is two years and less are tried as Summons cases. 
The summary procedure prescribed by section 262 to 264 of the Code, if 
exercised properly, would quicken the pace of justice considerably. 
However, the number of cases, which are presently tried summarily, 
is quite small and maximum punishment that can be given after a 
summary trial is three months. In order to speed up the process, the 
committee feel that all cases in which punishment is three years and below 
should be tried summarily and punishment that can be awarded in 
summary trial should be increased to three years. At present only specially 
empowered magistrate can exercise summary powers which the 
committee feels should be given to all Judicial Magistrates First class. 
Section 206 of the Code prescribes the procedure for dealing with 
"petty offences'. This provision empowers the Magistrates to specify in the 
Summons the fine, which the accused should pay if he pleads guilty, and 
to send the fine amount along with his reply to the court. This procedure is 
simple and convenient to the accused, as he need not engage a lawyer nor 
appear before the court if he is not interested in contending the case. 
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However, the definition of the expression 'petty offences' restricts if to 
those offences punishable only with fine not exceeding Rs. 1000/-. 
In order to give benefit of this provision to large number of accused, 
the committee has favoured suitable modification of the expression 'petty 
offences'. 
The following recommendations were made: 
a) Section 260 of the Code may be amended by substituting the word 
"shall" for the words "may if he thinks fit." 
b) Section 260 (l)(c) of the Code be amended empowering any 
Magistrate of First class to exercise the power to try the cases 
summarily without any special empowerment in this behalf by the 
High Court. 
c) The limit of Rs. 2000/-'*^ fixed for the value of property under section 
260 (1) (c) (ii, iii, iv) be enhanced to Rs. 5000/-. 
d) Section 262 (2) be amended to enhance the power of sentence of 
V imprisonment from three months to three years. 
e) Section 2 (x) be amended by substituting the word 'three' for the 
world 'two'. 
f) That all Magistrates shall be given intensive practical training to try 
cases following the summary procedure. 
g) Section 206 be amended to make it mandatory to deal with all petty 
cases in the manner prescribed in sub-section (1). 
h) In the proviso to sub-section(l) the fine amount to be specified in the 
Summons shall be raised to Rs. 2000^2 
i) Notice to the accused under Section 206 shall be in form No. 30-A and 
the reply of the accused shall be in form No. 30-B as per annexure. 
j) In sub-section (2) of section 206 the limit relating to fine be raised to 
Rs. 5000/-. 
k) (a) Sub-section (3) of Sec. 206 shall be suitably amended to empower 
every Magistrate to deal with cases under sub-section (1). Offences 
which are compoundable under Sec. 320 or any offence punishable 
with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or with fine or 
with both. 
41. Subs. For the Words "Two hundred rupees" by Act. No. 25 of 2005, Section 23 (w.e.f. 
23.6.2006). 
42. At present one thousand' subs, for the words "one hundred rupees" by Act. No.l 25 of 
2005, Section 20 (w.e.f. 23.6.2006). 
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(b) (i) Section 62 of the Code amended by dealing reference to the 
need for rules by state Government for alternate modes of 
service. 
(ii) In section 69 before the word 'witness' the word 'accused' be 
added wherever the word 'witness' occurs. 
viii) Compounding of Offences 
The first step to speedy trial could therefore, be to sit together and 
sort out the difference. The offences that may lawfully be compounded are 
those that are mentioned in section 320 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
The offences other than those mentioned in this section, i.e. Section 320, 
caimot be compounded. Further, the offences punishable under laws other 
than Indian Penal Code are not compoundable. Remedy for speedy trial 
for them lies somewhere else.^^ Section 320(1) specifies the offences, which 
can be compounded without the permission of the Court. These offences 
are mostly of a minor nature viz injuring religious feelings S. 298, causing 
hurt - Section 323 and 324, wrongfully restraining or confining any person 
- Section 341 and 342, assault or use of criminal force. Sections 352, 355 and 
358 mischief. Sections 426 and 427 criminal trespass and house trespass 
Sections 447, 448, criminal breach of contract of service - Sec. 491, 
Adultery. Section 497, enticing taking away or detaining with criminal 
intent a married women - Sections 498, defamation - Section 500, 501 and 
502, insult intended to provoke breach of the peace - Section 504, criminal 
intimidation except when the offence is punishable with imprisonment for 
7 years. Section 506, act caused by making a person to believe that he will 
be an object of divine displeasure Section 508 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.^ ^ 
Section 320 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code give the list of offences, 
which can be compounded with the permission of court only. These 
offences are mostly of the same nature as described in sub-section (1), but 
43. Arora B.L. Law of speedy Trial in India, P. 141. 
44. Phansalkar-Joshi, S.S. Permitting compounding of more offences to achieve the aim of 
speedy trial and success of lok-Nayalaya., Cr. LJ 2001 Nov., 107; p. 162-163. 
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in graver form like causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon - Section 
324,325,335, causing hurt by rash and negligent act - Sections 337 and 338. 
Wrongfully confining a person for more than 3 or 10 days or in a secret 
place - Section 343, 344 and 346, assault or criminal force to woman with 
an intent to outrage her modesty. Section 354, assault or criminal force in 
attempting wrongfully to confine a person - 357, theft - section 379, 381 
dishonest misappropriation of property - section 403, criminal breach of 
trust - Section 406, 407 and 408, dishonestly receiving the stolen property 
or assisting disposal of the stolen property. Sections 411 and 414, cheating 
- Sections 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423 and 424, Mischief by killing or 
maiming animal. Sections 428, 429 and 430, House Trespass to commute an 
offence punishable with imprisonment. Section 451, use of false or 
counterfeited trade Mark or property - Sections 482, 483 and 486, Bigamy -
Section 498, defamation of person like president, vice president. Governor 
etc. Section 500, altering words or making gestures to insult modesty of 
woman - Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.'^ ^ 
Section 320(3) of Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that the 
abetment or attempt to commit the above said offences described in 
sub-clauses (1) and (2) may also be compounded in the like manner. 
The crucial provision is contained in sub Section (9) which stipulates that 
no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. 
Therefore, no offences of I.P.C., which are not specified in these two 
Sub-sections, are compoundable. Moreover, the offences created by special 
laws not being specified in these two sub-sections, are also not 
compoundable. The compounding of offence other than those made 
compoundable by this section, is illegal as it is prohibited by Sub-section 
(9).46 The court also refuses to compromise a non-compoundable offence 
(vide state of U.P. V. Chandrapal Singh).47 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid. 
47. 1968 Cr. LJ 1342 (All.) 
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Thus, even the cursory look at Section 320 of Cr.P.C, 1973 makes it 
clear that it leaves uncovered large category of offences, which cannot be 
compounded at all, even with the permission of the court. It may be of 
interest to note that whole of Indian Penal Code 1860 contains totally 511 
sections that are so many numbers of offences, but out of them, under 
section 320 of Cr.P.C. only 57 offences can be compounded, some with the 
permission of the court, other without permission. 
If speedy trial is the essence of criminal justice, then having regard 
to the mounting arrears of cases and the poor rate of conviction, which is 5 
to 6% only, it is necessary to take a more pragmatic and more realistic 
view. 
As observed by Krishna Iyer, J in case of Re. special Courts Bill,'^^ if 
the Justice is a Cinderella in our scheme, then something is seriously 
required to be done. 
We have to be creative in irmovating new ideas and provisions, 
being compelled by special situation of the present day. No one will 
disagree that we have reached at a stage where no effort should be spared 
to speed up the trial and reduce the number of arrears so that Judicial 
System can be saved from the disastrous consequences of being collapsed. 
A beginning is made in that direction with the initiative taken by the Apex 
Court in the case of common cause case^^ and Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of 
Bihar^^ where by State, lingering and in effective cases are tried to be 
disposed of, reducing the pendency considerably. Acting and proceeding 
on the same initiative and with the same intention. If more and more 
offences, both under Indian Penal Code and under other enactments, are 
made legally compoundable, by carrying out necessary Amendment in 
Criminal Procedure Code or by Pronouncing of Such epoch making 
48. AIR 1979 SC 478. 
49. 1996 Cr. LJ 2380: AIR 1996 SC 1619. 
50. 1998Cr.LJ4596: AIR 1998SC3281 ^ a-*^'**^ 
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judgement by the Apex Court, it will pave a new way of reducing the 
pendency. 
ix) Plea-Bargaining 
The problem of delay and backlog is rampant in criminal cases. 
Various strategies and methods have been used in various jurisdictions to 
lessen the burden and ensure speedy disposal of cases. One such strategy 
is plea bargaining. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 (which came 
into force with effect from 5* July 2006) has inserted Chapter XXI-A in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that for the first time accords 
recognition to the idea of plea bargaining within the Indian Criminal 
Justice System. For providing the Working details of the plea bargaining 
system, new sections 265A to 265L have been introduced with a view to 
providing for the qualifications for plea bargaining, the stage and 
procedure for making an application, the role of Court and the parties, the 
guidelines for mutually satisfactory disposition. The final disposition of 
the case by the court and its finality, the decoding of set-off benefit. 
The prohibition against use of plea bargaining depositions in any other 
proceedings and non-applicability of plea bargaining in juvenile justice 
proceedings, etc plea bargaining proceeding is a new technique for 
simplifying the rigor of the formal system as well as measure for the 
speedier disposal of cases. But this technique has immense significance 
from the point of view of the accused, who is accorded an option to 
bargain plea within the existing system. Thus, the rules relating to plea 
bargaining have special value not only for the accused, but also for those 
who are responsible for operating the system at the ground level.^ ^ 
The concept of plea bargaining is a significant part of the criminal 
Judicial System in U.S.A. The success of plea bargaining as a procedure 
leading to high convictions has been proven in the United States, where 
51. Human Rights Best Practices Relating to Criminal Justice in a Nutshell. First Edition: 
2007, First Reprint: 2008.,Chapt. III,. Division through plea Bargaining, P. 30. 
the Supreme Court in a number of cases has upheld its Constitutionality 
and significance.52 
Majority of the individuals who are accused of a crime give up their 
Constitutional rights and plead guilty. In a landmark judgement,53 the 
Supreme Court has held that there should be no element of punishment or 
retaliation as long as the accused is free to accept or reject the offer of the 
prosecution. Plea bargaining has over the years emerged as a prominent 
feature of the American Criminal Justice system where over 90% criminal 
cases are settled by plea bargaining rather than by a jury trial. 
Thus, less than ten percent of criminal cases go to trial. 
The United States experiment shows that Plea bargaining helps the 
disposal of the accumulated cases and expedites delivery of justice. Plea 
bargaining was not favoured in Colonial America, infact, courts actively 
discouraged defendants from pleading guilty. As population increased 
and courts became overcrowded, trial in every case became lengthier and 
impossible. Thus, the need was felt for such a strategy, which can result in 
speedy disposal. Thereafter, in the 19* century, courts gradually started 
accepting guilty pleas and by the 20* century, the vast majority of criminal 
cases started being resolved with plea bargaining. It takes a more subtle 
from the United Kingdom, where the courts are still cautions about 
concerning their powers of passing a sentence in open court.^^ 
> Concept of Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is a concept derived from USA, there is no perfect or 
simple definition of Plea bargaining. As the term implies, it involves an 
active negotiation process whereby offender is allowed to confess his guilt 
52. Brady Vs. United States (297 US 724-25 L.Ed. 2d, 747), Santobello Vs.Nevv York (404 US 
257 (1971)] 
53. Brodenkiircher Vs. Hayes. The Apex Court however upheld the life imprisonment of 
the accused because he rejected the 'plea Guilty' offer of 5 years imprisonment. 
54. A.K.Sikri J, Reforming Criminal Justice System: Can Plea Bargaining be the Answer? 
Naya Deep Vol. CII, Jan. 2007, p. 43-44. 
in court if he so desires in exchange of lighter punishment that would 
have been fixed for such offence. Plea bargaining usually occurs prior to 
trial but may occur any time before a judgement is rendered.ss Black's Law 
Dictionary defines it as "The process whereby the accused and the 
prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition 
of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's 
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a 
multi - count indictment in return for a lighter sentence that possible for 
the graver charge.^6 
From the point of view of the accused, it means that he bargain 
conviction and a lesser sentence, for a long, expensive and tortuous 
process of under going trial where he may be convicted. For the vast 
majority of cases. Plea bargaining - also known as negotiating a settlement, 
coping a plea, or coping out is the most important step in the criminal 
justice process in United States. Thus, it involves an active negotiation 
process by which the defendant offers to exchange a plea of guilty, thereby 
waiving his right to trial, for some concessions in charges or for a sentence 
recommendation. The offender is allowed to confess his guilt in court if he 
so desires in exchange of lighter punishment that would have been fixed 
for such offence. 
> Types of Plea-Bargaining 
There are mainly three types of Plea bargaining: 
1. Charge Bargaining, 
2. Sentence Bargaining; and 
3. Fact Bargaining. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Bryan A. Garner & Henry Campbell, Black's Law Dictionary, (6th Ed., 1990), West 
PublishingCo., p. 1173. 
The first category, i.e. charge bargaining, is such bargain in which a 
defendant pleads guilty to reduced charges. It occurs when defendant 
pleads guilty to necessarily included offences.^^ For Example, a defendant 
charged with burglary may be offered the Opportunity to plead guilty to 
attempted burglary. A defendant charged with drunken driving and 
driving with license suspended may be offered the opportunity to plead 
guilty to justify the drunken driving charge. 
The second type is Sentence Bargain: A Sentence Bargain occurs 
when a defendant is told in advance that his sentence will be reduced if he 
pleads guilty. This can help a prosecutor obtain a conviction if, for 
example, a defendant is facing serious charges and is afraid of being hit 
with the maximum sentence. Typically, sentence bargains can only be 
granted if the trial judge approves them. Many jurisdictions severely limit 
Sentence Bargaining.^s 
The third type of plea i.e. least used negotiation in Fact Bargaining 
in which negotiation involves an admission to certain facts 'Stipulating' to 
the truth and existence of provable facts, thereby eliminating the need for 
the prosecutor to have to prove them in return for an agreement not to 
introduce certain facts into evidence.^^ 
Plea bargaining - Indian Perspective 
Plea bargaining has been introduced in India in the Criminal 
Procedure Code by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Chapter 
XXIA). This lays down a procedure with a distinct feature of enabling an 
accused to file an application for plea bargaining in the court where the 
trial is pending. The Law Commission in its 154* report recommended the 
introduction of 'Plea bargaining' as an alternative method to deal with 
57. David Levinson, Encyclopedia of crime and Punishment, (2003) Vol. 3, SAGE 
Publications, P. 1147. 
58. Manupatra Newsline 'Point of view. Plea Bargaining": A positive way Ahead in 
criminal Justice System', July-August 2006, Vol. I, p. 3. 
59. Supra note 55 p. 46-47. 
huge backlog of criminal cases. Later on, the Malimath Committee Report 
on criminal reforms also recommended that a system of Plea bargaining be 
introduced in the Indian Criminal Justice System to facilitate the speedy 
disposal of criminal cases and to reduce burden of the courts. The 
committee in its report cited the success of Plea bargaining system in USA 
and other European Countries to support its claim. 
> Position Before 2005 
The Act has sparked off serious public debate. It is generally 
criticized on the basis that it is not recognized under our criminal justice 
system and is against public policy. The Apex Court has also rejected the 
concept of plea bargaining time and again. And consistently opposed the 
incorporation of it in our criminal justice process as implicit in series of 
cases. In Madanlal Ram Chandra Daga vs. State of Maharashtra^^ the Supreme 
Court for the first time made an observation in regard to the efficacy of 
Plea bargaining and observed: 
"In our opinion, it is very wrong for a court to enter into a bargain of 
this character. Offences should be tried and punished accordingly to 
the guilt of the accused; if the court thinks that leniency can be shown 
on the facts of the case, it may impose a lighter sentence. But the 
court should never be party to a bargain by which money is recovered 
for the complainant through their agency." 
The concept was again condemned in the case of Murlidhar Meghraj 
vs. State of Maharashtra v^herein the Apex Court observed: 
"To begin with, we are free to confess to hunch that the appellants had 
hastened with their plea of guilty hopefully, induced by an informal 
tripartite understanding of life sentence in lieu of nolo contendere 
stance. Many economic offenders resort to practices the American call 
'Plea bargaining' 'Plea Negotiation', Trading out' and 'compromise' 
in criminal cases as a Trial magistrate drowned by a docket burden 
nods assent to the sub-rasa ante-room settlement. The businessmen 
culprit, confronted by a sure prospect of the agency and ignominy of 
tendency of a prison cell 'trade out' of the situation, the bargain being a 
plea of guilt coupled with a promise of'no jail'. It is idle to speculate on 
60. AIR 1968 SC 1267. 
the virtue of negotiated settlement of criminal cases as obtain in the 
United States. But in our jurisdiction specially in the area of dangerous 
economic times and food offence this practice includes on society's 
interest by opposing society's decision expressed through pre-
determined legislative fixation of minimum sentences and by subtly 
subverting the mandate of the law". 
On the same line. Plea bargaining was further, disapproved in 
Ganesh Mai Jashraj vs. Govt, of Gujrat^^ and Thippaswamy vs. State of 
Kamataka^^. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kasambhi Abdul Rehman Bhai 
Sheikh and Others, vs. State ofGujrat and another.^^, held the practice of Plea 
bargaining to be unconstitutional, illegal and which would tend to 
encourage corruption, collusion and pollute the pure fount aim of justice. 
Even, as late as in the year 2000, in Uttar Pradesh vs. Chandrika,^ Apex 
Court reiterated its earlier view holding, that concept of Plea bargaining is 
not recognized and is against public policy under our criminal justice 
system. Further, it was observed that on the basis of Plea bargaining court 
cannot dispose of the criminal cases. The court has to decide it on merits. If 
the accused confesses its guilt, appropriate sentence is required to be 
implemented. 
However, on the other hand, the view of law reformers including 
legal luminaries was in favour of introduction of concept of plea 
bargaining. 
It appears that the thinking in favour of Plea bargaining were based 
on dire necessity for speedy justice in our criminal justice process as the 
arrears and delays were mounting day-by-day. One famous saying which 
aptly applies in this context, i.e., 'necessity has no law' and another being 
61. AIR 1980 SC 264 
62. 1983 Cr. LJ 1271 (SC) 
63. AIR 1980 SC 854. 
64. AIR 2000 SC 164. 
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"I find no hint throughout the universe of good or evil of blessings or of 
cure, I find alone necessity supreme".^s 
Thus, as per thinking practical, considerations make introduction of 
plea bargaining in our criminal justice process a necessity. 
> The Provisions of Criminal law (Amendment Act 2005) 
The newly introduced chapter XXI - A has incorporated Plea 
bargaining. Section 265A states as to against whom this chapter is 
applicable. The section elaborates that this chapter is inapplicable where 
the offender under which the accused punishable with more than seven 
years of imprisonment and/or where the offence is one which affects the 
socio-economic condition of the country or has been committed against a 
woman or child below the age of fourteen years. 
Section 265B makes it mandatory for the accused to move an 
application for plea bargaining before the trial court and places the 
discretion and the trial court to determine whether such application has 
been moved voluntarily. The trial courts is also obligated to reject any 
application where it finds that the accused has been previously convicted 
by a court in a case in which he had been charged with same offence. 
Section 265C ensures mutually satisfactory disposition of the case 
by retaining voluntary participation of all concerned parties in the 
proceedings. 
Section 265D envisages the preparation of a report in the event of 
satisfactory disposition of a case. 
Under section 265E the court is bound to dispose of a case, the event 
of satisfactory disposal, after awarding compensation to the victim and 
after hearing the parties on the aspect of quantum of punishment and 
thereafter awarding appropriate sentence which applicable cases, may 
65. A.K. Sikri J. Reforming Criminal Jusatice System: Naya Deep, Vol. VIII, Jan. (2007), p. 
51. 
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range from one-half to one-fourth of prescribed punishment for the said 
offence. 
Section 265F makes it mandatory to pronounce the judgement in 
open court. 
Section 265G provides that the judgement carmot be appealed 
against unless by means of a special leave petition or writ petition thereby 
ensuring a degree of finality. 
Section 265 H seven certain powers unto the court and Section 265-1 
provides that period of detention, if any, undergone by the accused shall 
be set off against the sentence of punishment imposed. 
Section 265J is a non-obstinate clause and gives effect to the 
provisions of the chapter as against any other provision of the Code. 
Section 265K is a beneficial clause in favour of the accused and 
states that any statements or facts used by an accused in an application 
under this chapter shall not be used for any purpose other than that 
prescribed under the chapter. 
Section 265L states that nothing in this chapter shall apply to any 
juvenile or child as defined in clause(k) of section 2 of the juvenile Justice 
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 
This is the statutory provisions, in a nutshell, for the use of Plea 
bargaining in the Indian Criminal Justice Process. It would be pertinent 
herein to deal with the challenges, which the above procedure entails for 
Judiciary to ensure that the process does develop into a fruitful and 
beneficial reality. 
In a country, like India, where there is great backlog of cases, the 
concept of Plea bargaining will help to reduce the backlog by expediting 
the cases. The main reason of introducing plea bargaining is that it will 
keep our system going. By using this, we can avoid the serious congestion 
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within the courts. The jails will no longer be over packed and occupants 
will not be under trials. The system suffers when there is enormous delay 
in deciding the criminal cases but the situation worsens when an innocent 
person is punished or a guilty person is exonerated. Plea bargaining, if 
successful, will ensure quick resolution of cases involving petty offences 
and courts will be able to concentrate on the cases involving serious 
offences and fulfilling its Constitutional obligation to provide a speedy 
trial. It will lead to load reduction as well as productivity enhancement as 
shown by the experience of United States. 
Plea bargaining will not only restore the faith of people in judiciary 
but will also lead to lower crime rate. It is an attempt to tackle the court 
pendency and simplify the criminal procedure. Plea bargaining apart from 
guaranteeing speedy justice and reducing the pendency of cases in the 
court would also reduce the number of under trials in the prisons.^^ 
The legislation in its present form has considerable safeguards, like 
excluding the scope of plea bargaining from offences that affects the 
socio-economic conditions of the country or where an offence has been 
committed against a woman or a child below the age of 14 years. 
Moreover, this is not applicable if the court finds that the accused has been 
previously convicted by a court for the same offence. A positive beginning 
has been made with the first Plea bargaining case having been heard in 
Delhi High Court on 24* July, 2006 in a 14 years old dispute between two 
families. The criminal justice system has a long way to go in India and Plea 
bargaining is indeed a positive way ahead.^'' 
B. Speedy Investigation 
Investigation is the most important part of criminal jurisprudence. It 
is during investigation that the basic facts relating to crime committed are 
66. Ibid. 
67. Manupatra News line, July-August 2006, Vol. I, p. 4. 
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enquired into. Unless there is an efficient, prompt, fair and impartial 
investigation, justice in criminal cases cannot be ensured. In the case of 
cognizable offence, it is the duty of police to hold an independent, 
unbiased and impartial investigation. 
If investigation and eventual trial of cases are delayed the chances 
of miscarriage of justice and expenses of litigation increase tremendously. 
Delay gives an opportunity to the opposite party to win over witnesses 
and thus to deflect the course of justice. It also results in loss of evidence 
for disinterested witnesses not are personally involved with the incident 
may often forget details of the occurrence after a certain lapse of time. 
Then again, many a time even the remedy provided by the law becomes 
infructuous due to flux of time. Thus, it is rightly said, "justice delayed is 
justice denied". Delay in investigation of cases, if not properly explain in 
the case diary and in course of the evidence of the investigating officer, 
may seriously affect the bonafides of an investigation and may even lead 
to failure of the case in hand. Similarly, unexplained delay even of one day 
in recording the FIR may prove fatal to a case. Thus, in Santa Singh vs. State 
of Punjah^^ where there was inordinate delay in sending the sealed 
parcels of -
(a) the empty cartridge case recovered from the scene of occurrence and 
(b) the rifle recovered from the house of the accused for the opinion of 
the ballistic expert and 
(c) there was also delay of several days in the interrogation of the 
suspect after his arrest, the Supreme Court in acquitting the accused 
of the charge of murder despite the evidence of three eye witnesses 
observed: 
"The suspicious delays that have occurred as regards important steps in 
the course of the investigation render it unsafe to hold that the case of the 
prosecution has been established beyond reasonable doubt".^^ 
68. 1956 Cr.LJ 930(SC) 
69. Ibid. 
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Similarly, in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab,'^^ where there was 
extraordinary delay in the investigation and in submitting the 
charge-sheet, the Supreme Court remarked: 
"It is an utmost importance that investigation into criminal offences 
must always be free from any objectionable features or infirmities which 
may legitimately lead to the grievance of the accused that the work of 
investigation is carried on unfairly or with an ulterior motive".'''' Even 
three days unexplained delay in examining eyewitnesses has been 
held to be fatal as it casts doubt on the veracity of such 
witnesses72 
Courts have no control over such investigations. A defective 
investigation with some irregularity or even illegality generally is not 
treated as a ground to reject the prosecution case if the case is otherwise 
found established against the accused. A police officer is free to collect 
information of an occurrence of a cognizable offence, on his own, even 
without registering a case. A female police officer should be associated as 
investigating officer with the case involving dowry death as held by 
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh Vs Commissioner of Police.'^^ 
Investigation can be conducted even after submission of challan so 
long as the court has not taken cognizance. In rare cases, court may permit 
further investigation even after it has taken cognizance of the offence. A 
defective and delayed investigation may leads to nabbing of an innocent 
person or full facts about the crime may not see the light of the day. 
Reasonably expeditious investigation of crimes is in the interest of 
both, the society as well as the accused. From the point of view of society, 
expeditious investigation of crimes increases efficacy in the criminal law 
process and respect for the law. From the point of accused, Constitutional 
guarantee of speedy investigation is essential to protect at least three basic 
70. 1960 Cr. LJ 1239(SC) 
71. Ibid. 
72. Basudev Sahu V. State, 1985 Cr. LJ (NOC) 29 (Orissa). 
73. AIR 1983 SC 826: (1983) 3 SCC 344:1983 SCC (Cri) 637.1983 Cr.LJ 1081. 
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demands of criminal justice system, as pointed out in Richard M. Smith Vs. 
Fred M. MooleyJ^ 
(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial; 
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation; 
(3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an 
accused to defend himself." 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India confers upon every individual 
a fimdamental right not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in 
accordance with due procedure prescribed under law. The procedure 
prescribed under law has to be necessarily reasonable, fair and just. Under 
Article 21 of the Constitution, the right to speedy investigation is a 
fundamental requirement. 
Hence, it is the state that has on its shoulders the burden of 
investigation as well as the prosecution in a criminal trial. 
Speedy and expeditious investigation and trial, which have been 
envisaged under section 309(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
reflect the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
Procedural prescription for securing speedy investigation is given 
under section 173 of the Code, which directs that every investigation shall 
be completed without unnecessary delay. Sections 157,168,173 should be 
read conjointly for speedy investigation. In cases of investigation relating, 
to summons cases, if the investigation is not concluded within a period of 
six months from the date of arrest of the accused. The magistrate is bound 
to make an order stopping further proceedings in the investigation unless 
the investigating officer satisfies the Magistrate that for some special 
reasons and in the interest of justice continuation of the investigation 
beyond six months is necessary. 
74. (1969) 21 Law Ed 2nds 607; 393 US 374. 
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The order passed by the Magistrate is subject to review by session's 
judge who may direct further investigation to be made into the offence 
subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may 
specify .75 In Sushil Kumar vs. State of West BengaF^ the Calcutta High Court 
took the view that principle behind this provision is that the investigation 
agency may not harass a person for long by binding him over in less 
serious cases. 
So far as the investigation of cases triable as warrant cases is 
concerned, there is no specific provision in the Code analogous to section 
167 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code where the Magistrate could 
enforce speedy investigation. 
However, the Code only prescribes statutory protection against 
prolonged custodial detention of the accused pending investigation, such 
protection are in the form of right to be released on bail after detention in 
custody for a specific period. If the police do not file a final report against 
the accused within the period of sixty or ninety days, as specified in 
section 167, a valuable right to be released on bail accrues to the accused. 
By incorporating these provisions in the Code it seems, legislature 
intended that the Magistrate is required to monitor the investigation and 
see if the investigation is being conducted expeditiously and if not, 
whether to authorize further detention of the accused in custody. 
However, there is no provision under which a Magistrate can give specific 
directions to the police to speed up investigation and failing which he may 
take action in the direction of stopping the investigation. 
Inordinate delay by the police in the investigation of criminal cases 
is violative of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and 
gives rise to a right in favour of the accused to move the High Court under 
Article 226 or to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution 
75. Section 167 (5)(6) of Cr. PO.C. 1973 
76. 1987 Cri LJ. 1517 (Cal. H.C.) 
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for the enforcement of his right. In cases of inordinate delay there are two 
approaches followed by the courts. The first approach is to release the 
accused on personal bond or without any bond, where an accused had 
been in Jail for the maximum term which could have been awarded to him 
if found guilty for the offence he was charged with, he was ordered to be 
released from custody forthwith. In cases where no charge sheet had been 
filed for three years, accused remaining in Jail custody, they were ordered 
to be released on furnishing personal bonds in meagre amount.^^ 
The second approach is somewhat radical and revolutionary. 
In Krishna Bahadur vs. State'^^ where the accused was in Jail for over 40 
months without any charge sheet having been filed by the police, it held 
that the delay in submission of final report was not bonafide but really in 
pursuance of malafide exercise of investigational powers obviously 
designed to keep the prisoner under detention for an indefinite period. 
In this case, the petitioner was set free. 
The second approach adopted by various High Courts seems to be 
more effective. Inordinate delays in investigations raise presumption that 
either there is no evidence against the accused to put him on trial or the 
investigation is malafide with a view to keep the accused in custody or 
harass the same. In both the cases, the appropriate remedy is quashing of 
the investigational proceedings. 
In Madheshioardhari Singh vs. State of Bihar'^^ was held that speedy 
trial a Constitutional right. Right to speedy trial is applicable not to 
proceedings before court but also to police investigation preceding it. 
In the case of Raghuhir Singh vs. State of Bihar,^'^ It was held that right to 
77. Mohd. Saleem Khan V. State of UP AIR 1982 SC 1996. See also Mantoo Mazoomdar vs. 
State of Bihar AIR 1980 S.C. 847. 
78. 1981 Cr, LJ NOC 208 Mad. 
79. AIR 1986 pat. 324 (FB): 1986, Cr. LJ 1771. 
80. AIR 1987 SC 194:1987 Cr. LJ 157: (1986) 4 SCC 481. 
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speedy trial, which is a fundamental right of an accused, shall be 
construed as including period of investigation. 
In Seeta Hemchandra Shashilal vs. State of Mahashtra,^^ the court held 
that where accused is alleged to have committed offences punishable 
under the prevention of corruption Act, no period has been fixed by the 
legislature for taking cognizance; hence, cognizance cannot be quashed on 
the mere ground of delay in completing investigation. 
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court^^ {XQI^ that speedy trial 
includes within its sweep the investigatory police proceedings in a 
criminal prosecution. In Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. NayakP now the 
Supreme Court has finally settled the position that right to speedy trail 
flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India encompasses all the 
stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision 
and retrial, by this decision the Apex Court has broadened the scope of 
this right. 
The Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 too has emphasized the need 
for speedier investigation in criminal cases and in the case of petty 
offences has either barred investigation beyond a certain period of time or 
barred the taking of cognizance thereof by the court after a fixed time 
schedule.^'* Thus when the highest court and the law of the land have both 
enjoined on all concerned to expedite investigation of cases it does not 
behave any investigating officer not to investigate cases with utmost 
promptness. Santa Singh's case^5 should be a pointer to all investigating 
officers in the country. It must, however, be said in all fairness to the 
81. (2001) 4 s e c 525: 2001 SCC (Cri) 187: AIR 2001SCC 1246: 20-01 Cr. L] 1242 (SC) 
82. Kuldeep Singh vs. State of J & K 1989 Cr. LJ 1941 (SC) 
83. AIR 1992 SC 1630. 
84. Sections 167(5) & (6) and 468-473 Cr.P.C, 1973, also Nimeon Sangma vs. Govt, of 
Meghalaya, 1979 Cr, LJ 944 (SC)," Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar, 1979 Cr.LJ 
1036 at pp. 1045 (SC), See also Mantoo Majumdar vs. State of Bihar, 1980 Cr. LJ 546 (SC). 
85. 1956 Cr. LJ 930 (SC) 
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investigating officers that at present their strength is inadequate and in 
addition to their duties as investigating officers, they are also saddled with 
all sorts of law and order, bandobast, and VIP duties which take a lot of 
their time to the detriment of investigation of cases. They also lack 
transport facilities and modern equipment. In the circumstances, the 
Law Commission of India recommended for increase the strength of the 
Police Station, modernizing their equipment and means of transport and 
also urged for creation of a separate investigating cadre consisting of 
officer who will have no other duties than investigation of crime.^'' 
Investigation is the first step on the basis of which prosecution files 
a case against accused in the court which tries the accused for alleged 
offence. It includes all proceedings under Criminal Procedure Code for the 
collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person 
(other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this 
behalf.87 The Supreme Court has viewed the investigation of an offence as 
generally consisting of: 
• Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; 
• Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, 
• Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence 
which may consists of; 
- The examination of various person (including the accused) and 
the reduction of their statements into writing, if the police 
officers think fit, 
- The search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for 
the investigation or to be produced at the trial; and 
- Formation of the opinion as to whether on the materials 
collected there is a case to place the accused before a magistrate 
for trial, and if so, taking the necessary steps for the same by the 
filing of a charge sheet under section 173 of Cr.P.C.^^ 
86. Law Commission of India: 14th Report. Vol. II. Pp. 733-764 (1958). 
87. Section 2(h) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
88. H.N. Rishbud vs. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1995 SC196. 
300 
For the effective discharge of its duties, police has the power to 
arrest any person in certain circumstances.^^ Arrest of an alleged offender 
even before magistrate issues Summons or warrants against him is thus 
provided so for as to secure his presence during the trial. Police may take 
long time for the investigation into an offence and thus delaying the 
initiation of the process of trial, which begins on the filing of charge sheet 
by the prosecution in court. In order to check this, Cr.P.C. impose certain 
restrictions with respect to time to be taken for investigation by police and 
incarceration of accused pending such investigation. 
According to Section 57 of Cr.P.C, every such person has to be 
produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty four 
hours of such arrest. Excluding the time necessary for the journey from the 
place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and arrestee cannot be 
detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a 
magistrate.* 
No police officer has the authority to detain a person arrested 
without warrant in custody for a period longer than twenty-four hours^^. 
But if it appears to the officer in charge of the Police Station or the police 
officer making the investigation (not below the rank of the sub-inspector) 
that the investigation cannot be completed within the said period. And 
there are grounds for believing that the accusation is well founded he is 
required to transmit a copy of the entries made in his diary and at the 
same time forward the accused to the nearest judicial magistrate.92 Such 
magistrate, whether he has or has not the jurisdiction to try the case, from 
time to time may authorize the detention of the accused in such custody 
for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole.^^ J]^Q magistrate, who 
89. See for detail section 41 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
90. Section 57 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
91. Section 57 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
92. Section 167(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 
93. Section 167(2) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 
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has jurisdiction to try the case, may authorize the detention of the accused 
person. Otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the pried of 
fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exists for doing so but 
even the magistrate cannot authorize the detention of the accused person 
in custody for a total period exceeding: 
• Ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence 
punishable with death imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a 
term of not less than ten years.^^ 
• Sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence.^ ^ 
The police are required to complete investigation without 
unnecessary delay 96 on the completion of investigation. If there is not 
sufficient, evidence or reasonable ground of Suspicion the accused is to be 
released on executing a bond to appear when so required before a 
magistrate empowered to take cognizance.^'' And if, there is sufficient 
evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion then the officer incharge of the 
Police Station forwards the accused under custody to a magistrate 
empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to 
try the accused or commit him for trial^^ on completion of investigation the 
officer in charge of the Police Station is also required to send a report to a 
competent magistrate.^^ Such a report is known as 'police report'^oo 
popularly called 'charge-sheet' or 'challan'. When a charge sheet is filed in 
a case in respect of, this there is sufficient evidence to forward the accused 
person to a magistrate. Then along with the charge sheet all the documents 
or their extracts on which the prosecution proposes to rely (other than 
94. Section 167 proviso (a)(i), Cr.P.C, 1973 
95. Section 167 proviso (a)(ii), Cr.P.C. 1973. 
96. Section 173(1), Cr.P.C. 1973. 
97. Section 169 Cr.P.C. 1973. 
98. Section 170(1) Cr.P.C. 1973. 
99. Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. 1973. 
100. Section 2(v) Cr.P.C. 1973. 
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those already sent to the magistrate during investigation^o^ and statement 
of witnesses whom the prosecution proposes to examine have to be 
forwarded to the magistrate.^o^ 
The Constitutional right to speedy trial is applicable not only to 
proceedings before court but also to police investigation preceding it.^ o^  
The report of the police is not binding on the court. Even where the 
police report discloses that no case was made out still the Magistrate can 
take cognizance and issue process.^^^ 
The power of the Magistrate to order police investigation under 
section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred 
by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. 
The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post 
cognizance stage. A Magistrate can also under section 159 direct an 
investigation or preliminary inquiry into a case which may have been 
reported by the police as not worth investigation. 
The official investigation should be totally extricated from any 
extraneous influence; as such, the police investigation should necessarily 
be conducted with the fund supplied by the state. The funding of 
investigation by private/interested parties would vitiate the investigation 
contemplated in Code.^^s 
> Interference in Investigation by Courts 
There is a clear demarcation of function between judiciary and 
police department. Courts normally do not interfere with investigation but 
a court may interfere in case of violation of fundamental right of an 
101. Section 173(5)(a)Cr.P.C. 1973. 
102. Section 173(5)(b), Cr.P.C. 1973. 
103. Supra note 21. 
104. H.S. Bains vs. State, AIR 1980 SC 1883: (1980) 4 SCC 631. 
105. Navinchandra N. Majithia vs. State of Meghalaya (2000) 8 SCC 323: 2000 SCC (Cri) 
1510:AIR 2000 SC 3275. 
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accused and or where investigation is conducted contrary to the 
procedural safeguards in violation of the rights of an accused. 
Privy Council in King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad,^^ observed: 
"]ust as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free 
access to a court of justice, so that he may he duly acquitted if found 
not guilty of the offence with which he is charged. So, it is of the utmost 
importance that the Judiciary should not interfere with the police in 
matters which are within their province and into which the law 
imposes on them the duty of inquiry" 
The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, 
not overlapping, and the combination of the individual liberty with a due 
observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to 
exercise its own function. 
> Fixing Time Limits for Report 
A Magistrate will be justified in prescribing a time limit for the 
police to complete the investigation and send a report. If police shows 
legthary, a Magistrate can address the police to facilitate and expedite 
report. 
In Frances Coralie Mullin vs. W.C. Khambra,^^'^ the Supreme Court 
observed: 
"The role of the courts in cases of preventive detention has to he one of 
eternal vigilance. No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no 
duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired. The courts writ is the 
ultimate insurance against illegal detention. The Constitution enjoins 
conformance with the provision of Article 22 and the courts exacts 
compliance. Article 22 (5) vests in the detenue the right to be provided 
ivith an opportunity to make a representation. The principal enemy of 
the detenue and high right to make a representation is neither high-
handedness nor mean mindless insensibility, but the routine and 
the red-tape of bureaucratic machine". 
An accused has a Constitutional right to be protected from torture 
by police during investigation. Offences committed outside India do not 
106. AIR 1945 PC 18. 
107. AIR 1980 SC 849: (1980) 2 SCC 275. 
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fall within the territorial limits of any court in India. Police can also not 
investigate the same. 
> Filing of Charge-sheet 
Every police officer conducting an investigation has to maintain a 
case diary on day-to-day basis setting forth the time at which he received 
the information, the time at which he began and closed his investigation 
and the places he visited in connection with and during the course of 
investigation, etc. The court may send for the police diary of the case 
under trial and way use it, not as evidence, but to refresh memory and in 
aid of trial. The accused and his agents are not entitled to see the police 
diary. 
Investigation involves not only collection of evidence but formation 
of opinion also. Therefore, there are three different kinds of reports to be 
made by police officers at three different stages of investigation: 
1. a preliminary report from the officer incharge of a Police Station to 
the Magistrate.^08 
2. reports from a subordinate police officer to the officer-incharge of 
the station.^? 
3. a final report of the police officer to the Magistrate as soon as the 
investigation is complete.^^o 
According to Section 173 of Cr. P., C. three courses of action are 
open the Magistrate or the court on receipt of a charge-sheet: 
(i) It may accept the report and drop the proceedings; 
(ii) It may discharge with the report and drop the proceedings; 
Section 173(1) every investigation under this chapter shall be 
completed without unnecessary delay. 
2.(i) As soon as it is completed the officer-in-charge of the Police 
Station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take 
108. Section 157 Cr.P.C. 1973 
109. Section 168 Cr.P.C. 1973 
110. Section 173 Cr.P.C. 1973 
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cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form 
prescribed by the state Government, stating the particulars. 
3. Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under 
section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the State 
Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted 
through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the 
Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of the Police Station to 
make further investigation. 
4. Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section 
that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate 
shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise 
as he thinks fit. 
5. When such report is in respect of a case to which section 170 
applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along 
with the report. 
(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to 
the Magistrate during investigation. 
(b) the statement recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C. of all the 
persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its 
witnesses. 
6. If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such 
statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the proceedings 
or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interest 
of justice, and is inexpedient in the public interest he shall indicate 
that part of the statement and append a note requesting the 
Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to 
the accused and stating his reasons for waking such request. 
7. Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient 
so to do, he may furnish to the accused convenient so to do, he 
may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents 
referred to in sub-section (5). 
8. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further 
investigation in respect of an offence after a report under 
sub-section (2) has been forwarded to Magistrate and where upon 
such investigation, the officer-in-charge of the Police Station 
obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to 
the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence 
in the form prescribed, and the provisions of sub-section (2) to (6) 
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports 
as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-
section(2)". 
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Word "custody" appearing in section 170 Cr.P.C. does not 
contemplate either police or judicial custody. It only connotes the 
presentation of the accused by investigating officer before the 
Magistrate or the court at the time of filing of the chargesheet. 
Thereafter, the role of the Court starts. 
A combined reading of section 157, 167 and 173 of Criminal 
Procedure Code indicates that the accused is entitled to speedy 
trial as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
> The Committee on Reforms - Police Investigation 
It is the duty of the state to protect fundamental rights of the 
citizens. The state has constituted the criminal justice system to protect the 
rights of the innocent and punish the guilty. The system devised more 
than century back, has become ineffective; a large number of guilty go 
unpunished in a large number of cases; the system takes years to bring the 
guilty to justice and has ceased to deter criminals. Crime is increasing 
rapidly everyday and types of crimes are proliferating. The citizens live in 
constant fear. It is therefore, that the Government of India, Ministry of 
Home Affairs constituted the committee on reforms of criminal Justice 
system to make a comprehensive examination of all the functionaries of 
criminal justice system. 
A prompt and quality investigation is therefore the foundation of 
the effective criminal justice system. Police are employed to perform 
multifarious duties and quite often, the important work expeditious 
investigation gets relegated in priority."^ 
A separate wing of investigation with clear mandate that it is 
accountable only to Rule of Law is the need of the day. Therefore, the 
apparatus designed for investigation has to be equipped with laws and 
procedures to make it functional in the present context.^^^ 
111. Recommendations of Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System Cr. LJ. 
112. Ibid. 
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To improve quality and speedy investigation the commission 
recommended the following measures:^^^ 
(a) The post of an Addl.Suprintendent of Police (ASP) may be created 
exclusively for supervision of crime. 
(b) Another, Additional SP in each district should be made responsible 
for collection, collation and dissemination of criminal intelligence; 
maintenance and analysis of crime data and investigation of 
important cases. 
(c) Each state should have an officer of the IGP rank in the State Crime 
Branch exclusively to supervise the functioning of the police. The 
crime Branch should have specialized squads far organized crime 
and other major crimes. 
(d) Grave and sensational crimes having inter-stated and transactional 
ramifications should be investigated by a team of officers and not 
by a single investigating officer. 
(e) The senior most police officer posted at the Police Station must 
investigate the cases exclusively tried by the session's judge. 
(f) Fair and transparent mechanisms shall be set up in place where, 
they do not exist and strengthened where they exist, at the District 
Police Range and State level for redressal of public grievances. 
(g) Police establishment Boards should be set up at the police 
headquarters for posting, transfer and promotion etc. of the District 
level officers. 
(h) The existing system of police commissioner's office, which is found 
to be more efficient in the matter of crime control and management, 
shall be introduced in the urban cities and towns. 
(i) Deputy S.P. level officers to investigate crimes need to be reviewed 
to investigate crimes need to be reviewed for reducing the burden 
of the circle officers so as to enable them to denote more time to 
supervisory work.. 
(j) Criminal cases should be registered promptly with utmost 
promptitude by the Station Houser Officers (SHO). 
(k) Stringent punishment should be provided for false registration of 
cases and false complaints. Section 182/211 of I.P.C. be suitably 
amended. 
(1) Specialized units/squads should be set up at the state and District 
level for investigating specified category crimes. 
113. Ibid. 
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(m) A panel of experts be drawn from various disciplines such as 
auditing, computer science, banking, engineering, and revenue 
matters etc. at the state level from whom assistance can be sought 
by the investigating officers. 
(n) With emphasis on compulsory registration of crime and removal of 
difference between non-cognizable and cognizable offences, the 
work load of investigation agencies would increase considerably. 
Additionally, some investigators would be required to be done by a 
team of investigators. For liquidating the existing pendency and for 
speedy and quality investigation including increase in the number 
of investigating officers is of utmost importance. It is recommended 
that such number be increased at least two fold during the next 
three years. 
(o) Similarly, for ensuring effective and better quality of supervision of 
investigation the number of supervisory officers (additional SPs/Dy 
SP) should be doubled in next three years. 
(p) Infrastructural facilities available to the investigating officers 
specially in regard to accommodation, mobility, connectivity, use of 
technology, training facilities etc. are grossly inadequate and they 
need to be improved on top priority. 
Criminal Investigation by Scientific Method 
> Narcoanalysis Test and Brain Mapping 
Development of new tools of investigation has led to the emergence 
of scientific tools of interrogation like the Narcoanalysis test and brain 
mapping. Such tests are a result of advances, in science but they often raise 
doubts regarding basic human rights and also about their reliability, legal 
questions are raised about their validity with some upholding its validity 
in the light of legal principles and others rejecting it as a blatant violation 
of Constitutional provisions. 
Narcoanalysis is a scientific tool of interrogation, and helps a lot in 
crime prevention and detention. It also helps in getting clinching 
evidences and is an effective and non-hazardous methods of inducing 
hypnosis, according to the police, if a criminal was put under 
narcoanalysis then he would reveal about the crime committed, where he 
had hidden the weapons used in committing the crime and why did he do 
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it? This would help in getting the motive for the crime and collect other 
evidence needed for prosecution."^ 
> The Legal Aspect: The Dilemma 
The privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental canon of 
common law criminal Jurisprudence. 
The characteristics features of this principle are -
• The accused is presumed to be innocent. 
• That it is for the prosecution to establish his guilt and 
• That the accused need not make any statement against his will. 
The privilege against self-incrimination thus enables the 
maintenance of human privacy and observance of civilized standards in 
the enforcement of criminal justice Article 20(3), which embodies this 
privilege reads, "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to 
be a witness against himself." 
On analysis, this provision will be found to contain the following 
components: 
• It is a right available to a person "accused of an offence"; 
• It is a protection against such "compulsion" resulting in his giving 
evidence against himself .^ ^^  
All the three ingredients must necessarily co-exist before the 
protection of Article 20(3) can be claimed. If any of these ingredients is 
missing. Article 20(3) cannot be invoked. The main issue thus is the 
question of its admissibility as a scientific technique in investigations and 
its ultimate admissibility in court as forensic evidence."^ 
114. All India Seminar on Judicial Reforms, on 23rd & 24th Feb. 2008 Souvenir by Malak 
BhattP. 116. 
115. www Legal service India.com/article/19-silence-of-The - Lambs Article-20(3)- In-
Administrative Proceedings, html. 
116. Ibid. 
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It is well established that the right to silence has been granted to the 
accused by virtue of the pronouncement in the case of Nandini Sathpathy 
vs. P.L. Dani^^'^ no one can forcibly extract statements from the accused, 
who has the right to keep silent during to course of investigation. But by 
the administration of these tests, forcible intrusion into one's mind is being 
restored. 
> The Precedent: Telgi and What Followed 
Abdul Karim Telgi, the Kingpin in the stamp paper scam, was 
among the first to hit the headlines for undergoing narcoanalysis, earlier, 
Veerappan's men were 'narcoanalysed' to find out where the bring and 
had hidden the ransom money he had received for releasing actor Raj 
Kumar. The accused in the Godhara train burning, Mumbai train blasts, 
Nithari killings and Aurushi murder, besides gangster Abu Salem and a 
number of people charged with terrorism have been put through the 'truth 
serum' test. 
To get an accused narcoanalysed, the police need just say 'suspect 
not cooperating with investigation'. The courts have been giving go-ahead 
and some scientists, who claim that the method reveals the truth, have 
been conducting the test in India for the past eight years. In fact India is 
the only country in the civilized World where narcoanalysis is being used 
by investigative agencies. 
A special court dealing with cases under the Maharashtra Control of 
Organized Crime Act (MCOCA) in Pune had allowed the special 
Investigation Team(SIT) probing the multi crore fake stamp paper scam to 
put Abdul Karim Telgi through an array of scientific tests, in order to aid 
speedy investigation and facilitate the collection of evidence. The Karnatka 
Forensic Science Laboratory (KFSC) is Banglore conducted a polygraph 
test, brain mapping, and a narcoanalysis procedure on Telgi. The 
117. AIR 1978 SC1025. 
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Narcoanalysis test yielded an immense amount of information but doubts 
were raised about its value as evidence. The use of drugs on Telgi in order 
to extract the truth created a controversy."» The aforesaid controversy is 
also considered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Selvi vs. 
State by Koramangla Police StationA'^^ 
The new trend of using scientific test in investigation was welcomed 
by the police for having immense potential for the greater good of the 
society. The intention of using Truth serum was to help investigations 
with leads to corroborate evidence that had already been gathered. 
According to defence lawyers, Narcoanalysis report had no evidential 
value as the test violated Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 
C. Speedy Services of Summons 
After taking Cognizance once, the magistrate forms an opinion that 
there is sufficient ground for proceeding; the further orders are issued 
only after a list of prosecution witnesses has been filed.^ ^o On the basis of 
the nature of the case magistrate is empowered to issue. Summons or 
warrant. Where the case appears to be a Summons case^^i ^g issues 
summons for the attendance of the accused.^22 where the case appears to 
be a warrant case^23 he may issue a warrant or Summons.124 jf j-j^ e law in 
force requires process fees or other fees to be paid no process is issued 
118. www.tribuneinida.com/2004/20040323/mainl.htm. 
119. 2004(7)KarLJ501. 
120. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 204(2) 
121. Section 2(W) of Cr.P.C. defines Summons Case as: Summons case means a case relating 
to an offence and not being a warrant case. 
122. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 204(l)(a) 
123. Section 2(x) Cr.P.C. defines warrants as ;Warrant case means a case relating to an 
offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term 
exceeding two years 
124. Id. Section 204(4) 
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unless such fee is paid, and if such fees is not paid the magistrate may 
dismiss the complaint.^^s 
Lapses of time in paying process fee or in furnishing copies of the 
aforesaid documents to the accused at times contributors in a major way 
towards delaying the process of trial. 
The delay in the delivery of Summons also adds in delaying the 
process of trial. A Summons is an authoritative call to appear in court for a 
certain purpose. The Summons from court may be to the accused to a 
witness to produce document or to a person to show cause. Summons 
should be clear and specific in terms as to title of court, place day and hour 
of attendance. Non compliance with the requirements of the forms can not 
be treated highly especially when essential features, like the nature of the 
offence charged are not mentioned. Where Summons is disobeyed, it is the 
bounden duty of the court to act according to law for disobedience to 
Summons. 
Section 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with personal 
service, in case of personal service process server must satisfy himself that 
the right man has been found and then deliver or tender him one of the 
duplicates of the Summons Showing him the original, if asked. Tender is 
sufficient Service, although there may be refusal to receive or to sign 
receipt, which is not an offence.^ ^e gut the tender must be real tender of a 
document which is understood by the person to be served, and he must 
have waived actual delivery. 
All that a Magistrate has to do that at the stage of section 203 or 204, 
Cr.P.C. is to see whether, on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the 
evidence placed, there is prima-facie evidence in support of the charge 
levelled against the accused. If he finds prima-facie, that there is sufficient 
125. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 
126. Sarkar on. Criminal Procedure, 5th Ed. 1988, p. 51. 
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ground for proceeding against the accused, he orders the issue of process 
to the accused. 
Where the Magistrate dismisses the complaint,^27 the recording of 
reasons is mandatory. Omission to record the reasons vitiates the order, 
failure to record reasons is a direct disobedience of law and not a mere 
irregularity which can, however, be cured by section 464 or 465.^ 28 
The order passed by the Magistrate must show his application of mind 
and should be a speaking order. However, for issuing process under 
section 204, it is not necessary to give detailed reasons. 
At the time of issuing process, the accused has no locus standi to 
participate in the inquiry and the case has to be judged exclusively from 
the point of view of the complainant only. The accused is not entitled to be 
heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or 
not. He has no right to participate in proceedings^^^ either in police case or 
in complaint case. 
Where cognizance has been taken against an accused under section 
204 or a person has been summoned as an accused, i^ o The court can re-
consider the order at a later stage when the accused applies for setting 
aside the order. 
Where on the dismissal of a complaint by the Magistrate, the 
sessions Judge held that there are sufficient materials to proceed, the 
Magistrate has no option but to direct the summoning of the accused in 
the light of the order of the superior court. 
Where the accused in a complaint case are of different districts of 
state, the Magistrate should invariably issue Summons to the accused 
dispensing his personal attendance and permitting him to appear through 
127. Criminal Procedure Code 1973, Section 203. 
128. Crinainal Procedure Code 1973 
129. Id., Section (202) 
130. Id., Section 319. 
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pleader. This will automatically minimize mischievous and vexations 
complaints simply filed for causing harassing and humiliation to the 
accused. 
In the case of Nirmaljit Singh Hoon vs. State of West Bengal}^^ a three 
judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held: 
"If the Magistrate before whom the complaint is made or to whom it has 
been transferred, after considering the statement on oath of the 
complainant and his witnesses and the result of inquiry or investigation 
under section 202, Cr.P.C. is of the opinion that there is no sufficient cause 
for proceeding, he may for reasons to be recorded briefly, dismiss the 
complaint. If, on the contrary, the Magistrate taking cognizance of the 
offence is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for proceeding, he 
should issue process against the accused in accordance with section 204 of 
the Code. It may be noted that the evidence which is required to be 
adduced by the complainant at that stage may not be sufficient for 
recording a finding of conviction, but that fact would not absolve the 
complainant who wants the Magistrate to issue a process against the 
accused persons from leading some credible evidence as may prima facie 
show the commission of the offence". 
In Subramanium Sethuraman vs. State of MaharashtraP'^ a three Judge 
Bench of the Supreme Court held: "The issuance of process under section 
204 of the Code is a preliminary step in the stage of trial contemplated in 
chapter XX, Cr.P.C. such an order made at a preliminary stage being an 
interlocutory order, the same cannot be reviewed or reconsidered by the 
Magistrate, there being no provision under Cr.P.C. for review of an order 
by the same court. Hence, it is impermissible for the Magistrate to 
reconsider his decision to issue process in the absence of any specific 
provision to recall such order. It is true that the case of Adalat Prasad vs. 
131. (1973) 3 SC 753: (1973) SCC (Cri) 521: AIR 1972 SC 2639. 
132. (2002) SCC (Cri) 248. 
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Rooplal Jindal^^^ pertained to a Warrant case whereas Matheiu case,^^^ 
pertained to a Summons Case. To this extent, there is some difference in 
the two cases, but that does, in any manner, make the law laid down by 
the Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad case bad law." 
> Fourteenth Report of Law Commission of India 
Delay in services of summon -Magistrates generally send a packet 
containing Summonses by post to the concerned Police Station within 
whose jurisdiction the witnesses reside, generally no record is kept by the 
Station House Officer (SHO), to show the receipt of the packet of 
Summonses. Often the police officers allege that these Summonses were 
not received by them or did not reach them in time to effect service.^^^ 
In this connection we may draw attention to certain instructions 
framed in the state of Madras. These rules provide that a magistrate, 
whenever he has to issue Summonses, should hand over the Summonses 
to a police officer of that station which has to serve them if he appears 
before him that day in any connection or is otherwise present in court. 
This would be easy because Summonses would be ready in respect of the 
cases which are posted a fortnight or three weeks ahead. Ordinarily, the 
police officers or constables of that station would appear in the court of the 
magistrate either in connection with a pending case on for the delivery of 
property or the return of warrants and other purposes. The Summonses 
are handed over to the police officer on such occasions and his 
acknowledgement is taken in a register kept for the purpose. A similar 
register is maintained against the name of the court. Immediate action is 
expected to be taken for the service of Summonses and the served copies 
thereof have to be sent to the court in advance of the hearing. Superior 
police officers have to inspect these registers, with a view to ensure that 
133. (2002) 7 s e c 338; 2004 SCC(Cri.) 1927. 
134. (1992) 1 s e c 217: AIR 1992 SCC 2206. 
135. Law Commission of India, 14th Report, Vol. II 
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prompt action is taken or receipt of the Summonses. They are also 
authorized to look into the register of Summonses kept by the court and 
compare, them with the police registers. We have referred to certain other 
details of this method in our chapter on the supervision of Subordinate 
Courts similar instructions issued elsewhere would in our view, help to 
avoid delays arising from non-service of Summonses. These instructions 
will achieve their purpose only if their working is properly supervised. 
D. Speedy Inquiry 
In common parlance, 'investigation' and 'inquiry' are used as 
synonymous or inter-changeable terms. The Criminal Procedure Code, 
however, uses them differently and with specific distinct connotations.^^^ 
An 'Inquiry', according to the Code, means every inquiry which is 
conducted by a magistrate or court and which is not a trial.^3'' 
An 'inquiry' is never conducted by the police though in common 
parlance we talk of police inquiries. 
The term 'trial' has not been defined in the Code. It means the 
judicial process in accordance with law whereby the question of guilt or 
irmocence of the person accused of any offence is determined. Therefore, 
where a magistrate or court conducts an inquiry for deciding as to the 
guilt or innocence of any person accused of any offence, such an inquiry is 
not just an 'inquiry' but it is termed as a 'trial'. But where the inquiry 
relates to a matter other than the determination of guilt or innocence in 
respect of any alleged offence, such an inquiry is not a 'trial' but a mere 
'inquiry'. 
The regime of criminal trial in India is regulated by the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code. The provisions of the 
136. Kelkars R.V. Lectures on Criminal Procedure, p. 46. 
137. CR.P.C. 1973, Section 2(g) 
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Cr.P.C. clearly contain essential ingredients of speedy trial including 
speedy inquiry. 
And the Constitutional guarantee of speedy trial emanating from 
Article 21 is properly reflected in the provision of the Code. 
Section 309(1) stipulates a positive move towards speedy inquiry, and as 
such it reads: 
In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as 
expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of 
witnesses has once began the same shall be continued from day to day 
until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court 
finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be 
necessary for reasons to be recorded. 
E. Free Legal Aid 
Free Legal Aid is one of the specific rights of the accused as flowing 
from the fountainhead of the Constitution of India and as embodied in the 
Criminal Procedure Code, provides free Legal Aid to accused at state 
expense where in a trial before the Court of Session is not represented by a 
pleader and where appears to the court that the accused has not sufficient 
means to engage a pleader. The High Court may, with the previous 
approval of the State Government, make rules providing for: 
(a) The mode of selecting pleaders for defence; 
(b) The facilities to be allowed to such pleaders by the courts; and 
(c) The fee payable to such pleaders by the Government and 
generally, for carrying out the purposes of sub-section (1). 
The State Government may, by notification, direct that, as from such 
date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of this section 
shall apply in relation to any class of trials before other courts in the state 
as they apply in relation to trials before courts of session.^^s 
138. Criminal Procedure Code 1973, Section 304. 
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> Access to Speedy Justice 
The Constitution of India recognized importance of access to justice 
to courts, particularly the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The right 
under Article 32 to petition the Supreme Court for enforcement and 
protection of a fundamental right is itself a fundamental right.^ 39 
It is also to be stated that 'Right to access to courts' includes right to 
Legal Aid and engaging Counsel. Article 39-A was introduced in the 
Constitution 42"*^  Amendment Act, 1976 and it provides that: 
"The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system 
promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, 
provide free Legal Aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or any other way, 
to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any 
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. 
In the decision of Hussainam Khatoon vs. State of Bihar,^^^ Where the 
court was appalled at the plight of thousands under trials languishing in 
the jails in Bihar for years without ever being represented by a lawyer. The 
court declared that "there can be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy 
trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part 
of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. 
The Apex Court pointed out at Article 39-A of the Constitution 
emphasized that free legal services was an inalienable element of 
'reasonable, fair and just' procedure and that the right to free legal services 
is implicit in the guarantee of Article 21. Justice Bhagwati declared: Legal 
Aid is really nothing else but equal justice in action. Legal Aid is in fact the 
delivery system of social justice. If free legal services are not provided to 
such an accused, the trial itself may run the risk of being vitiated as 
139. The Constitution of India Article 32. 
140. (1980) s e c 81. 
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contravening Article 21 and we have no doubt that every state 
Government would try to avoid such a possible eventuality". 
He reiterated this proposition in Suk Das vs. Union Territory of Arunachal 
Pradesh^'^^ and said "It may therefore now be taken as settled law that free 
legal assistance at State Cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of 
an offence which may involve jeopardy to his life or personal liberty and 
this fundamental right is implicit in the requirement of reasonable, fair 
and just procedure prescribed by Article 21.". This part of the narration 
would be incomplete without referring to the other astute architect of 
human rights jurisprudence, justice Krishna Iyer in M.H. Hoskot vs. State of 
Maharashtra,^'^^ he declared: "If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment is 
virtually unable to exercise his Constitutional and statutory right of appeal 
inclusive of special leave to appeal for want of legal assistance, there is 
implicit in the court under Article 142 read with Article 21 and 39-A of the 
Constitution of India, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned 
individual 'for doing complete justice". 
To support this number of Apex Court verdicts there are some facts 
and figures which confirm to above decisions. 
Particulars 
Number of Pending cases 
Number of Vacancies of 
Judges in Courts 
District 
Courts 
2,52,85,982 
3,233 
High Court 
37,00,223 
284 
Supreme Court 
46,926 
02 
Reference: Supreme Court Quarterly Newsletter October - December, 2007 (Released on 24 January 
2008). 
> Financial Support Provided by the Government to have Access to 
Justice 
Judicial administrations in the country have the deficiencies due to 
lack of proper planning and adequate financial support for establishing 
141. (1986) 2 s e c 401. 
142. (1978) 3 s e c 544. 
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more courts and providing them with adequate infrastructure. For several 
decades, the courts have not been provided with any funds under the 
five-year plans nor has the Finance Commission been making any separate 
provisions to serve the financial needs of the courts.^^s jy^Q edifice of the 
administration of justice rests on the shoulder of district judiciary, as the 
majority of the litigants go only upto district level. The High Courts have 
power of Superintendence over the state Judiciary but they do not have 
any financial powers to acquire new manpower or infrastructure. 
The Financial Budget of the financial year 2007-2008 out of its total 
"Demand for Grants" of Rs. 23,11,132.98 crores granted only Rs. 817 crores 
to Ministry of law and justice.^ ^** It comes to be 0.036% approximately only. 
> Financial Autonomy in the Functioning of Judiciary 
Today, the judiciary in India is blamed for the huge back log of 
cases as mentioned above. It is high time that the public is made aware 
that during the last 60 years after independence, the Government for 
improvement of the infrastructure of the Judiciary has paid little attention. 
There is a dearth of courts and judges and of building for both 
courts and Judges and officers and staff. In several cases, even minimum 
facilities have not been given. The reason is that there is no planning and 
proper budgeting of the courts' requirements in consultation with the 
Judiciary as is done in other countries nor is there a long-range plan or at 
least a Five Year Plan. The result is that most courts are over burdened 
with cases on the civil and criminal side. Delay results in a serious 
infraction of right to speedy trials, to violation of human rights in various 
cases. A stage has reached when the parties are thinking of taking the law 
into their hands. 
143. Recommendations for Amendments to the Constitution of India: Report of the National 
Commission to Review the working of the Constitution (Delhi: Universal law 
publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2002) P. 142. 
144. http://indiabudgetr.nic.in 
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At this above scenario, it has become necessary to go into the subject 
of 'financial independence' or 'financial support' of the Judiciary in India 
at some length on a comparative basis and also to consider the need for 
adequate provision for the Judiciary as a 'plan' subject. First of all it has 
already been justified that the independence of the Judiciary is part of the 
basic structure of our Constitution. 
In S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India & Another,^"^^ Bhagwati J. (as he then 
was) observed that "the concept of independence of the Judiciary is a 
noble concept which inspires the Constitutional scheme and constitutes 
the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity." In the 
same case, Fazal Ali, J. Stated that, it has, however, not been doubted by 
Counsel for any of the parties that independence of Judiciary is doubtless 
a basic structure of the Constitution". Again in Shri Kumar Padma Prasad vs. 
Union of India & Others}'^^ Kuldip Singh, J. observed that the 
"Independence of the Judiciary is the basic feature of the Constitution of 
India". 
By giving financial autonomy to judiciary, it shall be protected 
against economic, political and other influences, which would ensure 
impartiality. The nation expects from the Superior Judicial officers, the 
wisdom of Solomon; the courage of David, the strength of Samson, the 
patience of Job; the leadership of Moses; the kindness of Good Samaritan, 
the strategic training of Alexander; the diplomacy of Lincoln and the 
tolerance of carpenter of Nazareth and the intimate knowledge of every 
branch of natural, biological and social sciences.^^/ p^ reference may be 
made to Article 50 of the Constitution of India, which enjoins the state to 
145. (1981) s e c 87 at p. 223. 
146. (1992(2) s e c 428 at 446 and 456) 
147. Hon'ble Justice Arjit Pasayat, Judge, Supreme Court of India; Safeguarding Judicial 
Independence, First South Asian Regional Judicial Colloquium on Access to Justice, 
New Delhi 1-3 November 2002. 
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separate the Judiciary from the executive with the intent to minimize the 
Judiciary from any form of executive control or interference. 
Independence of the Judiciary deals with the independence of the 
individual Judges in relation to their appointment, tenure, payment of 
salaries and also non-removal except by process of impeachment. 
The independence has also other facets including the 'Institutional 
independence of the Judiciary'. One of the accepted facets of 'institutional 
independence' is the one concerning the financial resources and financial 
freedom or autonomy that is to be given to the Judiciary. Today, this 
concept has been developed and accepted in most of the democracies 
governed by the rule of law. The doctrine of separation of powers has been 
suitably modified and adjusted to achieve the above goal of financial 
freedom of the Judiciary. It must never be overlooked that where judicial 
pay levels are very low, especially subordinate Judiciary, judges often take 
on other work. Sometimes of a nature demeaning of Judicial status. 
This distracts them from their judicial duties. Certainly, also low pay 
makes judges vulnerable to corruption. The dependence of the judiciary 
on the Executive branch for its resources is another factor, which impairs 
its independence. The Judiciary has no power of purse. At best it has to act 
within the allocation of funds made to it in the annual budget. More often, 
the allocation of fund is assessed as part of a departmental budget, control 
over which is exercised by the Minister responsible. Consequently, the 
Judiciary carmot spend a rupee more even if it is necessary for stream 
lining the machinery of justice and improving its performance. 
If the Judiciary wants to introduce modem science and technology 
in the functioning of the Court system, to expand its facilities, or appoint 
more judges with a view to expediting the disposal of cases, it cannot do 
so unless the executive makes the necessary funds available. Thus the 
executive can twist the arm of the Judiciary if it does not behave to its 
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liking. This absence of financial autonomy has an adverse impact on the 
independence of the judiciary as an institution. 
There is need for budgetary independence that is the ability of the 
judiciary to exercise control over its own funds and apply these funds in 
accordance with its own priorities for a better administration of justice. 
> How to Achieve Financial Autonomy for Judiciary? 
There are two methods devised by professors of Yale University for 
identifying the financial needs of the courts, presenting them clearly, 
getting the required appropriations, and administering the funds in an 
intelligent and responsible manner.^*^ 
These methods are as follows: 
> The Constitution Theory of Inherent Power 
The doctrine of inherent power implies that the courts are 
a constitutionally created branch of government who's continued effective 
functioning is indispensable; performance of that Constitutional function 
is a responsibility committed to the courts; this responsibility implies the 
authority necessary to carry it out, therefore, the courts have the authority 
to raise money to sustain their essential functions. The doctrine presents 
the alluring prospect of obtaining funds through writs of mandamus thus 
avoiding the Bargaining and uncertainty of the legislative process. Even its 
most extensive formulations, however, have been somewhat ambiguous, 
never precisely defining the needs to be covered. A court has inherent 
power, to determine what funds are reasonably necessary for its efficient 
and effective operation, and to compel the executive and legislative 
branches to provide such funds. Such statements have raised hopes that 
the doctrine can be used by courts to achieve fiscal independence. 
148. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Martin B. Mc Namava; Irwin F. Sentilles, III, Court Finance and 
Unitary Budgeting; The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 81, No. 7. Jun, (1972) pp. 1286-1301. 
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> The Administrative Concept of Unitary Budgeting 
Unitary budgeting represents a fundamental departure from 
traditional court fiscal management. It locates in one central authority the 
ultimate responsibility for planning, channelling, and auditing all judicial 
expenditures within a state. Under unitary budgeting statutes, authority in 
court fiscal matters accompanies ultimate administrative authority in the 
court system. 
The preparation of a consolidated budget is entrusted to the 
administrative head of the judicial department; the Chief Justice may 
assume the task or designate the Chief Court administrator to do so. Court 
finance is simply the fiscal counterpart of court administration. When a 
court system is administratively and functionally integrated, the budget 
expresses the means by which the various activities of the system are to be 
carried out. When a system is not administratively integrated, its budget is 
a formal, but not functional document. It simply aggregates expenditures 
for activities that are only nominally related to each other. 
• The National Commission to Review the working of the 
Constitution, 2002, it its consultation paper on Financial Autonomy 
for Indian Judiciary has proposed that Judiciary must be included 
separately in the plan by the planning commission and separate 
allotment be made by the planning commission and the Finance 
Commission. 
• Law Commission of India in its 189* Report on Revision of Court 
Fees Structure, February, 2004, has made following observations to 
achieve financial autonomy of the courts; 
"Every law made by parliament or the state Legislatures creates 
new civil rights and delegations and creates new criminal offences. Before 
such laws are introduced, a judicial impact assessment has to be made as 
to the impact of the acts on the courts - such as how many civil cases the 
Act will generate or how many fresh criminal cases will go before the 
courts. To that extent, each Bill must, in its Financial Memorandum, Seek 
budgetary allocation but in the last five decades, this has not been done. 
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We may state that in United States a statute specifically requires judicial 
impact assessment and adequate budgetary provisions to be made. 
Unfortunately, this is not done in India. The principle here is that the 
expense for the judicial branch must be met from the general taxes that are 
collected by the state." 
• Revenue earned by the state through the functioning of the Courts 
should be at least allocated to judicial wing only and state should 
not invest it elsewhere. 
• The National Commission to Review the working of the 
Constitution, 2002, recommended that 'access to justice' must be 
incorporated as an express fundamental right as in the South 
African Constitution of 1996. In the South Africa Constitution, 
Article 34 reads as follows: 
"Article 34: Access to courts and Tribunals and speedy justice: 
(1) Every one has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by 
the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court 
or tribunal or forum or where appreciate another independent and 
impartial court, tribunal or forum. 
(2) The right to access to courts shall be deemed to include the right to 
reasonably speedy and effective justice in all matters before the 
courts. Tribunals or other forum and the state shall take all reasonable 
steps to achieve that object." 
Accordingly, the National Commission for Review the working of 
Constitution has recommended insertion of Article 30A on the following 
terms: 
"30A: Access to courts and Tribunals and Speedy Justice: 
(1) Everyone has a right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before an 
independent court or where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum. 
(2) The right to access to courts shall be deemed to include the right to 
reasonably speedy and effective justice in all matters before the 
courts. Tribunals or other forum and the state shall take all reasonable 
steps to achieve the said object," 
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The main advantage of this Article will be that it will create legal 
obligation of the state to fulfil the needs of common man to have access to 
justice. It is because if it will be incorporated a Directive Principles of state 
policy then it will not be eriforceable. Even though now Directive 
Principles of State Policy should be made binding because India is no 
more an infant state. 
At present, hardly 0.2 per cent of GNP (or 0.73 per cent of the total 
revenue) is spent on Judiciary in India (when half of this is realized by 
state Governments through court fees and fines) as compared to other 
countries such as the United Kingdom, the United states and Japan where 
it is between 12 and 15 percent of the total revenue. It must be emphasized 
that it is not enough merely to lay down principles for the financial 
independence of the Judiciary. These principles have to be implemented. 
Society must be made aware of their importance and any violation of them 
exposed. In this way public opinion be created in defence of the financial 
autonomy of the Judiciary and so ensure by necessary outcry that the 
Executive does not erode the maintenance of judicial independence. It 
should be made as a slogan for 2009 General Elections. 
Chapter - VI 
ROLE OF VARIOUS AGENCIES 
IN FURTHERANCE OF 
SPEEDY TRIAL 
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ROLE OF VARIOUS AGENCIES IN FURTHERANCE 
OF SPEEDY TRIAL 
(A) An Overview 
The Judicial system, which has various constituents and each one of 
them, has its own role to play for the growth, progress and success of the 
judicial system. To have a close and clear look of the judicial panorama, 
status of the litigant ought to be seen and considered which in turn 
obviously, shall help in searching efficient and effective ways and means 
for better restructuring and reshaping the system. 
Broadly speaking, the constituents of the judicial mechanism can be 
explained better in terms of its structure. In this context, it is, therefore said 
that the head of this system is a judge. Heart of the system is the litigant; 
the hands of the body are the lawyers. Investigating and prosecuting 
agencies and staff are the legs of this body. Hence, keeping in view the 
importance of all the constituents, there should not be any attempt to 
underestimate or overestimate one or the other.i 
One can therefore, hardly remain blind and indifferent to this grim 
reality of the situation. We are passing through really very critical time. 
We have docket explosion. If no appropriate, no ideal ways and remedies 
are urgently traced out and also successfully implemented expeditiously, a 
feeling or apprehension that this August Institution, only redeeming ray of 
hope may collapse of its own weight, cannot easily be ruled out. 
Sky rocketing and mounting arrears issue is one of the areas where 
very effective and strong urgent actions are warranted. Imagine a situation 
of over-fed person who goes on and on, eating without getting eaten food 
digested. What will be the situation? In our system, arrears are ever 
expanding and increasing, undoubtedly have reached at an alarming 
1. Justice J.N. Bhatt, "Judicial Cardiogram" Naya Deep, the Official Journal of NALSA, 
vol. VII, July, 2006, p. 69. 
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stage. Various actions, effective measures and concerted efforts on the part 
of one and all concerned are required keeping in focus, the weak hearted 
body, like that, position of a consumer of justice for early clearance and 
disposals without sacrificing the quality so that fresh cases can be disposed 
of for better functioning of the institution of judicial system.^ 
The problem of arrears is truly complex. It is enormous in nature. 
The contributory factors and sources are many. The judicial branch of the 
State has borne much of the brunt of criticism, though the other organs of 
the system and State can hardly be absolved of the blame. Various 
Committees' right form Rankin Committee in, 1924 to Malimath 
Committee in various special reports has suggested ways and means to 
expedite the criminal trials to overcome the pendency of criminal cases. 
In our legal system, it is heartening to note that Bar is integral part 
of system and it appears to be organized force, which is to be reckoned 
with. Legal fraternity has played very significant and strong role and still 
can play stronger role in reshaping and re-enforcing institutional 
confidence. Legal profession, which is a noble profession, has an important 
role as it is an important force which should render better help 
strengthening and re-enforcing the judicial system.3 
Several Commissions and Committees appointed from time to time 
have made recommendations for revamping the judicial system with a 
view to reduce delay and enlarge cases to justice. The amendments in the 
Criminal Procedure Code have been introduced with a view to make 
criminal proceedings smooth and less time consuming. Remedies have 
been curtailed with a view to give finality to the decision of the court. 
In order to reduce the congestion in the courts, alternative tribunals have 
been provided. Large number of special courts of the various provisions 
under the procedural laws has relaxed the rigidity. The Apex Court in its 
2. Id., p. 71. 
3. Id., p. 73. 
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proactive role, has issued directions from time to time to the Central 
government as well as the State governments to provide irifrastructure to 
the courts. There is continuous monitoring by the Apex Court to ensure 
that the adequate infrastructure is provided to the subordinate courts in 
the country. Attempts have been made to improve the system by use of 
technology and modern management tools. Attempts have also been made 
for judicial reforms through judicial education and training. However, the 
fact remains that the system is still burdened with the mounting arrears, 
which results in delay in disposal and denial of justice to those, who are 
unable to manage prolonged litigation. 
On one side, large number of accused persons languishing in jail has 
been complaining of their detention and is awaiting decisions from the 
trial courts or the appellate courts. On the other had, there is a complaint 
of unmerited acquittals. For a common man, it is beyond comprehension, 
how does a person who commits an offence in broad day light and blatant 
violation of norms, manage to escape the clutches of law.^ 
The popular concerns require to be responded by the lawyers and 
the judges. 
In a seminar on judicial reforms held at New Delhi on 23 February 
2008, the Hon'ble Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, the Chief Justice of India, 
states that, "we are trying to have planned approach to delay and arrears 
reduction. We are trying to have national minimum court performance 
standards that the people of India expect from the subordinate court. 
" We propose to have the following elements: 
(i) Disposal level of the national system should be raised from 60% of 
total case load (as of now) to 95% - 100% of total case load in five 
years. This will require this target to be established at the district, and 
State levels as well. 
4 . N.N. Mathur J. "Changes Required in Working and Procedural Laws for Speedy 
Processing", Indian Bar Review, vol. XXXII (3 & 4) 2005, pp. 337-338. 
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(ii) Each court to ensure that not more than 5% of the cases in that court 
should be more than 5 years old ( 5 x 5 rule) within the next three 
years, and in 5 years to ensure that not more than 1% of the cases 
should be more than 1 year old (1x1 rule). 
(iii) Time tables to be established for every contested case and monitored 
through a computerized signaling system (NJA has developed and 
piloted a model). 
(iv) Case numbers to indicate "litigation start dates" prominently in 
addition to filing dates. 
(v) Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution for civil cases and 'plea 
bargaining' for criminal cases to be enhanced and monitored through 
a nation-wide computerized tracking system. 
(vi) Bottleneck Monitoring: Four keys bottlenecks causing delays in civil 
and criminal process to be monitored through a computerized system 
and special attention to be provided through a special cell at the State 
and District level to resolve issues in coordination with executive 
agencies: (a) Service process; (b) Adjournments; (c) Interlocutory 
orders; and (d) Appearance of witnesses and accused.^ 
It is heartening that after several years, the judiciary has been 
seeking adequate Government support in building infrastructural capacity 
for enabling it to clear the backlog of cases and for increasing the efficiency 
and productivity in administration of justice. 
Horror stories abound regarding length of pendency. The 2002 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on delays gives examples of cases 
Presidential Address by Justice K.G. Balakrishrian, Chief justice of India, All India 
Seminar on "Judicial Reforms" held on 23 & 24 February, 2008 at Vigyan Bhawan, New 
Delhi, Souvenir vol. II, pp. 13-14. 
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pending for over 50 years, for 40 years and for over 30 years in certain 
States.^ 
In a conference of Chief Justice and Chief Ministers held at New 
Delhi in September 2004, the Prime Minister Dr, Manmohan Singh 
lamented the increasing delay and the cost of litigation. He added, 
"the problem of reducing backlog could be addressed in two ways. One is 
by reducing the load on courts and judges. The other is by improving the 
productivity and efficiency of our courts so that they can process more 
cases and in a faster manner". The Hon'ble Prime Minister gave out a 
10-point formula, which includes establishment of Lok Adalats, Family 
Courts, Fast Track Courts and Tribunals: emphasis on alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism improving the productivity of existing procedures 
by deploying modern technology, and emphasis on appointment of 
specialized and trend judges. There is need of co-ordinated and 
accelerated efforts both at policy level and implementation fronts. Thus, 
what is required is that properly arranges the recommendations made by 
the different Commissions and Committees and the resources made 
available and prepares an 'Action Plan' for the courts at all levels right 
from the Apex Court to down below. The 'Action Plan' not only prepared 
but also effectively monitored to ensure that it is implemented within the 
time bound programme. 
The recommendations made by some of the Committees on judicial 
reforms, deserve to be noticed. 
(B) Earlier Efforts 
One of the earliest government efforts to study efficient judicial 
functioning was undertaken by the Civil Justice Committee 1924. 
The report was known as the Rankin Committee Report, the report 
6 . The oldest case appears to be a 1950 pendency in the Madhya Pradesh State; a 1951 case 
is pending in the Patna State; a 1956 pendency exists in Rajasthan and a 1955 case is 
pending in Calcutta State. 
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highlighted the insufficient number of judges as the main cause of judicial 
delays in the States. In the year 1949, State Arrears Committee under the 
chairmanship of Justice S.R. Das was set up. The committee came up with 
the similar recommendations that the judge's strength in terms of number 
was not compatible with the volume of work, leading to inordinate delays 
in dispensation of justice. It recommended immediate increase in the 
number of judges at the State. 
Law Commission of India was constituted in the year 1955 to look 
into judicial administration and make scrutiny in all respects. 
It recommended the executive intervention as the major obstacle for 
increasing the number of judges at the State level and professed to 
minimize it to the extent possible.^ The State Committee appointed in 1972 
under Justice S.C. Shah expressed the same view; these observations were 
reiterated in the year 1979 and 1986.^  The 121 «* and 124* report of the Law 
Commission of India (LCI) and the recent Malimath Committee Report on 
Reforms of the Criminal Justice System have raised the similar concerns 'in 
one voice' apparently deficiency of judges has been cited as the main 
reason for the accumulation of the litigation in the courts. 
(C) Malimath Committee on Speedy Trial 
Justice Malimath Committee under the chairmanship of Justice V.S. 
Malimath, the former Chief Justice of Karnataka/Kerala States, was 
constituted by Government of India to suggest measures to revamp 
Criminal Justice System. 
Administration of criminal justice is part of governance and shares 
the virtues and vices of the government of the day. Investigation and 
prosecution of crimes constitutes the sole responsibility of the executive. It 
is the duty of the State to protect fundamental rights of the citizens as well 
as the right to property. The State has constituted the Criminal Justice 
7. The 14th Report Law Commission of India, 1958. 
8 . The 79th Report LCI, 1979 and 31st Report of Estimates Committee, 1986. 
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System to protect the rights of the innocent and punish the guilty. 
The system devised more than a century back has become ineffective; a 
large number of guilty go unpunished in a large number of cases the 
system takes years to bring the guilty to justice; and has ceased to deter 
criminals. Crime is increasing rapidly every day and types of crimes are 
proliferating. It is therefore that the Government of India, Ministry of 
Home Affairs constituted the committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice 
System to all the functionaries of the Criminal Justice System, the 
fundamental principles and the relevant laws. The committee having given 
its utmost consideration to the grave problems facing the country has 
made its recommendations in its final report. Those who are 
knowledgeable of the system believe that the situation is so grave that 
nothing less than a drastic change can put the system back on track. Vested 
interests will not let this happen and those in government will appoint 
Committees and Commissions to buy time or avoid responsibility. 
Meanwhile, people lose faith in the system and start depending on the 
emerging criminal elements themselves for protection and justice. The 
situation today reflects this dangerous transition. 
It is this alarming perception, which is reflected in the terms of 
reference of the Committees on Reforms of the Criminal Justice System 
appointed by the Government of India on 24* November 2000. 
An appraisal of the terms of reference of this committee is necessary to 
appreciate its recommendations in context. The terms, inter alia, include. 
(a) Examination of fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence 
to revamp the Criminal Justice System; if this warrants 
Constitutional Amendments, to propose them; 
(b) Need to re-write the Indian Penal Code (IPC) Criminal Procedure 
Code (Cr.P.C), Evidence Act to bring them in tune with the 
demand of the times; 
(c) Synergy among the judiciary prosecution and police to resolve 
confidence of common man in the system by protecting the 
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innocent and the victim and by punishing unsparingly the guilty 
and the criminal; 
(d) Simplification of judicial procedures to make delivery of justice 
faster and inexpensive; 
(e) Sound system and making police, prosecution and judiciary 
accountable for delays in their respective domains; 
(f) Examine feasibility of introducing concept of 'Federal crime' under 
list of seventh schedule to the constitution. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure is the backbone of Indian Criminal 
Justice System. The Code was given a new shape in the year 1973 by way 
repealing the old Code of 1898. The main thrust of bringing this new 
legislation was to separate the judiciary from the executive in order to 
bring uniformity in the criminal justice administration throughout the 
country. Simultaneously, the new procedural law of 1973 accommodated 
various recommendations made by the Law Commission of India with a 
view to simplify the procedure for speedy trial of criminal cases. However, 
the aspirations and expectations of people form this new law did not last 
even for two decades. 
Statistics shows that crime rate per one lack population were 179.9 
in the year 1951, which has gone as high as 520.4 in the year 2001. With the 
increase in number of crime, the rate of arrests also maintained upward 
trend. Against total arrests of 73,14,615 persons in the year 1996, for both 
IPC, special and local law (SLL), 68, 03,271 persons were arrested in the 
year 2001.9 
The conviction rate of IPC crimes in the trial courts is steadily 
sinking. It has come down to 40.8% in the year 2001 from 64.8% in the year 
1961. However, the conviction rate of special and local laws is 
encouraging. It was 80% in the year 2001. Graph of pendency in courts 
maintained a steady upward posture. As many as 1,32,65,407 criminal 
cases were pending in lower courts for disposal in the year 2001. Taking 
9 . Aggarwal, B.A., "Speedy and Visible Justice", Cr.L.J. (2004), p. 169. 
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criminal, civil and other miscellaneous criminal cases as well as the 
number of pending figures of States and Supreme Court, the pendency of 
cases in the country is more than two and half crores.^o 
The above facts and figures are enough to show the grim picture of 
criminal justice department of India. Having realized the urgent need to 
keep the people faith in the Criminal Justice System, the Government of 
India constituted a five member committee, headed by Hon'ble Dr. Justice 
V.S. Malimath, to suggest modifications and amendments in the criminal 
jurisdiction in tune with the demand of the time and in harmony with the 
aspirations of the people of India. 
Justice Malimath Committee has submitted its report to the 
Government in the month of March 2003 suggesting wide ranging changes 
in the procedural and penal laws. At the top of the report, the committee 
has suggested switching over from the 'adversarial system' to 'inquisitorial 
system'. 
According to the Committee 'quest for truth' should be the 
foundation of the Criminal Justice System in place of 'proof beyond doubt'. 
The Supreme Court of India has already played similar tune somehow 
advocating the doctrine of 'search for truth' even following the rules and 
objectives of criminal jurisprudence. In the case of Shakila Abul Gaffar Khan 
vs. Vasant R. Dhoble'^^ the Apex Court has affirmed the need of the hour to 
look beyond stony walls of procedural laws. Observing that the 
exaggerated adherence to and insistence upon the establishment of proof 
beyond every reasonable doubt by the prosecution ignoring the ground 
realities etc. often results in miscarriage of justice and makes the justice 
delivery system suspect and vulnerable. In a country like India, where 
10. Id., statistics are taken from crime in India Reports published by the Government of 
India. 
11 . 2003 Cr.LJ 4548: AIR 2003 SC 4567. 
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victims gradually losing the hope to get the protection of law, fundamental 
changes in the principles of criminal legal system needed. 
The adversarial system is already taking a back seat in the recent 
time. In a number of legislations like N.D.P.S., T.A.D.A., POTA and 
Negotiable Instrument Act, etc. the onus of prove innocence has been 
shifted upon the accused after the prosecution has made out a case against 
him, thus departing from the strict principle of adversarial system that the 
prosecution must prove its case to the hilt upon its own evidence. 
The Evidence Act, 1872, also contains a series of provisions allowing 
the courts to draw adverse presumptions only to reach to a just conclusion. 
Besides this in the civil side, legal rights of millions of people are being 
decided on the basis of 'preponderance of probability' concept. Similarly, 
fundamental rights of millions of people are being decided and restored by 
the High Courts and Supreme Court on the basis of affidavits and 
documents filed by the parties. This shows that justice can be done on the 
basis of 'clear and convincing evidence' doctrine, as propounded by the 
Malimath Committee. 
The MaHmath Committee has also propagated the concept of justice 
to victims, strengthening the investigation and prosecution wing, 
simplifying the trial procedure, methods to improve conviction rate, 
introducing a new scheme for eradication of arrears, amongst other 
suggestions. The report is a hard work by experts from judiciary, legal 
fraternity, executive, police agency and academician. The Report is 
exhaustive and deserves serious consideration by all concerned.^^ 
The committee identified the following two as the major problems 
to be addressed in the context of the terms of reference: 
1. Huge pendency and consequent delay in delivery of justice. 
12 . Aggarwal, B.A., "Speedy and visible Justice", CrLJ (2004), p. 170. 
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2. Very low rate of conviction in cases involving serious crimes, which 
reduced deterrence to the level that crime has become a profitable 
business and citizen's faith in the system constantly getting eroded. 
The committee adopted multiple strategies to get inputs from all 
stakeholders so that recommendations are acceptable, practical and 
responsive to the problems identified. 
(I) Problem of Pendency and Delay in Criminal Justice 
Speedy trial is a constitutional right of the accused. Inordinate delay 
tends to result in unjustified acquittals. Taking more than 3 years amounts 
to denying a fair trial, on a rough estimate, the average time taken (during 
2000) for trial of serious criminal cases is 5 to 10 years, and in some cases 
even more than that. 
Arrears and delay in criminal justice is the cumulative result of 
distortions in various stages of criminal proceeding involving the police, 
the prosecution, the defence and the courts. It is difficult to quantify the 
delay involved in each stage as the process depends on the performance of 
multiple parties not under the control of any single agency. Lack of 
coordination between investigation and prosecution is a serious problem.^3 
Major recommendations of the committee in respect of pendency and 
delay in various stages of criminal proceedings are as follows: 
> Arrears Eradication Scheme 
The recommendations made by the Committee in this report would 
help in reducing the arrears and speeding up the trials; but to tackle the 
huge arrears a complementary strategy is recommended. Government of 
India, Ministry of Law and justice has created a 'Fast Track Courts' scheme 
for dealing with the sessions cases. However, the scheme is good it is best 
13. Madhava Menon N.R. "Criminal Justice Reforms": A Fresh Look on Malimath 
Committee Recommendations. Journal of the Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 
Vol. 39, Jan.-Dec. (2005), p. 3. 
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with many practical problems besides being limited to dealing with 
sessions cases. The committee is in favour of working out an 'Arrears 
Eradication Scheme' for the purpose of tackling all the cases that are 
pending for more than 2 years on the appointed day. 
To carry out the scheme, the committee feels that in each State under 
an efficient retired State judges should be asked to tackle cases pending 
beyond 2 years. The scheme lapses once the 'arrears' are tackled. The judge 
should assess the requirements, get persormel appointed, monitor progress 
and be held accountable for results. 
Fast Track Courts with some modifications can be the institutional 
model to tackle the problem of arrears. The important characteristics of the 
scheme are: 
(a) Ad hoc or contractual appointment of judges from among able 
retired judges and senior members of the Bar. 
(b) Case taken up for hearing should be heard on a day-to-day basis 
until conclusion with no adjournment once the case is posted. If 
adjourned under special circumstances, it is to be subject to 
payment of costs and also of expenses of witnesses. 
(c) States to ensure that current cases (pending for less than 2 years) 
are disposed of promptly for which required Additional courts are 
to be constituted wherever needed. 
(d) Compounding and settlement as recommended by the committee 
to be extended to all pending cases. 
(e) To solve problem of space and facilities, the courts set up under 
the scheme should work in shifts, say form 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. and 
from 2:30 p.m. to 7: 30 p.m. 
> Settlement of Disputes through Plea - Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is a viable alternative to deal with huge arrears of 
criminal cases. It is to be part of pre-trial negotiation and can involve 
'charge bargaining' or 'sentence bargaining' or 'fact bargaining' or all. 
It results invariably in conviction, but reduced sentence and early disposal. 
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The Law Commission (under the chairmanship of Justice M.P. 
Thakka) in its 142"'^  Report^ ^^ considered the concept of Plea Bargaining to 
overcome the problem of mounting arrears of criminal cases. The 
Commission conducted a survey to ascertain whether the legal community 
was in support of plea Bargaining and also to gather opinions on the 
applicability of the practice if the earlier response was in the affirmative. 
Further, the Law Commission, in its 154* Report^ ^^ reiterated the need for 
remedial legislative measures to reduce the delays in the disposal of 
criminal trials and appeals and also to alleviate the suffering of under trial 
prisoners. The 177th^^ Report of the Law Commission 2001 also sought to 
incorporate the concept of Plea Bargaining. The Malimath Committee thus 
affirmed the recommendations of the Law Commission of India in its 142"^ 
and 154'h Reports. 
A formal proposal for incorporating Plea Bargaining into the Indian 
Criminal Justice process was put forth in 2003 through Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Bill, 2003. However, those provisions failed to come through 
and were introduced with slight changes through the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005 which was passed by both the houses of 
Parliament. And was finally incorporated into the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 as Chapter XXI-A through the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 2005, and came into being from July 5, 2006. 
> Re-classification of offences for Efficient Management of Criminal 
Justice 
Crimes vary in gravity and impact and accordingly the society 
varies. Reclassification helps to determine appropriate procedure for quick 
and effective treatment commensurate to the gravity of the infringement, 
14. Law Commission Report 1991 - Concessional treatment for offenders who on their 
own initiative chose to plead guilty without bargaining 
15 . Law Commission Report 1996 
16. Law Commission Report, 2001. 
340 
with certainty in terms of time and punishment and cost effectiveness in 
terms of management. 
Instead of the existing classification (cognizable and non-cognizable; 
bailable and non-bailable offences), the proposal is to adopt a 
cost-benefit standard in terms of gravity of infringement, prospects for 
correction/deterrence, desirability or otherwise of alternative non-punitive 
modes of settlement and society's capacity to bear the transaction costs. 
There are limits to the capacity of any system including the Criminal 
Justice System and system overload can lead to unacceptable costs and 
consequences. Hence, the need for diversion and system management 
based on capacities, acceptable pragmatic alternatives and transaction 
costs. 
One possible scheme or re-classification of offences in the above 
context can be the enactment of four different codes, namely -
1. Social Welfare Offences Code (minor infractions of quasi-criminal 
nature to be compounded at the earliest stage with compensatory 
remedies); 
2. Correctional Offences Code (minor but more serious infringements 
which warrant penal remedies, but of a correctional/reformative 
nature not involving imprisonment which are also subject to 
negotiated settlements; 
3. Economic Offences Code (offences involving fraud and endangering 
economic health of the nation which warrant severe economic 
deterrence); and 
4. Penal Code (hard crimes including organized crimes and terrorism 
which need to be dealt with strong responses from society). 
One can argue that there is no need for police to arrest ordinarily in 
the first two categories of offences and their enforcement may even be 
entrusted to agencies other than the police. Expeditious settlement with 
corrective, compensatory remedies is the objective and Penal consequence 
(imprisonment) is to be rare and exceptional under the social welfare and 
correctional offences codes. With such a policy change in dealing with 
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criminal infractions, opportunities for human rights violation are 
considerably reduced, system overload will be largely prevented, 
transaction costs in processing crimes will be substantially reduced and 
arrears/delay will assume manageable limits. 
> Training of Judicial Officers 
The image of the courts in the ultimate analysis depends essentially 
upon the way the cases are handled, the extent of confidence courts inspire 
in the parties to the cases before them, upon the promptness in the 
disposal of cases, upon the realities with which approximation of judicial 
findings are based. 
Various drawbacks are evident in our judicial system at work. Every 
effort should be made to weed out the defects of the system. Society needs 
an efficient judicial system to avert the menace of tooth and claws. Thus, a 
trial court judge is expected to be equally able; tactful, resourceful, alert 
and imaginative as other judges of higher courts. He is also expected to 
have administrative knowledge of day-to-day matters, so when he is 
posted independently in a court, so that he can discharge his functions 
with administrative ability. 
This leads to one irresistible conclusion that every judicial officer 
discharging the functions of a trial judge must atleast undergo one-year 
course of intensive and specialized training while he is under probation.i'' 
Need for training to judges has been emphasized by the Justice Hand of 
U.S. Court of Appeals very candidly as under: 
"The great Untied States Supreme Court judges have been widely read 
and deeply cultivated men whose reading and cultivation gave breadth 
and depth of their understanding of legal problems and infused their 
opinions. It can be as important to a judge to have at least, a bowing 
acquaintance with Action and Maitland with Machiavelli, Montiague 
and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with books which 
17. Dr. Chandrika Prasad Sharma, "Judicial Officers and Their Training" AIR September 
(2002) Journal Section, pp. 255-56. 
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have been specifically written on the area of law which he is 
considering. A period of training prior to ascending the Bench will help 
to repair the gaps which may have been created by the demands of life at 
the Bar".''8 
Fourteenth Law Commission presided over by eminent jurist 
Shri M.C. Setalvad elaborately dealt with the question of need for training 
of judicial officers: "Question has also been raised as to whether we should 
have a training course for all recruits to the judicial services before they 
actually start functioning as judicial officers. We are in favour of a training 
course lasting for a period of three to six months for recruits to the 
subordinate judiciary. The stress in such course would be to acquaint the 
recruits with procedural requirements for dealing with different stages of 
cases. For example, the recruits can be trained as to how to record 
statements of parties before framing issues. Frame issue and thereafter to 
record evidence and passing interlocutory orders. Apart form that recruits 
can be made familiar with different stages of execution proceedings and 
also taught how to dispose of matters at each of those stages. One aspect of 
training can also cover the method of dealing with administrative matters 
which are a part of duties of a judicial officer". 
There has been manifold increase in the number of criminal cases 
and this increase has subjected the trial judge to extreme strains. 
"The Malimath Committee has suggested continuous training and 
upgradation of skills at every level as the major strategy for 
productivity and efficiency. While the general inefficiency of the system 
can be addressed by structural and policy changes, the question of delay 
and backlog cannot be resolved by just adding more courts. This 
requires extensive training, both at the time of induction as ivell as 
regular intervals while in service. For managing a complex system, you 
need enhanced managerial and technical skills in the personnel, be it 
the police, the prosecutor or the judge". 
"There is need for specialization in judiciary for which again training 
is a pre-requisite. It is important to have a highly selected group of 
trainers who will train the other trainers. This is a critical area where 
18. Ibid. 
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the highest quality must be ensured. Research should be given prime 
importance in the new scheme of things. Information is the key for 
reform. Research and training council must be formed to pursue this 
strategy for reform on a continuing basis". 
> Change in Mind-Set, Work culture and Accountability 
The committee suggested a series of measures to create a new 
mindset in the system for taking on the challenges with responsibility and 
creativity. There is need for a new vision. The Government should come 
out with a clear and coherent policy Statement on all major issues of 
criminal justice. Reform is a continuous process in a developing society. 
There is need for a presidential Commission, which will review and 
recommend reforms on a continuing basis to put the system on healthy 
lines. 
> Long Vacations for Courts 
In view of the large pendency of cases, long vacations of courts 
Supreme Court and High Courts have to be curtailed and number of 
working days increased. Soli Sorabjee, former Attorney General, remarks 
that, "the frequent criticism about judges having long vacations overlooks 
that during vacation, judgements on important matters have to be 
prepared after proper research and deliberation", would act like a much 
needed whiff of cool breeze in scorching summer for the judiciary after the 
issue of long vocations being subject matter of criticism.^^ Prime Minister 
Shri Manmohan Singh at Chief Ministers and Chief Justices conference, 
speaking on the backlog of cases the P.M. had said "... a simple way of 
improving the productivity of the judicial system is by increasing the 
number of working days and cutting down on vacations".20 
"Wherever the committee has gone one question that the common 
people have asked is as to why the courts should have such long vacations 
19 . Indian Express (24 April, 2005). 
20 . Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister. 
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when there is such huge pendency of cases in all the courts waiting for 
decades for disposal".2^ 
It was well justified during British Raj, when judges would set sail 
to England for summer vacation by ship, hence the need and system of 
four to seven weeks of holidays. Moreover, the situation of arrears and the 
issue of increasing workload were not as critical then as it has been in 
India after independence. 
The question of court vacation is such an important issue today that 
Justice V.S. Malimath Committee Report has devoted a sub-chapter on the 
issue. It has interestingly reported that "wherever the committee has gone 
one question that the common people have asked is as to why the courts 
should have such long vacations when there is such huge pendency of 
cases in all the courts waiting for decades for disposal" .22 
Table for Working Days and Working Time for Year 2008^ 3 
s. 
No. 
1 
2 
Supreme 
Court 
185 days 
a year 
10.30 AM 
to 4.00 PM 
with one 
hour lunch 
(Four hour 
30 minutes 
each day) 
States 
210 days 
a year 
10.30 AM 
to 4.30 PM 
with one 
hour lunch 
(5 hour 
each 
working 
day) 
District M.M. 
Courts 
240 days 
a year 
10.30 AM to 
5.45 PM with 
45 minutes 
lunch (Five 
hours 45 
minutes each 
working day) 
Other Govt. 
Establishments 
245 days 
a year 
10.0 AM to 5.45 
PM with 4 
Sminutes lunch 
(seven hours a 
day) 
Private 
Orgy 
Non-
Govt, 
255 days 
a year 
9.30 AM 
to 6.00 
PMwith 
half hour 
lunch 
(eight 
hours or 
more 
each 
working 
day) 
21. Malimath Committee Report. 
22 . Long vacations - 'A British legacy or a Necessity', Manupatra Newsline, Vol. 2, March-
April 2005, p. 10. 
23 . Source : Abdul Rasheed Qureshi 'Court Vacations and Law Delays' All India Seminar 
on Judicial Reforms, held on 23rd and 24th Feb. 2008, Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi, 
Souvenir, p. 28. 
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This is in sharp contrast to many of the other countries in the world where 
the courts have no vacations. Even in India, the subordinate criminal 
courts do not have any vacation. However, the subordinate civil courts. 
High Courts and Supreme Court have vacations. As mentioned in the 
Malimath Committee, the judges from Courts in France and USA who 
interacted with committee informed that their courts have no vacation and 
the judges could take leave according to their convenience without 
affecting the smooth functioning of the court. However, the comparison of 
vacation of the Indian courts with other countries is not justified because 
the workload of the Indian courts is much heavier than other courts. 
A fact not known to the general public has been rightly shared by 
Mr. Soli Sorabjee in his column. He writes "the workload on judges is 
tremendous. The view that judges work for only four and a half hour in 
the Supreme Court and five hours in High Court is a misconception. 
Our Supreme Court judges work after court hours and most assiduously 
during weekends". 
Thus, even though the number of holidays including vacations 
might appear to be staggering compared to other profession, in reality a 
major part of these holidays are devoted for finishing off the pending 
work, both for writing judgements and completing the administrative 
work. The very important and complicated cases require extra research 
and understanding, which is not possible to be done during the normal 
working days. Thus, it is only during vacations that judges get quality time 
to concentrate and devote to finish the complicated cases.^* Justice J.S. 
Verma, former Chief Justice of India and former chairman of NHRC 
suggested a middle path, wherein he asserts that the rationale for the long 
vacations has to be analyzed. "It was a necessity during summers specially 
when the heat was unbearable and there was no way the judges could 
24. Long vacations - 'A British Legacy or Necessity' Manupab'a Newsline, vol. 2, March-
April 2005, p. 10. 
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work efficiently. Now with facilities such as fully furnished residential 
office with AC, the weather aspect has been taken care. Thus, the vacations 
as now available could be curtailed by two three weeks". However, he too 
like Soli Sorabjee is of the opinion that vacations are an essential part of the 
working as this is the only time that judges get to do quality research for 
big and important judgements, which they might not get during normal 
working days. 
Justice Verma opines - "The object of long vacations is not only for 
holidaying but is also meant to be utilized to finish the writing of all the pending 
judgements so that the backlog is cleared during vacations". 
The Malimath Committee revealed an interesting fact about State of 
Bombay. "There was a convention that before the courts went on vacation; 
all the criminal cases pending in State where the accused were in custody 
should be disposed of. If all the cases were not disposed off the judges 
could not go on vacation". 
A judicious trimming of holidays seems to be on its way with 
former Chief Justice Lahoti's recent decision to make the Supreme Court 
working on Ram Navami day.25 
Thus, the committee feels that there should be a reduction of the 
vacations. Hence, the following recommendations are made: 
a) The Working day of the Supreme Court be raised to 206 days. 
b) The working days of the High Court be raised 231 days. 
c) Consequently, the Supreme Court and the States shall reduce their 
vacations by 21 days on the increase in their working days. 
II. Structural Reforms 
The committee also addressed to the problem of low rate conviction, 
which has eroded the faith of the common citizens in the system. 
25. Id., pp. 10-11. 
347 
The committee made the following recommendations with regard to this 
problem: 
> Fundamental Principles 
The committee felt that the adversarial system, despite its 
drawbacks guarantees 'fair trial' particularly to the accused and, as such, 
must be continued. However, to strengthen and to make it more effective, 
certain features of inquisitorial system and goals of civilized justice can be 
adopted. This includes the duty of the court to search for truth, to assign a 
pro-active role to the judges to give directions to the investigating officers 
and prosecution agencies with the object of seeking the truth and focusing 
on justice to victims. 
It is generally recognized that the victim who initiates criminal 
proceedings, is the most neglected person in the whole system. He has no 
substantial right to participate in the proceedings. The committee felt this 
imbalance needs correction and better and quicker justice depends on 
recognition of rights of victims. 
III. Recommendations of the Committee on Rights of Victims 
An important object of the Criminal Justice System to ensure to the 
victims, yet he has not been given any substantial right, not even to 
participate in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the committee feels that 
the system must focus on justice to victims. Therefore, the committee has 
made several recommendations, which include the right of the victim to 
participate in cases involving serious crimes and to adequate 
compensation. Hence, the committee has made the following 
recommendations: 
(a) Victim/his legal representative to have the right to be impleaded 
as a party in serious crimes punishable with 7 years 
imprisonment or more; in select cases even a court approved 
NGO can also implead; 
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(b) Victim has a right to be represented by a lawyer; State has to 
provide a lawyer if he is indigent; 
(c) Participation includes right to produce evidence (with leave of 
court), to ask questions to witnesses, to know status of 
investigations and to move court to issue directions for further 
investigation, to be heard in respect of grant or cancellation of 
bail, to be heard if prosecution seeks to withdraw and to offer 
continuance, to advance arguments after prosecutor submitted 
his and to participate in negotiated settlements; 
(d) Victim has the right to prefer an appeal against adverse orders of 
acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, imposing inadequate 
sentence or granting inadequate compensation; 
(e) Legal services to victims to include medical help, interim 
compensation and protection against secondary victimization; 
(f) Victim compensation in serious crimes is to be organized under a 
separate legislation by Parliament. This law will provide for 
creation of victim compensation fund to be administered by the 
legal services authority. 
> Changes in Investigation 
There are many macro and micro changes recommended by the 
committee in the style, pace and powers of investigation. Some of which 
are perhaps legitimately criticized as unacceptable. However, there are no 
two opinions on the need for prompt, fair and efficient investigation for 
which a separate independent agency accountable to the rule of law is 
needed in the civil police. Towards this end of the committee wanted the 
following changes: 
(a) Investigation wing to be separate from law and order wing; 
(b) Better supervision through an officer of the rank of IGP in the 
State crime branch; 
(c) Police Commissionerate system in all urban cities and towns; 
(d) Removal of difference between cognizable and non-cognizable 
and compulsory registration of all crimes; 
(e) Audio/video recording of statements of witnesses, dying 
declarations and confessions to be mandated by law. 
(f) Mobile Forensic Units in every district and increased 
dependence on scientific evidence for which sustained training 
and strict directions to be given; 
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(g) Section 167 Cr.P.C. to be amended to authorize court to extend 
detention period to 180 days instead of 90 days for filing charge 
sheet or entitling bail; 
(h) Increase the permissible period of police custody to 30 days 
instead of 15 days (section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.) and this period to 
exclude time where the accused was not available for 
investigation; 
(i) Statement be allowed to be used for contradicting and 
corroborating the maker of the statement (section 162, Cr.P.C). 
(j) Section 25 of the Evidence Act, to be amended to allow 
confession recorded by an Superintendent of Police (SP) or 
officer above him to be admissible in evidence; 
(k) Police to be authorized for interception of electronic 
communication for prevention or detention of crime. 
> Strengthening the Prosecution System 
Prosecutors are the officers of the court whose duty is to assist the 
court in the search of truth, which is the objective of the Criminal Justice 
System. Any amount of good investigation would not result in success 
unless the institution of prosecution has persons who are of merit and who 
are committed with foundation of well-structured professional training. 
This important institution of the Criminal Justice System has been weak 
and somewhat neglected. Its recruitment, training and professionalism 
need special attention so as to make it synergistic with other institutions 
and effective in delivering good results.^^ 
Outside the investigation process, it is the prosecution that 
constitutes the weakest link of the Criminal Justice System, and it requires 
immediate revamping if the system is to deliver. 
Every State is to have a Director of Prosecution. A police officer of 
the rank of Director General of police is to be in that position. 
All prosecutors (other than the PP in the State) should be brought under 
26 . Recommendations of Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System, Cr.LJ (2004), 
p. 109. 
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the administrative and disciplinary control of the Director of the Advocate 
General of the State. 
All assistant public prosecutors to be appointed on the merit 
through competitive examinations for a period of 3 years after intensive 
training and they are to render legal advice to the police. 
> Changes in Trial Procedure 
The committee is concerned with enormous delay in decision 
making particularly in trial courts. At present, a large number of cases in 
which punishment is two years and less are tried as summons cases. 
The summary procedure prescribed by section 262-264 of the Code, if 
exercised properly, would quicken the pace of justice considerably. 
However, the number of cases, which are presently tried summarily, is 
quite small and maximum punishment that can be given after a summary 
trial is three months. In order to speed up the process, the committee feels 
that all cases in which punishment is three years and below should be tried 
summarily and punishment that can be awarded in summary trials should 
be increased to three years. At present only specially empowered 
magistrate can exercise summary powers, which the committee feels 
should be given to all the judicial Magistrates first class. 
Section 206 of the Code prescribes the procedure for dealing with 
'petty offences'. This provision empowers the fine which the accused 
should pay if he pleads guilty and to send the fine amount along with his 
reply to the court. This procedure is simple and convenient to the accused, 
as he need not to engage a lawyer nor appears in contesting the case. 
However, the definition of the expression 'petty offences' restricts it to 
those offences punishable only with fine not exceeding^^ Rs. 1000/-. 
In order to give benefit of this provision to large number of accused, the 
27. Substituted for the word "One hundred rupees" by Act No. 25 of 2005. Sec. 20 (w.e.f. 
23.6.2006). 
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committee has favoured suitable modification of the expression 'pett\' 
offences'. Hence, the following recommendations are made: 
(i) All cases in which punishment is three years and below (sections 
262 to 264 of Cr.P.C), should be tried summarily and 
punishment that can be awarded in summary trials should be 
increased to three years. At present only specially empowered 
Magistrate can exercise summary powers which should be 
extended to all judicial Magistrates who may be given special 
training on trial of cases by summary procedure; 
(ii) The scope of section 206 Cr.P.C. which empowers Magistrates to 
specify in summons the fine that the accused should pay if he 
pleads guilty and to send the fine amount along with his reply to 
the court in petty offences, should be expanded. 'Petty offences' 
are now defined as offences punishable only with fine not 
exceeding Rs. 1,000; this should be increased to Rs. 5,000. Section 
206 shall be so amended to make it mandatory to deal with petty 
offences only in the manner prescribed in that section. 
> Witnesses and Perjury 
According to Bentham "witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice". 
It is an open secret, that the witnesses get traumatized and harassed in our 
Criminal Justice System. Unnecessary adjournments for recording the 
statements of the witnesses in courts, causes them unnecessary 
harassment. The problem of witnesses not supporting the prosecution case 
and thereby turning hostile has been adversely affecting our Criminal 
Justice System. Interestingly, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the 
Evidence Act, 1872, does not refer to the term 'hostile'. The term 'hostile' is 
used by the courts for referring to a witness, who resile from his earlier 
statement made to the police under section 161 Cr.P.C. A witness may turn 
hostile due to threat, promise or induce to give money for not supporting 
the prosecution case, makes the prosecution case weak and the result in 
acquittal of the accused if there is no other substantial evidence.^^ 
The problem of witnesses turning hostile affecting our justice system from 
long time. However, it has been in news much due to witnesses turning 
28. Nirmal Chopra, 'Perjury by witnesses in criminal Trials', Cr. LJ, Vol. 115, January 2009, 
p . l . 
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hostile in high profile cases such as Best Bakery case in Gujarat and ]essica 
Lai Murder case in Delhi. The large number of witnesses turning 
hostile in high profile cases had lead to a growing demand for making 
suitable changes in our procedural laws to effectively deal with the 
problem of witnesses turning hostile. As a result, the central government 
introduced in the Rajya Sabha, Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 
Bill, 2006. As per the proposal for suitable amendments were to be made in 
Cr.P.C. 1973, providing for summary trial of witnesses giving false 
evidence and a punishment of not less than three months, which may 
extend to three years for such hostile witnesses. 
However, the said Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Home Affairs. Surprisingly the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee after examining the proposed amendment has concluded that 
it was unworkable as judicial officers are already over burdened.29 Though 
the cabinet is not bound by the recommendations of the parliamentary 
committee, but certainly there is laches on the part of political class. 
In the case of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat^^, it was 
observed and held that the State has a definite role to play in protecting the 
witness, to start with at least in sensitive cases involving those in power, 
who have political patronage and could use muscle and money power, to 
avert trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. As a 
protector of the citizens, it has to secure that during a trial in court, the 
witnesses could safely deposed truth without any fear of being haunted by 
those against whom they had deposed. 
Furthermore, in a recent case of Himanshu Singh Sabhanual vs. State of 
M.P. & Ors.^^ The Apex Court directed for transfer of the case outside the 
State of M.P. due to the repeated turning of prosecution witnesses as 
29. Hindustan Times, 13th May, 2008, New Delhi. 
30. AIR 2006 SC1367: (2006) 3 SCC 374. 
31. (2008) II DLT (CrI.) 394. 
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hostile. The brief facts were that the father of the petitioner was allegedly 
beated by certain persons due to which he died. The said persons are being 
prosecuted. But at the time of recording of evidence, many prosecution 
witnesses turned hostile including three police officials. The son of the 
deceased approached the Apex Court seeking transfer of the trial court 
outside the State of M.P. Allowing the transfer petition, the Apex Court 
cautioned against undue emphasis on the rights of an accused. It was held 
"legislative measures to emphasize prohibition against the tempering with 
witness, victim or informant have become the imminent and inevitable 
need of the day". 
In spite of such observation of the Apex Court for the protection of 
the witnesses, there appears to be no seriousness on the part of our law 
makers to do anything positive in this regard. 
At this juncture the question arises what action can be initiated at 
present in accordance with the Cr.P.C. 1973, as in force today. 
Such action can be two-fold. Firstly the courts should play a pro-active role 
as emphasized by the Apex Court in Zahira Sheikh case and secondly, the 
prosecution of the hostile witness under section 344 of Cr.P.C. provides for 
summary procedure for trial of persons giving or fabricating false 
evidence. 
Perjury is a major cause for failure of criminal justice in Indian 
courts. Many witnesses give false evidence either because of inducement 
or because of the threats to them or to their family members. There is no 
law to give protection to witnesses. Witnesses are treated shabbily in 
courts. There are no facilities for them. They have to wait for long hours 
and often subjected to unreasonable cross-examination. They are not paid 
their allowances in reasonable time. As such, the committee felt the need 
for changes in the laws and practices in relation to witnesses, the main 
aspects of which are as follows: 
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(i) Payment to witnesses to be made on the same day and facilities to be 
provided for them in court premises. 
(ii) Witness protection law as in USA to be enacted. 
(iii) Trial to proceed to day-to-day basis to avoid witnesses being called 
again and again. Adjournments to be restricted and judge to be made 
accountable for any lapse in this behalf. 
(iv) Evidence of experts as far as possible to be received through 
affidavits. 
(v) Harassment of witnesses through unnecessary cross examination to 
be strictly controlled. 
(vi) If the court is of the opinion that witness knowingly or wilfully gave 
false evidence (section 344 Cr.P.C), the case to be tried summarily 
and punishment upto imprisonment of two years or fine upto Rs. 
1,000.00 or both be imposed. Appeal under section 341 Cr.P.C. is 
unnecessary and be deleted. 
(vii) Court to whom witnesses in all cases that violation of oath may result 
in commission of the offence of perjury for which the court may 
punish him and inform him of the punishment. 
> Remedies - In Reference to Malimath Recommendation 
(i) In view of the large pending cases and mounting arrears of pending 
cases the Arrears Eradication Scheme, as recommended by Justice 
Malimath Committee would help in reducing pending cases. As per 
this scheme the long vacation for States and Supreme Court in the 
larger public interest should be reduced.^^ This is estimated to be 
equivalent to increasing the number of judges. The 
recommendations of Justice Malimath Committee deserve serious 
consideration by all concerned. 
(ii) Establishment of additional courts at any level involves enormous 
expenditure. Appointment of whole time staff judicial as well as 
administrative, to new courts involves considerable recurring 
expenditure, which the exchequer cannot afford. There is a way out. 
As recommended by the Law Commission Report^^. Introducing 
shift system in Supreme Court to clear the backlog of cases by 
deploying retired judges reputed for their integrity and ability, who 
are physically and mentally fit would provide immense relief to the 
litigants. They could be made to function in two shifts, with the 
same in fracture, utihze the services of retired judicial officers. 
32. Jastice Malimath's Committee Report (pp. 285-286). 
33. 125th Law Commission Report 1988. 
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(iii) In the administration of justice, information technology has not as 
yet been sued as an effective tool especially in lower judiciary. 
Advancement in modern science and technology can make judicial 
process more efficient. The use of modern technologies in criminal 
investigations and courts, in the realm of both substantive mission 
of any justice delivery system to ensure speedy and affordable 
justice cannot be achieved unless we have quick functionaries. 
(iv) Much of the delay occurs because of the provision of the code are 
not properly observed and followed legal awareness camps have to 
be conducted by the law college and N.G.O.s people should be 
made known about these provisions so that they can demand 
observance of and compliance with these provisions when these 
provisions are disregarded or sidetracked, either by the courts or by 
the lawyers because ultimately, it is interest of the people that 
suffers. In India, it is observed that while the new system is 
introduced, the old one continues for a considerable period of time 
due to lack of orientation. Workshops, seminars and orientation 
programmes for the judiciary should be conducted to understand 
the new and comprehensive methods of court management and on 
latest changes in the laws. 
(v) Faster filling up of vacancies - the existing poor ratio of judges per 
lakh of populations further affected adversely with the existing 
vacancies. These must be filled up at the earliest. The judge 
population ratio is abysmally poor. The suitable ratio may be 
considered as 50 judges for one lakh of population.^^ 
(vi) A supervisory and monitoring cell at district courts levels should be 
set up especially to look into cases of delayed disposal. Cases 
pending for more than specified period, say three years, with the 
same judge should be transferred to another judge with a report 
from the prior judge on reasons of delay. A monitoring cell should 
examine the working of the judges and their working style. 
Emoluments of public prosecutors and other concerned staff should 
be linked with their performance. 
(vii) Establishment of additional Fast Track Courts at all levels for 
speedy disposal of cases. The establishment of these types of courts 
would ease the burden of the existing courts. 
(viii) There is a need to invest in the training and capacity building of all 
judicial officers so that they become more effective in case 
management and disposal. In addition to the capacities of 
individuals, courts could develop collective mechanisms of review 
and monitoring so that performance of individual judges is 
monitored and causes of delay are addressed. In this regard, one 
34 . Justice Mali Math Committee Report, 2003, pp. 1-32. 
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must mention that the support and cooperation of the Bar is as 
much essential as the commitment of judges and the judicial staff. A 
seminar organized by the Supreme Court Bar Association on 
'Judicial Reforms - with special Reference to Arrears of court cases 
and also highlighted two ways to solve the problem of arrears of 
court cases. Firstly, too many adjournments must be curbed and 
secondly, dilatory acts of advocates must be penaHzed. Reforms 
must start from the law college level, ^ s 
D. Role of Lawyers in Speedy Trials 
Lawyers are by definition part of the legal system in every country. 
As direct participants in the system of justice, lawyers ensure and maintain 
the quality of the legal system.^^ Lawyers also play a critical role as an 
officer of the courts, a client's Advocate and a member of an ancient, 
Honourable and Learned profession. 
In these several capacities, it is a lawyer's duty to promote the 
interests of the State. Serve the cause of justice, maintain the authority and 
dignity of the courts, be faithful to clients, be candid and courteous in 
relations with other lawyers^^ and help the Criminal Justice System to 
ensure speedy disposal of the criminal cases to curb the backlog and delay. 
Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of the Nation, wrote in his 
autobiography about the role of law and lawyers: 
"I had learnt the practice of law. I had learnt to find out the better side 
of human nature, and to enter men's hearts. I realized that the true 
function of a lawyer was to unite parties' riven asunder. The lesson 
was so indelibly burnt into me that the larger part of my time during 
the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer luas occupied in bringing 
about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby 
not even money certainly not my soul".^^ 
35 . The Supreme Court Bar Association on 'Judicial Reforms with Special Reference to 
Arrars of Court cases', held on 29th and 30th April, 2005. 
36 . The Indian Advocate, Journal of the Bar Association of India, vol. XXXIO (2003), p. 75. 
37. Dr. U. Pattabhi Ramiah "Customary Clogs in justice Delivery Systems" AIR Journal 
Nov. (20030, p. 345. 
38. Gandhi, M.K., The law and lawyers, Navjivan Trust, Ahmedabad, India 1962, Reprint 
2001, p. 258. 
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In our judicial system, it is heartening to note that Bar is integral 
part of system and it appears to be organized force, which is to be 
reckoned with. Legal fraternity has played very significant and strong role 
and still can play stronger role in re-shaping and re-enforcing institutional 
confidence. Legal profession, which is an important force which should 
render better help strengthening and re-enforcing to expedite the Criminal 
Justice System. 
Needless to mention that role of legal fraternity and its contribution 
in Pre-Independence and Post-Independence era is very important and 
significant. Role of a lawyer in any system and in any part of the world is 
always important. It is, therefore, rightly said " the voice of Bar is heard on 
capital Hills" .^'^ 
"In modern times lawyers in various countries have given leadership to 
their nations. In the great American and French Revolutions many of 
the leading figures zvere lawyers. Abraham Lincoln, the great American 
President during the American civil War of 1861-1865 was a lawyer, 
and so was Robespierre, the great French leader during the French 
Revolution of 1789. Lenin the great leader of Russian Revolution of 
1917 was a student of a law. During our oivn Independence struggle 
many of the leaders, like Gandhiji, Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Dr. 
Rajendra Prasad, Deshbandhu, Chitranjan Das, etc. zvere lawyers"."^^ 
Now it become past when a lawyer was regarded as a family friend. 
He commanded awe, respect and for good reasons. 
At present, the public image of lawyer is far from flattering. 
They are seen as fortune seekers rather than seeking to serve, a selfish 
class, who on account of their special knowledge and expertise, provide 
services on such terms as they please. In short, the profession of law is 
regarded as a money making racket. Today people are apt to agree with 
Dean Swift's description of lawyers as, "a society of bred up from their youth 
in the art of proving by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black and 
39. Justice J.N. Bhatt, "Judicial Cardiogram" Naya Deep, vol. VII, July, 2006, p. 73. 
40. Justice M. Katju "Legal Education in India", AIR 2002. September, Journal section, p. 
241. 
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black is white accordingly as they are paid". No longer is the profession of law 
regarded as a noble one.*^ 
> Reasons for Decline 
The main reason is that lawyers, as also other professionals like 
doctors for example, have forgotten what is entailed in a profession and 
their proper role in society. 
Rosco Pound summed up the matter with admirable aptness when 
he said; "Historically, there are three ideas involved in a profession; 
organization, learning and a spirit of public service. These are essential. 
The remaining idea, that if gaining a livelihood, is incidental.'*^ Apparently, 
lawyers have forgotten that they are the guardians of noble ideals and 
traditions, and not mere traders in the market place, whose sole aim is the 
amazing of vast fortunes. 
There seems to be a fear psychosis prevailing in the judiciary and in 
the political class when it comes to confronting the Bar, which incidentally 
is responsible in big way for major ills of the system, namely delay, cost 
and corruption. The Transparency International Report of 2007 while 
projecting the Indian judiciary as the third most corrupt institution in the 
country has in fact come to that conclusion on the basis that 77 per cent of 
corruption in judicial system has been lawyer-driven. Several expert 
committee reports have long ago argued that lawyers contribute 
significantly for the increase in cost of litigation and its delay.^^ 
The reason for delays in dispensation of justice is deliberate misuse 
of procedure by lawyers, who in their own selfish manners protect 
litigation to make more profit and ensure litigants further. I have always 
seen this as a major problem and it is an issue of professional ethics that 
41 . Soli ]. Sorabjee "Lawyers as Professionals", AIR 2002 Journal Section, p. 4. 
42. Ibid. 
43. N.R. Madhava Menon "Reforming the Legal Profession: Some Ideas, The Hindu, 
February 20, 2008, p. 10. 
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requires deep analysis who are these lawyers? Not everyone does this, but 
many do.^'' 
Judicial system may be aptly characterized as a "system by lawyers, 
for lawyers and of lawyers". There is nothing wrong with the laws and 
regulations as such and every rule of Cr.P.C. has its own logic. But they 
have been grossly abused. In brief, it is not the system that has failed us, 
but we failed the system.'^s 
The profession of law is called a noble profession. It does not remain 
noble merely by calling it as such, unless there is a continued, 
corresponding and expected performance of a noble profession. Its nobility 
has to be preserved, protected and promoted. An institution cannot 
survive on its name or on its past glory alone. The glory and greatness of 
an institution depends on its continued and meaningful performance with 
grace and dignity. The profession of law being noble and an honourable 
one, it has to continue its meaningful, useful and purposeful performance 
inspired by and keeping in view the high and rich traditions consistent 
with its grace, dignity, utility and prestige.*^ 
Every day we are seeing, hearing that there is delay in every forum 
and everywhere and how the public suffer and the institution that is to be 
adored for rendering justice is also undermined. Infact the Supreme Court 
has spoken that "the advocates are equal partners with the judges in the 
administration of justice". The seven judge Constitution Bench in the 'Judge 
Transfer Case l'^'^, expressed that, 
"The profession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the 
judicial system and lawyers may figuratively he described as priests in 
the temple of justice". 
44 . Warner Menski Prof. Of Law, SOAS, University of London, "Opinion on Dealing with 
Backlog of Cases", Manupatra Newsline, March-April 2005, vol. 2, p. 13. 
45 . Dr. A. Jayagovind, Director, NLSIU, Bangalore, Id. 
46 . Satish Kumar Sharma vs. Bar Council of H.P. 2001(2) SCC 365; Justice Shivaraj V. Patil. 
47 . AIR 1982, p. 145. 
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Their lords continue to express; 
"They assist the court in dispensing justice and it can hardly be 
disputed that without their help, it would he well nigh impossible for 
the court to administer justice". 
Therefore rightly the .credit as well as discredit is to be shared by 
both these institutions and therefore I would like to categories as to what 
are the steps that should come from the Bar as well as from the Bench for 
atleast in minimizing the delay through not averting the delay, completely 
so that the maxim 'justice delayed is justice denied' should not be 
repeated. 
The foremost thing that should come from the Bar is, refraining 
from boycotting courts throughout the country we are witnessing as how, 
for various reasons, courts are closed, for days, weeks and months also. 
There are lot of decisions from Apex Court that boycotting the court would 
amount to contempt but still it is continued .^ ^ 
There is also the question mark about justification and ethical 
soundness for lawyers 'going on strike'. To illustrate the effect of a 
lawyer's strike on administration of justice the following statistics may be 
considered. In Delhi, subordinate courts remained closed on account of 
frequent strikes, on each of such days about 10,000 cases are pushed back 
by at least 4 months and an average strike of 3 consecutive days leads to 
adjournments in excess of 35,000 cases.'*^ 
> Understanding the Malaise 
In the age of technology and globalization, all professions are 
changing their methods of management and delivery of services to the 
public. In brief, change become necessity and no profession can accord to 
48. Dr.A.E. Chelliah, "Speeding up the Justice Delivery system with special reference to 
procedural Reforms and use of Technology in case Management", All India Seminar on 
Judicial Reforms' held on 23rd and 24th February, 2008. Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi, 
Souvenir, pp. 308-309. 
49 . Times of India, 20th December, 2003. 
361 
continue with old mindset, i.e. unquestioned monopoly and privileges and 
methods of delivery of services. 
In this scenario, the Indian legal profession needs reforms both in its 
functioning as well as its role in administration of justice. There is no clear 
understanding of the working of the profession today because very little 
data is available on several aspects of the profession and its functioning. 
The legal profession is said to be a million strong which includes 
approximately 6 to 7 lakhs practicing in the private sector as litigating 
lawyers, about a lakh or more working as in-house counsel in the 
corporate sector and an equal number involved in the public sector as law 
officers, legal assistants and legislative draftsmen in government or as 
legal aid support personnel. While the organized profession (Bar Councils 
and Bar Associations) has little to do with the latter two categories, it is 
effectively in control of the vast body of practicing advocates who operate 
in the trial and appellate courts as well as in tribunals and regulatory 
bodies. It is they who strike work, boycott courts, dabble in politics and 
corrupt the course of administration of justice.^o 
The problem with them are many, not all of their own making. 
The 80:20 ratios operate in the profession where 20 per cent of the lawyer's 
command 80 per cent of legal work. The system is like a pyramid where 
the bottom 40 per cent really has to struggle to make a living in the 
profession with no help from the seniors or the powerful to 20 per cent 
who have a monopolistic control over available legal work. Because of 
their numerical strength and lack of appreciation of professional ethics, 
they are in the forefront of agitational politics and exploitative practices. 
They decide who will go to the Bar Councils and how they manage the 
legislative, executive and judicial functions viz-a-viz the profession, 
without application of mind, resolutions are sometimes adopted to boycott 
50 . N.R. Madhava Menon, Reforming the legal profession; Some ideas, The Hindu, 
Wednesday, February 20, 2008, p. 10. 
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courts, to prohibit practice by foreign lawyers in India, to stall the 
implementation of laws intended to expedite administration of justice to 
deal with differences with police and courts and on how legal education 
should be organized in the country. They sit in judgement on complaints 
against other lawyers. Occasional stories in the media of lawyers attacking 
policemen on duty and judges before whom they practice are ignored as 
aberrations rather than to identify the problem, causing the malfunctioning 
of the system itself. It requires no less than a high powered committee of 
lawyers, judges and public men with a mandate like that of justice S.R. Das 
Committee appointed in the 1950s to look into the malaise and propose 
futuristic reforms including legislative measures to put back the legal 
profession as a service to the people and as an instrument of good 
govemance.5^ 
> Strikes by Lawyers 
The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Common Cause {A. Regd. 
Society) vs. Union of India^'^, challenging the legality of strikes by lawyers 
passed what was described as an 'Interim Order' is as following. 
1. "In the rare instance where any association of lawyers including 
Statutory Bar Councils considers it imperative to call upon and/or 
advise members of the legal profession to abstain from appearing in 
courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any individual 
member/members of that association to be free to appear without 
let, fear or hindrance or any other coercive steps. 
2. No such member who appears in court or otherwise practices his 
legal profession, shall be visited with any adverse or penal 
consequences whatever, by any association of lawyers, and shall not 
suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion there from. 
3. The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practicing 
lawyers in court such as, for instance wearing of armbands and 
other forms of protest, which in no way interrupt or disrupt the 
court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Any 
51 .Ibid. 
52 . [1995 1 Scale 6]. 
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such form of protest shall not however be derogatory to the court or 
to the profession. 
4. Office bearers of a Bar Association (including Bar Council) 
responsible for taking decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall 
ensure that such decisions are implemented in the spirit of what is 
stated in clauses (1), (2) and(3) above". 
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in another case of 
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India^^ a batch of related petitions 
considered the above order and have now held that "all the instant 
petitions involved the boycott of court/(s). The Supreme Court has passed 
the interim order therein (quoted above) in the hope that the lawyers 
would exercise self-restraint. However, at the present hearing the Supreme 
Court found that the Bar Council of India had failed to incorporate the 
interim measures stated in clauses (1) to (4) of para 2 of the said order and 
that the phenomenon of going on strike was on the increase paralyzing the 
functioning of the courts for several days. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
found it necessary to decide the said question. Besides the parties. Bar 
Council of various States and various Bar Associations made their 
submissions. 
The U.P. Bar Council was the only party to contend that lawyers 
had such a right and that courts had no power of supervision over the 
conduct of lawyers. 
Rejecting the U.P. Bar Council's contention and answering the 
question in the negative, the Supreme Court held: 
The law is already well settled. It is the duty of every advocate who 
has accepted a brief to attend trial, even though it may go on day to day 
and for a prolonged period. He cannot refuse to attend court because a 
boycott call is given by the Bar Association. It is unprofessional as well as 
unbecoming for him to refuse to attend court even in pursuance of a call 
for strike or boycott by the Bar Association or the Bar Council. The courts 
53. (2003) 2 s e c 45. 
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are under an obligation to hear and decide cases brought before them and 
cannot adjourn matters merely because lawyers are on strike. If a 
resolution is passed by Bar Association expressing want of confidence in 
judicial officers it would amount to scandalizing the courts to undermine 
its authority and thereby the advocates will have committed contempt of 
court. If the lawyers participate in a boycott or a strike, their action is ex-
fade in view of the decision in Mahahir Prasad Singh vs. Jacks Aviation (P) 
Ltd}'^ The advocates would be answerable for the consequences suffered 
by their clients if the non-appearance was solely on grounds of a strike call. 
Moreover, an advocate is an officer of the court and enjoys special 
status in society. Advocates have obligations and duties to ensure smooth 
functioning of the court. They owe a duty to their clients. Strikes interfere 
with administration of justice. They cannot thus disrupt court proceedings 
and put interest of their clients in jeopardy. 
As per Shah and Dharmadhikari, J}. 
"Held that merely holding strikes as illegal would not he sufficient in 
the present day situation nor would it serve any purpose. Some 
concrete joint action is required to he taken by the Bench and Bar to see 
that there are no strikes any more. Hence, it is directed that (a) all the 
Bar Associations in the country shall implement the resolution dated 
29.9.2002 passed by the Bar Council of India, and (b) under section 34 
of the Advocates Act, the States would frame necessary rules so that 
appropriate action can be taken against defaulting advocates". 
> Some Ideas to Remove Clogs 
The members of the Bar are the backbone of the judicial system. 
They are naturally aware of the role expected of them in the court 
proceedings. They should resolve to see that they on facts and in law 
prepare each brief they handle. They also should ensure that the courts 
work full time and that their matter is taken up in their turn for hearing 
and not unnecessarily adjourned. They would be justified in expecting 
punctuality in the working of the courts. Both the judges and lawyers must 
54. (1999) ISC37. 
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respect the timings appointed for court work. Waste of even fifteen 
minutes in each working session either due to non-availability of the judge 
or a lawyer works out to a loss of at least two full working days in a 
month. If this happens in ten courts, the loss would be twenty working 
days of one court, which means the effective judge strength of the courts is 
reduced by at least one judge, if all these were single judge benches all this 
at whose cost? Lawyers and judges should therefore conduct the work 
keeping foremost the interest of these who await the outcome of process 
and who have no say in their grooming. Good grooming is relevant only in 
the context of the quality of the outcome of work. Therefore, to be a 
concerted effort of correcting each other to bring about a work culture 
where the judges feel obligated to take up causes and ensure that public 
time not wasted. The lawyers co-operate in the proceeding by their active 
and effective participation, by avoiding adjournments, by guiding the 
judge on facts and in law so that he can reach a just and correct 
conclusion.55 
These are some of the authoritative versions of legal scholars and 
distinguished judges and writers, which can be helpful to remove the 
clogs, are as follows: 
1. Legal profession - a repertoire of endowed legal skills must 
tirelessly work. 
2. Professional services of legal fraternity must become essential 
services like. 
3. Lawyers work must be value oriented and be acceptable. 
4. Legal services must be on ethical principles and absolutely 
committed. 
5. Never misinterpret law for personal aggrandizements. 
6. Don't twist north to indicate as south i.e. don't twist a lie to magnify 
it as a truth. 
7. Reverse the philosophy of the sacred legal profession. 
55 . Justice R.K. Abhichandani "How to Groom Better Lawyers and Better Judges", AIR 
January 2003, p. J20. 
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8. Follow the basic legal structures and do not indulge in pleadings 
without justification. 
9. The judges make law within the reasonable bounds don't distract or 
deflect them by wrong submissions. 
10. Law schools inject professional norms - by becoming lawyers do not 
cast them away. 
11. Universities must inculcate 'generic skills' adoptable at workplaces 
business environs to improvise skills. 
12. Student's clinical legal education - must be a conjunction with legal 
centres. 
13. Provide alternative means of studying law like in the University of 
Sydney. 
14. Repair the cracks in legal education as enunciated by revered justice 
A.M. Ahmadi. 
15. Make legal education more meaningful and relevant as suggested 
by research scholar Mr. LP. Massey, narrates "In America in the first 
year law students are scared to death, in the second year they are 
laboured to death and in the third year they are bored to death. 
16. To save deteriorating legal standards of education, let the Bar, Bench 
and Law teachers take a cue from Justice P.N. Bhagwati and be 
prepared to take hard decisions. 
17. Justice J.S. Verma's word of caution on the "role of Bar in 
preservation of rule of law" have to be nurtured with all the 
sincerity and intensity of purpose. 
18. Never encourage false testimony. 
19. Withdraw, if client does anything prohibited by law. 
20. Keep an eye on predictions on latest legal technology tit-bits. 
Most important - A vibrant ADR in India through Lok Adalats as 
suggested by Justice J.N. Bhatt will become the saviour of our legal 
systems. 
E. Role of Litigants 
The very existence or very foundation of our judicial institution is 
due to the existence of the litigant or the consumer of justice who now feels 
to be neglected segment of the judicial system. Really speaking, the litigant 
has a very strong role to play but appears to be the weakest of all the 
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constituent of the system. The whole judicial system can, mainly and 
successfully function because of the existence of the important constituent 
i.e. consumer of justice/litigant. 
Ours is a socialist, secular, democratic, republic and welfare State and 
has a unique Constitution inter-alia providing social economic and political 
equality. However, one cannot be oblivious that this is a country where 
majority of the people are illiterate unsophisticated, rustic and rural. Even 
literate section of the society at times is also not fully aware of its rights. 
Thus, many times, literate people are also seen ignorant about existence of 
their legal rights and remedies. Again, in case of a very few literate people, 
who know about their rights, find it very difficult to get these rights 
translated into reality. He has to pass through long procedural and legal 
conduit pipes. How many of them even after undergoing such exercise 
could see successfully the light at the end of the tunnel?^^ 
In reality, the litigant has to wait in a long queue for a long time for 
his turn. He has to expend not only lot of money but valuable time, as 
well. The litigants want expeditious and inexpensive justice. In absence of 
it, somebody has observed, "instead of taking remedy or recourse to law, 
at times, he would be tempted to take law in his own hand". 
The litigant, a consumer of justice is not only in an unorganized state 
but also at times, he is in a pitiable position. It cannot be gainsaid that 
there are cases and cases wherein even successful litigants after long 
drawn expensive legal battle remain, unsuccessful, in reaping and 
enjoying the real and rightful fruits of success. The litigant has started 
feeling that instead of judge conducting a trial, justice itself is on the trial 
today. This feeling, really, cannot be said to be totally misconceived. There 
are many contributory factors in the emergence of such feeling in the mind 
of the litigant. 
56 . Bhatt J.N. (Justice) "Judicial Cardiogram", Naya Deep, The Official Journal of NALSA, 
vol. VII, July 2007, p. 70. 
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It is a fact that the litigation has also tremendously increased and one 
of the reasons in the increase in the litigation is the awareness of legal 
consciousness in the people, which of course, is a good feature. However, 
at the same time, a frivolous litigation has also increased and one of such 
branch, which has contributed to the frivolous litigation, is in the name of 
Public Interest Litigation. There are genuine persons, who do come to the 
court to seek relief for injustice to the people at large, but there is a class of 
litigants, which has developed, who have adopted Public Interest 
Litigation as profession to make money and file frivolous litigations. 
No scheme for speedy trial can achieve the goal without the 
cooperation of the parties to the litigation. That the court and judiciary 
have assumed responsibility for backlog reduction, but not all the means 
to reduce backlog and expedite the proceeding of the court are within the 
control of the judiciary. Judiciary can neither create permanent judgeships 
nor adopt dispute avoidance strategies that require legislation. 
While the judiciary requires the support and cooperation of court 
staff, the Bar/lawyers and the variety of litigants to be effective, the 
judiciary is in unique position to mobilize that support and cooperation. 
There, it is right time, to seriously consider present judicial problems and 
to search effective corrective ways and means for efficient restructuring 
and reshaping schemes so that 'A litigant' 'consumer of justice' could 
receive equal, effective trial and speedy and inexpensive justice which is a 
cry of our Constitution. Therefore, it is submitted that making litigant 
strong by an effective and efficient judicial mechanism for expeditious and 
inexpensive justice shall proved to be a reality. 
(F) Lok Adalat 
Litigation is time consuming and relatively expensive. In a country 
with a vast population of poor people, justice has to be necessarily cheap 
and expeditious. For this Mahatma Gandhi father of the Nation rightly 
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cautioned the people of India about the dangers of copying British Judicial 
model, which makes the judicial machinery cumbersome, and slow 
moving. He reminded the people to resort to the homespun judicial system 
for Lok Adalats so that the poor litigants need not to go out of their village 
and spend hard-earned money and time towards litigation.57 
> Brief History 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has been an integral part of 
our historical past. The concept of Lok Adalat (Peoples' court) is an 
irmovative Indian contribution to the world jurisprudence. 
India has a long tradition and history of such methods being 
practiced in the society at grass roots level. These are called panchayat and 
in the legal terminology, these are called arbitration. These are widely used 
in India for resolution of disputes - both commercial and non-commercial. 
Other alternative methods being used are Lok Adalat, where justice is 
dispensed summarily without too much emphasis on legal technicalities. It 
has been proved to be a very effective alternative to litigation. Lok Adalat is 
one of the fine and familiar forms which has been playing an important 
role in settlement of disputes. 
The concept of Lok Adalat was pushed back into oblivion in last few 
centuries before independence and particularly during the British regime. 
Now, this concept has once again be rejuvenated. It has, once again 
become very popular and familiar amongst litigants. This is the system 
which has deep roots in Indian legal history and its close allegiance to the 
culture and perception of justice in Indian ethos. This concept is now, 
again very popular and is gaining historical momentum. Experience has 
shown that it is one of the very efficient and important ADRs and most 
suited to the Indian environment, culture and societal interests. 
57 . Shankar Rao P.B., "Establishment of Lok Adalats: A Bane or Boon"?, AIR April 2003, p. 
126. 
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Initially the camps of Lok Adalat were started in Gujarat in March 
1982 and now it has been extended throughout the country. The evolution 
of this movement was a part of the strategy to relieve heavy burden on the 
courts with pending cases. The first Lok Adalat was held on March 14,1982 
at Junagarh in Gujarat the land of Mahatma Gandhi. It is encouraging to 
know that upto the middle of the year (2004), more than 200,000 Lok 
Adalats have been held and therein more than 16 million cases have been 
settled, half of which were motor accident claim cases. More than one 
billion US dollars were distributed by way of compensation to those who 
had suffered accidents. 6.7 million Persons have benefited through legal 
aid and advice.^^ 
> Nature and Function 
Lok Adalat is not a court in its accepted connotation. It can be 
considered to be a para-judicial institution, developed by the people with 
the intention to find an appropriate structure and procedure in the 
struggle for social justice. The object of Lok Adalat is to provide speedy 
and less expensive justice to the people and to relieve the workload on the 
regular courts. 
The Secretary of the State Committee or the District Authority or the 
chairman of the Taluk Committee, as the case may be, shall assign specific 
cases to each Bench of the Lok Adalat. The above authorities are to prepare 
a 'cause list' for each Bench of the Lok Adalat and intimate the same to all 
concerned at least 10 days before the date of Lok Adalat. 
Each Bench of Lok Adalat shall strive to bring about a conciliatory 
settlement in every case. Lok Adalat should not use coercion, threat or 
undue influence against the parties to the case. 
58. Prof. Anurag K. Aggarwal, "Strengthening 'Lok Adalat' Movement in India", AIR 
March (2006), p. 35. 
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> Benefits of Lok Adalat 
The institution of Lok Adalat tries to resolve the people's disputes 
by discussions, counselling, persuasions, which result in quick and cheap 
justice. The essence of Lok Adalat is handing over justice with the mutual 
and free consent of the parties. Lok Adalat is not a substitute for the 
present judicial system. It works as supplementary to the judicial system 
so that mounting arrears are reduced and speedy justice is provided. 
The benefits that litigants derive through the Lok Adalat are as 
following: 
(1) There is no court-fee and even if the case is already filed in the 
regular court, the fee paid will be refunded if the dispute is settled 
at the Lok Adalat 
(2) There is no strict application of the procedural laws and the 
Evidence Act, while assessing the merits of the claim by the Lok 
Adalat. The parties to the disputes though represented by their 
advocate can interact with the Lok Adalat Judge directly and 
explain their stand in the dispute and the reasons therefore, which is 
not possible in a regular court of law. 
(3) Disputes can be brought before the Lok Adalat directly instead of 
going to a regular court first and then to the Lok Adalat. 
(4) The decision of the Lok Adalat is binding on the parties to the 
dispute and its order is capable of execution through legal process. 
No appeal lies against the order of the Lok Adalat whereas in the 
regular law courts there is always a scope to appeal to the higher 
forum on the decision of the trial court, which causes delay in the 
settlement of the dispute finally. The reason being that in a regular 
court, decision is that of the Court but in Lok Adalat it is mutual 
settlement and hence no case for appeal will arise. In every respect, 
the scheme of Lok Adalat is beneficent to the litigant public, where 
they can get their disputes settled fast and free of cost.s^ 
> Procedure at Lok Adalat 
The procedure followed at a Lok Adalat is very simple. 
The Lok Adalat is presided over by a sitting or retired judicial officer as 
the chairman with two other members, usually a lawyer and a social 
59 . Idi, pp. 35-36. 
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worker It is easier to settle money claims since in most such cases the 
quantum alone may be in dispute. Thus, the motor accident claim cases are 
brought before the Lok Adalat and a number of cases were disposed of in 
each Lok Adalat. One important condition is that both parties in dispute 
should agree for settlement through Lok Adalat and abide by its decision. 
A Lok Adalat has the jurisdiction to settle, by way of effecting 
compromise between the parties, any matter, which may be pending 
before any court, as well as matters at prelitigative stage i.e. disputes 
which have not yet been formally instituted in any court of law. Such 
matters may be civil or criminal in nature, but any matter relating to an 
offence not compoundable under any law cannot be decided by the Lok 
Adalat even if the parties involved therein agree to settle the same. Lok 
Adalats can take cognizance of matters involving not only those persons 
who are entitled to avail free legal services but of all other persons also, be 
they women, men or children and even institutions. 
Anyone, or more of the parties to a dispute can move an application 
to the court where their matter may be pending, or even at pre-litigative 
stage, for such matter being taken up in the Lok Adalat whereupon the 
Lok Adalat Bench constituted for the purpose shall attempt to resolve the 
dispute by helping the parties to arrive at an amicable solution and once it 
is successful in doing so, the award passed by it shall be final which has 
much force as a decree of a civil court obtained after due contest. 
> Statutory Basis of Lok Adalat 
Ever since 1987, Lok Adalats have been given statutory recognition. 
The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 pursuant to the Constitutional 
mandate in Article 39-A of the Constitution of India, contains various 
provisions for settlement of disputes through Lok Adalat. Thus, the 
ancient concept of Lok Adalat has, now, statutory basis. It is an Act to 
constitute legal services authorities to provide free and competent legal 
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services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities 
for securing justice and not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or 
other disabilities, and to organize Lok Adalats to secure that the operation 
of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity. In 
2002, Parliament of India amended the Legal Services Authorities Act, 
1987, requiring establishment of permanent Lok Adalats for public utility 
services. 
The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (as amended vide Act No. 
37 of 2002) provides for setting up of a 'Permanent Lok Adalat' which can 
be approached by any party to a dispute involving 'public utility services' 
which have been defined in the Act (as amended) to include transport 
services for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water; 
postal, telegraph or telephone services, insurance services, as also services 
in hospital or dispensary, supply of power, light or water to public, besides 
systems of public conservancy or sanitation. Any civil dispute with a 
public utility service and where the value of the property in dispute does 
not exceed Rupees one million (about US $ 2200), or any criminal dispute 
which does not involve an offence not compoundable under any law, can 
be taken up in the "Permanent Lok Adalat." An important feature of this 
amendment is that after an application is made to the Permanent Lok 
Adalat, no party to that application can invoke jurisdiction of any court in 
the same dispute. Such disputes involving public utility services shall be 
attempted to be settled by the Permanent Lok Adalat by way of 
conciliation and failing that on merit and in doing so the Permanent Lok 
Adalat shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair 
play, equity and other principles of justice without being bound by the 
Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. 
The aforesaid Statutory dimension to the Permanent Lok Adalat 
may seem to be very ordinary at the outset but it tends to bring about a 
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spectacular transformation in the very juristic approach of the Indian legal 
system. 
The provision of there being no appeal against the decisions of the 
Permanent Lok Adalat, is well in consonance with the true connotation of 
Lok Adalat which can hardly be defined than perceived as it represents 
the sense of justice in the hearts of the people which percolate through 
their thinking, deeds and behaviour. It may noted that in the 
contemporary world of modern democracies, the legislation is the sole 
mode of achieving the aspirations of the hope to unburden the system 
from too much law and too much technicalities, if we have to cut short the 
imending wait for justice.^ 
The amendment of the Legal Services Authority (L.S.A.), Act has 
opened a single window independent judicial redressal forum by 
introducing chapter VI A. This chapter is in consonance with most 
acceptable old adage - 'prevention is better than cure'. The L.S.A. Act in 
the original form had no doubt provided for settling disputes concerning 
public utility services and other minor civil and criminal offences through 
Lok Adalats, the new amendment has given the liberty to persons 
intending to initiate a court proceeding, i.e. to the prospective litigants to 
approach permanent Lok Adalat for pre-litigation conciliation and 
settlement of cases specified in the said law.^ ^ 
> Future Prospect and Challenges 
The success of Lok Adalat in India is tremendous. Lok Adalat has 
provided an important juristic technique and vital tool for easy and speedy 
settlement of disputes. It has been proved to be a successful and viable 
national imperative and incumbency, best suited for the larger and higher 
sections of the present society and Indian system. The concept of legal 
60. Guman Singh, "Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services: A Statutory Land 
Mark", AIR December (2003), pp. 355-356. 
61. Aggarwal B.D., "New Road to Speedy Justice", AIR Jan. 2003, p. 19. 
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services which includes Lok Adalat is a "revolutionary evolution of 
resolution of disputes" .^ ^ 
There is a need for improving the quality of legal aid that is being 
given by legal aid advocates. Terming millions of this country, who live 
below poverty line in tribal, backward and far flung areas look to legal 
services authorities for help and support in resolving their legal problems. 
When involved in litigation they very often, feel that they are fighting an 
unequal battle in which the party that has better financial resources can 
secure movable legal assistance. There is a need to revise the payment 
schedule for legal aid panel advocates and also compress the panels so that 
panel advocates get more work and better remuneration from legal 
services authorities and thus get encouraged to render effective legal 
assistance to aided persons. 
Legal aid and legal literacy programmes have to expand to take care 
of the poor and ignorant. Interlining of ADR methodology with justice 
dispensation process would succeed in delivering quicker and inexpensive 
quality justice and stand taller over all its counterparts elsewhere in the 
world. Besides Lok Adalat, India has to be a venue for International 
Arbitrations. 
New trends in litigation, such as those related to intellectual 
property rights, cyber crimes, environment money-laundering, 
competition, telecom taxation, international arbitration and so on need 
expertise. The judges need to be trained and updated for achieving and 
maintaining professional excellence. And side by side it is need of the hour 
to provide value oriented legal education to achieve the goal. 
In addition to making statutory provisions for expeditious disposal 
of cases through Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism the 
Government has taken initiative in constituting Fast Track Courts, 
62. Bhatt, J.N., "A Round Table Justice through Lok Adalat (People's Court) - A Vibrant 
ADR in India" (2002) 1 SCC, p. 11 J-
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strengthening institution for legal aids to ensure that the burden of courts 
is reduced. The proposal of Gram nayayalayas is also under active 
consideration. In the present age of information technology the efficiency 
of justice delivery system can increase manifold. Electronic connectivity is 
achievable even with the means available today if initiative and 
imagination is at work. 
Use of Information Technology to Achieve Speedy Justice 
Technology can play an important role in all the human activities. 
Administration of justice is one of the most important activities of human 
kind. Due to delayed disposal of cases in courts, the people had started 
losing faith in administration of justice. Now information technology has 
emerged as harbinger to rejuvenate the faith of people in the judicial 
institution. The Report on strategic plan for implementation of Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) in Indian Judiciary^^ justifies the need of 
introduction of technology in a systematic way in the courts by explicitly 
stating that, "It needs no emphasis that Indian judicial system is facing an 
appalling state of affair. It is apprehended that Court congestion and 
delays in adjudication may require a perennial nature. Its functional 
credibility, both in domestic and international world is at stake. There is an 
urgency to take immediate steps to enhance its quality, productivity, 
accountability and transparency". Use of technology can help facilitate the 
judiciary in bringing greater access transparency, and ultimately help in 
reducing backlog and delays in the court. 
The first National Judicial Pay Commission Report or the Shetty 
Commission Report formulated a specific question on application of 
63. Supreme Court of India (2005). Report on Strategic plan for implementation of 
Information and Communication Technology in Indian Judiciary, E-Committee, New 
Delhi. This report was prepared by the E-Committee under the chairmanship of justice 
G.C. Bharukha, former Judge, States of Patna and Karnataka, Justice Bharuka was 
supported by Shri N.S. Kulkarni, Member Judicial (District Judge, Karnataka Judicial 
Service) and Shri Manas Patnaik Member Technical (Director, Software Technology 
Parks of India). The report was presented to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India on 11th 
May, 2005. 
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Information Technology in court system and Commissioned Indian 
Institute of Management (IIM), Bangalore to enquire whether the 
introduction of computers had brought about any sea-change in the work 
and efficiency in various activities of the court. IIM, Bangalore, in its report 
recommended that information technology was necessary for 
improvements in operational efficiency, coordination, accessibility and 
speed in the administration of justice. 
There are various reasons for delay and backlog in the courts. The 
most important reason perhaps is the sheer numbers of cases that are filed 
in the courts and which is increasing every day making it difficult for the 
disposal rate of the courts to keep pace with the fresh filing or institution 
rate. Moreover, there exist huge vacancies and they are consistently lying 
vacant. There is an urgent need to increase the judge-to population ratio .^ 
There are huge procedural delays caused by lack of case management as 
well as case flow management. Technology can provide great deal of 
assistance at this level. 
For example one of the typical problems faced in the court is to 
bring witnesses or accused for appearance in the court. Despite all the 
efforts on the part of the witnesses to attend a court hearing, sometime 
court adjourned for another reasons e.g. absence of lawyers and judges. 
But in all these circumstances, the witness is the sufferer. 
Technology have a solution in the form of tools like video 
conferencing which can greatly reduce the hardship both financial and in 
terms of time for the witness in particular for those who are form 
outside the jurisdiction. There are various other ways through which 
computerization can improve efficiency in legal services and 
administration of justice. Statutes and judgments can be electronically 
stored and provided through internet. Law libraries can be connected 
64 . All India Judge's Association vs. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247. 
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through internet and thus legal research can become more easy and 
accurate finding of law which consume less time, effort and expense. By 
computerization registry and record rooms of the court, litigants can be 
provided direct access to it. Through computerization lawyer chambers 
and court rooms can help best to speedy process of the judicial 
administration. Petitions and affidavits can be filed from the lawyer's 
home at any time during day or night. Trial can be organized through 
video conferencing without the accused being present in the court. Service 
of summons, procuring copies of documents connecting parties in far 
flung areas for quick resolution of issues will all become far more efficient 
and cost efficient once electronic connectivity is established and style of 
judicial functioning is changed.^s 
Video conferencing is a medium by which to or more persons can 
hold conference using audio video capability, though being physically 
located at two different places. E-committee^^ and various other studies 
have given importance to the use of video conferencing especially in 
criminal cases. 
> Information Technology: Applicable Areas 
The problem of the congestion of courts identified by judicial 
Commissions and Committees referring to delay arrears and backlog are 
partly overcome if a sound judicial management information system is 
introduced in India. Case Management, File Management and Docket 
Management will be vastly improved by resorting to the use of computers. 
Judicial systems around the world are recognizing that computers 
can aid decision-makers by providing them with upto date information on 
all aspects of a case before them. Judicial support systems can include 
65 . Dr. S.K. Singh "E-Enabled Judicial Administration in India", AIR April 2002, pp. 100-101 
Journal. 
66 . E-Committee was set up by G.O. order dated 28.12.2004 for assisting the Chief Justice of 
India in formulating a National Policy on Computerization of Indian Judiciary and 
advice him on the technological, communication and management related changes. 
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anything from judges having access to computers and laptops, the 
Internet, CD Rom services and primary research materials through an 
internet. 
The following are areas where use of computer will result in 
enhanced productivity and reduction of delays: 
(a) Legal Information data Bases 
(b) On line query system of precedents, citations, codes statutes etc. 
(c) Generation of cause list and on line statistical reports 
(d) Online caveat matching 
(e) Online updating of data, monitoring and "flagging" of events. 
(f) Pooling or orders and judgments. 
(g) Daily List generation with historical data of each case 
(h) Word processing with standard templates including generation of 
notices/processes. 
(i) Access to international data bases. 
(j) Feedback reports for use of various levels. 
Computerization should be supplemented by the use of Fax, 
E-mail, Video conferencing and other facilities for higher productivity and 
speedy decision-making at all levels.^'' 
> International Practices 
Courts in United States of America have been extensively using 
Information Technology for several years. In United Kingdom, Software 
development for computers at the subordinate court level has been 
developed extensively for example, the Local County Court Management 
System (LOCCS) is used in England has a data base system which is part 
of a package called CASEMAN Supporting various judicial applications. 
67 . Akhaya Bismal "Speedy Justice by use of Technology", All India Seminar on 'Judicial 
Reforms' held on 23rd & 24th Feb. 2008, Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi, pubhshed in 
Souvenir, pp. 36-37. 
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In Australia "Cyber Courts" use technology in the legal arena 
extensively at all stages and has demonstrated considerable reduction in 
delays as a result. 
In Singapore the courts manage their time and resources optimally 
to achieve an active, efficient and effective case management process. The 
use of technology in Singapore courts goes beyond the use of computers. 
Occasions for transporting of accused and witnesses in criminal cases 
within the country and from outside are greatly reduced by the use of 
video cameras in jails and court premises. Video conferencing is a common 
feature both within the judiciary and outside it. A key board is provided in 
each court to the lawyers to make their written submissions on a real time 
basis. Their Differentiated Case Management (DCM) System assigns 
different management tracks to different cases in subordinate courts in 
accordance with the nature and complexity of each case. The public who 
visit the courts have also access to the status of various cases. This practice 
promotes transparency and improves accountability.^^ 
The main goal of the courts computerization is introducing 
Information Technology Tools in all areas, which are routine and time 
critical in nature, streamlining the judicial administration and bring about 
transparency of information to the litigants. 
The following areas may be identified for computerization in courts. 
> Filing of Cases 
At present, the fresh cases are filed before Supreme Court and all 
states to computerized filing counters. The advocates stand on queue for 
filing the cases, the data entry operator enters the details required for 
registration of a case. By way of computerized filing, the filing process is 
made easy and the advocates need not wait for long time in the queue. 
However, courts do not to establish standards for collection of information 
68. Ibid. 
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and review their processes to be effective in the information age. Electronic 
filing has obvious benefits to advocates, litigants and courts. In future it 
can be made possible to file cases from lawyer's chamber, affidavits, 
counter affidavits etc. be filed from lawyers chamber. 
> Preparation of Cause List 
Courts took a lot of time for manual preparation and supply of 
cause list to the advocates and the process is also very costly. The Supreme 
Court and States in India have been fully computerized and they prepare 
causes lists from the computer servers installed by National Informatics 
Centre (NIC) Ministry of Information and Technology, Government of 
India. Now these are the features of the cause list generated by NIC is as 
follows: 
(i) It is available on internet. 
(ii) Case lists of Supreme Court and States can be accessed at -
indiancourts .nic .in 
(iii) Advocates can generate their own cause list consisting of his/her own 
cases. 
(iv) Cause list can generated judge wise, court wise and case number wise 
etc. 
> Digitally Signed Certified Copies 
Parallel to the signing of the daily orders on hard copies, judges 
would sign digitally on electronic copies using digital signatures. The 
digitally signed orders would be made available on the court web site, 
litigants can download the electronic copies, with self-contained proof of 
authenticity of the document. Every judge will be provided with his/her 
digital signature. 
When digitally signed orders are available on server, the certified 
copy section simply accepts the application from the Utigants, downloads 
the relevant order from the server, takes a printout, checks the authenticity 
and integrity of the document, when satisfied simply signs and serves to 
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the litigant on the spot. As the digitally signed copies need not be cross 
checked with the original file, it can be served to the litigant on the spot 
without time delay. The benefits of digitally signed orders may briefly be 
summarised as follows: 
• A large number of certified copies can be issued in a single day 
without keeping any application in pendency. 
• One person can handle the entire certified copy branch. 
• As there will be no delay in issuing the certified copy, the dealing 
clerk has to provide the copy on the spot. 
• The ligitant can even download an electronically certified copy from 
the net without contacting the court.^^ 
Computerisation during 2004 
Regarding the computerization of courts, a lot of initiatives have 
been taken. These initiatives are evident from the implementation of the 
report of the Supreme Court's committee on implementation and 
communication technology (ICT) in the Indian judiciary, chaired by retired 
Justice Bharuka. 
The report owes its genesis to the initiative of Chief Justice Lahoti in 
proposing an ICT reform cell in the Supreme Court at the last Chief 
Justices Conference and thereafter an e-committee through the 
Government of India in December 2004. The committee's terms of 
reference were comprehensive from obtaining updated status of 
computerization in all States and lower courts, to making a specific 
diagnostic study of existing IT applications. In certain specific States and 
subordinate courts, to formulation of a national policy on computerization 
of justice delivery system, to designing in IT network, to creating an IT 
grid linking the Supreme Court to all courts in India, to drawing up of a 
time bound action plan and creating of infrastructure and manpower 
support systems for the foregoing. 
69. Lahoti, R.C. (Justice), Speech on Law Day, delivered on November 26th, 2004, 
published in (2005) 2 SCC J13-14. 
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Based upon similar work done in Karnataka by justice Bharuka 
when he was in the Karnataka State, the committee has done remarkable 
work in a very short period of time and already submitted its main reports 
in May and August 2005. It has provided a comprehensive action plan for 
diverse initiatives. The creation of computer rooms at all court complexes 
with internet provisioning, providing laptops to judges, ICT training, 
manpower development, creation of software, extension of computer 
facility from filing counter to judges chamber as also to all sections of the 
Registry, provisioning of video conferencing facility between under trials 
and courts, digital archive of record room and libraries.^o 
The Registry of the Supreme Court and the National Informatics 
Centre has in close coordination developed the following programmes: 
(i) Supreme Court is filing defects on web - A list of filing defects 
consisting of 379 items has been standardised and is available on web 
site by reference to each case filed in the Registry. 
(ii) Digitisation of old records - Considering the space problem in the 
record room of the Supreme Court, NIC suggested to go in for 
digitization of all records stored in the record room godown, so as to 
make space available for the fresh records. This process enables the 
Supreme Court in preventing loss of records, saving storage space, to 
manage records easily, to find documents quickly, to make the 
scarmed documents available on internet and to eliminate the need 
for file cabinets centrally. 
(iii) Supreme Court's digital display boards on Internet - Court wise 
progress of the cases, as they are being heard, is available on internet 
for the advantage of lawyers and litigants who need not necessarily 
reach the courtroom for watching the progress of the case. 
(iv) Automatic delete/shifting of excess matters and proposing next 
listing date - This software module has been successfully 
implemented since July 2004 and excludes the possibility of manual 
manipulation. 
(v) E-Kiosk - Two e-kiosks are installed one at the filing counter and 
other at the reception with touch screening facility providing 
information as to pending status of a case, the latest order delivered 
70. Abhishek M. Singhvi, "Beating the Backlog : Less Talk, More Action", SCC March 14 
(2007), vol. 2, Journal Section, p. J-15. 
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by the court, cause lists, judgements, SC web site, filing defects and so 
on. 
(vi) Interactive voice response system (IVRS) - Any litigant can access and 
ascertain the status of his case in the Supreme Court by dialling the 
telephone number; 24357276. 
(vii) Video conferencing facility - A video conferencing facility will be 
established in the conference Hall of the Supreme Court to enable the 
Hon'ble judges to interact with the Hon'ble Judges of the States, 
Ministries of Government if required or any organization based 
outside India. 
(viii) Electronic self-operating facilitation counter - For providing easy 
information access to the litigant public, a facility consisting of a few 
computers, printers and internet will be established at the reception 
(to be constructed shortly). This will enable the users to access the 
required information on their own. 
The installed technology, if applied efficiently in the courts will help 
the judiciary in making available case, including all the data, 
documents, evidence and legal reference materials more efficiently to 
the people and to whom it matters. The computer will help to 
improve the speed, cost and fairness of decisions. However, if not 
applied properly it will only create more chaos and confusion. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
"An effective Judicial System not only that just results be reached but 
that they be reached swiftly" Justice Y.V. Chandrachud. 
Law is a kind of order. Criminal Law Seeks to provide order in 
the society without which human beings would be driven by individual 
aspiration, greed and false ego. All human beings are born with 
'passion', emotions and enviousness. These passions, emotions and 
enviousness lead a number of people to commit crime in the society 
which consequently brings them to trial and finally justice. 
The criminal justice system in a country is designed to protect the 
citizens of that country from the onslaught of criminal activities of a 
section of the community which indulges in such acts. The outcome of 
any criminal justice system be to inspire confidence and create an 
attitude of respect for the Rule of Law. An efficient criminal justice 
system is one of the corner stones of good governance. 
When we think of criminal justice system it consists with the 
police, prosecuting agency, various courts. Jail and the host of other 
institutions connected with the system. 
The state as a guardian of the Fundamental Rights of it's citizen is 
duty bound to ensure speedy trial and avoid excessively long delays in 
trial of criminal cases that could result in grave miscarriage of justice. 
It is, indeed in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or 
innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible. But, 
unfortunately, there are a large number of cases pending in various 
courts. There are a large number of under trial prisoners in different 
part of the country. Various factors are responsible for the huge 
pendency of criminal cases in the subordinate courts. Speedy trial of 
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criminal cases is an urgent need of the present judicial system in order 
to decide the fate of lacks of litigants. It will help enhance the faith of 
general public in the present judicial system. 
The challenge before the judicial system is to balance the rights of 
accused while dispensing speedy and effective justice. In order to have 
a strong socio-economic system it is important that each and every state 
of trial of an accused should move at reasonably fast pace. In many 
cases, the accused is the head of the family and is the only bread 
winner, his responsibility is also towards the large family left behind 
him. It is not only the accused but also other members of the family 
suffer because of delays in trial. Speedy justice ensures that a society is 
free of such vices. 
Dispensation of justice has always been looked as an important 
function of the state from the beginning of the civilization. The ultimate 
and absolute power of the state remained with the king who used to 
administer law with the aid and advice of able ministers and learned 
Brahmins. The law applied was on the basis of ancient religious texts 
i.e. kautilya's "Arthashastra, Manusmriti and other text were the 
guiding force. Kings who did not follow the religious text and practices 
who not deliver justice to their subjects are condemned with contempt 
even today. Judges were also appointed by the kings to administer law 
and maintain order amongst the subjects. 
It is evident from history the ancient decision makers emphasised 
the evil of delay in disposal of case. Sukra said that the king could not 
give much time for the preparation and trial of cases. Great evils flow 
from delay and it may amount denial of justice. 
During the Mughal period either the influx of cases was meagre 
or because of some other reasons there was no specific provision of 
speedy dispensation of justice. The literature available concerning the 
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criminal justice during initial stages of the Mughal period in India 
reveals that it was endeavoured to dispose off cases as quickly as 
possible so that neither the evidence of witnesses decayed nor the 
sequence of events were obliterated by lapse of time. 
Mughal Emperors were extraordinary hard-working they used to 
hold their Courts everyday while ordinary cases were decided. 
Emperor Akbar held his court after prayers and administered justice 
there. The Mughal Emperors even when out of the capital did not 
neglect the cause of justice. While Emperor Akbar embarking on the 
Bengal expedition, held his court in the boat and decided cases there. 
Even while he was on march the king failed not to hold the court 
in tent and administer justice. "The king of Hindustan Seldom fails even 
when in the field, to hold this the assembly twice during the 24 hours, 
the same as when in the capital." 
The analysis made in different chapters of this work makes it 
abundantly clear that the right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of 
the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the various cases laid down 
certain propositions as guideline for the lower judiciary to follow so 
that the accused's right to speedy trial is made meaningful. Prolong or 
unreasonable delay in deciding cases violates the right of the accused to 
speedy trial. What is prolonged or unreasonable delay depends upon 
several factors of each case. The Apex Court has gone to the extent of 
declaring that the state cannot avoid its responsibility of providing 
speedy trial by putting an excuse of financial and administrative 
inability. 
Therefore, justice and especially speedy dispensation of justice, is 
a constitutional and fundamental right of the citizens of India meant to 
be guaranteed by State under Article 21 and Preamble of the 
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Constitution of India, and is a Constitutional obligation of State under 
Article 39A. 
'Justice delayed is justice denied' as repeatedly held by the Apex 
Court and neither poverty nor administrative inability can allow the 
state to deny the citizens of their Constitutional and fundamental rights. 
The Supreme Court had rightly maintained in Hussainara Khatoon 
case, that: 
"It is the Constitutional obligation of the State to dispense speedy 
justice, more so in the field of criminal law." It is high time that the 
Union of India and various states realize their Constitutional obligation 
and do something concrete in the direction of strengthening the justice 
delivery system. It is further submitted that timely justice is not 
delivered in this country, as reflected in about 2.5 crore criminal cases 
are pending and cases are dragged on for years together, preventing 
many citizens from ever receiving justice and constantly violating their 
fundamental rights. 
India is bound by International Covenants and Declarations 
adopted and ratified by it, that require delivery of speedy justice to its 
citizens. And the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bind the country to 
ensure equal rights of men and women, universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Due to delayed dispensation of justice the people of the country 
losing faith in the judiciary and resort to lawless, violent and criminal 
means of dispute resolution. 
Hence, the States and other agencies responsible for delivery of 
criminal justice should develop policies and procedures which will 
expedite criminal trials and minimize pre-trial detention and all of its 
potential for un-constitutional confinement. 
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The prime objective of the judiciary/judicial institution is to 
ensure fair and speedy trial within shortest possible time so that justice 
seeking people can get justice expeditiously. The judicial process must 
possess the genius to do social justice and the judiciary cannot be 
oblivious of the Constitutional norm. Only just and speedy decision can 
prevent unjust cause and restore people's faith in the justice delivery 
system. And same the norms of fair and speedy trial are the condition 
precedents. It is not only the duty of the courts to provide a fair and 
speedy justice to the accused, but also the other instruments of criminal 
justice system viz., police, public prosecutors and defence counsel. At 
the same time it is also the duty of the public to extend its utmost co-
operation to the police and the courts to complete investigations and 
trial speedily. Without public co-operation no agency can discharge its 
duties successfully. Therefore, in order to provide speedy justice to the 
accused, the aforesaid instrument must work collectively. 
The executive has a central role to play in the process of 
expediting the criminal justice delivery system. The executive should 
protect witnesses and victims, conduct the prosecution efficiently and 
avoid political influence. The investigating agencies must be well 
equipped to analyse the organisation and planning of crimes involving 
equipments. The legislature's immediate concerns are also required in 
certain areas which need to be addressed. Since access to justice is an 
integral part of social justice. 
Although every effort should be made to weed out the defects 
and infirmities of the system and to improve it with a view to make it 
responsive to the people's need. The stake of the public at large in this 
matter is tremendous. For instance, an under trial has languished in 
prison for 10 years, when the trial finally takes place it is found that he 
deserved imprisonment only for two years (such a situation is not far-
390 
fetched in law, and especially in Indian law); a child is unable to get the 
affection of one parent and kept bereft of the benefits of wealth of the 
other because courts took 15 years to decide the divorce case to 
determine the rights of the child and those of the parents; the man lives 
as a pauper and dies of poverty, and only after many years of forensic 
research the police and courts decide that the property actually 
belonged to the man and not to the trustee who enjoyed it. All these 
cases are instances of the well know maxim "justice delayed is justice 
denied." 
A respected and independent Judiciary and a respected and 
strong Bar are indispensable if we want to maintain our system of 
freedom under law. The contribution of the judicial system towards the 
evolution of an orderly society is a fact of history. 
The powerful impact which the system of courts and judicial 
administration has on a vast number of citizens, need to be pointed out, 
so that it may be appreciated that the reforms of the system is a matter 
of vital importance, not only to the lawyers and the judges but also to be 
state and the average citizens. The smooth and speedy operation of the 
courts of law is essential to the progress of the country. So, it is in the 
interest of the citizens as well as the state that the disputes which go to 
the courts for adjudication should be decided within a reasonable time, 
so as to give certainty and definiteness to rights and obligations. If the 
course of a trial is inordinately long, the chances of miscarriage of 
justice and the expenses of litigation increase alike. Delays result in 
witnesses being unable to testify correctly to events which may have 
faded in their memory and some times in their being won over by the 
opponent. Relief granted to an aggrieved party after lapse of years, 
loses much of its value and sometimes becomes totally infructuous. 
Such is the basis of the saying "justice delayed is justice denied." 
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But speedy justice does not mean a hasty or even a summary 
dispensation of justice by persons not qualified to administer it. Hasty 
or summary dispensation of justice, by persons not qualified to 
administer, will certainly affect the quality of justice and amounts gross 
injustice. Thus, the aggrieved person goes in appeal which leads to 
further addition in number of pending cases. What has to be ensured is 
that the determination of facts in controversy and the application to the 
facts so determined of the appropriate legal principles should not be 
unduly delayed. Applying these standards, there is a great scope for 
improvement in the working of our judicial machinery. 
Here to fix time limit for disposing of a case is not 
recommendable. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time 
limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. 
But it is equally true that the trial in every criminal case should be 
completed without delay as soon as possible in the shortest time 
possible. Such analysis is in accordance with the law as laid down by 
various courts and particularly in the case of Kadra Pehadiya while 
observing the shocking state of affairs and ruled that no one should be 
confined in jail or fortune of prolonged trial for more than a reasonable 
period of time. This rule needs to be implemented and without any 
violation. It may some times strictly for exceptional reasons be not 
possible to adhere to this strict rule but there appears no gainsaying that 
the reasonable period of one year prescribed for trial in Session's Court 
should not be applied to appeals in High Court. Beyond this the delay, 
if any, must be termed as unreasonable and has to be at the cost of the 
state. 
The present study although limited in scope, also endeavours to 
ascertain the material facts that has paralised the criminal justice 
system. For instance, the study reveals that justice today, is shut out to 
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most in India. Most citizens, especially the disadvantaged sections, have 
limited access to justice, due to unclear laws and high costs that act as 
effective barriers. Unfortunately, those who do venture forth are also, 
often denied of their right to justice. One of the major causes for this is 
known to be 'delays in the dispensation of justice.' 
That "justice delayed is justice denied" as repeatedly held by 
Apex Court, yet 'delays continue in matters before the judiciary 
resulting in huge arrears/backlogs/pendency' and repeated violation of 
fundamental rights of citizens of India. 
Although the purpose of establishing the Law Commission in 
1954, was: "to realize that justice is simple, speedy, cheap, effective and 
substantial yet despite repeated identification of the problems and clear 
cut recommendations by the Law Commission over the past 50 odd 
years, the twin problems of pendency and delays, remains unacceptably 
large even today. According to Law Commission of India, delays arise 
when disputes are prolonged and not resolved within reasonable time 
periods. 
It is, therefore evident that the old adage "justice delayed is 
justice denied" is found present in about all part of our country, causing 
frustration and anxiety not only amongst the under trial prisoners but 
also amongst their family members, neighbours, scholars dealing with 
criminal justice system, jurists, judges and a number of other people. 
The urgent need, therefore, is to find out solutions for delays in disposal 
of cases in general and criminal cases in particular. Hence the researcher 
offers the following suggestions. 
1. The first and foremost step is to increase the strength of judges at all 
levels. The present strength is inadequate in the sense that there are 
only 10.5 judges per 10 lack of population which is highly 
dissatisfactory as compared to the strength of judges in advanced 
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western countries like United States of America and United 
Kingdom. The present strength of judges should be raised to 50 per 
10 lack of population at the earliest otherwise the huge pendency of 
cases will go on increasing in future. 
2. The existing infrastructure of the courts in most part of the country is 
grossly dissatisfactory in the height of technological advanced 
atmosphere. It is not only necessary that the posts of judges and 
other court staff are to be created but the old and ineffective 
infrastructure such as court rooms, building, manner of keeping 
court records should all be changed be replaced with the modern 
techniques and latest gadgets. 
3. There is urgent need to have in place judicial machinery, which is 
easily accessible and dispenses affordable, incorruptible, and speedy 
justice to the people. 
4. There is urgent need to improve the present legal aid support system 
and legal aid lawyers given better and prompt remuneration. 
5. It is need of the hour to have our legal procedures simple, rational, 
easily understandable and the amendments of procedure have to be 
made carefully so as to ensure quick justice while safeguarding that 
fair play, equity and good conscience does not become a casualty. 
Speedy but faulty justice is no justice at all. 
6. Steps need to be taken to make use of alternative disputes resolution 
mechanism to decide the cases pending in different court involving 
petty offences. Such minor cases may easily resolve through 
mediation and compromise. 
7. The role of advocates in speedy trial is also very crucial because they 
are equal partners with the judges in the administration of justice. 
Separate steps need delivery system. The Bar should also refrain 
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from boycotting the courts and approach concerned authority for 
redressal of their grievances. Members of the Bar should avoid 
unnecessary adjournments. Members of the Bar should also stat 
following strictly the principles of professional ethics and abandon 
their narrow parochial interest. 
8. There must be an effective computer training programme for not 
only the judges of subordinate courts in different parts of the 
country but also for the entire staff of the subordinate courts so as to 
make justice delivery system at the base level speedier and timely. 
9. There is an urgent need on the part of the Union Government and as 
well as state governments to change their mindset and stop 
politicising fundamental issues such as judicial reforms, rather the 
government should take effective steps at all levels that no inaction 
on the part of any government agency becomes an obstacles in the 
speedy dispensation of justice. 
10. There is a need for effective case management system so as to control 
the rising number of new cases for this purpose Fast Track Courts 
should be extended to the level of Magistrates and all existing 
vacancies in courts across the country should be filled up on top 
priority. 
11. Gram Nyayalay system dealing with petty disputes at the village 
level should resolve the cases amicably and such courts should not 
be allowed to reach the complicated legal stages and procedural 
delays are avoided. 
12. The concept of pre-trial meeting to restrict issues and admissible 
evidence should also be taken to meet out the long and complicated 
procedural hurdles of the evidentiary law. 
395 
13. There is an urgent need to create deterrent effect on the witnesses 
who do not turn up in the courts of law for evidence. Punishment 
for absconding witnesses should be imposed and there should be 
strict enforcement deadlines and restrictions on the length of 
arguments so as to ensue speedy trial in criminal justice system. 
The criminal justice system machinery must also meet the 
challenge of effectively dealing with the emerging forms of crime and 
behaviour of criminals. On many occasions, delay in the process of trial 
is caused by the accused themselves. 
The accused know that only delay in trial would help him as the 
memory of witnesses is likely to be blurred by the passage of time. In 
most of cases, the blame for delay in administration of criminal justice 
system is put at the doors of the courts. Courts are over congested with 
petty cases and many legislations are being enacted which result in 
filing of large number of cases before the courts. 
Last but not the lest the need of the hour is to maintain an 
equilibrium between the two most popular doctrines - "justice delayed 
is justice denied" and "Justice hurried is justice buried" dispensation of 
justice should result with best possible speed but the quality of the trials 
and judgements is not compromised and that would be the only way to 
achieve the noble ideas of justice - social, economic and political as 
conferred in the Preamble of our Constitution. 
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